Mitch Fifield (Victoria, Liberal Party, Manager of Government Business in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I present the government’s response to the report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee on its inquiry into the use of unmanned air, maritime and land platforms by the Australian Defence Force and seek leave to have the document incorporated in Hansard.

Leave granted.

The document read as follows—

Australian Government response to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

Use of Unmanned Air, Maritime, and Land Platforms by the Australian Defence Force

March 2016

Recommendation 1

The committee recommends that the Department of Defence strengthen its public communications in relation to military unmanned platforms.

Government Response

Agree

The Department of Defence, through VCDF, will develop Strategic Communication Guidance that aligns current Group and Service communication strategies and prioritises opportunities to promote and explain the acquisition and employment of military unmanned platforms.

The focus of this guidance will be to identify and support public information activities for the Government and Defence that: promote the capability and reliability of military unmanned platforms; explain the policy and physical control mechanisms that govern their employment in operational and domestic environments; and, address public concerns and dispel misinformation regarding their use.

Recommendation 2

The committee recommends that the Australian Defence Force acquire armed unmanned platforms when the capability requirement exists and the Australian Government make a policy statement regarding their use. This policy statement will:

Government Response

Agreed in principle

The Government's decisions on Australia's future defence capabilities, including unmanned platforms, will be addressed in the forthcoming Defence White Paper. The Government will make statements in regard to the introduction of new capabilities addressed in the Defence White Paper at appropriate times.

If the Government decides to acquire armed unmanned systems, Defence will develop policy and doctrine concerning their use. All Australian Defence capabilities, including unmanned platforms, will continue to be operated in accordance with Australian domestic law and consistent with Australia's international legal obligations (in particular the provisions of the law of armed conflict).

The recommendation proposes that armed unmanned platforms will only be operated by Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel. Defence's policy will allow the option for contracted staff to support administrative functions of armed unmanned platforms, such as their launch and recovery, test and evaluation and for training purposes. ADF members would retain responsibility and accountability for any use of force by those unmanned platforms.

Recommendation 3

The committee recommends that the Australian Defence Force notify the Australian Government of measures taken to address any identified gaps [in] training and dissemination programs regarding the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law when armed unmanned platforms are acquired.

Government Response

Disagree

Unmanned Australian Defence Force (ADF) platforms are subject to, and employed under the same legal framework (whether domestic or international) as manned ADF platforms. Specifically, both types of platforms are subject to the same legal considerations and constraints under the law of armed conflict.

As noted in the Report, the ADF has a recognised record of compliance with the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law and has a high level of engagement with entities such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Australian Red Cross. The ADF also consistently provides foundation level training on the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law to all ADF personnel, which is supplemented with in-depth and mission specific training on these topics, as well as rules of engagement as part of pre-deployment training. Reinforcement training in rules of engagement and the law of armed conflict is also conducted while forces are deployed.

The ADF has already anticipated the need for additional training for personnel in relation to a number of different areas of emerging technology, including unmanned platforms, and has already introduced a number of courses and training programs for individuals working within these fields to ensure that they are fully cognisant of Australia's domestic and international legal obligations.

The ADF continues to conduct careful analysis of the ability of any proposed new weapons to comply with Australia's international legal obligations through its weapons review processes conducted under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. As part of the review of new weapons, analysis is conducted on the manner in which the weapon is proposed to be employed, thus enabling, if necessary, the modification of its use, as well as training requirements for those personnel operating the system, to ensure compliance with the law of armed conflict. The Government does not expect to alter this process as a result of any future introduction of armed unmanned systems.

The Government therefore sees no need for the ADF to report changes in its training programs upon acquisition of armed unmanned platforms, given the current level of training provided to ADF personnel, the use of a robust legal and governance framework for all ADF operations, and the ADF's strong record of compliance with the law of armed conflict.

Recommendation 4

The committee recommends the Australian Government:

Part 1 " increase funding for innovation in the relation to unmanned platforms "

Government Response

Agreed in principle

The Australian Government recognises that Australian industry and academia are globally competitive in a number of key technologies related to "unmanned platforms" and autonomous systems. Defence will seek to maximise these strengths to support future capability development. However, the level of investment in innovation activities is driven by the future capability needs of Defence and will be aligned with broader Defence strategy and policy.

Part 2 " establish a Defence Unmanned Platforms Centre as a cooperative research centre in the area of military unmanned platforms "

Government Response

Disagree

Establishing a cooperative research centre may not be the most effective means of delivering access to innovation in technologies and systems supporting future unmanned platforms and autonomous systems. Defence will investigate appropriate mechanisms to bring together industry, academia and publicly funded research agencies within the context of revisions to the Defence Innovation System to be outlined in the forthcoming Defence Industry Policy Statement. Defence will also investigate how this might impact current investments in autonomy and automation - such as the Australian Research Centre for Aerospace Automation (ARCAA).

Recommendation 5

The committee recommends that strategic engagement with the Australian unmanned platform industry be addressed in the forthcoming Defence Industry Policy Statement.

Government Response

Agreed in principle

The forthcoming Defence White Paper and accompanying Defence Industry Policy Statement, will set out the Government's plans for Australian industry's critical role in delivering and supporting Defence capability. This will include plans for a closer Defence-industry relationship, including with the unmanned platform industry, that will see industry engaged much earlier in the capability development process—including in the setting of requirements—in line with the recommendations of the First Principles Review.

Recommendation 6

The committee recommends that the Australian Government:

Government Response

Agreed in principle

The Australian Government seeks to ensure that all current and future capabilities are supported with the necessary facilities. The Department of Defence recognises the requirement for support facilities in the Northern Territory to deliver critical capabilities, but acknowledges the need to balance forward positioning against access to industry support, training facilities, ranges, logistic support and the costs of other fundamental inputs to capability.

Defence has already planned the establishment of a Forward Operating Base for Triton at RAAF Base Tindal which will include launch/recovery and maintenance elements. The consideration of support facilities is ongoing through Project AIR 7000 Phase 1B.

The Government's decisions on Australia's future defence capabilities, including unmanned platforms and associated support facilities, are addressed in the forthcoming Defence White Paper.

Recommendation 7

The committee recommends that the Australian Government support international efforts to establish a regulatory regime for autonomous weapons systems, including those associated with unmanned platforms.

Government Response

Agreed in principle

The Australian Government is participating in international discussions on autonomous weapons systems. Since 2014, Australian delegations (led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and supported by the Department of Defence) have been participating in discussions on lethal autonomous weapon systems at meetings of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). These discussions are at the preliminary stage. The Government will remain engaged in these discussions.

The Government notes that the Committee recommendation has referred to both autonomous weapon systems and unmanned platforms. While there are unmanned platforms that have some autonomous features, these are not fully autonomous weapon systems. Unmanned platforms used by Defence are not fully autonomous weapon systems. These unmanned platforms are under the command of trained Australian Defence Force personnel. The Government supports the use of unmanned platforms, in accordance with Australian domestic law and consistent with Australia ' s international legal obligations.

Recommendation 8

The committee recommends that following the release of the Defence White Paper 2015 the Australian Defence Force review the adequacy of its existing policies in relation to autonomous weapons systems.

Government Response

Agreed in principle

As a matter of practice, after the Defence White Paper is released, the Department of Defence will review affected policies and practices and amend as needed. Defence does not have existing policy on autonomous weapon systems to review. Defence will continue to monitor this topic and develop policy on an as-needed basis.

Recommendation 9

The committee recommends that Defence, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and Airservices Australia increase their cooperation to facilitate the safe use of unmanned platforms in Australian airspace.

Government Response

Agree

The Government supports efforts to improve and enhance cooperation between Defence, The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and Airservices Australia. Addressing the emerging policy and regulatory challenges surrounding Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) has, and will continue to be, a key focus of these efforts.

Under the auspices of the Defence Aviation Safety Program, Defence has sought to ensure close cooperation with CASA in the ongoing development of regulations and standards for UAS, harmonised where possible. The Agreement on the Promotion of Aviation Safety and Airworthiness between CASA and Defence was re-signed on 28 April 2015. The Agreement identifies UAS as a possible Topic Area in which regulatory systems may be aligned through the development of Implementation Procedures (IP). Defence is currently working with CASA to develop UAS IP during 2015.

The principal interface for operation of military UAS within civil airspace is through Airservices Australia. Reflecting the increased coordination and cooperation between civil and Defence agencies, a Memorandum of Agreement between Airservices Australia and Defence was signed on 29 May 2015 permitting the operation of the Heron UAS in both civil and military airspace within Australia. Defence will continue to actively engage with Airservices Australia and the Office of Airspace Regulation within CASA to facilitate the integration of military UAS into civil airspace.

Defence is represented on a number of interagency forums, including the Aviation Policy Group and the CASA UAS Standards Subcommittee, and will continue to seek to enhance cooperation with CASA and Airservices Australia to enable the safe and effective operation of UAS.

Joe Ludwig (Queensland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I move:

That the Senate take note of the document.

The reason I want to speak on this is that the use of unmanned air, maritime and land platforms has, across the board, permeated the existence of aviation. Aviation itself, more broadly, is now coming to grips with how to deal with the use of drones, as they are referred to—the use of unmanned air, maritime and land platforms. They are now being used as first responders. In the US, I had the opportunity of seeing how they are utilised by first responder groups right across the board.

It is interesting to note that they are also becoming far more cost-effective, far more reliable and far more useful in a wide range of roles—and in which they do not put people at risk. If you look at the broad use of UAVs across the platforms, the use by the various armed services is helpful. But when you look at how they can be utilised for communication and for first response—to give you a scenario that is easily thought through—if you want to have a look over the horizon, over a hill or at various things that are occurring, then UAVs are a perfect platform to do that.

That is why recommendations in the original report went to the Department of Defence strengthening its public communication in relation to military unmanned platforms as but the first step. We also want to look at how the Australian Defence Force acquires these platforms, the capability of the platforms and how they can be utilised by the Defence Force in various roles. But you cannot simply put them into the field and expect them to be used ad hoc for different types of ambitions or different types of outcomes. You have to spend a fair bit of time to decide what the role is and how you going to use them, to train the operators to be able to use the UAVs in an appropriate way and to ensure that, for role that you want a UAV to be used for, the UAV is fit for purpose. All of these issues were ventilated in that report. The government response to that report is helpful in pointing us in the right direction.

The committee earlier recommended that the Australian Defence Force takes measures to identify gaps in training and dissemination programs. This is the point I was making. You simply cannot buy UAVs as a platform and expect them to perform the multi roles that you want them to perform. You have to actually define the role, consider how they can be utilised and then ensure that they are utilised for their best effect for a role where a manned aircraft, or a manner maritime patrol, would be, otherwise, more useful. It is imperative that we do look at how a government can increase funding for the use of UAVs as we go forward.

If you look at the UAV development in such a very short space of time, it has been phenomenal. In the use of UAVs across Europe, the US, the UK, there has been a growth in the use of UAVs in defence—or the armed services more broadly. Therefore, Australia does not want to be left behind in the utilisation of UAVs. But we also do not want to be simply buying UAVs for any purpose. Recommendation 4, I think, is germane to this point. It is not only about increasing the funding for innovation in relation to unmanned platforms, but it is also imperative to look at how you establish a defence unmanned platform centre—in other words, a cooperative centre to ensure that we can examine UAVs—how they are going to be used and the training, or what I call the ancillary support mechanisms, that would surround the use of UAVs. They can save lives, they can save time, they can be cost efficient in planning and executing various missions.

The committee also took the opportunity of recommending that strategic engagement with the Australian unmanned platform industry be addressed in the Defence industry policy statement. This is an area that simply cannot be ignored. It is a growing area for UAVs. You only have to consider how they can be deployed and how they can be more cost effective over the short to medium term as to why it is imperative for the Defence Force to seriously look at the longer term use. At the moment, I think it is fair to say, the Defence Force is acquiring UAVs and is utilising them in various ways. But it is the deeper understanding of how UAVs can be utilised for missions over the longer term which is imperative because they will not only replace established missions by manned vessels and manner aircraft but also complement that work as well.

In addition to that, how you then defend against UAVs is an important concept. I had an opportunity of talking to a person who is doing a doctoral thesis. They are doing their doctoral thesis, effectively, on how UAVs can communicate to one another—in other words, what they generally consider as swarm technologies—so that they can interconnect, operate as a group, have a redundancy within that group and also, obviously, carry out a mission effectively. Complex algorithms are being developed for the use of that swarm type of arrangement—technologies. That will then drive even further developments with UAVs over time.

The committee at that time also recommended that the Australian government support international efforts to establish a regulatory regime for autonomous weapons systems. You also have to look at how you will manage the impact of these in battlefield environments. You want to ensure that you have the appropriate rules and regulations in place to ensure that the technology does not offend many of the arrangements we have in place about the use of current weapons. We do ban a range of weapons for very good reasons, but we want to be able to ensure that the regulatory environment for UAVs does not trip into any of those areas.

We also want to ensure overall that when we look at aviation and maritime—in other words, rights of passage—the regulations dealing with airspace and the sea are compatible with the use of UAVs. This technology is growing far more rapidly than the regulatory regimes that are following it are. Australia has been fortunate in that Airservices Australia has managed to look at how it would integrate UAVs into its airspace management for some time and that it has one model. The US has had a different approach and, in fact, they are now trying desperately to catch up to where they should be.

But all of that tells us that this technology is here to stay. Not only that, it is here to develop into significant use by the Defence Force over time. These issues that I have had the opportunity of ventilating today do need to be sorted through and managed in an appropriate way to ensure that we do have and can use UAVs effectively to advance the Australian Defence Force and to advance the opportunity for saving lives by their use, where they can be used, but not put people at risk.

They can also complement intelligence gathering and they can complement the civilian response to an emergency, one of the areas where it would be helpful to have platforms such as this utilised.

Question agreed to.