Rex Patrick (SA, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

My question is to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and relates to the implementation of the AUKUS agreement. Isn't it the case that, to implement transfers of nuclear material to fuel any Australian nuclear submarine, it will be necessary for Australia to conclude a specific arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with article 14 of our 1974 nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA? Isn't it a fact that in more than 40 years in which the IAEA has been implementing comprehensive nuclear safeguard agreements, the agency has never concluded an article 14 agreement? Isn't this required agreement unprecedented? Isn't it the case that the approval by the IAEA board of governors will be required for the agency to agree to a article 14 agreement with Australia?

Marise Payne (NSW, Liberal Party, Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Senator Patrick, for your question. There are a number of issues that have you raised in that question, and I'll try to canvass as many of them as I can. In the first instance, Australia has been very strongly engaged with the IAEA since the announcement of AUKUS itself. We notified the IAEA as soon as the announcement occurred. The Prime Minister himself met with the Director General Grossi on 2 November.

Importantly, Australia comes to this table absolutely steadfast in our support of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its cornerstone, the NPT. There is no change to our status as a non-nuclear weapon state, and we will comply with our obligations under the NPT. In fact, we have one of the best nuclear weapons non-proliferation reputations in the world. I can go to that further, but let me also record for the record that neither the NPT nor Australia's comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA prohibit naval nuclear proliferation. We aim to set the highest possible non-proliferation standard and strengthen the integrity, indeed, of the non-proliferation architecture.

Australia delivered a trilateral statement with the United Kingdom and the United States during the IAEA Board of Governors meeting last week, from 24 to 26 November. That statement emphasised: Australia does not and will not seek nuclear weapons; our willingness and intent to proceed in an open and consultative manner, especially regarding issues of nuclear material, facilities and activities relevant to the IAEA; our cooperation will be fully consistent with the three parties' respective non-proliferation obligations; and that this cooperation will be pursued in a manner that preserves the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. As is publicly known, many of the program's specifics have yet to be determined across the next 18-month period. (Time expired)

Slade Brockman (President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Senator Patrick, a supplementary question?

Rex Patrick (SA, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Last week, Australian Ambassador Richard Sadler sought to persuade the IAEA board that consideration of AUKUS is premature. The board, at China's initiative, agreed to include the transfer of nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and nuclear safeguards as an agenda item. Mr Sadler argued China's proposal to establish a special committee to look at AUKUS issues would politicise board deliberations. Is China trying to politicise these board deliberations?

Marise Payne (NSW, Liberal Party, Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In relation to whether the matter does or does not become an agenda item, our trilateral statement noted that a board agenda item addressing safeguards related to an Australian nuclear-powered submarine program is premature. When there are significant developments to report and in the interests of transparency, we are happy—indeed, very keen—to update the board in the future under the AOB, as we intended to do at this meeting.

The statement also noted that there have been some mischaracterisations of the AUKUS partnership and Australia's acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines, and it clarified those. So I don't entirely agree with Senator Patrick's description of Ambassador Sadleir's approach, but that is the way in which the matter was dealt with on the agenda. Can I say that we have seen wilful disinformation in relation to the AUKUS announcement from a number of parties, and that disinformation compounds multiple offences of a similar nature this year. (Time expired)

Slade Brockman (President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Senator Patrick, a second supplementary?

Rex Patrick (SA, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Minister, how concerned are you that China and Russia will seek to obstruct IAEA board approval of the safeguard arrangements that will be required to implement the AUKUS nuclear submarine program? Are you concerned that AUKUS will be hostage to other issues on the IAEA agenda—Iran's nuclear ambitions and what to do with North Korea? What is your diplomatic strategy to overcome these risks?

Marise Payne (NSW, Liberal Party, Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank Senator Patrick for his supplementary question. We expect all members of the IAEA board—and, in fact, members of the international community—to act responsibly and to engage in the accurate dissemination of information, not disinformation or misinformation. That goes to these matters and of course many others, as I have stated repeatedly during the pandemic in particular, and this is no exception.

In relation to the IAEA, we will continue to work transparently and openly with and within the IAEA. We'll engage with the IAEA in a manner that is consistent with the established rules and practices of the IAEA. Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom will not be playing political games which undermine that very architecture. We know that it goes to the heart of the importance of this process, and we intend to work within that constructively, openly and transparently.