David Fawcett (Wakefield, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to address the Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007. I would like to start by addressing some of the macro issues the member for Banks and others have raised, because these are issues that are valid and that people are concerned about—they are questioning the efficacy and the purpose of this card—and I think it is important that we put some appropriate context around some of these issues. The member for Banks, along with others, has talked about whether this really is an identity card. He raised the issue of whether it is inconsistent for the government to put into this legislation a prohibition on people demanding this card as a form of identification except for the purposes of the act. What he and many others fail to recognise is that it is quite legitimate and it is quite consistent with normal practice for a business—whether it be a bank, a video store or whatever—to demand some form of identification. We have accepted that for a long period of time. It could be a passport or a drivers licence. Under this legislation, if an individual wants to choose to use their access card—and this is the important point that members are not recognising—as that form of identification, they are quite free to do so.

What we are saying is that your video store owner, your bank or the provider of any other third-party service that is not under the purpose of this act cannot demand specifically this card of an individual for the purposes of identification. They can demand identification. They do now. But they cannot specifically demand this card. If I choose to use it, that is up to me—it is my card, it identifies me and it suits that purpose. That is a really important difference from what is being purported—that is, that somehow this will become a default identity card or that people will on a broad basis break this legislation. What we are saying is that you can only demand this card specifically for the purpose that it is intended—which is the delivery of government services.

Others have said, ‘Well, it’s fine to write it in there but at the drop of a hat that could change.’ The fact that it is in the legislation and that there is no ability to change it via regulation means that if a future government did want to take another step and say, ‘Well, now we have this infrastructure we would like to extend this to become an identity card,’ it would still have to come back and pass both houses of this parliament. It is a legislative prohibition, not something that can be changed by a minister or by a department. I think that is as good a protection as what we have right now; we are faced with this bill having to go through two houses of parliament to get to this point. It is a legislative protection. I think it is fairly clear that, whilst this card can be used at the choice of the individual holder for identification, it cannot be demanded by a third party who is not associated with the purposes of this act. That is a really important foundation point to make.

I come to the issue of privacy. A number of people have highlighted their concerns about privacy and said, ‘All of this information is now going to be available to somebody with a card reader.’ It is really important to understand the underlying architecture of the system behind this card. And it is important to understand that each of the relevant departments of the government is going to maintain the existing information technology database and infrastructure. Anyone who has ever used a relational database like Microsoft Access or something where you have a number of tables and some common identifiers that link will find that this is a similar system.

Here, the register for the card will take common identifying information, but none of the detailed information specific to portfolios is going to be stored on the card or accessible to other parties within the system. That means that we will get benefits in terms of the ability to update common information through one entry. As opposed to having to change it with every single department that you have an interaction with, you would do it once and that would spread across the agencies. It provides, at the fundamental design part of this system, privacy for the more detailed information that pertains to each portfolio.

On the surface of the card there is probably going to be less information than most people have on their drivers licence: your name, photo, signature, a card number and the expiry date. That is certainly less information than is on my drivers licence, and less information than is on the drivers licences that most people in Australia carry without any qualms.

On the chip will be that same information as well as some detail about children and dependants, a digitised version of the photo, your concession status and, if you want, a PIN. That information is not a lot different to that provided through things like drivers licences. But, importantly, it does not mean that anyone with a card reader can suddenly access all of your medical records, your Centrelink data et cetera, because they are on separate databases.

Lastly, I turn to the issue of the photograph. Some people have questioned why we need a photograph on the card—or, indeed, the biometric photo. The photograph on the card is an important element in reducing fraud. As the member for Banks and others have pointed out, no system is perfect and it is possible that the physical card could be forged. But it is a little bit like a flight safety model—my background is as a test pilot—because no single system will ensure your safety. So we have layers. In the flight test world and the flying world we call it the ‘reason model’, where you have layers of protections. Collectively they produce the outcome you are after. So, in reducing fraud and protecting privacy, there are a range of protections. No one, by itself, is the answer but together they produce a highly efficient and effective model.

I guess fraud is one of the core principles that underpin this. Australia is a country where we believe in giving people a fair go. We believe in giving those who need it a hand up, but it really gets up our noses when people choose to abuse the support that we have offered to them. Fraud runs into billions of dollars each year but it is going to be overcome, in part, by the provision of these photographs.

Let us take a couple of examples. There was a woman who, between 1999 and 2005, fraudulently claimed the parenting payment single and family tax benefit by creating a number of false identities for herself and 18 children who did not exist. Through her employment she was able to get hold of forms to certify the births and she received over $600,000 in social security payments and family assistance that she was not entitled to. I do not think there is a taxpayer in Australia who thinks that that is fair or reasonable.

One of the elements of protection that this card will provide is the biometric photograph. That photograph would mean that if she had gone to register under another name—regardless of how good any of her forged documents were; providing, perhaps, a different identity for her—the data matching would have very quickly flagged that this was something that needed to be looked into. The chances that this would have prevented that fraud are incredibly high. So the biometric photo is an important element.

The photo on the surface of the card is another important element. I will give you another example. Through a tip-off from the public, Medicare Australia identified a person, who, on separate occasions, had fraudulently used Medicare details and identities of other people—remember, the Medicare card at the moment uses decades-old technology; it has a name and a magnetic strip but no other way of identifying the person—to access prescription medication that they were not entitled to. In this case the value was only $1,400, but the principle is that people can abuse the current system, and just the presence of a photograph would be a significant deterrent to the people who engage in that low-level fraud. They would not look to go and spend the money and take the time to have a card specifically made, but in the absence of a photo it is quite easy to do, and they go and do it. Bit by bit, those frauds of $1,000, $2,000 or $5,000 add up and start costing the taxpayer a lot of money. As I said, it gets right up the nose of people who are happy to give others a fair go. They do not like to see it abused.

Convenience is probably one of the other benefits that this card will bring out, and I think it is important to highlight. There are a number of cards that are issued to people, and this will reduce not only the cost to government of producing the cards but also the inconvenience to people of carrying the different cards. Importantly, it will reduce the administrative burden for people in maintaining the accuracy of the details on the cards.

It also provides an avenue for veterans to be recognised for the sort of service that they have given to our country. We have done that traditionally through things like the gold card and the white card, and it is important that under this card we make a provision that, if the person wants to, they can have a coloured card that recognises their level of service. If they are a TPI recipient, that can be recognised, and if they have a visual disability because of their service they can have the word ‘blind’ on the card. If they have been a prisoner of war they can have the card annotated with ‘POW’—or ‘war widower’, ‘war widow’, ‘DVA dependant’ et cetera. So it is important that this card does make provision to recognise the service and the sacrifice that veterans have made and to make sure that they get the recognition, the level of service and the entitlements that we as a community owe them for their service.

I want to briefly look at the electorate of Wakefield to say: what difference would this card make in the electorate of Wakefield? That is why I particularly support this card and what it is looking to do. In Wakefield, we have got three main locations where there are Centrelink offices or Medicare offices: in the City of Playford, the town of Gawler and the City of Salisbury there are Centrelink offices; in Playford and Gawler there are Medicare offices. Around the electorate of Wakefield in the smaller country towns, like Watervale, Two Wells, Saddleworth, Riverton and Port Wakefield, various post offices or pharmacies act as agencies for Medicare. They provide services with some of the forms, and there are a couple of part-time agencies for Centrelink that operate out of Balaklava and Clare. This means that there are a range of people who live in those more remote communities who have to travel significant distances in order to access services.

A number of government agencies have reported an incredibly high number of occasions where people come in and find that they have not got all the details or documentation they need to complete a transaction. Having this card will be one way to mitigate some of that unnecessary travel and they will potentially be able to update details in their locations rather than having to come down to Gawler, Playford or Salisbury.

More specifically, I wish to talk about some areas that are recognised as having a high degree of dysfunction and disadvantage in the electorate of Wakefield. As I go around and talk to health providers, providers of welfare services and school principals, it is very apparent that there is a percentage of the population who have low literacy levels. This has a number of impacts on things like employment but equally it has an impact on these people’s ability and willingness to access services that they are entitled to. In fact, one could argue these services are essential to help support them and their families. If somebody is reluctant to admit they cannot fill out a form then the best way to help them is to give them a card or a system whereby they are immediately recognised and the forms can be prefilled with their information.

Obviously, there are programs that we are supporting and looking to put in place to help young people and young parents with literacy skills et cetera but, in terms of helping them to access services, the ability to overcome some of the barriers which include literacy is really important. A card like this will enable them to complete transactions more seamlessly, particularly where that involves access to health care or other benefits. It is important for the welfare and the health and mental wellbeing of those families that we provide as many opportunities as possible for seamless and easy interaction with government services.

In conclusion, I think it is clear that this card has a number of benefits for individuals and for the government. It is not an identity card. I believe that is clear when you look at how it is intended to be used and at the protections in place in the legislation. It will go a long way to reducing fraud. It is going to increase convenience and it will not decrease privacy.

Many of the issues people have raised show they have not taken the time to read the legislation and understand the detail—for example, the issue about age. People have said younger people cannot access the card. If you read the legislation, even the exposure draft, it is clear that what is currently in place for a Medicare card will be grandfathered across to this card. There never has been a prohibition on people under 18 obtaining this card. Just as younger people can obtain a Medicare card today, they will be able to obtain this card.

Lastly and most importantly, I believe that this will enable people in the electorate of Wakefield, whether they are living in the country or the metro area, or specifically those people who struggle with literacy levels, to access better health and welfare services. I strongly support this bill because it supports our community, particularly the more vulnerable.

Debate (on motion by Mr Griffin) adjourned.

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