Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The original question was that this bill be now read a second time. To this the honourable member for Sydney has moved as an amendment that all words after ‘That’ be omitted with a view to substituting other words. The question now is that the words proposed to be omitted stand part of the question.

Nicola Roxon (Gellibrand, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Health) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today to speak on the Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007, which will establish the government’s Department of Human Services access card. Labor supports the use of smartcard technology to improve service delivery and reduce fraud, but there are huge holes in this legislation. It certainly does not establish a framework for operation and administration that is even close to watertight. The member for Sydney has already moved a second reading amendment outlining many of Labor’s concerns, and I support the comments that she has made with respect to this bill.

This bill omits crucial aspects of the card’s operation, such as the appeal and review process and information protection features. I particularly want to talk about those in relation to health matters. Sadly, this bill has also missed the opportunity to make sure that this powerful technology is a viable vehicle for e-health programs. Worryingly, it seems that the government cannot even get its story straight on exactly what it wants this card to do. The current Minister for Human Services has portrayed the card as a time saver and a fraud stopper. The former minister portrayed it as an administrative revolution, with all sorts of bells and whistles. Yet the Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, who introduced the bill in this place, told us it was solely a mechanism for streamlined service delivery.

It seems that the ministers are at cross-purposes on the uses of the card. Some want it to be all things to all people and others want to assure us that it will have few functions outside accessing government services. What is clear, however, is that this legislation does not pave the way for improvements to current e-health. This is disappointing because this technology could herald positive developments in e-health, but this does not seem likely to happen because of the government’s incompetent handling of this issue. For example, despite the fact that previous e-health trials, like the Tasmanian Medicare smartcard, are being wound up with the introduction of this card, we have been told by the member for Longman that this card would ‘not be an electronic health record’. There is potential—and I emphasise ‘potential’—for health information to be stored on the card, on the public section if you as an individual so choose, but this bill has shirked any responsibility to ensure that the information on the public section of the chip will be protected.

The government-commissioned KPMG report suggests that the card would be a single point of access for personal and emergency contact details and personal health information voluntarily supplied and managed by the cardholder. Aside from the privacy concerns which I shall raise shortly, the provision of medical information by non-medical professionals could lead to incorrect treatment if this information is used in an emergency. As it stands in the proposed legislation, you may, if you wish, put your penicillin allergy, your blood type or the name of your next of kin on the public section of the card in case of emergency. That sounds harmless enough, but this information would be readily available and accessible to anyone with a card reader. While this of course sounds okay and sensible in an emergency, what about when you lodge your application for family tax benefit? Do we really want all Centrelink staff to be able to access this health information—or a real estate agent or the bank?

We need to look at a more secure way to maintain emergency medical information. The access card in general raises serious privacy issues. In its latest discussion paper on voluntary medical and emergency information, the government’s own Access Card Consumer and Privacy Taskforce has looked into the privacy concerns around medical information on the card. The task force’s discussion paper recommended that the customer controlled area of the access card should contain a two-tiered system of emergency and health information in which the first tier should only list data which is absolutely necessary for emergency health treatment. According to the task force, the second tier would contain other medical and health data which should be PIN protected. It is unfortunate that no such considerations have been flagged in this legislation and no regulation of the public section of the card has been set out.

In commenting on the exposure draft, the Australian General Practice Network stated that the government needed to be more forthcoming in relation to the public section of the card. The report sets out a number of other considerations on the voluntary storage of health information, and I look forward to the task force findings, although I do hope that the recommendations are enshrined in the legislation and not developed simply as voluntary protocol. Last year, the former Minister for Human Services even floated the idea that stakeholders like the AMA may want to set up their own uses for the card. But surely you cannot introduce a card that will be held by almost every Australian and then open up the uses to a range of private stakeholders and provide no regulation.

Bear in mind, as I have already indicated, that Labor are not opposed to the use of technology in the health system. In fact, we clearly understand that e-health does have the potential to bring about a range of improvements in the delivery of health services in Australia. For example, if it is done right, e-health can make accessing health services more convenient and efficient for patients and streamline and improve care by removing duplication and reducing the risks of conflicting treatment or overprescribing. This was succinctly put by Dr Mukesh Haikerwal, the President of the AMA—that is, e-health is about giving health professionals access to:

... the right information [for] the right patient at the right time in the right place in order to deliver the best quality health care.

It does not seem, however, that this card is going to do any of that.

While there are clearly enormous benefits to e-health, there remains some work to be done in ensuring public confidence in any system that is developed. By floating thought-bubbles about private stakeholders using the access card to develop e-health records, the government does nothing to secure public confidence in the system. By skiving off and dodging the hard decisions, not only has the government missed an opportunity to move forward on e-health; it has potentially developed a less secure system that will undermine public confidence in years to come. If the government sees potential to use this smartcard technology for e-health, we need to be assured that the health and medical information will remain secure. It is vital that people have the utmost confidence in the security and privacy of their medical records. That is just one of the privacy implications of the card but obviously one which, as the shadow minister for health, I have a particular concern with. There are a range of other privacy matters, and I urge the government to accept Labor’s amendments to address these problems. I will not deal with them further in my speech, as many other speakers have already done so.

I do, however, have a particular interest in another range of provisions that deal with the eligibility for the access card which will have significant ramifications for young people. Under the current procedures, people aged 16 and over are eligible to obtain their own Medicare card. This legislation will now restrict eligibility for the card to those over 18. People under 18 who wish to have their own card must request a determination from the secretary of the department to be exempted from this provision. This administrative hurdle has the potential to deter young people from accessing healthcare services and to financially disadvantage them if they do access those services without a card. It is also enormously impractical for a number of young people who, for a range of reasons, live independently. It certainly goes against the government’s clearly stated aim of merely using this legislation to streamline access to services rather than changing access to them.

This would be a serious departure from current practice in the provision of Medicare services, with no explanation from the government as to why this departure is necessary. It could, of course, be us revisiting another version of the Minister for Health and Ageing’s controversial plan of several years ago to raise the age at which parents can access their children’s medical records. The plan, at the time, was shouted down by members of the government’s own backbench and by the AMA, just as this provision should be now. The AMA strenuously opposes this provision and states that it has a significant adverse impact on the rights of young persons to privacy and to make decisions about their health and life—decisions that they are legally and ethically entitled to make—with dignity and free of interference.

It seems that this provision of the bill has been included without considering the ramifications of withdrawing services to these independent young people, and I hope that the government considers amending this provision. I think we can all agree that there should be no impediment to a young person seeking the medical treatment that they need. I have been informed that negotiations are continuing with the government about this issue and that some assurances have been given that a range of guidelines will be introduced which may ensure that the existing rules will continue to apply—but not within the legislation. I call on the government to continue those negotiations in good faith. If this introduction of an access card is actually meant to be about the technology and not about changing entitlements, it should not be used as a backdoor way to change other entitlements which we might have a more forthright debate about in this place.

So I hope that the good work that is being done across the chamber to try to get issues like this one fixed will mean that we will not have to have a debate on this particular issue, because the government will stick to its original stated aim of using this to be about accessing services, not changing people’s entitlements to do so. It is surprising, though, that in this bill—where there are so many blank spaces and where there are so many unknowns about what will be done—there are also provisions that seem very ill considered. For instance, it seems nonsensical to start registration for the card before the government has finalised the document verification service and the scheme that will go with it. Without a verification system, this fraud-busting revolution, as it is described by the government, will be based upon documents that are readily falsified, such as birth and marriage certificates. Labor has put forward sensible amendments in relation to this service and it would be careless of the government to overlook them.

Equally troubling—and of particular interest for my electorate and, I know, for my colleagues here at the bench—is the uncertainty around what documents will be required for registration and whether overseas birth and marriage certificates will be accepted in obtaining an access card. While I understand the difficulty in verifying these documents, we do have to accept that we live in a nation of migrants. Over a third of the population in my electorate were born overseas, and any number of them, of course, married overseas. What provision will there be to enable us to establish the identities of these people in order for them to have the card? Surely they are entitled to enjoy the right to universal health care and to access government services as they do now. But no thought has been given to how they will be able to produce documents for registration that are acceptable under this scheme.

There remain several further questions about the access card: the use of the public section, the documents required to obtain it, the age requirements, the treatment of dependants, document verification and privacy. While I understand that a number of these issues—and others have been raised—may be addressed in future legislation, it is not good enough to run government on a promise. This is a major change. The government has taken a long time to work through it. It is not adequate to say: ‘Just trust us on this. Let’s just do this part and then we’ll fix the rest in the future.’ You cannot and should not rush such an important piece of legislation and say that you will leave the tricky bits until later on. Surely Australians deserve better than this half-baked legislation that creates more questions than it answers.

Michael Johnson (Ryan, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am pleased to speak in the House of Representatives, as the federal member for Ryan, on this important bill, the Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007. I support it very strongly. I certainly commend it to the House for its full support, and I take issue with the shadow minister and member for Gellibrand. I do not agree with her at all that there are inconsistencies or that there are holes all over this bill. This is an important bill, and I will come to its critical features.

I want to preface my remarks on the substance of the bill by talking about two features of the Howard government that I think have contributed to its political success. The first one has been its economic management skills and the second is its support for those Australians who are most in need of the support of the federal government. We on this side of the chamber value economic security and we value social security, and I think so too do the Australian people. Quite frankly, without economic prosperity, without economic security in a nation, a government is not in a position to provide welfare, it is not in a position to provide services and it is not in a position to provide the very valuable social security network that is so important to Australians who are less advantaged or who are going through a period where they need the support of the federal government and the taxpayers. There can be no social security without economic security. I do not think anybody would contend with my remarks that the safety net in this country is very much a part of the Australian fabric but that so too is the intense desire of Australians to get on with their lives and aspire to a better future for themselves and their families. We have certainly ensured that the prosperity of this country allows the government to look after Australians who need its support.

I link this to a key aspect of this bill, and that is welfare payments. Associated with welfare payments is the matter of ensuring that those who receive welfare are entitled to receive it—they are legitimately receiving welfare—and that those who are not entitled to it in a legitimate fashion do not short-change their fellow Australians who are entitled to it.

In 2006, the coalition government delivered some $87.1 billion in social security and welfare payments. The federal budget is some $240 billion, so the social security and welfare payments are certainly no small amount of money. Of course, the Howard government is very much in the business of looking after Australians who are going through a tough time or who are struggling with issues and require the support of the taxpayer. But, at the end of the day, I think the greatest form of welfare will always remain a job, and this is something that the Howard government can be very proud of, in creating 1.9 million jobs since it came to office in 1996.

The area of welfare fraud that I want to touch on now is of importance to us because that is one of the key components that this bill addresses. I would like to refer to (1) the amount of money that is paid to welfare recipients and (2) the assessed amount of possible fraud that this bill can perhaps redress. First of all, the amount of money that the government pays to Australians who are in receipt of taxpayers’ money is substantial. But, before I come to that, I want to touch on the amount that can be saved, because that is probably more of a central feature of this bill. A potential amount of some $3 billion from fraud related conduct can be saved over a period of a decade. Anyone who suggests that this is a small amount of money really ought to reconsider their thoughts, because $3 billion is a lot of money that potentially could be going into a whole host of services that our schools require, that our hospitals require and that our roads and infrastructure could require. I do not know why any measure, any piece of legislation, that tries to recover this kind of money would not be supported in this parliament, and the access card that this bill brings into existence goes a long way to doing that.

I do not think that the Australian people would want us to do anything less than to come up with measures, initiatives and policies to prevent money going to people who should not be receiving it; and that, I think, is at the heart of this bill and that is why I support it very strongly. This bill will bring about a new access card which will simplify and streamline access to government health and social security services and prevent fraud. Of course, trying to manage and deliver some $87 billion in social security payments to those who are entitled to them is a massive challenge, but I think that the government can hold its head high in the way it manages the distribution of that money to Australians who are in genuine need of it. The challenge, difficulty and complexity lies in making sure that this amount of money—this safety net—is not abused or rorted and that the taxpayer, through the Commonwealth, is not defrauded.

The government takes its role as the custodian of taxpayers’ money very seriously, and it takes every opportunity to innovate new money-saving procedures and mechanisms. This is one manifestation of that, and it should be supported wholeheartedly. In 1997, the Howard government established Centrelink, a one-stop venue for managing the delivery of social security payments. In 2004, the government established the Department of Human Services to bring under one umbrella the six agencies that administer social security payments and services. Now, in 2007, it is introducing this legislation to continue to put in place reform measures in this important area.

Unfortunately, discussion and public consultation surrounding this card have been overtaken by some individuals in, I think, a totally misleading fashion. These people falsely claim that this access card is some form of national identity card or a precursor to an all-pervasive national identity card. Quite frankly, it is not. I do not like to refer to those who have tried to lambast this proposal, but Greens Senator Kerry Nettle is one who is constantly carping about policies that the government comes up with. She said that the Australian Greens are concerned that a smartcard could effectively define a person’s identity. There would not be too many people in this parliament who give the Greens much credibility at all, especially after their leader tried to destroy the coal industry, which is worth some $24 billion to the Australian economy, by proposing it be taken away from the economic equation. I know that in Queensland the Greens leader has absolutely no credibility, and I would hope that the 30,000 Australians who have jobs in the coal industry would not give him much of their time; I certainly think that the 18,000 Queenslanders who are in the coal industry would not give him much time at all. That is the sort of criticism, and that is the source of the criticism that is coming toward this bill. If those sorts of people are criticising it then, quite frankly, I think we are onto a good piece of legislation.

Anyone seriously participating in this debate will agree that this proposal has no resemblance at all to the 1986 Australia Card that was proposed by the then Hawke Labor government. This card is important because it is going to consolidate 17 cards and vouchers which are currently required to access government health and social security services. While very few individuals would have 17 cards at one time, it is not uncommon—especially in the case of our age pensioners and seniors—to have three, four or maybe even five or six cards. In the Ryan electorate, there are some 5,942 age pensioners who are on different types of Commonwealth cards, so this access card really is good news for the Ryan age pensioners. It will make their lives much easier. The card will be a form of protection and efficiency as well as a practical support for them.

The access card is an updated Medicare card. It does not contain financial or health record details. It is not required by law to be shown or carried in everyday situations, and the bill is very clear on this point. Anyone who tries to purport that that is what this card is all about is guilty of great deception. I would hope very much that no-one is trying to make that suggestion in order to scare our senior Australians—who will, of course, have some anxieties and concerns about the card, not being familiar with fine print and detailed clauses in legislation. Any person who requires an access cardholder to produce the card for anything other than Commonwealth health and social security benefits faces the possibility of five years in jail or fines of up to $250,000. I would think that anyone who has in mind trying to misrepresent the true purpose of this access card will find themselves in very hot water, and the $250,000 in potential fines is no small sum of money.

The only information to be kept on the surface of the card will be the cardholder’s name, a photo, a digitised signature, a card number and an expiry date. This is far less information than is contained on the face of state drivers licences, so it cannot be compared with that or with the purposes of drivers licences—such as entry into a pub or even hiring a video. Some video cards require addresses, photographs and all kinds of other personal details and quite private information.

While this bill dictates what can be placed on the surface of the access card, the card will be unique in its ability to be customised by the holder. The microchip within the card will contain two separate areas. The first area will contain information required by the Commonwealth, including date of birth, sex, residential address and Medicare number. The second area will be free for the customer to store whatever information they would like to store, within, of course, the confines of available chip memory. The information people may like to include could be things like blood type, donor status and other emergency contacts. This is possible because this legislation grants ownership over the card to the customer, as opposed to the conventional situation where the issuer retains property rights over the card, such as in the case of the common credit card.

I want to touch on the issue of fraud because it is something that I feel very strongly about. I know that many constituents in Ryan feel as strongly as I do about reducing fraud. The Howard government has taken very important steps to address welfare fraud. Between 1997-98 and 2004-05 there were some 25,137,431 welfare payment reviews. Almost three million cases of overpayment and/or fraud were identified and 24,179 prosecutions for welfare fraud followed—resulting in savings to taxpayers of an average of $62.2 million per fortnight. So every two weeks, $62.2 million of taxpayers’ money was going to people who did not have a legitimate entitlement to that money. I think that all Australians would expect the government of the country to ensure that their hard-earned taxes are directed to the interests of the people of Australia. The fact is that, unfortunately, there is great fraud and a great short-changing of the taxpayers of Australia by some of their fellow Australians. We have an obligation to address that, and we think that this legislation is one way to do that.

The current Medicare card not only does very little to prevent fraud but also perhaps even plays a part in it. I will touch on the amount of Medicare fraud that has been estimated. The figure of $1 billion in Medicare fraud certainly staggered me when I came across it, and I am sure that it would surprise many of the residents of the Ryan electorate. Some $1 billion of Medicare fraud is a staggering amount of money that I know would go a very long way in the Ryan electorate—for example, for schools, infrastructure and fixing the potholes in some of the roads. This government will retrieve some of that $1 billion through this access card.

The new access card will utilise the latest in state-of-the-art smartcard technology in order to store important identification details without displaying that information on the front of the card and will include anti-counterfeit measures. Unlike the current system, the new access card database will be able to detect when people try to register under two identities. This will enable the government to identify fraud from the outset, before it costs Australian taxpayers more money. There will also be stringent identification requirements that will have to be met to apply for the access card.

The very strong case for the access card lies in the savings to be made from arresting and minimising fraudulent activities. In the opinion of KPMG, a very reputable national firm, the amount of fraud savings that may be recovered could be up to $3 billion over a 10-year period. That is a significant amount of money. Even if we were to recover only half of that amount, $1.5 billion—which is at the very low end of the estimation—it would still be a lot of money. So I am very keen to support this legislation. I know the 5,695 health care cardholders in Ryan will also support this legislation very strongly, because one of the key aspects of the bill is the way in which it will streamline the process for receiving government health and social security benefits. For example, they will not have to get their cards reissued every time they change their address or need to have their card updated.

I support this bill very strongly. I think it is very important for us as a government to ensure that we pass legislation in this parliament that actually makes a difference to people on the ground. People who are working hard right across the length and breadth of this country have great enthusiasm for governments that come up with real ideas, real policies and real initiatives that not only make a difference to their own personal lifestyle and family security but also benefit the overall fabric of this country. Part of that is supporting Australians who do need great support while, at the same time, ensuring that the taxpayers of Australia are not being short-changed. (Time expired)

Daryl Melham (Banks, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In rising to speak in the debate on the Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007, I must say I am amused by the turnaround of the Prime Minister in supporting legislation such as this, given his opposition in 1987 to the then Hawke Labor government’s push for a national identity card. The government says, with its platitudes, that the access card in this legislation is not going to be a national identity card; the truth is otherwise. The practical nature of what is on this card and the purposes for which it is going to be used mean that it will be a national identity card, notwithstanding the fact that clause 6(2) of the legislation says:

It is also an object of this Act that access cards are not to be used as, and do not become, national identity cards.

It seems to me that the government has got itself caught in the politics of the situation. We are getting platitudes thrown about saying: ‘Oh no, this isn’t the 1987 card; this is something different. It’s going to overcome fraud, it’s going to do all these wonderful things.’

In relation to requiring production of an access card for identification, clause 45 says:

(1) A person commits an offence if:

(a) the person requires you to produce your access card or someone else’s access card; and

(b) the person does so for the purposes of identifying you or someone else; and

(c) if the person is a delegate—

and it goes on. There is a penalty of imprisonment for five years or 500 penalty units. It beggars belief to think that members of the public will not require the production of these cards to verify identity. The government is saying on the one hand, ‘We have all these safeguards and requirements that are going to stop fraud,’ but what about business men and women who want to make sure that a fraud is not being perpetrated against them when they are dealing with a particular person? On the other hand, the government is saying that ordinary members of the public are not allowed to require these cards to be produced as proof of identification. It is not consistent on the one hand to say that this is about stopping fraud and other things associated with it but on the other hand for there to be a five-year imprisonment threat hanging over the heads of the general public if they ask for the access card as proof of identity.

We all know that when drivers licences were first introduced with photo IDs they were not going to be used for identification purposes. Of course, drivers licences are now commonly used for identification purposes. It is fair to say that that is what these cards are going to be used for. I do not care what is in the legislation in prescription of the penalty; the average punter in the street will be required to produce these cards in a range of transactions as requisite proof. I say: what is wrong with that, if this is part of the ether we are going to work through in the future? There is an inconsistency there. If we are going to introduce this, let us be honest and fair dinkum. I think a number of these provisions have slipped into the legislation as a compromise, to provide false hope, as an appeasement for some of the critics of the access card within the government and the general community. It is subject to criticism because it has not been properly thought through by the government.

The cost of its introduction has been quoted by other speakers, and I will come to that later. There has also been secrecy involved on the part of the government in not releasing figures so that we can have an informed debate on the cost of the implementation of this card. I am always concerned when governments refuse to release information. To me, natural cynic that I am, when governments do not release information, that means they have something to hide. There is a claim in relation to savings but the government refuses to release the cost-benefit case for the card. I suggest one could assume that it is not favourable to the government to release such information. To argue that it is commercial-in-confidence is, I think, a false argument. The public and we as legislators are entitled to that material to properly evaluate the pros and cons for the introduction of this card.

Producing relevant documentation to obtain a card is going to come at a cost to members of the community, not to mention what I think is going to be the length of time it is going to take to register all the relevant people. Extraordinarily, the government just dismisses that. I read somewhere that, on average, it is going to take 12 minutes to register each person. The truth is it will take longer. Any of us who have been involved in assisting people to fill out forms knows that it will take longer.

I note that there is a discretion for the secretary concerning material that may be required in relation to homeless and itinerant people—I would include Indigenous people. I think that is appropriate. Again, what it shows is that there will be a different standard of documentation for the production of the cards. I notice an assertion or statement of fact in the second reading speech that:

The Medicare card is cheap and easy to fraudulently copy.

Some examples were given and in each case it was said:

In each of these cases a false identity was created.

We are told:

With the new access card, the registration process for the card will require people to provide robust proof of their identity through substantially improved procedures.

Unlike the current arrangements, the new system will detect people trying to register under two identities. We will be able to catch fraudsters before it costs Australian taxpayers large, and often unrecoverable, amounts of money.

The truth is that fraud will be perpetrated through these cards. Let us not deceive one another. Criminal elements and people who are hell-bent on engaging in fraud find ways and means of manipulating the system to produce fraudulent identification. So this is not going to be a foolproof system. I do not care what the government say. I think there is plenty on the record to show that, in this instance, they are wrong. Indeed, in the debate last night, one of their own members, the member for Moncrieff, Mr Ciobo, was honest enough to say:

The notion that in some way this card is unable to be forged is wrong. It of course can be and will be forged. In that respect, production of the access card as a form of identity verification is of no consequence whatsoever.

He quite rightly makes the point that you can get identification fraud in relation to this particular card.

I raise that because I say let us have an honest debate and not a dishonest debate. Let us own up honestly to what the flaws and positives in the system are. Just in case you think I am invoking only the member for Moncrieff, my speech notes contain a copy of comments taken from a speech made in 2005 by Dame Stella Rimington, the former chief of MI5 in the UK. In relation to the UK ID card, she said:

ID cards have possibly some purpose.

But I don’t think that anybody in the intelligence services, particularly in my former service, would be pressing for ID cards.

My angle on ID cards is that they may be of some use but only if they can be made unforgeable—and all our other documentation is quite easy to forge.

If we have ID cards at vast expense and people can go into a back room and forge them they are going to be absolutely useless.

That, of itself, is not a basis for not having these cards. You have to look at what the positives and the negatives are. All I say to the parliament and to colleagues on both sides of the House is: let us have an honest debate and let us be realistic; let us not talk in language that is unreal—and it is unreal to say that these things cannot be forged.

I also object to a term that was used in the second reading speech. During that speech, reference was made to this bill perhaps being opposed by some on the other side of politics and the phrase ‘friends of fraud’ was used. I think that is unbecoming of the government and unbecoming of a second reading speech. That is a cheap political point. It is not even a decent political point. It demeans the debate and, in effect, it does not go to what our genuine concerns are—and it is quite pejorative. When people descend to using terms like that, it tells you that they do not have a lot to put forward.

I think, frankly, in reply, we are owed an apology in relation to that term, particularly when you consider that it was the Labor Party in 1987 that actually wanted to introduce an ID card and it was the conservatives that opposed it. There is every chance that, if that proposal had got up in 1987, this would not have been necessary. The Labor Party’s history is not one of going out and aiding and abetting fraud, and I take exception to that term being used in the second reading speech. That is something that I would expect of an over-the-top backbencher; but I would not expect someone introducing a serious bill into this place to turn around and make that allegation against members of the opposition and those who might oppose the introduction of this bill in its current form. I note that already press reports are saying that the government is making some modifications to the bill as a result of the concerns of the honourable member Dr Washer and other government backbenchers. So I found that phrase to be quite offensive.

An argument has been mounted in terms of terrorism offences. The Parliamentary Library has gone into arguments for and against the card assisting counterterrorism and security services, because some terrorists use false or multiple identities. With great respect to the argument put, I have to say that it is a nonsense. Modern terrorists do not have to use false or multiple identities but are quite happy to use their own identity when engaging in terrorist acts. You only have to look at the example of the bombings that took place in London within the last couple of years. They were home-grown terrorists who used their own identities. Basically, they had resolved to die for the cause of terrorism. So that argument, in my view, just does not wash in relation to this bill.

It is interesting that in the second reading debate speeches on this bill government members attacked Labor’s Australia card as ‘a true national identity card’ which was ‘rightly rejected by the Australian people’. There are efforts to differentiate the access card established by this bill by claiming that it will not be a national identity card. I have said already that I believe for all practical purposes it will be an identity card. I think it is quite wrong for the government to be putting in legislation that criminalises what will be in some people’s eyes reasonable requests to get someone to in effect prove their identity before they engage in a transaction that occurs outside the purposes of this act. That is a real inconsistency, I believe, because you are going to criminalise conduct that will be engaged in on a regular basis in the community. I would be very surprised if the government were able to maintain the prosecutions that would flow from that.

The idea that it will not be compulsory for every Australian is a nonsense. If you are going to access the benefits, you are going to be required to, in effect, have the access card. That is compulsion. It is a case of six of one and half a dozen of the other. It will be compulsory to have this card. It will be compulsory for all those Australians who, for the purposes of the act, are accessing particular benefits. We have heard that it will not be required to be carried at all times. You can leave it at home; you can do whatever you want; but if you do not carry it with you and produce it at the appropriate time then you are not going to get the benefit, and they are inextricably linked. That is where I think the government is being dishonest. I think it would be better if the government just fessed up and said, ‘These are the requirements. This is what we’re producing it for.’

I am not saying that there is not going to be a reduction in fraud as a result of the production of this card. I am not saying that at all. What I am saying is that we are kidding ourselves if we think that fraud will not still take place even with the production of this card. This card will spawn another industry. That is just a statement of fact based on what has happened in the past every time technology like this has been introduced—there are those in the community hell-bent on abusing it. I concede that that of itself is not a reason not to proceed. That is not my argument. My argument is about having an honest debate. If you are going to proceed then be up-front with the community, tell them up-front and do not put in provisions that are unworkable provisions—and I suggest to you that these are unworkable provisions. As someone who has been in this place for 17 years, who has dealt on a regular basis with people involved in government departments and non-government organisations, I know what happens out there on the street; and so do most members of this place.

The opposition has moved a second reading amendment to this legislation and will foreshadow a number of other amendments in relation to the legislation. We know what will happen, but I think it is inexcusable that the government continues to keep secret key information about the cost of the cards. I think we are entitled to know what it is going to cost. We know it will cost taxpayers a lot of money in terms of getting a card, and in fairness the government have been honest on that. (Time expired)

David Fawcett (Wakefield, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to address the Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007. I would like to start by addressing some of the macro issues the member for Banks and others have raised, because these are issues that are valid and that people are concerned about—they are questioning the efficacy and the purpose of this card—and I think it is important that we put some appropriate context around some of these issues. The member for Banks, along with others, has talked about whether this really is an identity card. He raised the issue of whether it is inconsistent for the government to put into this legislation a prohibition on people demanding this card as a form of identification except for the purposes of the act. What he and many others fail to recognise is that it is quite legitimate and it is quite consistent with normal practice for a business—whether it be a bank, a video store or whatever—to demand some form of identification. We have accepted that for a long period of time. It could be a passport or a drivers licence. Under this legislation, if an individual wants to choose to use their access card—and this is the important point that members are not recognising—as that form of identification, they are quite free to do so.

What we are saying is that your video store owner, your bank or the provider of any other third-party service that is not under the purpose of this act cannot demand specifically this card of an individual for the purposes of identification. They can demand identification. They do now. But they cannot specifically demand this card. If I choose to use it, that is up to me—it is my card, it identifies me and it suits that purpose. That is a really important difference from what is being purported—that is, that somehow this will become a default identity card or that people will on a broad basis break this legislation. What we are saying is that you can only demand this card specifically for the purpose that it is intended—which is the delivery of government services.

Others have said, ‘Well, it’s fine to write it in there but at the drop of a hat that could change.’ The fact that it is in the legislation and that there is no ability to change it via regulation means that if a future government did want to take another step and say, ‘Well, now we have this infrastructure we would like to extend this to become an identity card,’ it would still have to come back and pass both houses of this parliament. It is a legislative prohibition, not something that can be changed by a minister or by a department. I think that is as good a protection as what we have right now; we are faced with this bill having to go through two houses of parliament to get to this point. It is a legislative protection. I think it is fairly clear that, whilst this card can be used at the choice of the individual holder for identification, it cannot be demanded by a third party who is not associated with the purposes of this act. That is a really important foundation point to make.

I come to the issue of privacy. A number of people have highlighted their concerns about privacy and said, ‘All of this information is now going to be available to somebody with a card reader.’ It is really important to understand the underlying architecture of the system behind this card. And it is important to understand that each of the relevant departments of the government is going to maintain the existing information technology database and infrastructure. Anyone who has ever used a relational database like Microsoft Access or something where you have a number of tables and some common identifiers that link will find that this is a similar system.

Here, the register for the card will take common identifying information, but none of the detailed information specific to portfolios is going to be stored on the card or accessible to other parties within the system. That means that we will get benefits in terms of the ability to update common information through one entry. As opposed to having to change it with every single department that you have an interaction with, you would do it once and that would spread across the agencies. It provides, at the fundamental design part of this system, privacy for the more detailed information that pertains to each portfolio.

On the surface of the card there is probably going to be less information than most people have on their drivers licence: your name, photo, signature, a card number and the expiry date. That is certainly less information than is on my drivers licence, and less information than is on the drivers licences that most people in Australia carry without any qualms.

On the chip will be that same information as well as some detail about children and dependants, a digitised version of the photo, your concession status and, if you want, a PIN. That information is not a lot different to that provided through things like drivers licences. But, importantly, it does not mean that anyone with a card reader can suddenly access all of your medical records, your Centrelink data et cetera, because they are on separate databases.

Lastly, I turn to the issue of the photograph. Some people have questioned why we need a photograph on the card—or, indeed, the biometric photo. The photograph on the card is an important element in reducing fraud. As the member for Banks and others have pointed out, no system is perfect and it is possible that the physical card could be forged. But it is a little bit like a flight safety model—my background is as a test pilot—because no single system will ensure your safety. So we have layers. In the flight test world and the flying world we call it the ‘reason model’, where you have layers of protections. Collectively they produce the outcome you are after. So, in reducing fraud and protecting privacy, there are a range of protections. No one, by itself, is the answer but together they produce a highly efficient and effective model.

I guess fraud is one of the core principles that underpin this. Australia is a country where we believe in giving people a fair go. We believe in giving those who need it a hand up, but it really gets up our noses when people choose to abuse the support that we have offered to them. Fraud runs into billions of dollars each year but it is going to be overcome, in part, by the provision of these photographs.

Let us take a couple of examples. There was a woman who, between 1999 and 2005, fraudulently claimed the parenting payment single and family tax benefit by creating a number of false identities for herself and 18 children who did not exist. Through her employment she was able to get hold of forms to certify the births and she received over $600,000 in social security payments and family assistance that she was not entitled to. I do not think there is a taxpayer in Australia who thinks that that is fair or reasonable.

One of the elements of protection that this card will provide is the biometric photograph. That photograph would mean that if she had gone to register under another name—regardless of how good any of her forged documents were; providing, perhaps, a different identity for her—the data matching would have very quickly flagged that this was something that needed to be looked into. The chances that this would have prevented that fraud are incredibly high. So the biometric photo is an important element.

The photo on the surface of the card is another important element. I will give you another example. Through a tip-off from the public, Medicare Australia identified a person, who, on separate occasions, had fraudulently used Medicare details and identities of other people—remember, the Medicare card at the moment uses decades-old technology; it has a name and a magnetic strip but no other way of identifying the person—to access prescription medication that they were not entitled to. In this case the value was only $1,400, but the principle is that people can abuse the current system, and just the presence of a photograph would be a significant deterrent to the people who engage in that low-level fraud. They would not look to go and spend the money and take the time to have a card specifically made, but in the absence of a photo it is quite easy to do, and they go and do it. Bit by bit, those frauds of $1,000, $2,000 or $5,000 add up and start costing the taxpayer a lot of money. As I said, it gets right up the nose of people who are happy to give others a fair go. They do not like to see it abused.

Convenience is probably one of the other benefits that this card will bring out, and I think it is important to highlight. There are a number of cards that are issued to people, and this will reduce not only the cost to government of producing the cards but also the inconvenience to people of carrying the different cards. Importantly, it will reduce the administrative burden for people in maintaining the accuracy of the details on the cards.

It also provides an avenue for veterans to be recognised for the sort of service that they have given to our country. We have done that traditionally through things like the gold card and the white card, and it is important that under this card we make a provision that, if the person wants to, they can have a coloured card that recognises their level of service. If they are a TPI recipient, that can be recognised, and if they have a visual disability because of their service they can have the word ‘blind’ on the card. If they have been a prisoner of war they can have the card annotated with ‘POW’—or ‘war widower’, ‘war widow’, ‘DVA dependant’ et cetera. So it is important that this card does make provision to recognise the service and the sacrifice that veterans have made and to make sure that they get the recognition, the level of service and the entitlements that we as a community owe them for their service.

I want to briefly look at the electorate of Wakefield to say: what difference would this card make in the electorate of Wakefield? That is why I particularly support this card and what it is looking to do. In Wakefield, we have got three main locations where there are Centrelink offices or Medicare offices: in the City of Playford, the town of Gawler and the City of Salisbury there are Centrelink offices; in Playford and Gawler there are Medicare offices. Around the electorate of Wakefield in the smaller country towns, like Watervale, Two Wells, Saddleworth, Riverton and Port Wakefield, various post offices or pharmacies act as agencies for Medicare. They provide services with some of the forms, and there are a couple of part-time agencies for Centrelink that operate out of Balaklava and Clare. This means that there are a range of people who live in those more remote communities who have to travel significant distances in order to access services.

A number of government agencies have reported an incredibly high number of occasions where people come in and find that they have not got all the details or documentation they need to complete a transaction. Having this card will be one way to mitigate some of that unnecessary travel and they will potentially be able to update details in their locations rather than having to come down to Gawler, Playford or Salisbury.

More specifically, I wish to talk about some areas that are recognised as having a high degree of dysfunction and disadvantage in the electorate of Wakefield. As I go around and talk to health providers, providers of welfare services and school principals, it is very apparent that there is a percentage of the population who have low literacy levels. This has a number of impacts on things like employment but equally it has an impact on these people’s ability and willingness to access services that they are entitled to. In fact, one could argue these services are essential to help support them and their families. If somebody is reluctant to admit they cannot fill out a form then the best way to help them is to give them a card or a system whereby they are immediately recognised and the forms can be prefilled with their information.

Obviously, there are programs that we are supporting and looking to put in place to help young people and young parents with literacy skills et cetera but, in terms of helping them to access services, the ability to overcome some of the barriers which include literacy is really important. A card like this will enable them to complete transactions more seamlessly, particularly where that involves access to health care or other benefits. It is important for the welfare and the health and mental wellbeing of those families that we provide as many opportunities as possible for seamless and easy interaction with government services.

In conclusion, I think it is clear that this card has a number of benefits for individuals and for the government. It is not an identity card. I believe that is clear when you look at how it is intended to be used and at the protections in place in the legislation. It will go a long way to reducing fraud. It is going to increase convenience and it will not decrease privacy.

Many of the issues people have raised show they have not taken the time to read the legislation and understand the detail—for example, the issue about age. People have said younger people cannot access the card. If you read the legislation, even the exposure draft, it is clear that what is currently in place for a Medicare card will be grandfathered across to this card. There never has been a prohibition on people under 18 obtaining this card. Just as younger people can obtain a Medicare card today, they will be able to obtain this card.

Lastly and most importantly, I believe that this will enable people in the electorate of Wakefield, whether they are living in the country or the metro area, or specifically those people who struggle with literacy levels, to access better health and welfare services. I strongly support this bill because it supports our community, particularly the more vulnerable.

Debate (on motion by Mr Griffin) adjourned.