Robert McClelland (Barton, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Hansard source

The effect of the amendment will be to strengthen measures relating to the trafficking of nuclear material and interfering with the operation of a nuclear facility. The bill also increases various imprisonment penalties for offences committed under the act. The bill also extends the geographical scope of jurisdiction for various offences, which will mean that Australian citizens residing overseas will be imprisoned if found guilty of these offences. It is noted that the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade strongly supports Australia’s continued engagement in multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Indeed, the parliamentary secretary said that this bill is obviously intended not only to introduce necessary provisions but also to demonstrate Australia’s strong commitment to the non-proliferation regime.

I will place on the record reasonably briefly those areas in which Australia has played a significant role and those in which we believe it could still play such a role. Of course, non-proliferation has become a crucial issue as a result of the nuclear test in North Korea and the controversy in respect of Iran and its apparent intention to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

It was controversy relating to the French nuclear tests in the 1980s that we can recall that motivated the then foreign minister, Gareth Evans, to drive what has become the Canberra commission. He proposed drawing together a panel of military, scientific and administrative experts from around the world who had world-renowned reputations for their expertise. That Canberra commission, as it became known, was given secretarial support by both DFAT and the Australian Department of Defence. Its brief was to come up with practical measures in relation to nonproliferation, the French nuclear tests being seen not only in the context of the tests but in the whole context of potential proliferation of nuclear weapons and the testing, obviously, by countries as part of that process.

The topics of the Canberra commission included horizontal proliferation—that is, more countries becoming nuclear capable. It included, perhaps with some foresight, the risk of nuclear terrorism. I note that Einstein wrote to the United States President in World War II cautioning him regarding the possibility of a nuclear device being planted in the hold of a ship coming into one of the significant harbours. Even then, intelligent analysis suggested the risk of a nuclear terrorist event. The Canberra commission also realised that it was necessary to address the issue of potential delivery of nuclear weapons and, therefore, focused on the elimination of ballistic missiles as a form of delivery.

Those who read the 2000 non-proliferation treaty will see a remarkable similarity between the wording of that treaty and the recommendations of the Canberra commission. It was intended that Prime Minister Keating, as he then was, would launch the Canberra commission report on the floor of the General Assembly of the United Nations but there was a change of government. The government subsequently presented the report. But it was noted by the then Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and former Canberra commission panel member, Mr Jayantha Dhanapala:

The Canberra commission report received lukewarm support from the government that inherited it after Keating’s party suffered an election defeat and did not do more than absolutely necessary.

Indeed, the agenda of the Canberra commission was followed up by a number of countries coming together in June 1998 to form a coalition known as the New Agenda Coalition. They published a document called Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda. It was also part of their legacy that resulted in the striking of the agreement to create and enter into the 2000 non-proliferation treaty to extend the original treaty indefinitely.

So we can see that Australia did play a very significant part. I should add that the new government did not form part of the New Agenda Coalition, if you like taking a backseat role, although they did vote for the motion in December 1998 as a result of recommendations of that New Agenda Coalition. Jayantha Dhanapala has proposed that the model of the Canberra commission, driven by Australia, provide a template for the world and the international community to consider in dealing with the issue of weapons of mass destruction. He proposed the establishment of a new commission based on the Canberra commission format, essentially bringing together people of world renown to consider practical measures to address the issues of weapons of mass destruction. He said that must include nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and that the mandate of the new commission must extend to both nonproliferation and disarmament of those weapons of mass destruction that already exist.

We should not ignore the fact that, while we all have tremendous fear of these weapons of mass destruction, of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons coming into the hands of terrorist organisations, we should not ignore the reality that many countries in the world—regrettably, many legitimate nation states—have weapons in each of those categories. So it is not simply an issue of nonproliferation—that is, stopping other countries or organisations from acquiring those weapons of mass destruction; it is also very much necessary for the international community to focus upon disarmament of those countries that continue to possess and, regrettably, develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Dhanapala said that obviously the mandate would also need to very specifically cover and come up with practical measures to address and prevent the possible use of those weapons by terrorists. It is significant that just this month the Leader of the Opposition committed a future Labor government to driving a new Canberra commission type agenda to look at those weapons of mass destruction and to come up with practical measures in respect of both non-proliferation—that is, the spreading of those organisations and countries that possess and develop those weapons—and, significantly, the need for countries to disarm themselves of those weapons of mass destruction.

The Leader of the Opposition also indicated that a future Labor government would be seeking international agreement for a fissile material cut-off treaty to end the production of both highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons—and that is obviously particularly relevant to the events that we are seeing in Iran. Such a treaty would apply directly to a country’s capacity to develop or enrich uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons, and he is very strongly committed to that agenda. Given Australia’s history in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, I think we could play a very constructive role indeed.

In conclusion, I note that the minister indicated—and sincerely indicated, I believe—the government’s intention to introduce these amendments not only for its own sake to strengthen the control of nuclear material and to impose penalties and greater protections and safeguards against the measures coming into the hands of terrorists or criminals but also to demonstrate Australia’s strong commitment to nonproliferation. In that context, I note that in the near future the government will be confronted with a decision as to whether or not it agrees to sell uranium to India. India, of course, is friendly with Australia. We have significant relations in a number of areas—economically, militarily and culturally—and of course in sport. But the reality is that India has—

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