Greg Hunt (Flinders, Liberal Party, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I present the explanatory memorandum to the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006 and I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

The Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006 amends the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987, which is subsequently to be known as the safeguards act; the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Act 1998, the CTBT act; and the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994, the CW(P) Act, which all implement a range of Australian policies and treaty commitments promoting the nonproliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons.

In particular, this bill enables Australia to demonstrate its commitment to strong international measures for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. These measures are essential to counter the heightened risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The bill is the main element of legislative steps that will allow Australia to ratify a 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. That amendment requires states parties to establish robust and comprehensive security regimes for nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.

Several new offences are created by the bill, including an offence for conduct against a nuclear facility which causes, or is likely to cause, death or serious injury, or substantial damage to property or to the environment by exposure to radiation or release of radioactive substances. In addition, a new offence of trafficking in nuclear materials is introduced.

The bill also improves the application of Australia’s existing non-proliferation arrangements. It extends the geographical jurisdiction for offences related to the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons by an Australian citizen or resident anywhere. It also updates penalties for the most serious offences so that these provide a significant deterrent to the commission of such offences, and are consistent with penalties under comparable Commonwealth non-proliferation legislation.

Further, the bill introduces a requirement for a permit to be obtained under the safeguards act where a nuclear or related facility is to be decommissioned. This seeks to ensure that non-proliferation safeguards measures can be effectively applied in the course of decommissioning. It underscores Australia’s ability to apply the principle that planned nuclear activities are fully transparent to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

To ensure that Australia’s domestic arrangements are robust, the bill allows that most provisions implementing the amendment to the physical protection convention can come into effect in Australia ahead of the entry into force of the amended convention.

I thank members of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and other arms within the Australian government for their contribution to the development of this bill, and I commend the bill to the chamber.

Robert McClelland (Barton, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The opposition supports the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006. I commend members to the second reading speech of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and also to the report of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, which has prepared a succinct summary of the provisions of the bill. As that report notes, the bill primarily amends the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987, which gives legislative effect to Australia’s non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and also under the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

As the parliamentary secretary indicated, the bill is intended to meet the new requirements of the July 2005 amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material—the physical protection convention—as described by the parliamentary secretary. The bill is also intended to deal with the decommissioning of a nuclear facility, namely, the facility at Lucas Heights in Sydney. I note the speaker’s list contains my friend the member for Hughes, who will no doubt have an interest in that aspect of the bill, given that that facility is in her electorate.

The bill also amends several other related acts of parliament, including the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Act 1998, the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994, the Australian Federal Police Act 1979, the Extradition Act 1988 and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987.

As the minister indicated, the bill contains three new offences relating to the decommissioning of a nuclear facility. That is of interest to me because my electorate of Barton is the neighbouring electorate to the seat of Hughes. Proposed new section 16B will be included in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act to allow the minister to grant a written permit to allow the decommissioning of the whole or part of a nuclear facility, which includes the Lucas Heights facility as defined in the legislation. That proposed new section requires that the permit to decommission a facility be approved by the Director of Safeguards. The director must also be satisfied that appropriate safeguards could be applied and that adequate physical security could be provided for nuclear material during the decommissioning.

The bill also inserts proposed new section 29A, which makes it an offence for a person to decommission the whole or part of a facility without holding such a permit. Obviously those provisions are desirable—indeed, essential—for the safe decommissioning of the Lucas Heights facility. I note that the facility is almost exactly my age. I think it was originally commissioned on the day I was born, or thereabouts. It has gone, but hopefully I will be here for a little longer.

Andrew Robb (Goldstein, Liberal Party, Minister for Vocational and Further Education) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Two volatile things on the same day.

Mrs Bronwyn Bishop (Mackellar, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am sure the chamber is very interested in that anniversary.

Robert McClelland (Barton, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The effect of the amendment will be to strengthen measures relating to the trafficking of nuclear material and interfering with the operation of a nuclear facility. The bill also increases various imprisonment penalties for offences committed under the act. The bill also extends the geographical scope of jurisdiction for various offences, which will mean that Australian citizens residing overseas will be imprisoned if found guilty of these offences. It is noted that the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade strongly supports Australia’s continued engagement in multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Indeed, the parliamentary secretary said that this bill is obviously intended not only to introduce necessary provisions but also to demonstrate Australia’s strong commitment to the non-proliferation regime.

I will place on the record reasonably briefly those areas in which Australia has played a significant role and those in which we believe it could still play such a role. Of course, non-proliferation has become a crucial issue as a result of the nuclear test in North Korea and the controversy in respect of Iran and its apparent intention to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

It was controversy relating to the French nuclear tests in the 1980s that we can recall that motivated the then foreign minister, Gareth Evans, to drive what has become the Canberra commission. He proposed drawing together a panel of military, scientific and administrative experts from around the world who had world-renowned reputations for their expertise. That Canberra commission, as it became known, was given secretarial support by both DFAT and the Australian Department of Defence. Its brief was to come up with practical measures in relation to nonproliferation, the French nuclear tests being seen not only in the context of the tests but in the whole context of potential proliferation of nuclear weapons and the testing, obviously, by countries as part of that process.

The topics of the Canberra commission included horizontal proliferation—that is, more countries becoming nuclear capable. It included, perhaps with some foresight, the risk of nuclear terrorism. I note that Einstein wrote to the United States President in World War II cautioning him regarding the possibility of a nuclear device being planted in the hold of a ship coming into one of the significant harbours. Even then, intelligent analysis suggested the risk of a nuclear terrorist event. The Canberra commission also realised that it was necessary to address the issue of potential delivery of nuclear weapons and, therefore, focused on the elimination of ballistic missiles as a form of delivery.

Those who read the 2000 non-proliferation treaty will see a remarkable similarity between the wording of that treaty and the recommendations of the Canberra commission. It was intended that Prime Minister Keating, as he then was, would launch the Canberra commission report on the floor of the General Assembly of the United Nations but there was a change of government. The government subsequently presented the report. But it was noted by the then Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and former Canberra commission panel member, Mr Jayantha Dhanapala:

The Canberra commission report received lukewarm support from the government that inherited it after Keating’s party suffered an election defeat and did not do more than absolutely necessary.

Indeed, the agenda of the Canberra commission was followed up by a number of countries coming together in June 1998 to form a coalition known as the New Agenda Coalition. They published a document called Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda. It was also part of their legacy that resulted in the striking of the agreement to create and enter into the 2000 non-proliferation treaty to extend the original treaty indefinitely.

So we can see that Australia did play a very significant part. I should add that the new government did not form part of the New Agenda Coalition, if you like taking a backseat role, although they did vote for the motion in December 1998 as a result of recommendations of that New Agenda Coalition. Jayantha Dhanapala has proposed that the model of the Canberra commission, driven by Australia, provide a template for the world and the international community to consider in dealing with the issue of weapons of mass destruction. He proposed the establishment of a new commission based on the Canberra commission format, essentially bringing together people of world renown to consider practical measures to address the issues of weapons of mass destruction. He said that must include nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and that the mandate of the new commission must extend to both nonproliferation and disarmament of those weapons of mass destruction that already exist.

We should not ignore the fact that, while we all have tremendous fear of these weapons of mass destruction, of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons coming into the hands of terrorist organisations, we should not ignore the reality that many countries in the world—regrettably, many legitimate nation states—have weapons in each of those categories. So it is not simply an issue of nonproliferation—that is, stopping other countries or organisations from acquiring those weapons of mass destruction; it is also very much necessary for the international community to focus upon disarmament of those countries that continue to possess and, regrettably, develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Dhanapala said that obviously the mandate would also need to very specifically cover and come up with practical measures to address and prevent the possible use of those weapons by terrorists. It is significant that just this month the Leader of the Opposition committed a future Labor government to driving a new Canberra commission type agenda to look at those weapons of mass destruction and to come up with practical measures in respect of both non-proliferation—that is, the spreading of those organisations and countries that possess and develop those weapons—and, significantly, the need for countries to disarm themselves of those weapons of mass destruction.

The Leader of the Opposition also indicated that a future Labor government would be seeking international agreement for a fissile material cut-off treaty to end the production of both highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons—and that is obviously particularly relevant to the events that we are seeing in Iran. Such a treaty would apply directly to a country’s capacity to develop or enrich uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons, and he is very strongly committed to that agenda. Given Australia’s history in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, I think we could play a very constructive role indeed.

In conclusion, I note that the minister indicated—and sincerely indicated, I believe—the government’s intention to introduce these amendments not only for its own sake to strengthen the control of nuclear material and to impose penalties and greater protections and safeguards against the measures coming into the hands of terrorists or criminals but also to demonstrate Australia’s strong commitment to nonproliferation. In that context, I note that in the near future the government will be confronted with a decision as to whether or not it agrees to sell uranium to India. India, of course, is friendly with Australia. We have significant relations in a number of areas—economically, militarily and culturally—and of course in sport. But the reality is that India has—

Joel Fitzgibbon (Hunter, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Defence) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

We’re better than them!

Robert McClelland (Barton, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Certainly at cricket. I thank the member for Hunter. Despite all of that, India is still not a party to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The reality is that they should be. It is in their interests that they are. One can imagine what would happen should an Islamic fundamentalist movement gain control of the government in Pakistan. The fear and risk to the international community would be so much more profound in India. One can understand their anxiety, but the reality is that no-one wins a nuclear conflict. One would think it would be in India’s interests to promote more rigorously than any other country the non-proliferation agenda. Rather than agreeing to sell uranium to India, in circumstances where they are not a party to the non-proliferation regime, the government should be putting pressure on India to become part of that regime if they want to utilise Australian uranium. With those words, I conclude my contribution by indicating our support for these measures.

Danna Vale (Hughes, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006 will be welcomed by the people of Australia, and most especially by the people in my electorate of Hughes, in which is located Australia’s only nuclear research reactor at Lucas Heights. The bill implements Australia’s commitment to strengthened international measures for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. Further, it provides for machinery changes to improve the application of existing non-proliferation arrangements.

This bill amends the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 to implement new requirements of the amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to regulate, with respect to nuclear safeguards, the decommissioning of a nuclear facility to ensure that Australia is able to meet its international obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency under the additional protocol. It makes penalties for the most serious offences consistent with penalties under comparable Commonwealth non-proliferation legislation and provides a significant deterrent to the commission of such offences.

ANSTO is Australia’s national nuclear research and development organisation and the centre of Australian nuclear expertise. It is the second largest corporate employer in my electorate. It employs around 900 local residents and provides income for several hundred local tradespeople and industry suppliers. As a matter of fact, ANSTO contributes over $70 million to my local electorate economy.

ANSTO is responsible for delivering specialised advice, scientific services and products to government, industry, academia and other research organisations. ANSTO’s nuclear infrastructure includes the research reactor OPAL, which has taken over from HIFAR. It has particle accelerators, radiopharmaceutical production facilities and a range of other unique research facilities. OPAL will be Australia’s only nuclear reactor. It will be used to produce radioactive products for use in medicine and industry and as a source of neutron beams for scientific research and to irradiate silicon for semiconductor applications.

The OPAL—which stands for Open Pool Australian Light-water—reactor is due to be officially opened on the same site as HIFAR at Lucas Heights in my electorate in April this year. The new OPAL reactor is of profound significance for those at the leading edge of science and research. The new reactor will be a world-class neutron source, capable of supporting up to 17 neutron beam instruments. The scope of research that these instruments will allow is tremendous, from research on advanced materials through to molecular biology, using technologies that were unknown at the time that the old HIFAR was opened by Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies on 18 April 1958.

As well as opening up new areas of research, ANSTO is well known as the principal producer and supplier of radioisotopes for medical diagnoses, treatment and pain relief in Australia. Last year approximately 550,000 patient treatments were transported from ANSTO to hospitals around Australia and, increasingly, in South-East Asia. Nuclear medicines are chiefly used for diagnoses, but increasingly also to treat disease and for pain relief. For example, bone scans can detect the spread of cancers six to 18 months sooner than X-rays. ANSTO also continually conducts new research aimed at developing new radiation treatments for different types of cancer and other medical conditions.

With additional capacity, ANSTO will also be able to expand its support of the Australian manufacturing, minerals and agricultural industries. The estimated gross benefit of support to the minerals industry alone currently exceeds $100 million annually. The replacement reactor will give us significantly more. This modern, high-tech research facility will attract eminent foreign scientists to work in Australia and provide Australian scientists with greater reciprocal access to complementary first-class research facilities around the world. Indeed, the return to Australia from the new research reactor will be significant in attracting to Australia the greatest scientific minds of our age.

To put this into perspective in terms of general everyday use, radioactivity from ANSTO includes applications in the automobile industry, which uses radioactive materials to test the quality of steel in cars. Aircraft manufacturers use radiation to check for flaws in jet engines. Mining and petroleum companies use radionuclides to locate and quantify mineral deposits. Manufacturers use radioactive materials to obtain the proper thickness of tin and aluminium. Pipeline companies use radioactive materials to look for defects in welds. Oil, gas and mining companies use radioactive materials to map geological contours, using test wells and mine bores, and to determine the presence of hydrocarbons. By showing how plants absorb fertiliser, radioactive materials help researchers learn when fertiliser should be applied and how much is needed. This helps prevent the overuse of fertilisers, a major source of soil and water pollution. Radiation sterilisation techniques are used to control insect pests such as fruit fly—very important to Australian industry. The smoke detectors in our houses and offices rely on a tiny radioactive source to sound the alarm when it senses smoke from a fire. The irradiation of silicon for the semiconductor industry is a significant business for ANSTO. Non-stick pans are treated with radiation to ensure that the coating will stick to the surface. Photocopiers use small amounts of radiation to eliminate static and prevent paper from sticking together and jamming the machine. Cosmetics, hair products and contact lens solutions are sterilised with radiation to remove irritants and allergens. Radioactive materials are also used to sterilise medical bandages and a variety of personal health and hygiene products. The use of radioactive materials, nuclides and isotopes are so varied and extensive within our community that I think many of us do not realise the applications in our everyday use.

I also want to take this opportunity to remind the constituents of my electorate of the existence of ARPANSA. ARPANSA is the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency. Depending on your point of view, I will either accept the blame or the credit for its existence. When the Prime Minister informed me many years ago that we would receive in my electorate a new reactor, which is now called OPAL, I asked the Prime Minister if we could have an independent oversight agency. I want to acknowledge the work that was done towards establishing this agency by a previous minister for health, Dr Michael Wooldridge, and a previous member for Adelaide in her role as parliamentary secretary. It took a tremendous amount of work to establish this agency which has a vital role in establishing world’s best practice and overseeing the fact that such is continued on at ANSTO by the professionals that are there. The agency is headed up by Dr John Loy, who is highly regarded, and his team of scientific researchers. My constituents can take great faith and comfort in the fact that this is an independent body, an independent oversight agency of very high expertise. I am grateful to the government for having made sure that this came into existence.

To return to the bill, Australia has international obligations to safeguard nuclear material under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The convention sets standards for the international transport of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes. It defines serious offences involving nuclear materials which parties to the convention must make punishable. These include ‘the receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material’ without lawful authority and a threat ‘to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial property damage’.

The convention also specifies certain levels of physical protection needed during international transport of nuclear material. This requires Australia and the other signatories to the convention to ‘take appropriate steps within the framework of its national law and consistent with international law’. The convention was opened for signature in 1980 and entered into force on 8 February 1987. Notably, the original document did not address the protection of nuclear facilities and deals only in a limited way with the domestic use, storage and transportation of nuclear material.

On 8 July 2005, delegates from 89 countries agreed on changes to strengthen the physical protection convention. The amended convention makes it legally binding for states to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport. The amendments strengthen requirements for the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities against criminal or terrorist attack.

There were four main amendments to the convention: (1) a new article 2A established a series of fundamental principles to be applied to protect nuclear material against theft and sabotage and to rapidly recover any missing or stolen nuclear material; (2) an amendment to article 5 to strengthen cooperation among states in the event of actual or threatened theft of nuclear material or sabotage; (3) the creation of new offences under article 7 of the convention relating to the trafficking of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear facilities with the intent to cause death, injury or damage by exposure to radiation; (4) new articles 11A and 11B dealing with extradition and mutual legal assistance in relation to offences under article 7 of the convention that stipulate states cannot refuse to extradite or provide mutual legal assistance for an offence under article 7 on the sole ground that it is a political offence under domestic law.

In a statement to the convention, the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office supported the proposed amendments. It stated:

The Australian Government is committed to addressing international concerns about nuclear terrorism, smuggling and sabotage, and to protecting people and the environment from any impacts associated with such activities. The amended Physical Protection Convention aims to address these issues more comprehensively than the existing convention. Australia has played a leading role in developing these changes, and to encourage universal adherence should be among the first to ratify and implement them.

The provisions of the bill are to implement Australia’s commitment to these international measures which increase the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. In particular, the bill is intended to meet the new requirements of the July 2005 amendments to the physical protection convention. The amended convention makes it legally binding for states to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport. To this end, the bill makes amendments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Act 1998, the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994, the Australian Federal Police Act 1979, the Extradition Act 1988 and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987.

Most of the bill’s amendments are made to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987. This act gives legislative effect to Australia’s international nuclear non-proliferation obligations, establishes a system of permits for the possession and transportation of nuclear material, and provides a legislative basis for the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office. The bill inserts a new section 13(3)(d)(da) into this act stating that a permit to possess nuclear material may be granted provided ‘measures are taken that are consistent with Australia’s obligations under the physical protection convention’. The bill also amends this act to: introduce new offences and increase penalties for various offences under part III of the act; extend the geographical scope of jurisdiction for various offences under part III; and require a permit to decommission a facility.

The bill also introduces three new offences and imprisonment penalties under the safeguards act. Under new section 29A, a person found guilty of decommissioning a facility without a permit faces an imprisonment penalty of five years. Under new section 34A, a person commits an offence if he or she carries, sends, or moves nuclear material into or out of Australia or a foreign country. A person found guilty of this offence faces an imprisonment penalty of 10 years. Under new section 35A, a person found guilty of interfering with the operation of a nuclear facility—and who does so intending or knowing that the act will cause injury or damage to property—faces an imprisonment penalty of 20 years.

The bill also strengthens the maximum term of various imprisonment offences under part III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987. It contains five provisions to lengthen imprisonment penalties under the act. Under proposed section 23(1), the maximum imprisonment term for a person found guilty of possessing nuclear material without a permit will be lengthened from not more than five years to not more than 10 years. Under proposed section 26(1), the maximum imprisonment term for a person found guilty of communicating information about nuclear technology as defined in section 4(1) of the act will be lengthened from not more than two years to not more than 10 years.

Under proposed section 26A(1), the imprisonment penalty for a person found guilty of communicating information that compromises the security of nuclear material will be lengthened from two years to eight years. Under proposed section 31(1), the maximum imprisonment term for a person found guilty of obstructing or hindering an agency inspector in the performance of a duty under the act will be lengthened from not more than six months to not more than two years. Under section 35, the maximum imprisonment term for a person found guilty of using nuclear material to cause serious damage to any person or substantial damage to property will be lengthened from 10 years to 20 years. I have taken time to explain those increased penalties for the benefit of the constituents of my electorate of Hughes.

The bill inserts a new section 16B into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 to allow the minister to grant a written permit to decommission the whole or part of a nuclear facility. Under this section the bill requires that the permit to decommission a facility must be approved by the director of safeguards as per subsection 12(2) of the act. The director must also be satisfied that appropriate safeguards could be applied during the decommissioning and that adequate physical security could be applied to nuclear material during the commissioning. The bill also inserts a new section 29A which makes it an offence for a person to decommission the whole or part of a facility without holding a permit.

In conclusion, the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006 is a strong response to Australia’s new obligations under the amended physical protection convention. It reflects the active role that Australia took in negotiating the amendments to the convention. The system of permits and the list of offences under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 already includes elements of some of the new offences required by the amendments. The bill responds further to the amendments by increasing the prison penalties and extending the geographical scope of jurisdiction for offences under the safeguards act. It also contains three new offences relating to the decommissioning of a nuclear facility without a permit, trafficking nuclear material and interfering with the operation of a nuclear facility—all very important amendments and aspects for the people of Australia but of particular interest to the people of my electorate. I commend this bill to the House.

Joel Fitzgibbon (Hunter, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Defence) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am not surprised to hear the member for Hughes speaking on the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006. I know that she has a pretty good understanding of the nuclear industry and the nuclear fuel cycle, which, of course, is very relevant to her electorate. I know that, like most members of this place, she understands the significant contribution that nuclear technology plays towards health in this country in treating a number of deadly diseases in that area commonly coming under the banner of cancer. I appreciate her contribution to the debate.

I am of 1962 vintage, so I am just old enough to remember the Cold War. I think it is true to say that those of us who remember the Cold War take a slightly different attitude to nuclear weapons capability than those younger than me who did not live through that period. It was a period which, I suppose you could say, formally came to an end with the eventual fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Those of us who lived through that era grew up with American television and films: James Bond, Get Smart and programs and movies such as these which highlighted the very strong tussle between the West and the East. I think most of us remember the concept, if not first-hand then through television, of people having bunkers in their backyards to protect them from a possible nuclear attack of some sort. No doubt that is the reason why, in this country, we have such strong opposition to the use of nuclear energy for civil and peaceful purposes. Too many of us are scarred with the fear that we grew up with when we were younger. We all remember the fear, and I suspect many remember the Cuban missile stand-off with President Kennedy. We really were living under the fear of nuclear attack when I was growing up.

I suspect that people significantly younger than me are relatively complacent about the use of nuclear weapons, not having grown up with the fear of them and not having the threat of nuclear attack thrust upon them almost on a daily basis by television programs and movies. That may seem light-hearted, but it is very true. I fear that it is a complacency that is misplaced. The world remains one in which nuclear attack is not likely—certainly not as likely as it may have been in the three or four decades following the Second World War—but where it is a possibility. We have seen that in recent times with the stresses and strains in the Middle East in particular. North Korea, with an apparent nuclear capacity sitting not all that far away from our own continent, possibly has a capability for that nuclear capacity to reach our own shores. We have enormous instability with the emergence of non-state groups and rogue states, so this is not a world with a very good balance. We see the legitimate concerns of the Israelis about the ongoing refusal of the Iranians to comply with their obligations to the international community, to reassure them that their interest in nuclear does not go beyond energy and peaceful, civil purposes.

As the member for Barton indicated, Labor supports the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006. It is a bill that strengthens Australia’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and all of the issues that go with safeguarding us against the misuse of nuclear facilities and tools. What it does not do, and what it and any Australian government cannot do, is strengthen the foundations of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty itself. Only the international community, acting in concert, can do that. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty is a treaty under much stress and strain.

My colleague the member for Melbourne Ports showed me some interesting research that he has done on new revelations about the Russian attitude to the Iranians. I know that he is going to say something about that, and I am delighted by that news. I will let him expand on that.

The problem for the international community is the nuclear non-proliferation treaty itself. It is a document which is now decades old, and many of the foundations on which it stands have been undermined and changed by the new paradigm in which we all live: the emergence of terror, rogue states and non-state groups. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty is of course premised on the basis of state groups, not non-state groups. If I am wrong about that, I would be more than happy to hear some counterarguments, but that is certainly my interpretation and assessment of the treaty as it stands.

Of course, that treaty amongst other things does recognise five original nuclear states—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China. One of the problems of that proposition is that of course we now have other democracies. Those five states also happen to be—not just by coincidence—the five members of the UN Security Council. But we now have other democratic states that also have nuclear capacity. Take India, for example—one reference made by the member for Barton—which still stands outside the nuclear non-proliferation treaty simply because it cannot enter into the treaty without giving up its nuclear capacity.

I am at one with the member for Barton: India should sign up to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and we should be very reluctant to be engaging ourselves in her nuclear fuel cycle without that commitment. Having said that, you can understand why a democracy like India is not prepared to forgo its nuclear capacity—with the neighbouring state of Pakistan with similar capacity. It is like asking them to take their gloves off but allowing their neighbour to leave them on.

While we do not have any sympathy with that view, I do acknowledge and recognise, as I am sure we all do, that this is a problem for the international community. How do we get the Indias of the world to agree? India is an emerging superpower and therefore probably sees itself, particularly given that it is a democracy, as a country that is legitimately entitled to have the same capacity as the Chinas of the world, for example, which are not democracies. This is a big challenge for the international community. That is the first problem with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which was first established in 1968. It is a very old document.

The second problem, under the second pillar of the treaty, is that we have this determination to ensure that the five original nuclear weapon states disarm themselves or at least significantly reduce their armaments, their nuclear capacity. But it has not worked—it has worked to an extent, but those countries have, over the decades, found many and quite often legitimate reasons why that commitment is not always possible.

The third pillar has many strengths. It is a commitment to ensuring that all nation states have a right to use uranium for civil and peaceful uses—in other words, for power generation. But in many senses the problems with the first and second pillars undermine the strength of the third, and that was the example given by the member for Barton. We have a situation in which India should be able to enforce its right to nuclear power generation but it cannot source the fuel it needs to do so because it is unable, it would say, to comply with the first pillar of the treaty. There is no point giving it the right to generate nuclear energy if it cannot get the fuel to supply its nuclear energy generators, and it cannot get the fuel to supply its nuclear generators because it is not part of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Of course, it would argue that it cannot be part of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty because it is not possible for it, in strategic terms—it would argue, not my words—to forgo its nuclear capacity when it has a neighbouring state which is also not a part of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and which can maintain its nuclear weapons. I have not done my research on Pakistan’s energy needs, requirements and strengths but, for example, Pakistan might not have any need for uranium for civil purposes and therefore does not face the same dilemma that India does.

These are complex issues for the international community. I was very pleased to have visited the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna last year to look at the very good work they are doing. The IAEA not only work towards nonproliferation but also assist various states in assessing their future in nuclear energy. Firstly, the states look at whether or not nuclear energy is for them, and, for various reasons, it sometimes is not. They have great expertise in helping nation states work through this process. Secondly, if states draw the conclusion that it is for them, they advise on how to put the civil industry in place without the threat of getting it wrong and therefore raising concerns amongst other nation states about nuclear proliferation. They also assist with putting it in place in a way that ensures the safety of their domestic community.

One of the strong messages I walked away with from the International Atomic Energy Agency is that it is underresourced—significantly so. One of the other issues that face the international community is finding the strength and the will to more sufficiently resource the agency to ensure it can continue to do its very good work—and, for all the reasons I have outlined, that work is getting more difficult and more challenging.

Labor supports this bill, which amends our domestic laws to strengthen our commitment to our various international obligations. I know that some of them are a bit belated, but we are not going to be too critical of that. We welcome their introduction in this place. I will close by reinforcing what I said at the beginning. We are living in testing times. We have emerging change in the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region. The Middle East is as unstable as it has ever been. I note that the member for Melbourne Ports is agreeing with that point and I know that he knows the strategic situation in the Middle East better than I do because it has great significance to a large slice of his constituency. In Africa we have significant problems as well. The old Soviet Union is struggling under its new form of democracy—I am not suggesting it poses a threat to us, but it all adds to the stress and the strain of what is happening geopolitically across the region. Cyprus is still divided and, although it is not in the daily headlines, it is still causing significant geopolitical stresses. Enormous energy issues are emerging, and that brings me back to what we now know as Russia. They now control much of the energy supply to many energy-dependent nations, and they have already shown their preparedness to cut off that supply to suit their own strategic and economic ambitions or protections, or the mix of the two.

Iraq, in my view, has been a disaster for this country—the worst foreign policy decision ever taken by us as a nation state. I was most disappointed by the Prime Minister’s response last night on the fourth anniversary of our intervention in Iraq. I thought he had to do one thing last night before any other: I am not going to say that he should have apologised, because he never does that, and I know he will not. I had no expectation whatsoever that we would get an apology from the Prime Minister for his decision to take us to war in Iraq: first to get weapons of mass destruction—very relevant to this bill—which were eventually found not to exist; second to impose regime change—something he said did not in itself justify any intervention in any nation state; and now, supposedly to bed down the fledgling democracy which exists in the country.

Of course, this is all despite the fact that his Minister for Defence, Dr Nelson, told us that victory is not possible in Iraq, nor is the imposition of a Western style democracy. On that basis, I am not sure why we are still there. However, I did expect the Prime Minister to attempt to take some responsibility for the mess in which we find ourselves in Iraq. There was no apology nor any acknowledgement that he got at least part of it wrong. He has never acknowledged that our approach to Iraq could have been handled differently.

I thought I might have heard the Prime Minister succinctly argue the case that Australia is now a safer place as a result of our intervention in Iraq. He talked more broadly and globally about the world being a safer place. He would argue that, but I do not agree. However, he did not specifically focus on whether someone going to a football match in Melbourne or Sydney is now more or less vulnerable to a terrorist attack today than they were before our intervention in Iraq.

The Australian people are entitled to hear the Prime Minister argue his case. His speech was simply a summary of his position on Iraq and the usual rhetoric about how, if we were to withdraw from Iraq, terrorism would suddenly proliferate and the world as we know it would come to an end. He did not argue that case very well; he simply concentrated on the politics and, of course, once again, on instilling fear in the Australian community. He sent the message that if the opposition’s view on Iraq were ever put into effect the world would somehow be a more dangerous place. It would have been fine for him to do that if he had produced the evidence, but he simply failed to prosecute that case.

The Prime Minister tried to suggest that there is some inconsistency in the Labor Party’s approach to Iraq vis-a-vis Afghanistan. That is not true. Iraq has descended into a civil war and the connection to al-Qaeda is, at best, tenuous. Of course, that situation will not be fixed using the guns and bullets of international forces but by using diplomacy and with the will and strength of the Iraqis themselves. Resolution depends on the will and strength of the religious and ethnic groups to sort themselves out, and we need to put pressure on them to do so. The best way to do that is to let them know that we will not be around forever.

Of course, Afghanistan is another situation, where you have a government fighting what is effectively an invasion by Taliban troops trained in Pakistan. It is an entirely different situation. It is a war in a country that is training members of al-Qaeda and associated groups; it is training the terrorists who are bombing Australians in places like Bali. That war can be won and must be won. That is the very simple difference between Iraq and Afghanistan, and the opposition maintains its position. (Time expired)

Michael Johnson (Ryan, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am very pleased to speak on this very important legislation, the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006, because it goes to how global security and global energy can be so intimately linked in our modern, 21st century world. I was delighted to hear the shadow foreign minister, the member for Barton, indicate to the parliament that the federal opposition supports this bill. It is a very important bill that warrants the federal opposition’s support. Of course, I utterly reject the comments of the shadow foreign minister in relation to Iraq. I did not hear him talking about how the Leader of the Opposition categorically supported the government when we went to war. He did not apologise to the 12 million Iraqis who went and voted at the ballot box. We in this country cherish our democracy, but somehow it is not appropriate for 12 million Iraqis to cast a vote.

Ann Corcoran (Isaacs, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Order! I interrupt the honourable member for Ryan. Is the member seeking to ask a question?

Joel Fitzgibbon (Hunter, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Defence) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am.

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Member for Ryan, will you accept a question?

Michael Johnson (Ryan, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

No, I will not. I absolutely reject the opposition’s views that this government has acted in poor faith. I absolutely reject the comments of the shadow foreign minister and his Labor colleague there in relation to the 12 million Iraqis that went to vote. Why is it—

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Madam Deputy Speaker, I have a question for the member.

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Member for Ryan, will you accept a question?

Michael Johnson (Ryan, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

No, I will not.

Joel Fitzgibbon (Hunter, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Defence) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Coward!

Michael Johnson (Ryan, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I reject the assertion that the member for Ryan is a coward. I absolutely reject that assertion. I sat in silence while the shadow foreign minister gave his speech. I sat in absolute silence and courtesy, and here we have his Labor colleague, who refuses to allow—

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Danby interjecting

Joel Fitzgibbon (Hunter, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Defence) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Fitzgibbon interjecting

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Member for Melbourne Ports and Member for Hunter, a bit of order please. Member for Ryan, do not respond to interjections.

Michael Johnson (Ryan, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am pleased to speak on this bill because it is an important bill. When the government has a position which the opposition fails to support, it is entirely appropriate for government members to defend the government’s position. The bottom line is that 12 million Iraqis went to vote at the elections, and you cannot have a situation where the opposition says to the government, ‘No, that’s not good enough.’ Twelve million Iraqis went to vote: that is absolutely good enough for this country. We can sit here and enjoy democracy, but why can’t other people? And that goes to the heart of what we are all about.

Why this bill is important is that it is all about global security, it is all about global energy and these issues are tied together. It is, in fact, quite relevant that the shadow foreign minister spoke about Iraq and the Prime Minister’s presentation last night, because it goes to the status of the US in the world and to the credibility of the US’s position in world affairs. For the United States to be compelled to withdraw from Iraq in the current climate would send the absolute wrong message. I would suggest that those sitting opposite—who claim to have the exclusive monopoly on wisdom in foreign affairs and in international relations—do some basic 101 studies and bone up on foreign affairs, because they have absolutely no idea whatsoever.

I am disappointed that the member for Melbourne Ports, of all people in the opposition, would not stand shoulder to shoulder with the government in relation to a position that tries to bring about the democratic vote in a country in the Middle East where people want to have the sovereign right to determine their own future. And what is wrong with that? Just as the people of North Korea absolutely want to be able to determine their own future—what is wrong with that? It is a terrific position for us to enjoy in this part of the world. Why can’t we be part of a coalition to bring about freedom around the world? Why can’t we be part of that? I am just so disappointed. Of all members of the opposition, the member for Melbourne Ports in particular goes about trying to defend freedom for this part of the world but not for that part of the world—it is absolutely absurd.

In relation to this important bill, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT, was negotiated in the mid-1960s between the United States, the Soviet Union and the 18-nation committee on disarmament. We all know that the NPT came into force in 1970, and our country became a party to it in January 1973. There are some 189 states that have signed on to the treaty. It is an international agreement that we very strongly respect and that we are very strongly part of promoting. As part of our commitment to the treaty, Australia also signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1974. As a signatory to the treaty, Australia has an obligation—as do all member states, of course—not to transfer nuclear weapons and not to assist any non nuclear weapons state to manufacture or to acquire such weapons or devices. The treaty also outlines that, in the case of a non nuclear weapons state like Australia, there is a responsibility not to receive or manufacture nuclear weapons, and to apply International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities carried out within our borders.

Australia also has international obligations to safeguard nuclear material under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The convention sets standards for the international transport of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes. It also defines serious offences involving nuclear materials, including the receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material without lawful authority or making a threat to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person, or substantial property damage. Australia’s obligation and that of other signatories to the convention is to make those offences enforceable in their domestic law.

I will make a few comments on the current legislative framework for nonproliferation. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 gives legislative effect to Australia’s obligations under the NPT and the physical protection convention. The act primarily provides for a system of permits for the possession and transport of nuclear material, the establishment of a facility and the communication of information relating to nuclear technology. The act also enshrines a number of offences and their punishments in Australian law including those relating to the nonproliferation of nuclear material such as the possession of nuclear material without a permit, a breach of duty to ensure the security of nuclear technology, the communication of unauthorised information, establishing a nuclear facility without a permit and accessing without a permit areas which are restricted. Offences relating to the physical protection of nuclear material include stealing nuclear material, demanding nuclear material by threats, the use of nuclear material causing injury to persons or damage to property and threatening to use nuclear material.

I turn to the specifics of the bill. I will not go into the changes to the physical protection convention, because they are quite numerous, but I will talk about the changes that this bill makes to the amendments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 to implement Australia’s international obligations as a country that is absolutely committed to the nonproliferation of nuclear material. This bill brings Australian law into line with our commitments as a party to the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards agreement and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The bill will also demonstrate Australia’s commitment to the physical security of nuclear facilities, material and information.

Firstly, the bill will introduce three new offences under the safeguards act relating to decommissioning a nuclear facility without a permit, trafficking nuclear material and interfering with the operation of a nuclear facility. Secondly, it will make the penalties for the most serious offences in the safeguards act consistent with penalties under comparable Commonwealth non-proliferation legislation. Thirdly, it will extend the geographical jurisdiction for various non-proliferation offences in the safeguards act. The extended geographical jurisdiction allows for Australian citizens residing overseas to be imprisoned if found guilty of these very serious offences. Lastly, the bill will also regulate, with respect to nuclear safeguards, the decommissioning of a nuclear facility to ensure that Australia is able to meet its international obligations to the IAEA.

I think a good way to stress the gravity and importance of this bill is to use the example of North Korea and South Korea. The Korean peninsula is one of the most sensitive geopolitical and security areas in our region. I had the very great privilege last year to be invited by the South Korean government to visit South Korea. I also had the very special opportunity to visit the demilitarised zone, which, as everyone would know, separates North and South Korea. It was a profound experience and one which will certainly live in my memory for a very long time. It did inspire me to take a far deeper interest in the issues of the Korean peninsula and in the relationship between the north and the south in particular.

As members who follow foreign policy and international relations with interest would know, North Korea withdrew from the NPT in January 2003. In October 2003 North Korea declared that it had completed processing spent fuel rods in order to obtain the material used in the production of nuclear weapons. Then in February 2005 the North Korean regime openly declared that it had actually manufactured nuclear weapons. We all know that in October 2006 North Korea successfully detonated a nuclear device, and that came as a tremendous shock to all of us—not only to the people of Asia but also to those of us in this country.

The blast was estimated to have had an explosive force of less than one kiloton. The precise nature of the North Korean nuclear program probably is still largely unknown given the absolute secrecy of that regime. But, more than the measure of explosive force, the key impact of that test was a frightening wake-up call to the democracies of the world and to countries like Australia that the sheer potential for something catastrophic in our times and in our part of the world still exists. We must, more than ever, be vigilant about our global security and our global activities that prevent something catastrophic taking place, such as a wider regional conflict that might bring in countries like North Korea to react in the worst possible fashion, including exploding further nuclear weapons if they have them.

As a signatory to the joint declaration on the Korean armistice in 1953, our country would probably have some kind of obligation to be part of a wider solution to such a terrible conflict. It is incumbent on all of us at this time, before such a disaster comes our way, to be as vigilant as possible and to recognise that North Korea remains a serious threat to global peace and security. The progress that has been made in recent weeks with the United States Ambassador, Christopher Hill, and his counterparts in the six-party talks is to be commended. However, I read a couple of days ago with some disappointment that there may be some difficulties with those talks continuing as successfully as seems to have been indicated in the previous few weeks.

We wish that North Korea and South Korea could perhaps one day unify in peace and security. Unfortunately, at this point in time, North Korea’s successful nuclear test last year continues to cause immense anxiety and concern, not just for us here in Australia but also for the immediate neighbours of North Korea.

One of the results has been to bring into the public domain conversation about whether countries like Japan and South Korea would go towards nuclear protection in an absolutely worst-case scenario. All of us would be aware that Japan remains under the protection of the US security umbrella, as does South Korea. But that is why this bill is so important and this architecture, the NPT architecture, is so important to all of us and that we are able to implement it, we are able to enforce it is much as is possible. Without these kinds of agreements, we really do not have a reference point in which to deal with countries like North Korea.

I want to very strongly commend the bill to parliament. I know that, as we look across the world, particularly to the Middle East, there are worrying signs that other states might be looking to acquire such devices. All of us, with our very best intentions and our very best faith in those with the capacities to prevent that, wish that that would happen.

On the media reports that suggest progress has been made in the six-party talks, if they have any substance to them, that would be a huge setback and would be of immense disappointment. I would hope very much that the North Korean regime would not again waver in terms of its commitment to trying to come to some sort of solution, particularly with the influence the Chinese might be able to bring to bear on North Korea’s future conduct.

I will end my remarks with some thoughts from the former US Deputy Secretary of State, Rich Armitage, who came out to Australia last year and made some comments about things getting done in global politics. He made reference to the fact that active participation in international relations by the United States was still vital to the global peace and security of the world, that the United States certainly was not taking its eyes off what was happening in our part of the world and that, at the end of the day, nothing very meaningful could take place in any part of the world without the involvement of the United States. I think that those comments have some significant merit.

This bill is a strong step in the right direction, reaffirming our commitment to non-proliferation, and I hope that it encourages other countries to be equally committed to this very worthy endeavour. The world must stand strong and united against the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons. We all know that we live in very challenging times and that countries like Australia have an immensely important role to play commensurate with our size and our economic strength.

Martin Ferguson (Batman, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Transport, Roads and Tourism) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The opposition supports this very important bill. The Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006 obviously implements the revised convention on the physical protection of nuclear material as agreed in July 2005. It regulates with respect to nuclear safeguards the decommissioning of a nuclear facility to ensure that Australia meets its obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency under the additional protocol. It also deals with appropriate penalties for serious offences—and we all appreciate that we are dealing with a very serious issue when it comes to the issue of nuclear nonproliferation.

Can I say on behalf of the opposition that there is also much more that needs to be done when it comes to the global non-proliferation regime. This is one of the challenges that confront us as a global community, especially as a nation, because we are strategically positioned to be one of the biggest suppliers of yellowcake to the world; therefore, we have additional responsibilities with our huge uranium assets. For that reason, it has been the opposition that have called for serious attention to be given to this issue, because we, in government, will make sure that Australia as a nation takes a lead in the international community in getting the nuclear non-proliferation treaty back on track. I must say that it is a treaty that both sides of politics, the major political parties in Australia, have supported for some considerable time. But you reach a point in time where you have to step up to the challenge of revising the treaty and modernising it for the challenges that confront the global community.

I therefore give credit to the former Labor leader, Kim Beazley, who said in July last year:

Australia has no greater international obligations and no greater international opportunities than those granted by our position as a nuclear supplier.

That is about Australia accepting its international responsibilities on that challenging field. Kim understood that the world is threatened by the collapse of the existing non-proliferation regime and we must do everything to prevent that. At the time, he as the Labor leader proposed a new diplomatic initiative against nuclear proliferation to be led by Australia. It was to be about a review to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. That is where we believe our nation’s efforts have to be focused—and I can assure you that that is where the Labor Party’s forthcoming national conference’s efforts will also be focused in the context of a major debate about us removing our three-mine policy with respect to uranium mining in Australia; it is an outdated policy and it is time it was thrown out the door.

We are strategically located as a nation to be a major supplier of uranium to the world in the context of guaranteeing that it is mined and handled with safe hands internationally. As part of that decision we also have to accept that we as a nation have to put a bigger effort into modernising and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. I can assure honourable members that this will be a key issue in the debate about uranium at our conference at the end of April, because we regard the issues as inseparable.

Let us go to the issue of the United Nations. In working with the United Nations and our allies to exercise the leadership needed to get the nuclear non-proliferation treaty back on track, we have to provide a coherent international framework for the future peaceful use of uranium in nuclear technology. That is the challenge that confronts us as a nation. We are prepared to mine it with safe hands and supply it to the world. The world needs uranium because it is part of the solution to the growing demand for energy throughout the world. Demand for energy is expanding, and not only in Australia; it will double internationally by 2030. Part of the energy mix is going to be nuclear power. We as a nation do not have to make those tough decisions because we are energy rich. Other nations such as China are going to increase their use of nuclear power in the same way as they are going to increase their use of new renewables and also coal and gas. But, for a whole variety of nations, including the United Kingdom, France and the United States—there are nearly 40 such nations throughout the world—nuclear power is a fact of life. As part of that growth in nuclear energy, we have to make sure that, side by side, we strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It is about leadership.

Australia is used to playing above its weight. We do it in the sporting arena, we do it in the arts, we do it in international business and we do it in international politics. I remind the House that in 1988 it was Australia, under the Hawke Labor government, that led the way to a global agreement preserving the Antarctic forever from human exploitation of its minerals. In 1989 it was Australia, again led by Hawke, which established APEC, a very important forum in terms of our own backyard. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation process was established here in Canberra by the Hawke Labor government. It started as a consultative forum of 12 economies with a modest program of sectoral and trade negotiations to promote economic growth, and it will meet in Australia later this year. It was an original Hawke initiative.

We believe that Australia can and should lead the world on nuclear nonproliferation too. Under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, there is nothing illegal about any country having processing technology. Let us be clear about the facts. The acquisition of highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium is one of the most difficult and important steps towards making a nuclear weapon. If a country with a full nuclear fuel cycle decides to break away from its non-proliferation commitments, a nuclear weapon capacity could be within reach in a very short time. So these are huge responsibilities with respect to the nations participating and supporting the nuclear non-proliferation process. That is why we as a world are frightened of Iran at this point. As the United Nations struggles to hold Iran to account under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards regime, it has never been clearer that the NPT must be reviewed to make it more relevant to today’s issues and more relevant in a modern world.

We clearly do not want rogue nations processing uranium. It is very disappointing that so few nations supported Mohamed ElBaradei’s proposal—he is head of the International Atomic Energy Agency—for a five-year moratorium on the enrichment of uranium and production of plutonium at the last nuclear non-proliferation treaty review conference in May 2005. That was a failed exercise, unfortunately, despite the leadership of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Unfortunately, Australia is one of the many and not one of the few. We have to get the balance right. The peaceful nuclear cycle offers so much to the advancement of society: for clean power generation in those countries less fortunate in their energy resources than Australia, for minerals processing, for advanced industrial processes and for radiopharmaceuticals. I simply remind Australians that there are very few of us who have not been touched in some way by the requirement for a nuclear medical capacity in Australia; yet people say we should not be fronting up to our responsibilities in the nuclear debate, when we are beneficiaries on the medical front. We will continue to be beneficiaries on the medical front, and that is why the future of Lucas Heights and the new OPAL reactor to be opened in April this year is very important for Australia as a nation, and exceptionally important from a research and a medical point of view.

I say that because I think the peaceful nuclear cycle is so important in these contexts that the debate is no longer about uranium mining. The world has moved on. The big marches on Palm Sunday in the seventies were about nuclear nonproliferation and ending the international capacity of the world to actually embrace nuclear weapons. Uranium mining was a side issue. The world has moved on. It is a new debate—one about climate change and where nuclear power fits into that debate in countries which are not as energy rich as Australia is. We are the envy of the world when it comes to our access to energy; be it coal, gas—which is really a peaking capacity more often than not—renewables or geothermal, we have got it. Other nations have not, and they are going to embrace coal, gas, renewables and nuclear power. They are facts, and it is about time some people in the Australian community had a factual debate rather than an emotional debate about these issues.

When it comes to the nuclear cycle, the Labor Party will always stop to think about national security, global security, the safety of workers and the protection of the environment. They are part of the debate. I remind members of the House that article 4 of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty recognises the importance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the broad sense, not just nuclear power. I also remind the House that Australia has an important contribution to make in this field, which will be further realised when we open the OPAL reactor at Lucas Heights next month. I also remind members that OPAL is fuelled by low-enriched uranium, which is not a proliferation concern. ANSTO in Australia is therefore contributing to reducing the global use of high-enriched uranium, and that is very important. ANSTO’s radiopharmaceutical production process also uses low-enriched uranium, whilst most of Australia’s competitors use high-enriched uranium. We are again leading in a very practical sense on this important non-proliferation issue.

Given that some in the community remain concerned about the safety of the Lucas Heights facility, it is also worth noting that a 2005 US government agencies peer review of security concluded that security at ANSTO is equal to or better than security at any civilian research facility in the world—facts, rather than what you hear from Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the Australian Conservation Foundation. Security is critical with respect to the future operation of OPAL, and particular care has been taken to separate the researchers from the reactor itself. This means that scientists from around the world will be able to access the world-class instruments at Lucas Heights without having access to areas of any significance to the safety or security of the OPAL reactor itself.

I believe ANSTO is one of Australia’s iconic research institutions, as important as CSIRO, as important as our CRCs and as important as our universities. It is part of our research capacity as a nation. It is part of our future. It is part of our employment and new manufacturing opportunities of the future. There is no question in my mind that it is the appropriate organisation to be responsible for managing radioactive materials in Australia. ANSTO is Australia’s nuclear research and development organisation and it is the centre of our nuclear expertise. As well as OPAL, ANSTO also operates the national medical cyclotron, an accelerator facility used to produce certain short-lived radioisotopes for nuclear medicine. Interestingly, this is located in the grounds of the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, Camperdown, in close proximity to Sydney University. In addition, ANSTO manages Australian cyclotron facilities at a number of overseas locations. The Australian facilities overseas have been a critical resource to CSIRO in developing an understanding at an atomic level of its new low-cost processes for the production of titanium powder and metals and parts. The potential of these titanium technologies for Australian resource and manufacturing industries is extraordinary. It is important, for example, to the future of the aviation industry.

The synchrotron facilities have been an important piece of infrastructure that has helped CSIRO reach the level of achievement that it has in these new technologies. I am pleased to say that Australia now has its own synchrotron, which was built by the Victorian government and is located adjacent to Monash University and the CSIRO campus at Clayton in Victoria—a campus that is going to become more important for the centre of CSIRO’s manufacturing research activities. Both CSIRO and ANSTO are foundation investors and members of the Australian Synchrotron Co. It is a world-class facility that will deliver beams of very intense X-rays with unique characteristics that can be used for a wide range of scientific experiments, including new drug design, advanced manufacturing, medical imaging, metals research and mineral analysis. The effective operation of this facility will support a large number of Australian national research priorities and associated goals.

We are fortunate as a nation to have this capacity to develop leading-edge technology in many areas, guaranteeing our future as a nation. There are outstanding research and development opportunities but unfortunately little is known about them, and some of the organisations involved are pilloried for the wrong reasons. Let us stop the fearmongering with respect to some of these debates, because we need these facilities.

Nuclear nonproliferation is an issue that raises the question of waste disposal. The Labor Party when last in government started two decades ago a process to deliver a national approach and a national solution to the issue of nuclear waste. That is still unresolved and it is an indictment of all of us. There is not a member or senator in this parliament who would not agree with me. I simply say that, if the games were stopped and all of us delivered a responsible outcome to the Australian community on this complex challenge, we would be a better nation. Australians deserve better than the cheap politics that has surrounded this complex and important decision for over two decades.

Radioactive material is currently stored at over 100 locations around Australia: in government stores, universities, hospitals and factories in the suburbs of our major capital cities. That is where it is stored now. We are saying we cannot establish a national facility in remote Australia to store it on a long-lasting basis, but, again, the facts speak for themselves. This waste is currently stored in the suburbs of our major capital cities. So let us have a factual debate rather than the emotional debate that has surrounded this issue for far too long.

Radioactive waste is disposed of at the Western Australian government’s Mount Walton East integrated waste management facility and in the Queensland government’s purpose-built radioactive waste store at Esk. Radioactive waste is stored at Woomera in South Australia and at the Lucas Heights facility in Sydney, and in defence facilities in and around Melbourne, Ipswich, Wodonga, Albury, Newcastle, Darwin, Sydney and Nowra. Radioactive waste is stored at CSIRO facilities in Canberra, Sydney, Adelaide, Mount Gambier, Brisbane and Melbourne—and guess where—at the Australian National University, one of Australia’s leading institutions.

It is about time we worked out where to put this waste and how to manage and store it in a proper, professional way. This waste includes such things as contaminated laboratory equipment, protective clothing, paper, rubber gloves, plastic, glassware, lightly contaminated soil arising from previous CSIRO research into mineral extraction that was transported to Woomera in 1995, and low-activity, disused radioactive sources such as smoke detectors and exit signs from the buildings we are working in today.

Let us store it properly and stop this stupid political debate that has surrounded this issue for far too long. We need a national repository, we need it sooner rather than later, and we need it in the hands of ANSTO so it is managed in a professional and proper way by an institution that we can trust. The Labor Party started this process, so we have got to be part of the solution. It has become too politicised in recent times, with foolish decisions made in the last election in an attempt to get it off the political agenda in the short term. This has only complicated what should have been an easy decision.

I raise these issues because, as far as I am concerned, they are all interrelated to the debate about the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and our responsibilities as a nation that will potentially be even more important in the global debate about the safe use of uranium into the future. The use of uranium coming out of Australia is going to grow sooner rather than later, with us as a nation potentially having the largest mine in the world and being the largest supplier of uranium in the world. The current policy limits our capacity to three mines, let alone using our capacity to open up a range of new opportunities in most states and territories of Australia.

This treaty is exceptionally important and the Labor Party supports the changes reflected in the bill before the House today. But we have added responsibility to work to strengthen the treaty even further as part of the ongoing debate about modernising the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. We owe that to ourselves as a nation. We owe that to ourselves as part of a global community. We also owe it to Australian scientists and engineers, who have a proud history in nuclear technologies—just as they have in solar technologies, light metals, coal technologies and so on.

It is equally important that we are at the leading edge of nuclear technology into the future as well. I say in conclusion that Labor supports the bill, but I call on the government to take a stronger approach when it comes to nonproliferation and for it to adopt Labor’s call for a new diplomatic initiative led by Australia to get the nuclear non-proliferation treaty back on track. Both sides of politics have supported those endeavours in the past. The global community has failed, at recent conferences, to achieve that. Both sides should renew their commitment because it is of fundamental importance to the future of a safe global community, a global community that will embrace nuclear energy more than ever. I commend the bill to the House.

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to support the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006. This is a non-controversial bill which, as the member for Batman has pointed out, the opposition supports. The purpose of the bill is to reinforce Australia’s commitment to the international regime for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by strengthening the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities in Australia. The bill implements new requirements following amendments to the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It regulates the decommissioning of a nuclear facility to ensure that Australia is able to meet its international obligations in this respect. It increases penalties for serious offences relating to security of nuclear materials. These are sensible measures and the opposition supports them.

Australia is currently having a debate about the future of nuclear energy in this country and also about the future of uranium mining and exporting. We in the Labor Party will be debating these issues at our national conference next month, so we will have a sound policy to put to the Australian people at the election later this year. The scope of that policy is something that delegates to the conference will determine, but I can tell the House now that our policy will firmly reject any suggestion of nuclear power generation in Australia. Let me quote from an excellent article by Senator Chris Evans, the shadow minister for resources and energy:

For countries with limited energy choices, nuclear energy may be a reasonable option despite its substantial disadvantages. But for a nation with vast reserves of cheap coal and gas, and an environment suited to renewable energy production, nuclear power makes no sense at all.

Australia has a competitive advantage in coal; we have an abundance of supplies and an established industry.

What we have got to do is bring the new technology into play to make it cleaner and more efficient.

Labor rejects both the anti-coal fundamentalism of the Greens and the fetish for nuclear power which seems to have seized the coalition in recent months.

These are discouraging times for those of us who take the issue of nuclear nonproliferation seriously, which is why I support any moves Australia can take, such as those in this bill, however limited, to support nonproliferation. Indeed, I echo the excellent sentiments of the member for Batman in pointing to the call by the former Leader of the Opposition, the member for Brand, for a new international diplomatic initiative led by Australia to enhance the provisions of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Last year we saw North Korea join the club of declared nuclear powers, although it now appears that the device the North Koreans exploded was small and not very sophisticated. That a lunatic such as Kim Jong Il should be close to developing a useable nuclear weapon is a frightening prospect and one which the international community, particularly North Korea’s neighbours, such as Japan, are increasingly alarmed by. Although I welcome the recent announcement that North Korea has agreed to suspend its nuclear program in exchange for assistance in developing non-nuclear energy options, I remain sceptical. The North Korean regime’s record of bad faith and broken agreements is too long for anyone to believe that Kim Jong Il has suddenly given up his strategy of nuclear blackmail. I fear we have not heard the last of this story.

The extended deterrence of the nuclear umbrella of the Americans over North-East Asia has provided the security that has underwritten the spectacular economic growth of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and even China. But, as a result of nuclear proliferation, I am concerned that Japan will now be asking the US for a nuclear guarantee—which, of course, no US government could provide. Although the North Korean nuclear threat to Japan has steadily grown since the end of the Cold War, it is not just about North Korea but also about China. During the Cold War, China developed nuclear weapons for its own defences, including deterring both superpowers. Now China is free to use nuclear weapons for other purposes, China’s destruction of one of its satellites in January strongly suggests the rise of China might not be too peaceful. This should be seen in the context of yet another 17 per cent increase in China’s acknowledged defence spending, its lack of transparency, its activities in the East China Sea and the rapid build-up of the Chinese navy.

Australian policymakers have to be concerned particularly about the effect on Japan of these developments in North-East Asia. I wonder about the internal debate within the Japanese governing party, the LDP, re extended deterrence of the US nuclear umbrella. Is their support growing for what might be described as the Gaullist position, long advocated by the likes of Japanese Diet member Shintaro Ishihara? Such a change in attitude in Japan would be based on the belief that Japan could not rely for its nuclear security on more powerful allies who might not prove reliable in a crisis. According to Robyn Lim, professor of international politics at Nanzan University in Japan, a top Australian analyst, who recently testified to the Labor Party national security committee, we are now entering what some strategists call ‘the third nuclear age, in which a much faster pace of nuclear proliferation can be expected—that is, horizontal proliferation; states acquiring nuclear weapons for the usual reasons: power, status and security’. Professor Lim has long questioned whether extended deterrence can possibly work in a multithreat environment. It is important to remember that everything we know—or we think we know—about nuclear deterrence and extended deterrence came out of the particular global strategic circumstances of the Cold War. The problem is, as Professor Lim points out, that the rules of the game have changed. If we have a multithreat environment, not based on two polar opposites who had rational aims, we have a very complicated situation with nuclear proliferation.

Particularly worrying is the rapid progress being made in Iran towards the development of nuclear weapons. Iran does not need nuclear energy any more than Australia does. It has huge reserves of oil and gas. The only reason Iran is building nuclear reactors is so that it can produce nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Iranian regime is scarcely bothering to conceal that fact. Furthermore, while we can reasonably expect that Kim Jong Il does not actually intend to use a nuclear weapon if he finally succeeds in building a rocket that could deliver one, the same cannot be said of Iran. Kim’s reasons for playing the nuclear card are essentially political and economic: he wants to blackmail the West, particularly South Korea and Japan, into perpetuating his economically and morally bankrupt state. His intentions are evil, but based on what Bismarck called an iron logic. President Ahmadinejad does not need Western money and his country is far from bankrupt. Iran is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, although that is not reflected in the living standards of the Iranian people, who continue to suffer under the Islamic republic’s economic mismanagement and corruption. Iran can afford to build nuclear weapons that work and delivery systems that deliver.

Iran is the only country in the world which has openly expressed the desire to destroy another sovereign state, Israel, in blatant violation of the UN charter to which Iran is a signatory. Today even Syria and Libya grudgingly accept Israel’s right to exist. Iran is the last bastion of rejectionism and its most dangerous advocate. I do not think the world quite realises how deep are the religious and ideological convictions that drive the behaviour of President Ahmadinejad and those around him. Shiah Muslims, like Christians and Jews, believe in a great redeeming figure who will return to earth and bring human history to an end. Christians believe in the return of Christ; Jews await the coming of Mosiach the Messiah; but the variant of Shiism to which Ahmadinejad belongs is known as Twelver Shiism. It awaits the return of the 12th or Hidden Imam, whose name is Muhammad al-Mahdi. Twelver Shiahs believe that Muhammad has been hidden by God since the ninth century and he will one day emerge to fulfil God’s plan. President Ahmadinejad and his circle believe, on the basis of various omens and prophesies, that the return of the Hidden Imam is imminent. Since the return of the Imam will bring human history to an end, they are not particularly concerned about earthly things, like whether the people of Iran can find employment or the broken-down state of Iran’s oil industry; they are concerned above all about the end of what they see as the greatest affront to God—that is, the establishment of a non-Muslim state in the Middle East, namely Israel.

Honourable members would be aware of President Ahmadinejad’s recent sponsorship of a grotesque conference of Holocaust deniers, led by David Duke of the Ku Klux Klan, in Tehran. They probably think Ahmadinejad’s preoccupation with disproving the Holocaust offensive and ridiculous but essentially harmless. This is a mistake. Ahmadinejad’s objective in trying to refute the irrefutable is to de-legitimise the state of Israel as a prelude to its destruction in fulfilment of what he conceives to be God’s will and as a precondition to the return of the Hidden Imam. That is the basis for his rhetorical attack against Israel. When he speaks to the UN Security Council next week, which is scheduled to discuss extended sanctions against Iran for its failure to observe international demands that it cut back its nuclear program, we can expect to hear more of his deluded view of reality, which he will bring to the UN Security Council, which he sees as a necessary precondition for an actual physical assault on the state of Israel.

This is the essential difference between the North Korean situation and the Iranian situation. North Korea is playing a game of bluff, a dangerous game but essentially a game. Kim Jong-il has his price and it now appears that the US and Japan—Japan less willingly—are willing to pay that price. This may prove to be a mistake in the long run, but it certainly eases the North Korean situation in the short term. President Ahmadinejad, in my view, is not bluffing and he does not have his price. He cannot be talked out of his nuclear ambitions and he will not be bribed out of them. What arguments, what bribes could mean anything to a fanatic who believes in the coming apocalypse? That is why Iran’s nuclear ambitions are so dangerous.

Of course, there are many international diplomatic moves that can be implemented in the meantime to stop the Iranian atom bomb. We can hope that comments made in the Iranian press recently by people associated with the mullahs, the Supreme Guidance Council, denigrating Ahmadinejad are a sign of hope, because many people argue that within the power circles in Iran the mullahs are more interested in keeping control of power than getting involved in a nuclear exchange. They prefer to continue running Iran than to get involved in a nuclear war with Israel. That is again a glimmer of rationality. Hopefully within the power circles in Iran this will be resolved in their favour by their pulling back Ahmadinejad on the nuclear weapons acquisition plan.

It is of course a great pity that this drama with Iran is unfolding at a time when there is a crisis of leadership in the Western world. President Bush has been discredited by the debacle in Iraq. One of history’s greatest Labour prime ministers, Tony Blair, is about to retire in September. The failure in Iraq, particularly the botched post-invasion plan, means that it is almost now impossible to mobilise international public opinion in the Western world to take the Iranian threat seriously. People say: ‘We were lied to about Iraq. Why should we believe you about Iran?’ It is a difficult question to answer.

But this is, in my view, not a problem for Israel alone. People no doubt remember the Israeli air attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 which ended Saddam Hussein’s first attempt to acquire nuclear capacity. They assume that Israel could always do the same thing to Iran. Perhaps many world powers secretly hope the Israelis will, so that it will absolve everyone else from dealing with the situation. There are two problems with this rosy scenario, one military and one political. Firstly, the Iranians also remember what happened to Osirak and are not as dumb as Saddam Hussein. Their nuclear facilities are scattered all over Iran and buried, thanks to North Korean engineers, deep underground. Perhaps the Israelis know where they are, but probably they do not, or they do not know where all of them are. Even if leaders in Jerusalem did, a single air raid would not do the job and they do not have the capacity to bomb every bunker in a country the size of Iran.

In any case, following the demise of Arik Sharon, the Israelis are quite unprepared for the challenge. Few analysts believe that the current shaky coalition government in Israel has the nerve to make a pre-emptive attack on Iran—even if it has the means to—unless the Iranian threat literally becomes imminent. I have no doubt, however, that if Iran really did attack Israel the response would be immediate and overwhelming. I am sure honourable members understand what I mean by this: the whole region, the whole world, would be plunged into a nuclear conflagration. That is why the current Iranian regime is the greatest threat ever faced by the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, of which this bill is a small part. Russia’s move in the last couple of days to withhold nuclear fuel from the nearly completed Bushehr nuclear power plant—I suspect it is unless Iran suspends its enrichment program—is a very encouraging development. When told of Russia giving Iran an ultimatum on its enrichment, a senior European official said:

We consider this a very important decision by the Russians. It shows that our disagreements with the Russians about the dangers of Iran’s nuclear program are tactical. Fundamentally, the Russians don’t want a nuclear Iran.

For a long time, there has been a proposal which would create hundreds of millions of dollars of business for Russia and at the same time ensure that Iran does not go nuclear. The proposal involves Iran receiving, for its power reactors, nuclear enriched material that was produced within Russian territory. Iran has unfortunately rejected that proposal.

Last month the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, informed some European officials that Russia had made a political decision not to deliver the fuel to Iran, adding that Russia would state publicly that the sole reason was financial. Then, last week, a senior Iranian official confirmed in an interview that the Secretary of the Russian National Security Council, Mr Ivanov, had threatened Iran with an ultimatum: the fuel would be delivered only after Iran’s enrichment of uranium at Natanz was frozen. In other words, the Russians are happy to provide nuclear fuel for the real domestic nuclear power facility they are building for the Iranians at Bushehr, but they are not prepared to continue providing it if the Iranians go ahead with their nuclear activity with their centrifuges at Natanz, which is where the world fears Ahmadinejad’s Iran is building fuel for their nuclear weapons. Mr Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister, also called on Iran to resolve outstanding questions with the International Atomic Energy Agency about its nuclear program and to stop enriching uranium. The Russians have been pressing Iran to take some sort of pause in its uranium enrichment which might allow the UN Security Council sanction process to halt and bring Iran back to the negotiating table. The Russian foreign minister said:

The clock must be stopped: Iran must freeze uranium enrichment ... The U.N. Security Council will then take a break, too, and the parties would gather at the negotiating table.

I congratulate the Russian foreign ministry and President Putin on this very wise stance of the Russian federation.

Five years ago, President Bush described Iraq, North Korea and Iran as the ‘axis of evil’. Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq has been overthrown. Kim Jong Il’s regime is now being bribed and cajoled into abandoning its nuclear program—at least for the time being—although, as Robyn Lim has pointed out, the subject of negotiations with North Korea is its ongoing nuclear program at Yongbyon. The negotiations are not about decommissioning the nuclear weapons that, theoretically or actually, the North Koreans have. This is subject to further negotiations, and I hope that in the political blowback from Iraq in North-East Asia we do not concede too much to the North Koreans. It is a very encouraging development, but we have to remain firm in our purpose in North-East Asia and hopefully decommission their primitive bombs.

President Ahmadinejad’s regime in Iran is the one partner in the ‘axis of evil’ that really does have the capacity to build weapons of mass destruction, really does have a target in mind as it builds them and really does have a regime evil enough and reckless enough to use them. After what has happened in Iraq, I am aware that there is not much appetite in the Western world for the concept of regime change. At this stage any regime change in Iran will be internal and limited, with the mullahs there realising that the whole world, via the UN Security Council, is putting tighter and tighter sanctions on them—financial and economic sanctions—and realising that the particular brand of provocative international behaviour of the Iranian president is going to lead to conflict and to their loss of power. I hope that this will cause them to wake up and to abandon this attempt to acquire nuclear weapons and to use them.

Unless there is a change of regime in Iran one way or the other, there is a real danger that not only will the nuclear non-proliferation regime be at grave risk, but so will the peace of the world. That is why I strongly endorse the comments of the member for Batman that the proposal of the former Leader of the Opposition, the member for Brand, for a new effort, an international diplomatic effort, by Australia to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and non-proliferation regime is an urgent task that Australia should take to its heart. This issue is becoming very live all around the world, and we are going to see more of it at the United Nations Security Council meeting next week when President Ahmadinejad will face all of his critics, including the Russian government, the European Union, the United States and indeed the entire world, who have decided that if Iran will not desist from its policy of acquiring nuclear weapons it will face stronger and stronger sanctions. I hope that, despite Mr Ahmadinejad’s no doubt deluded rhetoric next week, forces within Iran come to the realisation that the international community will not put up with these threats of genocide and the plan to acquire nuclear weapons that would enable them to put that into effect.

Warren Snowdon (Lingiari, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Northern Australia and Indigenous Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Firstly, let me say that I enjoyed listening to the previous member, the member for Melbourne Ports. I do not always agree with him but I think the arguments which he presented about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular in relation to Iran and North Korea, are very apposite. We need to take strong note of them because there is absolutely no doubt in my mind, and I am sure in the minds of many others, that we have to be watching very carefully as to what happens in relation to those matters.

Nevertheless, it is important that we do solidly support the legislation that is before the House today. The Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006 will implement new requirements of the amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which were agreed in July 2005. The bill amends a range of acts, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Act 1998, the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994 and the Australian Federal Police Act 1979.

The 2005 amendment will come into force after two-thirds of the parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material have ratified or otherwise accepted the 2005 amendment. Unfortunately, to date only seven parties have done so. The title of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is expanded under this legislation to include the protection of nuclear facilities. The preamble to the convention is also replaced completely by the new preamble in the 2005 amendment. The paragraph relating to criminal offences is expanded both to include coverage of nuclear facilities and to reflect an urgent need to strengthen existing offences.

There is a new paragraph which reflects the desire to ‘avert the potential dangers posed by illicit trafficking and the unlawful taking and use of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, noting that physical protection against such acts has become a matter of increased national and international concern’. I note that this legislation has gone through the processes of the Senate and the Senate committees, and they have endorsed strongly this legislation as well as Australia’s continued engagement in multilateral efforts on disarmament and nonproliferation.

I want to also attach myself to those recommendations, because, as the member for Batman said, it seems to me that we have a great responsibility for a number of reasons, but, because of our interest in ensuring that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is back on track, we should be increasing our efforts internationally to ensure that is the case. I say that because we know that there is a debate taking place within the Labor Party at the moment—and other members have referred to it—about the question of expansion of the nuclear industry in Australia through the mining of uranium. That debate will have its culmination on the floor of the national conference in April in Sydney.

I have been involved with this debate on the nuclear industry since the mid-1970s. I did my utmost to prevent the expansion of uranium mining in the Northern Territory in 1977 and 1978, and the arguments about the nature of the nuclear industry which were used then remain valid today. These are issues which this community has to contemplate, and one of these issues is the question of nuclear non-proliferation. There is grave concern, despite the fact of the wealth that the uranium industry might bring to this country, about the question of proliferation of nuclear weapons. As I said earlier, we have heard the member for Melbourne Ports in a very erudite way explain what is happening with North Korea and Iran in terms of nuclear nonproliferation. There is genuine concern in the community, despite the fact that we export uranium, about the question of nuclear nonproliferation, and it is of interest to know that that issue—although not one which is seen in the headlines of major newspapers when we have these discussions—is very important to the Australian community. We need to ensure, as this bill does, that we support every effort that will prevent the expansion of the nuclear industry, but, most importantly, we need to protect—and ensure that we protect—those places where nuclear materials might be stored or otherwise used.

We need also to contemplate the arguments which are used—again, as they were in the early seventies—about the expansion of the uranium industry in Australia in terms of their environmental impact: what that has meant, what has developed over time, what the issues are and whether they have been addressed. That is something which I know is, again, at the heart of many of the concerns which are being expressed within the Labor Party as I talk to members of the Labor Party about the proposal to change the Labor Party’s policy at its conference. Those issues go not only to the immediate environmental impacts of the mining operation themselves but also, most importantly, to the question of the downstream effects of nuclear waste. The member for Batman, I think quite properly, said that this country needs to take a far more sophisticated approach to the question of nuclear waste disposal.

Barry Wakelin (Grey, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Hear, hear!

Warren Snowdon (Lingiari, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Northern Australia and Indigenous Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Whilst I note that the member for Grey said, ‘Hear, hear!’, let me say to him that it is totally inappropriate for the Commonwealth government to seek to impose nuclear waste facilities upon the community of the Northern Territory without consultation and without agreement. The fact is that a great proponent of the nuclear industry in terms of mining, the South Australian government, prevented the siting of a nuclear waste facility, the national repository, in their state because they sought to reflect the concerns which were being expressed in their community about that matter.

The bottom line is—and this, of course, is the rub—that one of the chief proponents of the change to the uranium policy at the ALP national conference will be the Premier of South Australia. To me, you cannot have it both ways. You have got to be in a position to accept that, if you are going to start the process in the nuclear fuel cycle, you have to go to the very end of that process and understand that you have obligations to deal with the nuclear waste generated.

Everyone accepts that there needs to be a national repository. But to have that waste repository now, as a result of the decision by the South Australian government and of decisions taken by the Commonwealth government because of the inability to be able to negotiate a set of arrangements with any state government, and to impose it upon the people of the Northern Territory just because the Commonwealth can do so is, in my view, immoral. The fact is that the Northern Territory community is sick and tired of the way this government has dealt with this situation. When a conservative government in the Northern Territory dealt with a Labor government federally, not once in the 13 years that that Labor government was in power did it seek to impose its view upon the people of the Northern Territory in the way the current government has sought to impose its view on the people of the Northern Territory—on a number of occasions—by denying due process and the right of the Territory community to determine what should happen within the jurisdiction of the Northern Territory.

One of the most heinous of these has been the decision by the Commonwealth government to arbitrarily choose three sites around the Northern Territory, which is Commonwealth land, and say to the people of the Northern Territory, ‘We’ve now chosen three sites; one of these three sites is quite probably going to be the place where we are going to secure our nuclear waste repository.’ They did that without agreement. We heard members of this parliament, ministers in this government, say to the people of the Northern Territory that they thought this country was uninhabited, that no-one was living out there, and so on. Of course, that is just absolute, absurd nonsense. There are Aboriginal people with traditional rights in those communities, and there are pastoralists who live very close to the sites which have been chosen. The community is most concerned about it, yet it was not something which was negotiated; it was something which was imposed.

Whilst the member for Batman is quite right to raise the concerns about our needing to have a national repository, the way in which it has been imposed upon the people of the Northern Territory is not appropriate and, as I said, is totally immoral. But we do have a responsibility, and that responsibility means that we should be engaging all communities nationally to find a solution to the problem—and not, as the Commonwealth has done, just imposing it upon one part of the community just because it can.

With great respect to you, Mr Deputy Speaker Scott, you come from a rural community and understand, as I do, that rural communities across Australia are sick and tired of being dictated to in the way this federal government seeks to dictate to them. We need to be able to assure the people who live in the bush that they are not going to be subject to arbitrary decisions in the way in which people in the Northern Territory have been subject to decisions about nuclear waste disposal. We have a responsibility to ensure—and I am sure you do; I hope you do—that we speak up on behalf of those rural constituencies. You have a responsibility to say to this government that, just as your rural constituents would not want their land denigrated in the way the Northern Territory land has been denigrated by this government—and their rights denigrated—you would support the people of the Northern Territory in ensuring that their struggle against victimisation by this federal government is successful. I hope that is something you would do in your party room, because we share a common interest, and that common interest is to ensure that the rights of every Australian are protected by this parliament. They have not been protected by this parliament, particularly by your government, in the way in which it has imposed this nuclear facility on the people of the Northern Territory.

I will go to the question of the ALP national conference. As president of the Northern Territory branch of the Labor Party, I have been holding forums across the Northern Territory on the question of uranium mining. That is with the full knowledge that, given the way in which these things happen, in all likelihood the Labor Party will have a discussion about a policy proposal which will be given to it by its leaders at the national conference, there will be a vigorous debate and the policy will be changed.

We all know what the end result is likely to be. Nevertheless, I saw it as my obligation to go and talk to the rank and file of the Labor Party in the Northern Territory about what they thought about these policy proposals. They indicated to me that not only do they still harbour the same concerns that were expressed by me and many others in the seventies but also they remain really concerned about nuclear nonproliferation and waste disposal. They are most concerned that when we have this discussion, as the member for Batman said, we properly address all parts of the question. We need to do that in a sophisticated and relatively detached manner.

Even though I have been opposed to the nuclear industry all my adult life, I am a realist and I understand that we are going to have uranium mining now and into the future. Therefore, we need to rationally address all of these issues. The fact is that we are not going to have a policy change in the Labor Party which will close down any mines. The fact is that, under the existing arrangements, there is the capacity for new mines to be developed across the country. The odd thing is that they have not been, even though I understand that uranium is almost at $100 a pound. The fact is that we have not had a plethora of uranium mines developed across the community, partly because state Labor governments have said they will not countenance them—except, of course, the government of South Australia. That government has decided that it will not accept a nuclear waste repository, even though it is a chief proponent of the expansion of the uranium industry.

I think, therefore, that there is some logic in us arguing that those people who are proponents of the nuclear industry should come up with a solution for nuclear waste disposal and should not allow decisions which they make to have a detrimental impact upon other people in the community in the way in which the decision taken by the South Australian government has had an impact upon the people of the Northern Territory. They have an obligation.

I say to those people who are going to participate in this debate at the national conference that they should accept that obligation and should come up with a proposal which, on the issue of nuclear waste disposal, addresses the national priorities, needs and concerns. They should accept that if there is an open and fair process in assessing a site—which did take place as a result of initiatives of the Keating government in the early nineties—once the site is selected, on the basis of the best scientific knowledge, negotiations should take place in a proper and ordered manner. All of the communities that might be involved need to be engaged, including the local communities. Then we can get a resolution to this.

It will not happen if, as the federal government has done with the Northern Territory, you seek to impose a solution. But if you accept that you are going to be a party to the discussion about where a nuclear waste facility should be, then you should be prepared to accept that the outcome which is agreed as a result of that discussion is something you will advocate. You should not treat the community with contempt, which is what has been done by the government of South Australia. I think they have been contemptuous of their obligations, partly because they were participants in the process in the first instance but also because we have a national responsibility to address the issue.

Whether or not we end up getting a waste facility in the Northern Territory, if, as I hope, Labor wins the federal election later this year, then the undertaking is very clear: we will go back to the drawing board. Unless contracts have been let, we have an obligation to go back and find a rational way to deal with this issue. The rational way we would deal with this issue is by going through the process which I outlined a little earlier.

I know that there are people on both sides of this parliament who are concerned about the way in which we are dealing with these matters. I know there are people on both sides of this parliament and certainly people in the general community who, whilst they are very concerned about uranium mining, accept that uranium mining is going to continue now and into the future. We need to address these issues of national priority. We must do it in a way which the community accepts as being fair and reasonable and not in a way which imposes upon people or derogates people’s rights and their desires to live safely.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I am pleased that I have had the opportunity to contribute to this discussion, but I say to you that the nuclear industry—uranium mining and all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle—is not going to leave the community’s psyche. People are going to be engaged in this discussion for many years to come, partly because of the priority that the government is imposing on us to develop nuclear power generation. Let me make it very clear, so that the government and those people who support the government around this place know, that the Labor Party will not be part of it. We will not be part of embracing nuclear power generation.

Greg Hunt (Flinders, Liberal Party, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

But you do want to expand uranium mining.

Warren Snowdon (Lingiari, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Northern Australia and Indigenous Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

No, I never said that. You have missed what I have said, and I have said it very clearly. Expanding uranium mining and nuclear power generation do not go hand in glove, my friend. The fact is that we have sufficient cheap energy resources so that we do not require nuclear fuel generation, as you well know. The fact is that, if the government were prepared to invest in renewables in the way they ought to be prepared to invest in renewables, we would not even be having this discussion.

Greg Hunt (Flinders, Liberal Party, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

What are the people who are buying our uranium using it for?

Warren Snowdon (Lingiari, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Northern Australia and Indigenous Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am concerned that the member opposite wants to have a discussion about this, and I am happy to have one with him. But unfortunately, as I only have 56 seconds left, it ain’t going to happen today.

Greg Hunt (Flinders, Liberal Party, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

in reply—In rising to summarise the contributions to this debate, I want to proceed on three fronts: firstly, to address the arguments made by speakers on both sides of the House; secondly, to deal with the content of the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006; and, thirdly, to deal with the process and those who have contributed to the bill.

In dealing with the contributions made by speakers on both sides of the House, I hope that I am characterising their contributions correctly and accurately by grouping them into three main themes. The first of these themes was support for the general provisions of the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006. I believe that we have had universal support from all speakers, representing strong and unified support within the parliament for the general notion of protection of the physical materials and strengthening of penalties for any serious offences in relation to nuclear materials within Australia or arising from Australian activities.

The second theme of debate today has been around a general desire for a strong non-proliferation regime. I know from my time in a previous life before being a member of this place that I was engaged with and saw the work of the foreign minister, the Prime Minister, the then defence minister and others in the development and establishment of the comprehensive test ban treaty. Australia was one of the driving forces behind that, and it has been one of the driving forces in maintaining the integrity of and further strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. So those are two fundamental pillars of the international non-proliferation system. Their work and their standing as foundation treaties are critical. We are proud of the role that we have played and are committed to future work on that front. But there is strong and united support within the House on those points.

The third of the themes raised for debate within this House has been the division which we have seen on the opposition side over the future of uranium mining in Australia. As I understand it, we saw from the member for Batman clear support for extension and expansion of uranium mining and the uranium industry within Australia, and that of course is somewhat at odds with the position presented by the member for Lingiari. So it is representative of a debate currently going on within the opposition but one which I think is a settled debate, even though it is likely that there will be some light and fury over the coming months. But it does highlight the curious position of, on the one hand, expanding uranium mining and, on the other, opposing nuclear energy, because all uranium mined from Australia is used for one purpose.

Honourable Member:

Honourable member interjecting—

Greg Hunt (Flinders, Liberal Party, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Well, there may be some medical purpose for the uranium that comes from Australia, but essentially it is used globally for the generation of nuclear power. It is not used for paperweights or bookends; it is used for a very clear purpose—that is, contributing to the practice and expansion of nuclear power globally. The counterposition of opposition to nuclear energy is entirely at odds (a) with the continued practice of uranium mining and (b) even more so with the proposed expansion of uranium mining which some within the federal opposition are championing. So there is a fundamental unresolved tension which is contradictory, which the members opposite know to be contradictory, but which they will persist in advancing. I note specifically the tension between the positions of the member for Batman and the member for Lingiari on precisely that front.

I specifically commend the contribution of the member for Hughes, who has within her electorate the Lucas Heights reactor. She has been a strong supporter of the new reactor, which is being used for scientific and medical purposes. The capacity to do different forms of medical imaging in nuclear medicine around Australia is dependent upon the work of that reactor and others of a similar nature around the world. It creates waste which has to be dealt with. At present, that waste is stored in hospital basements around Australia, and so we have opposition to waste management by different state governments but a willingness to allow that waste to remain within hospital basements. Again, that is a fundamental tension.

No person in Australia has strongly recognised this more than the member for Grey, who has said it would be an appropriate place in his own electorate. He has been a champion of a national repository within his own electorate but unfortunately his state government, whilst generating uranium and nuclear waste through the treatment of patients for good and proper reasons in their own hospitals, will not accept that responsibility. So we are left with the tension, which the member for Lingiari set out, that the very people who support the industry and benefit from the medical treatment in South Australia are opposing in quite a venal way the storage in their own area.

I similarly want to commend the words and work of the member for Ryan in relation to nonproliferation and North Korea. There is a long way to go but we are making promising steps. We are not as advanced with Iran and the potential for a breach in the non-proliferation regime there. We will be vigilant. There is a lot of strong international diplomacy, of which Russia plays an important part, still to be carried out.

This brings me to the second part of my speech, which is to re-emphasise very briefly the core elements of the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006. These elements can be summarised in three parts. Firstly, there is an establishment of stronger and better physical protection standards. Whilst these are legislative standards, they reflect an existing practice and international regime already in place. It is not as if there has been a lapse, but we are strengthening the legislation to back up that which is already in place.

Secondly, there are clear and precise areas where we are increasing the penalties for serious offences, which may in some way involve Australians acting against the safeguards and the regime for protecting the use of nuclear materials. Thirdly, in this bill there is a strengthening of the national counterproliferation objectives by extending the territorial jurisdiction for certain offences to include Australian residents anywhere in the world. The law currently applies to Australian citizens, but we are ensuring that it also applies to Australian residents. It is a tough recognition of the challenges we face today but it is an important one, and I am pleased that it has the support of all members of this House.

Finally, I want to thank all of those organisations, institutions and individuals who have contributed to the development of this bill, in particular the members of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, but also all of the different contributors. They serve Australia well. They do a great job. On behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I thank them. I commend the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006 to the chamber.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

Ordered that this bill be reported to the House without amendment.