Danna Vale (Hughes, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

The Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006 will be welcomed by the people of Australia, and most especially by the people in my electorate of Hughes, in which is located Australia’s only nuclear research reactor at Lucas Heights. The bill implements Australia’s commitment to strengthened international measures for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. Further, it provides for machinery changes to improve the application of existing non-proliferation arrangements.

This bill amends the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 to implement new requirements of the amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to regulate, with respect to nuclear safeguards, the decommissioning of a nuclear facility to ensure that Australia is able to meet its international obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency under the additional protocol. It makes penalties for the most serious offences consistent with penalties under comparable Commonwealth non-proliferation legislation and provides a significant deterrent to the commission of such offences.

ANSTO is Australia’s national nuclear research and development organisation and the centre of Australian nuclear expertise. It is the second largest corporate employer in my electorate. It employs around 900 local residents and provides income for several hundred local tradespeople and industry suppliers. As a matter of fact, ANSTO contributes over $70 million to my local electorate economy.

ANSTO is responsible for delivering specialised advice, scientific services and products to government, industry, academia and other research organisations. ANSTO’s nuclear infrastructure includes the research reactor OPAL, which has taken over from HIFAR. It has particle accelerators, radiopharmaceutical production facilities and a range of other unique research facilities. OPAL will be Australia’s only nuclear reactor. It will be used to produce radioactive products for use in medicine and industry and as a source of neutron beams for scientific research and to irradiate silicon for semiconductor applications.

The OPAL—which stands for Open Pool Australian Light-water—reactor is due to be officially opened on the same site as HIFAR at Lucas Heights in my electorate in April this year. The new OPAL reactor is of profound significance for those at the leading edge of science and research. The new reactor will be a world-class neutron source, capable of supporting up to 17 neutron beam instruments. The scope of research that these instruments will allow is tremendous, from research on advanced materials through to molecular biology, using technologies that were unknown at the time that the old HIFAR was opened by Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies on 18 April 1958.

As well as opening up new areas of research, ANSTO is well known as the principal producer and supplier of radioisotopes for medical diagnoses, treatment and pain relief in Australia. Last year approximately 550,000 patient treatments were transported from ANSTO to hospitals around Australia and, increasingly, in South-East Asia. Nuclear medicines are chiefly used for diagnoses, but increasingly also to treat disease and for pain relief. For example, bone scans can detect the spread of cancers six to 18 months sooner than X-rays. ANSTO also continually conducts new research aimed at developing new radiation treatments for different types of cancer and other medical conditions.

With additional capacity, ANSTO will also be able to expand its support of the Australian manufacturing, minerals and agricultural industries. The estimated gross benefit of support to the minerals industry alone currently exceeds $100 million annually. The replacement reactor will give us significantly more. This modern, high-tech research facility will attract eminent foreign scientists to work in Australia and provide Australian scientists with greater reciprocal access to complementary first-class research facilities around the world. Indeed, the return to Australia from the new research reactor will be significant in attracting to Australia the greatest scientific minds of our age.

To put this into perspective in terms of general everyday use, radioactivity from ANSTO includes applications in the automobile industry, which uses radioactive materials to test the quality of steel in cars. Aircraft manufacturers use radiation to check for flaws in jet engines. Mining and petroleum companies use radionuclides to locate and quantify mineral deposits. Manufacturers use radioactive materials to obtain the proper thickness of tin and aluminium. Pipeline companies use radioactive materials to look for defects in welds. Oil, gas and mining companies use radioactive materials to map geological contours, using test wells and mine bores, and to determine the presence of hydrocarbons. By showing how plants absorb fertiliser, radioactive materials help researchers learn when fertiliser should be applied and how much is needed. This helps prevent the overuse of fertilisers, a major source of soil and water pollution. Radiation sterilisation techniques are used to control insect pests such as fruit fly—very important to Australian industry. The smoke detectors in our houses and offices rely on a tiny radioactive source to sound the alarm when it senses smoke from a fire. The irradiation of silicon for the semiconductor industry is a significant business for ANSTO. Non-stick pans are treated with radiation to ensure that the coating will stick to the surface. Photocopiers use small amounts of radiation to eliminate static and prevent paper from sticking together and jamming the machine. Cosmetics, hair products and contact lens solutions are sterilised with radiation to remove irritants and allergens. Radioactive materials are also used to sterilise medical bandages and a variety of personal health and hygiene products. The use of radioactive materials, nuclides and isotopes are so varied and extensive within our community that I think many of us do not realise the applications in our everyday use.

I also want to take this opportunity to remind the constituents of my electorate of the existence of ARPANSA. ARPANSA is the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency. Depending on your point of view, I will either accept the blame or the credit for its existence. When the Prime Minister informed me many years ago that we would receive in my electorate a new reactor, which is now called OPAL, I asked the Prime Minister if we could have an independent oversight agency. I want to acknowledge the work that was done towards establishing this agency by a previous minister for health, Dr Michael Wooldridge, and a previous member for Adelaide in her role as parliamentary secretary. It took a tremendous amount of work to establish this agency which has a vital role in establishing world’s best practice and overseeing the fact that such is continued on at ANSTO by the professionals that are there. The agency is headed up by Dr John Loy, who is highly regarded, and his team of scientific researchers. My constituents can take great faith and comfort in the fact that this is an independent body, an independent oversight agency of very high expertise. I am grateful to the government for having made sure that this came into existence.

To return to the bill, Australia has international obligations to safeguard nuclear material under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The convention sets standards for the international transport of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes. It defines serious offences involving nuclear materials which parties to the convention must make punishable. These include ‘the receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material’ without lawful authority and a threat ‘to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial property damage’.

The convention also specifies certain levels of physical protection needed during international transport of nuclear material. This requires Australia and the other signatories to the convention to ‘take appropriate steps within the framework of its national law and consistent with international law’. The convention was opened for signature in 1980 and entered into force on 8 February 1987. Notably, the original document did not address the protection of nuclear facilities and deals only in a limited way with the domestic use, storage and transportation of nuclear material.

On 8 July 2005, delegates from 89 countries agreed on changes to strengthen the physical protection convention. The amended convention makes it legally binding for states to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport. The amendments strengthen requirements for the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities against criminal or terrorist attack.

There were four main amendments to the convention: (1) a new article 2A established a series of fundamental principles to be applied to protect nuclear material against theft and sabotage and to rapidly recover any missing or stolen nuclear material; (2) an amendment to article 5 to strengthen cooperation among states in the event of actual or threatened theft of nuclear material or sabotage; (3) the creation of new offences under article 7 of the convention relating to the trafficking of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear facilities with the intent to cause death, injury or damage by exposure to radiation; (4) new articles 11A and 11B dealing with extradition and mutual legal assistance in relation to offences under article 7 of the convention that stipulate states cannot refuse to extradite or provide mutual legal assistance for an offence under article 7 on the sole ground that it is a political offence under domestic law.

In a statement to the convention, the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office supported the proposed amendments. It stated:

The Australian Government is committed to addressing international concerns about nuclear terrorism, smuggling and sabotage, and to protecting people and the environment from any impacts associated with such activities. The amended Physical Protection Convention aims to address these issues more comprehensively than the existing convention. Australia has played a leading role in developing these changes, and to encourage universal adherence should be among the first to ratify and implement them.

The provisions of the bill are to implement Australia’s commitment to these international measures which increase the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. In particular, the bill is intended to meet the new requirements of the July 2005 amendments to the physical protection convention. The amended convention makes it legally binding for states to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport. To this end, the bill makes amendments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Act 1998, the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994, the Australian Federal Police Act 1979, the Extradition Act 1988 and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987.

Most of the bill’s amendments are made to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987. This act gives legislative effect to Australia’s international nuclear non-proliferation obligations, establishes a system of permits for the possession and transportation of nuclear material, and provides a legislative basis for the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office. The bill inserts a new section 13(3)(d)(da) into this act stating that a permit to possess nuclear material may be granted provided ‘measures are taken that are consistent with Australia’s obligations under the physical protection convention’. The bill also amends this act to: introduce new offences and increase penalties for various offences under part III of the act; extend the geographical scope of jurisdiction for various offences under part III; and require a permit to decommission a facility.

The bill also introduces three new offences and imprisonment penalties under the safeguards act. Under new section 29A, a person found guilty of decommissioning a facility without a permit faces an imprisonment penalty of five years. Under new section 34A, a person commits an offence if he or she carries, sends, or moves nuclear material into or out of Australia or a foreign country. A person found guilty of this offence faces an imprisonment penalty of 10 years. Under new section 35A, a person found guilty of interfering with the operation of a nuclear facility—and who does so intending or knowing that the act will cause injury or damage to property—faces an imprisonment penalty of 20 years.

The bill also strengthens the maximum term of various imprisonment offences under part III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987. It contains five provisions to lengthen imprisonment penalties under the act. Under proposed section 23(1), the maximum imprisonment term for a person found guilty of possessing nuclear material without a permit will be lengthened from not more than five years to not more than 10 years. Under proposed section 26(1), the maximum imprisonment term for a person found guilty of communicating information about nuclear technology as defined in section 4(1) of the act will be lengthened from not more than two years to not more than 10 years.

Under proposed section 26A(1), the imprisonment penalty for a person found guilty of communicating information that compromises the security of nuclear material will be lengthened from two years to eight years. Under proposed section 31(1), the maximum imprisonment term for a person found guilty of obstructing or hindering an agency inspector in the performance of a duty under the act will be lengthened from not more than six months to not more than two years. Under section 35, the maximum imprisonment term for a person found guilty of using nuclear material to cause serious damage to any person or substantial damage to property will be lengthened from 10 years to 20 years. I have taken time to explain those increased penalties for the benefit of the constituents of my electorate of Hughes.

The bill inserts a new section 16B into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 to allow the minister to grant a written permit to decommission the whole or part of a nuclear facility. Under this section the bill requires that the permit to decommission a facility must be approved by the director of safeguards as per subsection 12(2) of the act. The director must also be satisfied that appropriate safeguards could be applied during the decommissioning and that adequate physical security could be applied to nuclear material during the commissioning. The bill also inserts a new section 29A which makes it an offence for a person to decommission the whole or part of a facility without holding a permit.

In conclusion, the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill 2006 is a strong response to Australia’s new obligations under the amended physical protection convention. It reflects the active role that Australia took in negotiating the amendments to the convention. The system of permits and the list of offences under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 already includes elements of some of the new offences required by the amendments. The bill responds further to the amendments by increasing the prison penalties and extending the geographical scope of jurisdiction for offences under the safeguards act. It also contains three new offences relating to the decommissioning of a nuclear facility without a permit, trafficking nuclear material and interfering with the operation of a nuclear facility—all very important amendments and aspects for the people of Australia but of particular interest to the people of my electorate. I commend this bill to the House.

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