Paul Neville (Hinkler, National Party) Share this | Hansard source

On 18 August 2008 I was at the cenotaph in Hervey Bay. Lieutenant Colonel Harry Smith, who had been ill, was visited by seven of his colleagues—locals and visitors—who went up with him to lay wreaths on the cenotaph for Long Tan Day. There was nothing particularly spectacular about this, but, as those eight men stepped back from the cenotaph, the gathered crowd broke into loud and sustained applause. To me, they were emblematic of Australians who have for many years felt that many injustices in Vietnam have not been attended to.

I want to talk about one of those instances tonight. It is 18 August 1966 in the partly deserted village of Long Tan, four kilometres east of the Australian base at Nui Dat. It is mid-afternoon; 11 Platoon is out on patrol with D Company 6RAR, and they engage the enemy. They kill one and the rest take flight. What they did not know, and nor did their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Smith, the man at Hervey Bay I spoke about, who was then Major Harry Smith, was that they had contacted the forward units of two and a half to three thousand Viet Cong and regional and North Vietnamese regulars. There were only 105 men in D Company, and they were engaging two and a half thousand. So the odds were over 20 to one. The Vietnamese units came forward to see what was going on, a battle ensued and Major Smith had to send out 12 Platoon and 10 Platoon to try to get 11 Platoon back. Eventually, at about 6.10 pm, he got all his units together. Ten minutes earlier, a helicopter had dropped to them ammunition wrapped in blankets.

Let me divert for a minute. Prior to this, support having been called for, A Company came forward with 10 APCs, seven of which were heading towards the battle. About a kilometre short of Long Tan they too met a group of Vietnamese of company strength. They took them on. One particular man whom I know in Bundaberg rolled off his APC. He and his machine gunner lay on the ground, then got up and went straight into the face of the enemy, firing at them as they went. When their ammunition ran out they went with bayonets. It was such a convincing assault that the company of Vietnamese withdrew—turned and ran, actually.

Then they came on to the battle. By the time they got to the battle proper it had been completed. Major Harry Smith and his men—105 of them—took on wave after wave of battalion strength enemy who tried as they would to pierce the perimeter. Not once did they cross the Australian perimeter and, in fact, some of the battle occurred at the range of only 15 metres.

While all this was going on, Harry Smith was directing the battle. He was on his belly in the filthy mud, with Captain Morrie Stanley, a New Zealand officer who was directing the fire from the 24 guns that were behind them. He directed fire into the rubber plantation at Long Tan, all 24 guns firing at once—3,500 shells—you can imagine the devastation that caused. The effect of all this was that the enemy eventually broke off the engagement at a quarter to seven that night. The 11th Platoon had already lost half its number, either wounded or killed in the initial encounter. So in effect you had 80 Australians taking that fight off. But as Harry Smith himself says, nine of the 12 men that he wanted recognised for that engagement and who have been denied that recognition, were right in the front line. Three of them came up with the APCs with A Company.

Why do I feel so strongly about this? They were recommended for awards, and in fact two senior officers received DSOs. Harry Smith’s likely award, originally to be a DSO, was downgraded and he received the Military Cross. Two of his lieutenants, Sabben and Kendall, were downgraded to MIDs, and his 12 men that he recommended did not receive awards, including one who was killed in action. Unbelievable stuff.

There was a review, as there is at the end of all conflicts—what is called the end-of-war review—and still these men’s awards were not upgraded. Again, what is even more disturbing is the fact that another review was held under Generals Abigail and Gower and Brigadier Warner in 2008. They restored Harry Smith’s award to the equivalent of a DSO, the Star of Gallantry, and the two lieutenants’ to the equivalent of the Military Cross, the Medal of Gallantry—but again, nothing for the 12 soldiers.

There was a further review by a professor, a warrant officer who had not been in Vietnam and who had no Vietnam experience, and a former lieutenant colonel who had a staff posting in Vietnam. They again recommended against these awards. What had happened was that instead of those awards being kept for the end-of-war review, they were destroyed, and there is evidence that they were destroyed. But there is eyewitness evidence that these men acted with conspicuous bravery, and Harry Smith can tell you in intimate detail even today what each of them did. There is no justification at all for those men not receiving awards.

Madam Deputy Speaker, do you know that in the Vietnam War there were 726 awards, 61 going to private soldiers, and only 35 medals? In 1984 the Military Historical Society of Australia, in a paper on awards during the Vietnam War, said that the majority of awards were given to those people furthest from the action. What an absolute disgrace. I would like to go into more detail on this. I saw the reaction of fellow Australians at the cenotaph in 2008 at Hervey Bay. I know Harry Smith and his integrity. I know that these men fought with conspicuous gallantry and I am calling tonight for a further inquiry. I do not care what form it takes. Perhaps we should take it into the parliament and do it as a Senate inquiry. But this injustice cannot be allowed to continue and I will not rest until it is addressed. We go there on Long Tan Day, we put our hands on our hearts, we talk about the glories of what happened in Vietnam and yet we deny awards to 12 people who were seminal to the battle being won. It is a disgrace. (Time expired)

See this speech in context