Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise in support of the Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2019. I was looking forward to speaking in the chamber today and listening to the honourable member's contribution about how Labor would support this bill. But, unfortunately, that does not appear to be the case, at least in its current form.

The Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2019 amends the Aviation Transport Security Act and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 to address criminal activity at Australia's borders. The bill does this by changing the eligibility criteria under the aviation and maritime security identification card schemes, the ASIC and MSIC schemes, to exclude persons with a serious criminal history or with known links to organised crime. At present, the background check for ASIC and MSIC cardholders establishes whether an applicant poses a security threat but does not consider if the individual may pose a criminal threat. This bill will address that shortcoming. The bill has been reviewed by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, which recommended that the bill be passed with an amendment to allow applications to be refused on the basis of an adverse criminal intelligence assessment. An amendment to the bill has been developed to implement this recommendation.

The member for Ballarat talked about there not being a sufficient definition in the bill of what a serious crime is. Providing a definition of a serious crime in the bill, in my respectful submission, could inadvertently lead to serious offences not being captured in the regulations. Regulations made under the new powers being inserted by the bill will indicate categories of offences that are considered to be serious crimes. By specifically outlining categories of offences that are considered serious in relation to Australia's transport system, it ensures that we accurately capture offences most related to aviation, maritime and offshore facility security. Under this definition, serious criminal activity includes the sexual exploitation and abuse of children with lifelong impact on victims and families. It includes illicit drugs on our streets destroying lives and communities. It includes the money-laundering operations destroying our financial markets, the black market firearm shipments fuelling violence, and cybertheft of personal information and online investment scams, which constantly prey on Australian citizens day after day. These activities cause enormous human suffering in Australia, and the measures introduced in this bill will strengthen Australia's ability to combat serious crime.

Serious crime is a major threat to the Australian way of life and, as I suggested a moment ago, it causes enormous human suffering. Serious and organised criminals control illicit markets that can serve to fund a broad range of criminal activities, including terrorism. Organised criminals are gaining a major source of revenue from this illicit drug market. We need to ensure that our airports and our seaports are not safe havens for serious criminal activity. The Australian Institute of Criminology has estimated the cost of serious and organised crime in 2016-17 to be between $23.8 billion and $47.4 billion—huge sums of money at a huge cost to the Australian community. As sure as night follows day, this cost will continue to rise and it is imperative that the government puts in place measures to prevent serious crime, for the safety and security of all Australians.

The ASIC and MSIC schemes have been very effective in protecting Australian airports and seaports from terrorism. However, they are vulnerable to exploitation by serious crime groups. Securing our airports and seaports against infiltration from organised crime is vital in protecting legitimate industries and the Australian community. Airports and seaports are commonly used as entrance points to Australia for illicit goods and for transporting such goods around Australia. Criminals engage in illicit activities to maximise their profits, much to the detriment of all Australians, in areas such as illicit drugs, violence, money laundering, cybercrime, and, importantly, child exploitation. Protecting Australians and our nation's interests from these threats is critical.

The holders of these ASIC and MSIC are trusted individuals, and with that trust comes obligations. Trusted insiders may be any person who can use their knowledge and access to exploit vulnerabilities within an aviation or a maritime facility. The intelligence community has confirmed that trusted insiders remain a significant risk to the aviation and maritime transport sectors. Let me say that again: the intelligence community has confirmed that trusted insiders remain a significant risk to the aviation and maritime transport sectors. Based on intelligence from December 2019, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission has identified approximately 227 ASIC or MSIC holders currently recorded on the crime commission's National Criminal Target List. That's 227 existing ASIC or MSIC holders. The individuals recorded in the crime commission's criminal intelligence holdings have been identified as posing a significant threat to the security of Australia's borders. This demonstrates the importance in addressing the vulnerabilities in these schemes.

The expanded purpose of this bill will provide for greater safeguards to ensure that ASIC and MSICs are not inappropriately used to facilitate and perpetrate serious crime in security-controlled airports and seaports. The purpose of schedule 1 to this bill is very clear. Schedule 1 to the bill will introduce a new purpose for both the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 to prevent the use of security-controlled airports, seaports and offshore facilities in connection with serious crime. This additional purpose will complement the aviation and maritime security identification card schemes' current purpose of preventing unlawful interference. Schedule 1 will provide for regulations to be made to introduce new ASIC and MSIC eligibility criteria, targeting serious criminal offences and prescribing penalties for offences against the regulations for up to 200 penalty units. This means that penalties relating to the serious crime purpose will align with those relating to the unlawful interference purpose. Schedule 1 will also take care of a number of administrative issues and make some technical amendments.

The new purpose for the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003, to be inserted by schedule 1 to the bill, will provide greater safeguards to ensure that ASICs and MSICs are not inappropriately used to facilitate and perpetrate serious crimes at our airports and seaports. But one has to ask the question as to why people who are involved in or have serious criminal convictions or have links to organised crime have access to the most secure areas of our airports and seaports. Surely, in these most critical pieces of infrastructure, we have to maintain a high level of security. That is a priority for the Australian government.

The limited scope of the Aviation Transport Security Act and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act has enabled people who have serious criminal convictions or links to organised crime and are not considered to pose a security threat to be classified as eligible holders of ASICs and MSICs. This bill will provide greater security outcomes for Australians by ensuring that people with serious criminal convictions or links to organised crime are not able to access secure areas of our airports and seaports.

In my closing four minutes, I want to give the House some case examples of what has gone on in the past. In a matter in 1997, the applicant was convicted of offences of cultivating and trafficking cannabis. For these offences, the applicant was ordered to pay compensation and to perform unpaid community work and was sentenced to six months imprisonment, which was wholly suspended. Some nine years later, the applicant was convicted of two offences: firstly, aid, abet, counsel or procure the importation of a prohibited import, which was cocaine; and, secondly, attempt to possess prohibited imports, which was also cocaine. On the first count, the applicant was sentenced to six years imprisonment, and, on the second count, the applicant was sentenced to five years imprisonment. The applicant was released from prison in 2010. Just three years later the applicant applied to CASA for the issue of an aviation security identification card, the ASIC. CASA rightly refused to issue an ASIC due to the applicant's adverse criminal record. The applicant then applied to the department for a discretionary review. The department knocked him back, due to the nature of the applicant's offences. The matter went to the AAT, and the AAT gave this individual an ASIC, subject to certain conditions. In setting aside the decision to refuse the ASIC, the AAT stated that it must take into account the purpose of the Aviation Transport Security Act, as well as the discretion allowable by the Aviation Transport Security Regulations.

The current framework restricts determinations made with regard to ASICs to purely security risks and not criminal risks. Here's a person who was convicted of three serious offences, served considerable time and, three years later, applied for an ASIC, got knocked back by CASA and knocked back by the department, and the AAT approved it, subject to certain conditions. This bill will ensure that people who have been convicted of those sorts of serious criminal offences will not be entitled to hold important security vetting into our airports and our seaports.

I turn to the second case. In 1991, the applicant was placed on a good behaviour bond after being convicted of cultivating a cannabis plant. In 2007, some years later, the applicant was convicted of trafficking a commercial quantity—40.3 kilograms—of cannabis. The applicant was ordered to pay a fine and was sentenced to three years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 months. The applicant was also convicted of possessing an unregistered firearm. In 2011, four years later, the applicant applied to ClientView for a maritime security card and he was refused. He applied for a discretionary review and that was refused. He went to the AAT and, lo and behold, he was given an MSIC, subject to certain conditions.

Clearly the legislation in its current form is not fit for purpose. The amendments in this bill will ensure that the wrong people are not in the right places, and I commend this bill to the House.

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