House debates
Wednesday, 7 October 2020
Bills
Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2019; Second Reading
5:51 pm
Ms Catherine King (Ballarat, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
I rise to speak on the Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2019, and I flag that we will be moving a second reading amendment, and there are also a series of substantive amendments that I wish to move in the consideration in detail.
Our ports and our airports provide the lifeblood of our country. Australia could not have got through or be getting through this global crisis without them. Throughout this crisis port workers have been hard at it: keeping our trade moving; importing the goods that we all rely on, including medical devices; exporting to the world; and ensuring that our shelves remain stocked with imported medicines and other essentials. And our airports have been at the front line in getting Australians home from overseas, getting key medical staff to where they are needed and reuniting Australians who've been separated from loved ones. Of course, with ports and airports playing such an important role in our nation, it is absolutely essential that they are secure. Like everyone in this House, Labor is committed to ensuring that our ports and airports are secure from criminal organisations and those who seek to do our nation harm. Our record in government attests to that.
The Aviation Security Identification Card, or the ASIC, and the Maritime Security Identification Card, or the MSIC, are an important part of securing the aviation, maritime and offshore oil and gas sectors from acts of terrorism and unlawful interference. The vast majority of Australian port workers do a great job. But, just as in every workforce, there will always be a small minority who will put their own interests ahead of the greater good and ahead of the law. Those who use our aviation and maritime transport systems as means to distribute drugs and other contraband into, out of and within Australian commit crimes. We know it happens, and Labor will of course support sensible measures to minimise this trade, to detect the perpetrators and to bring them to justice.
But unfortunately this bill is not fit for purpose, and in some parts it's frankly not even sensible or workable. A quarter of a million Australian workers currently hold an ASIC or an MSIC. These Australians deserve a system that treats them with respect and allows them to do their jobs while also protecting our national security. And to protect our national security it must apply to everyone working in our ports, including foreign workers. However, we already know that the ASIC and MSIC system is plagued with bureaucratic bungling and, frankly, delays as people try to get or renew their passes. Too often workers can't attend work because their cards have not been completed on time by the Department of Home Affairs contractors. This is not because of any poor paperwork or missed deadlines by these hardworking Australians.
Take the case of Brendan, a seafarer, whose only conviction is that he got into a fight in a pub 31 years ago, yet every time he needs to renew his MSIC he faces up to a 90-day wait, never sure whether his card will arrive on time for his next shift. This is his livelihood.
The government now seeks to expand this failing system without first fixing the problems that exist within it at the moment. When we take a look at the legislation itself, we see that this bill, which is about serious crime, lacks an important detail. Incredibly, this bill contains no definition of 'serious crime'. How can this bill be about serious crime when it doesn't even define, for the purposes of this bill, what serious crime actually is? There are at least 12 different definitions of 'serious crime' in different Commonwealth acts and regulations. This bill provides no detail about which definition will apply in this case. The bill is about people's livelihoods—their careers, their ability to go to work—so it absolutely deserves clarity.
Next we find that the bill imposes stricter conditions on Australian workers in Australian ports than it does on foreign crews working on our shores. With more and more foreign ships with foreign crews plying our coastline under licences issued by this government, how is the government screening these foreign crew members? Under this government's watch, we are now in a situation where less than half of one per cent of our seaborne trade is carried by Australian ships. That percentage is rapidly heading towards zero. Under this government's watch, the number of Australian flagged vessels has fallen to barely being in the double digits. For six years the Abbott-Turnbull-Morrison government has stood by, when they should have been supporting and building our shipping industry. The government's own bureaucrats have pointed out the risks in relation to foreign crew working in Australia. But, rather than addressing these concerns in this bill, the government has chosen to target only Australian workers with ill-defined laws.
The then Department of Immigration and Border Protection could not have been clearer in 2017 when it said that foreign vessels and their crews, which use flag-of-convenience registration to operate in Australia, are likely targets for organised crime syndicates and terrorists. The department said that the reduced transparency and secrecy surrounding the complex financial and ownership arrangements of these vessels make them and their crews attractive for use in illegal activity, including by organised crime or terrorist groups. The department went on to say that these ships may be used in a range of illegal activities, including illegal exploitation of natural resources, illegal activity in protected areas, people smuggling and facilitating prohibited imports or exports. You'd think that this would be something that the government would follow up, but, no, they've done nothing to ensure that these workers are subject to any robust background checking.
So we have, in effect, one set of tough rules for Australians, which are about to get tougher through this legislation, and next to no background checks for foreign workers. How is that fair? How does that protect our borders and protect our national security? Labor does support measures to stop serious crime, but serious crime deserves serious responses, and this legislation needs improvement before Labor can support it.
To improve this bill, I will be moving amendments to define 'serious crime' to ensure the scope of crimes covered under this legislation is targeted and is not so unfairly broad that a range of workers are unnecessarily disqualified from the maritime and aviation industry, when they do not present a specific security threat. I will also move amendments to ensure that there is a legislative avenue of appeal for those who've been determined to have an adverse security status. People deserve to know why they cannot get to do their job. I will also move amendments to mandate processing times for ASIC and MSIC cards. This is a system that, as I said, has been plagued by delay, and it absolutely needs to be improved. I will also move amendments to take steps to ensure that foreign crew members are subject to similar background checking to Australian workers. The opposition will also ensure that workers cannot be denied access to an ASIC or MSIC on the basis of intelligence only. The legislation must not be a backdoor way for the government to remove aviation or waterside workers' rights to work, and they must make commitments to that effect. They've told us that that's the case, but we want to make absolutely sure that that is very clear and very explicit within this legislation.
This is a government that has been much more interested in getting a headline than actually delivering and helping people. And, of course, this bill comes from a government which has repeatedly failed when it comes to our borders. On 15 March, the Prime Minister said, 'The Australian government will also ban cruise ships from foreign ports arriving in Australian ports.' Four days later, at 6.30 am on 19 March, the Ruby Princess was allowed to disembark in Sydney, with 2,700 passengers, including sick passengers, allowed to spread COVID-19 across Australia and across the globe. When it comes to the borders, the buck stops with the Commonwealth, and, on that matter, they resoundingly failed.
But, while the government let passengers with COVID spread across the country, they still have no plan to assist stranded Australians across the world. The Prime Minister made the announcement about further travel restrictions and caps on international arrivals but didn't have a plan for what would happen next, and he doesn't care, frankly, for those many Australians who are left overseas. Members of parliament are being inundated with pleas for help from Australians stranded overseas, and the Prime Minister needs to come up with a realistic, sustainable plan to help them now.
We are hearing stories, of course, of Australians separated from their families, forced to live in caravans, drawing down on their superannuation or missing the funerals of loved ones because the government doesn't have a plan. This is a government that has failed on its borders. There are 27,000 Australians who want to return home but can't because the Morrison government won't assist. We know that the Commonwealth does have capacity here and there is plenty they could be doing. Australians are sick of a government which sees protecting our borders as nothing more than cheap headlines but doesn't care for Australians overseas and doesn't care for our maritime and aviation workers.
That being said, I do want to move the second reading amendment that I will circulate in my name. I move:
That all words after "That" be omitted with a view to substituting the following words:
"whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House:
(1) notes that:
(a) serious crime deserves a serious response;
(b) the Coalition Government has failed to bring appropriate legislation to the Parliament to solve issues involving serious crime at our airports and seaports;
(c) instead, the Coalition Government has rehashed the same flawed legislation that was introduced in—and ultimately rejected by—both the 44th and 45th Parliaments;
(d) the Opposition will move substantive amendments to fix the myriad issues with the bill; and
(e) the Opposition's amendments will address concerns relating to the bill's failure to:
(i) define 'serious crime';
(ii) provide an avenue for appeal for those with adverse security status judgments; and
(iii) legislate timeframes around the approval and renewal of Aviation Security Identification Cards and Maritime Security Identification Cards;
(2) is of the opinion that Australians can no longer trust the Coalition Government on border security; and
(3) calls on the Coalition Government to support the Opposition's amendments to the bill".
Sharon Claydon (Newcastle, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
Is the amendment seconded?
Matt Thistlethwaite (Kingsford Smith, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Financial Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
I second the amendment and reserve my right to speak.
6:04 pm
Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
I rise in support of the Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2019. I was looking forward to speaking in the chamber today and listening to the honourable member's contribution about how Labor would support this bill. But, unfortunately, that does not appear to be the case, at least in its current form.
The Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2019 amends the Aviation Transport Security Act and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 to address criminal activity at Australia's borders. The bill does this by changing the eligibility criteria under the aviation and maritime security identification card schemes, the ASIC and MSIC schemes, to exclude persons with a serious criminal history or with known links to organised crime. At present, the background check for ASIC and MSIC cardholders establishes whether an applicant poses a security threat but does not consider if the individual may pose a criminal threat. This bill will address that shortcoming. The bill has been reviewed by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, which recommended that the bill be passed with an amendment to allow applications to be refused on the basis of an adverse criminal intelligence assessment. An amendment to the bill has been developed to implement this recommendation.
The member for Ballarat talked about there not being a sufficient definition in the bill of what a serious crime is. Providing a definition of a serious crime in the bill, in my respectful submission, could inadvertently lead to serious offences not being captured in the regulations. Regulations made under the new powers being inserted by the bill will indicate categories of offences that are considered to be serious crimes. By specifically outlining categories of offences that are considered serious in relation to Australia's transport system, it ensures that we accurately capture offences most related to aviation, maritime and offshore facility security. Under this definition, serious criminal activity includes the sexual exploitation and abuse of children with lifelong impact on victims and families. It includes illicit drugs on our streets destroying lives and communities. It includes the money-laundering operations destroying our financial markets, the black market firearm shipments fuelling violence, and cybertheft of personal information and online investment scams, which constantly prey on Australian citizens day after day. These activities cause enormous human suffering in Australia, and the measures introduced in this bill will strengthen Australia's ability to combat serious crime.
Serious crime is a major threat to the Australian way of life and, as I suggested a moment ago, it causes enormous human suffering. Serious and organised criminals control illicit markets that can serve to fund a broad range of criminal activities, including terrorism. Organised criminals are gaining a major source of revenue from this illicit drug market. We need to ensure that our airports and our seaports are not safe havens for serious criminal activity. The Australian Institute of Criminology has estimated the cost of serious and organised crime in 2016-17 to be between $23.8 billion and $47.4 billion—huge sums of money at a huge cost to the Australian community. As sure as night follows day, this cost will continue to rise and it is imperative that the government puts in place measures to prevent serious crime, for the safety and security of all Australians.
The ASIC and MSIC schemes have been very effective in protecting Australian airports and seaports from terrorism. However, they are vulnerable to exploitation by serious crime groups. Securing our airports and seaports against infiltration from organised crime is vital in protecting legitimate industries and the Australian community. Airports and seaports are commonly used as entrance points to Australia for illicit goods and for transporting such goods around Australia. Criminals engage in illicit activities to maximise their profits, much to the detriment of all Australians, in areas such as illicit drugs, violence, money laundering, cybercrime, and, importantly, child exploitation. Protecting Australians and our nation's interests from these threats is critical.
The holders of these ASIC and MSIC are trusted individuals, and with that trust comes obligations. Trusted insiders may be any person who can use their knowledge and access to exploit vulnerabilities within an aviation or a maritime facility. The intelligence community has confirmed that trusted insiders remain a significant risk to the aviation and maritime transport sectors. Let me say that again: the intelligence community has confirmed that trusted insiders remain a significant risk to the aviation and maritime transport sectors. Based on intelligence from December 2019, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission has identified approximately 227 ASIC or MSIC holders currently recorded on the crime commission's National Criminal Target List. That's 227 existing ASIC or MSIC holders. The individuals recorded in the crime commission's criminal intelligence holdings have been identified as posing a significant threat to the security of Australia's borders. This demonstrates the importance in addressing the vulnerabilities in these schemes.
The expanded purpose of this bill will provide for greater safeguards to ensure that ASIC and MSICs are not inappropriately used to facilitate and perpetrate serious crime in security-controlled airports and seaports. The purpose of schedule 1 to this bill is very clear. Schedule 1 to the bill will introduce a new purpose for both the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 to prevent the use of security-controlled airports, seaports and offshore facilities in connection with serious crime. This additional purpose will complement the aviation and maritime security identification card schemes' current purpose of preventing unlawful interference. Schedule 1 will provide for regulations to be made to introduce new ASIC and MSIC eligibility criteria, targeting serious criminal offences and prescribing penalties for offences against the regulations for up to 200 penalty units. This means that penalties relating to the serious crime purpose will align with those relating to the unlawful interference purpose. Schedule 1 will also take care of a number of administrative issues and make some technical amendments.
The new purpose for the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003, to be inserted by schedule 1 to the bill, will provide greater safeguards to ensure that ASICs and MSICs are not inappropriately used to facilitate and perpetrate serious crimes at our airports and seaports. But one has to ask the question as to why people who are involved in or have serious criminal convictions or have links to organised crime have access to the most secure areas of our airports and seaports. Surely, in these most critical pieces of infrastructure, we have to maintain a high level of security. That is a priority for the Australian government.
The limited scope of the Aviation Transport Security Act and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act has enabled people who have serious criminal convictions or links to organised crime and are not considered to pose a security threat to be classified as eligible holders of ASICs and MSICs. This bill will provide greater security outcomes for Australians by ensuring that people with serious criminal convictions or links to organised crime are not able to access secure areas of our airports and seaports.
In my closing four minutes, I want to give the House some case examples of what has gone on in the past. In a matter in 1997, the applicant was convicted of offences of cultivating and trafficking cannabis. For these offences, the applicant was ordered to pay compensation and to perform unpaid community work and was sentenced to six months imprisonment, which was wholly suspended. Some nine years later, the applicant was convicted of two offences: firstly, aid, abet, counsel or procure the importation of a prohibited import, which was cocaine; and, secondly, attempt to possess prohibited imports, which was also cocaine. On the first count, the applicant was sentenced to six years imprisonment, and, on the second count, the applicant was sentenced to five years imprisonment. The applicant was released from prison in 2010. Just three years later the applicant applied to CASA for the issue of an aviation security identification card, the ASIC. CASA rightly refused to issue an ASIC due to the applicant's adverse criminal record. The applicant then applied to the department for a discretionary review. The department knocked him back, due to the nature of the applicant's offences. The matter went to the AAT, and the AAT gave this individual an ASIC, subject to certain conditions. In setting aside the decision to refuse the ASIC, the AAT stated that it must take into account the purpose of the Aviation Transport Security Act, as well as the discretion allowable by the Aviation Transport Security Regulations.
The current framework restricts determinations made with regard to ASICs to purely security risks and not criminal risks. Here's a person who was convicted of three serious offences, served considerable time and, three years later, applied for an ASIC, got knocked back by CASA and knocked back by the department, and the AAT approved it, subject to certain conditions. This bill will ensure that people who have been convicted of those sorts of serious criminal offences will not be entitled to hold important security vetting into our airports and our seaports.
I turn to the second case. In 1991, the applicant was placed on a good behaviour bond after being convicted of cultivating a cannabis plant. In 2007, some years later, the applicant was convicted of trafficking a commercial quantity—40.3 kilograms—of cannabis. The applicant was ordered to pay a fine and was sentenced to three years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 months. The applicant was also convicted of possessing an unregistered firearm. In 2011, four years later, the applicant applied to ClientView for a maritime security card and he was refused. He applied for a discretionary review and that was refused. He went to the AAT and, lo and behold, he was given an MSIC, subject to certain conditions.
Clearly the legislation in its current form is not fit for purpose. The amendments in this bill will ensure that the wrong people are not in the right places, and I commend this bill to the House.
6:19 pm
Craig Kelly (Hughes, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
I rise to speak on the Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2019. I'd like to pick up on the amendment moved by the member for Ballarat where she asks how we define what is a 'serious crime—and of course, by implication, what is not a 'serious crime'.
It should be put on the Hansard record for this House that it is not a serious crime in this country for a pregnant woman to post something on Facebook protesting a government policy. That is not a serious crime. It is also not a serious crime for a mother to take her children to the beach on a hot afternoon. That is not a serious crime. It is not a serious crime in this country for a grandmother to sit on a park bench in the sun. It is not a serious crime for people to go to Queen Victoria Markets on the weekend to purchase a few fruit and vegetables. It is not a serious crime in this country to hold a protest sign that says 'Casualties of corona: common sense, freedom of speech, human rights and democracy'. And it is not a serious crime in this country for an elderly lady to hold up a sign that merely says 'Open the churches'. These are not serious crimes and they should never be considered serious crimes in any country, let alone our great Australia.
But what is a serious crime? We know that one of the serious crimes that are proliferating during lockdowns is child sexual abuse. We've heard from the Australian Federal Police that the lockdowns provide 'a rich environment' for paedophiles to operate, and they said there had been almost a 100 per cent increase in that online activity during COVID-19. I wonder, if those numbers were run through a great supercomputer, if it could see what damage is being done.
I also put it to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, that a 'serious crime' could also be a breach of article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, through the denial of medicine and medical treatment. It says:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including … medical care …
I would also say it is a serious crime to be in breach of article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This specifically applies, and I'll read the relevant sections. It says:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for …
… … …
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.
So a serious crime in this country would be the denial of medicine and medical treatment, but that is a debate for another day.
In the bill, the minister has clearly set out what a 'serious crime' is. Serious crimes are costing the Australian economy $47 billion per annum. Our airports and our seaports are the transportation points where organised criminals import weapons, illicit drugs and other harmful goods into Australia. Trafficking in illicit drugs puts Australia's security, our prosperity, our welfare and our communities at great risk.
This bill has been reviewed by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, which has recommended the bill be passed with an amendment to allow applications to be refused on the basis of an adverse criminal assessment. The House should not wait another moment. I commend the bill to this House and I hope it is quickly passed by this House.
6:24 pm
Peter Dutton (Dickson, Liberal Party, Minister for Home Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
I want to thank all of the members for their contributions to the debate on the Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2019. The bill, as we know, is evidence of the government's commitment to ensuring that Australia's aviation and maritime systems are safe and secure. A number of inquiries and reports have noted that individuals and organised crime groups are exploiting weaknesses in the aviation and maritime security identification card schemes—the ASIC and MSIC schemes—enabling them to conduct serious criminal activity at our airports and seaports, such as the importation of illegal weapons and drugs.
Serious and organised crime causes enormous human suffering in the Australian community. For example, in 2018 alone there were 438 drug induced deaths that involved heroin and a further 407 drug induced deaths that involved amphetamines. The suffering inflicted on the families of these 845 Australians and visitors to Australia from just two of the many illicit drugs imported into Australia by criminal cartels is immeasurable. Serious and organised crime also imposes significant costs on our economy. The Australian Institute of Criminology has estimated that organised crime costs the Australian economy more than $47 billion per annum.
The government introduced this bill in order to address serious criminal influence at airports and seaports. The airports and seaports are gateways for the entry of illicit goods into Australia and it is essential that persons granted access to sensitive and secure areas in Australia's international ports of entry are of sound character. The bill establishes a regulatory framework to achieve this outcome. The reforms in this bill will impact persons involved in serious and organised crime, by allowing applicants for an ASIC or MSIC to have their application refused if they have a serious and relevant criminal history. A less serious or irrelevant offending history will not preclude a person from obtaining an ASIC or MSIC.
I want to thank the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee for its work on this bill, through its inquiry and recommendations. The committee's report on the bill made two recommendations. Specifically, the committee recommended that the bill be amended to incorporate a criminal intelligence assessment in the application process of the ASIC and MSIC schemes. The committee recommended that, subject to this recommendation being implemented, the bill be passed. The committee was of the view that our:
… aviation and maritime environments remain vulnerable to infiltration and exploitation by persons with links to serious and organised crime.
The committee stated:
The introduction of a criminal intelligence assessment in the background check process for the ASIC and MSIC schemes would strengthen the schemes by enabling decisions to exclude persons who have links to serious crime, where that person might facilitate or commit crime, from accessing airports and seaports.
The government supports the committee's recommendation, and I'll be moving amendments to this bill in order to implement the committee's recommendation to include criminal intelligence assessments as part of the background check process for ASICs and MSICs. The amendments will establish the regulatory framework to ensure that people with known links to serious and organised crime groups will be ineligible to hold ASICs or MSICs. The amendments will provide the ACIC with the ability to conduct these assessments, as well as providing for merits review of adverse criminal intelligence assessments. The purpose of the bill and the amendments is to ensure that ASICs and MSICs are not issued to individuals who pose a security or serious criminal risk.
The bill gives effect to the government's election commitment to strengthen background-checking regimes in order to ensure that individuals with links to serious crime cannot gain access to our airports or seaports. It will reduce the ability of serious and organised crime groups to engage in illegal activities and, in turn, keep illegal drugs and guns off our streets and our communities safe. I thank members for their contributions and I commend the bill to the House.
Sharon Claydon (Newcastle, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source
The question is that the words proposed to be omitted stand as part of the question.
Question agreed to.
Original question agreed to.
Bill read a second time.