Kate Chaney (Curtin, Independent) Share this | Hansard source

I move:

That:

(1) this House establish a joint select committee, to be known as the Joint Select Committee on Oversight of the Implementation of Recommendations of the Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme to inquire into and report upon:

(a) the implementation of recommendations of the Royal Commission, which are directed at strengthening the Australian Public Service (APS), improving the processes of the Department of Social Services and Services Australia, and reinforcing the capability of oversight agencies;

(b) the implementation of recommendations of other reviews relating to the APS which the Royal Commission endorsed or specifically supported;

(c) the work of the APS Integrity Taskforce to deliver a 'pro-integrity culture' across the APS, including a comprehensive response to the themes emerging from the Royal Commission;

(d) action taken in response to other observations by the Royal Commission relating to the capability of the APS and budget processes; and

(e) any matter in relation to the Royal Commission's recommendations referred to the committee by a resolution of either House of the Parliament;

(2) the committee present reports every six months until the final sitting day of the 47th Parliament;

(3) the committee consist of nine members, four Senators, and five Members of the House of Representatives, as follows:

(a) two Members of the House of the Representatives to be nominated by the Government Whip or Whips;

(b) two Members of the House of Representatives to be nominated by the Opposition Whip or Whips;

(c) two Senators to be nominated by the Leader of the Government in the Senate;

(d) one Senator to be nominated by the Leader of the Opposition in the Senate;

(e) one Senator to be nominated by any minority party or independent Senator; and

(f) one Member of the House of Representatives nominated by any minority party or independent Member;

(4) participating members may:

(a) be appointed to the committee on the nomination of the Government Whip in the House of Representatives, the Opposition Whip in the House of Representatives, the Leader of the Government in the Senate, the Leader of the Opposition in the Senate or any minority party or independent Senator or Member of the House of Representatives; and

(b) participate in hearings of evidence and deliberations of the committee, and have all the rights of members of the committee, but may not vote on any questions before the committee;

(5) every nomination of a member of the committee be notified in writing to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives;

(6) the members of the committee hold office as a joint select committee until the House of Representatives is dissolved or expires by effluxion of time;

(7) the committee may proceed to the dispatch of business notwithstanding that all members have not been duly nominated and appointed and notwithstanding any vacancy;

(8) the committee elect:

(a) a Government member as its chair; and

(b) a non-Government member as its deputy chair who shall act as chair of the committee at any time when the chair is not present at a meeting of the committee; and

(c) at any time when the chair and deputy chair are not present at a meeting of the committee, the members present shall elect another member to act as chair at that meeting;

(9) in the event of an equally divided vote, the chair, or the deputy chair when acting as chair, shall have a casting vote;

(10) three members of the committee constitute a quorum of the committee provided that in a deliberative meeting the quorum shall include one Government member of either House and one non-Government member of either House;

(11) the committee have power to:

(a) appoint subcommittees consisting of three or more of its members, and to refer to any such subcommittee any of the matters which the committee is empowered to examine; and

(b) appoint the chair of each subcommittee who shall have a casting vote only;

(12) two members of a subcommittee constitute the quorum of that subcommittee, provided that in a deliberative meeting the quorum shall include one Government member of either House and one non-Government member of either House;

(13) the committee have power to send for and examine persons and documents, to move from place to place, to sit in public or in private, and have leave to report from time to time its proceedings and the evidence taken and such interim recommendations as it may deem fit;

(14) the provisions of this resolution, so far as they are inconsistent with the standing orders, have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the standing orders; and

(15) a message be sent to the Senate seeking its concurrence in this resolution.

The robodebt royal commission resulted in 57 recommendations, as well as endorsements of other inquiry recommendations, to strengthen the Public Service and ensure robodebt cannot be repeated. The government has expressed some willingness to implement reform to prevent robodebt from happening again, but we need oversight of that implementation program by a parliamentary committee to hold the government to account and ensure that our Public Service is reformed as needed.

In recent years we've seen the consequences of the hollowing out and politicisation of the Australian Public Service. We've been appalled to see the impact of this in the robodebt debacle. The royal commission into robodebt found that robodebt was a crude and cruel mechanism, neither fair nor legal, and that it made many people feel like criminals. In essence, people were traumatised on the off-chance they might owe money. It was a costly failure of public administration in both human and economic terms. The report highlighted the venality, incompetence and cowardice that characterised the scheme. So how did this happen? In short, the government of the day agreed to robodebt with no regard for its impact on disadvantaged Australians, and the Public Service, in its desire to please ministers, suggested it, implemented it and defended it, despite knowing of its unlawfulness. We must respond to this in two ways. Firstly, the people responsible for robodebt must be held to account. This should be happening through the referrals that came out of the royal commission. Secondly, we must ensure that our system is reformed so this cannot happen again.

Under our system of government, the Public Service is meant to provide frank and fearless advice to the government of the day. This failed. We've known for a long time that our Public Service is not equipped to do its job. In 2019, the Thodey review confirmed that APS capability is no longer fit for purpose. That report said:

APS capability has arguably deteriorated and is not fit for the future. The approach to all aspects of workforce management lacks strategic direction and is below best practice in many areas.

The Thodey report outlined two fundamental concerns: firstly, that there has been a trend of outsourcing core ongoing Public Service work to contractors; and, secondly, that the APS is suffering from creeping politicisation. Both of these concerns have been evident recently, and neither can be fixed quickly.

So often, recommendations are made and then never implemented. As a newcomer to parliament I've been surprised by how often this happens. We invest taxpayers' money in doing the work and deciding what's needed through parliamentary committees, royal commissions and external reviews; then we just ignore them. Here we have 57 recommendations from the robodebt royal commission and others from the Thodey review endorsed by the royal commission. What will happen to them?

I believe that this government came in with intentions to reform. They had seen the robodebt debacle from across the floor and wanted to address it. They promised to revisit the Thodey recommendations that the previous government rejected. But, in a noisy world of competing priorities, greater accountability may not remain a key priority now that they are the ones to be held accountable.

The Public Service Amendment Bill is being debated in the Senate this week. While its introduction shows that the government has some intention to begin reform, the bill does not represent substantive change. It doesn't begin to address fundamental roles, structures, hierarchies and practices that need reform. It seems to be a piecemeal, knee-jerk reaction to the need to be seen to be doing something.

My private member's motion this morning would establish a joint select committee to oversee the much-needed Public Service reform. Its scope would include implementation of the robodebt royal commission recommendations and other recommendations, such as those from Thodey that are specifically mentioned. It would report parliament every six months on the progress in implementing those recommendations.

Reforming the Public Service will be hard. It won't be quick. Without some direct and regular accountability, it will be too easy for a busy government to reject the hard parts and make only cosmetic changes. Australians need to know that the work invested in the royal commission will not go to waste and that the government is committed to and accountable for Public Service reform. I commend the motion to the House and cede the remainder of my time to the member for Mackellar.

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