Monique Ryan (Kooyong, Independent) Share this | Hansard source

The purpose of the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 is to establish a new regulatory framework to promote and regulate the nuclear safety of activities relating to AUKUS submarines. This includes establishing a new independent regulator to be known as the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator. The impetus for the bill stems from the AUKUS partnership, a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. This partnership includes the development and deployment of nuclear powered submarines. Such will necessitate stringent safety protocols and regulatory oversight.

Transparency and accountability are key to the social licence for any significant government endeavour. In this biggest of national endeavours, transparency and accountability are sadly lacking. Instead, we're seeing an initial piece of legislation about the AUKUS scheme which really relates to its back end, and even this seems premature given the very real and outstanding questions regarding Australia's readiness for any form of nuclear capacity. I'm concerned that this parliament has not had an opportunity for a detailed and transparent inquiry into AUKUS—into its rationale, its costs and the implications for nuclear proliferation for Australia, or even just related to the questions related to safe handling and storage of nuclear waste. Naval nuclear power potentially offers this country significant strategic and operational advantages, and I'm not saying that I'm opposed to the AUKUS scheme. But it also comes with significant risks which require careful management.

It is an ongoing concern, for one, that all the oversight and regulation of AUKUS will be through Defence, which does, after all, have a very significant stake in its success. An independent overseer of the safety aspects of AUKUS—such as ARPANSA, which has decades of relevant expertise and experience but no conflict of interest—might well be more appropriate.

Nuclear powered submarines are obvious targets for terrorist attacks or other hostile actions. It's vital that from day one of the program we ensure the security of the vessels and of their nuclear materials. It's also vital that we ensure the safety of waste disposal sites. Addressing these risks involves a combination of rigorous safety protocols, continuous training, robust regulatory oversight and effective emergency preparedness plans. Any doubt regarding those measures will impact significantly on the social licence of the AUKUS scheme in Australia.

The operation of nuclear reactors on submarines involves the handling of radioactive materials. Ionising radiation can be harmful or even rapidly fatal to humans and to other living organisms. Despite even the most stringent of safety measures, the possibility of accidents can never be entirely eliminated. Incidents such as reactor malfunctions, leaks or collisions could well lead to the release of radioactive materials. This would pose immediate and severe risks to submarine crews, nearby human populations and the environment.

These concerns are not academic. Let's not forget that since 1945 the USA has lost no fewer than three atomic bombs and that since 1950 there have been at least 32 so-called Broken Arrow incidents, in which nuclear weapons have been either dropped by mistake or jettisoned in an emergency setting by American forces. And that's just the US. We have no similar accounting for the UK, France, China or Russia. We do know that Russia has lost several nuclear devices off submarines, but we don't know much more than that. In this country just last year, we saw a radioactive capsule literally fall off the back of a truck.

Australians deserve full clarity about the safety of all aspects of any or all nuclear programs in this country. When submarines are decommissioned, the radioactive reactor compartments and spent fuel have to be safely disposed of. Nuclear waste remains hazardous for thousands of years. Accidents during the handling, transport or storage of nuclear waste can lead to the immediate release of radioactive materials—materials which will have severe, immediate and long-term public health and environmental consequences. The storage and disposal of radioactive waste from Australia's nuclear powered submarines will require dedicated facilities and highly trained staff. We have to have surety in the processes of waste transport in sealed and secure containers to storage or disposal facilities. We will need purpose-built facilities for interim storage and then for permanent disposal of that radioactive waste, including spent fuel.

For the moment, the ANSTO nuclear facility at Lucas Heights in New South Wales, which has safely and securely managed low-level radioactive waste in Australia for decades, is probably the best place to put Australia's nuclear waste until we have an agreed and integrated management approach. However, at this point we have no information regarding planning processes for long-term management options of high level nuclear waste. Previous attempts to find permanent sites for even just our low-level nuclear waste have been unsuccessful—most recently, the failed attempt to build a dump at Kimba in South Australia. We've now signalled our intent to construct a storage facility for high-grade nuclear waste. That's a facility which will need to be robust for over 1,000 years. This has not been previously achieved by Australia, the US or the UK.

Both the US and the UK have had nuclear submarines for decades. Neither has yet worked out a permanent solution for their high-grade nuclear waste from those submarines. As of June 2023, the UK had failed to dispose of any of its 22 retired nuclear powered submarines. It stores them in designated dockyards at a cost of at least 30 million pounds every year. A high-level radioactive waste disposal facility which is now nearing completion in Finland has cost a billion euros already, and the estimated cost of the UK's geological facility for intermediate- and high-level waste disposal is over 20 billion pounds.

In March 2023 the defence minister told Australia that we would build a facility on Defence land with the aim of storage and disposal of dismantled reactors, high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. He said in March 2023 that the processes by which this facility would be identified and built would be given to us within a year. That was 18 months ago, and we're still waiting. We really have no reason to feel faith in this government's ability to do better than the US or the UK. It feels very premature to commit to this program when we have no immediate prospect of being able to deliver effective and safe disposal of long-term nuclear waste. I note that the cost of building this high-level storage facility in Australia has not been included in the $368 billion budget for AUKUS at this point. I note that in 2016 a South Australian royal commission estimated the total capital and operating cost of a high-level nuclear disposal facility to be $145 billion over the 120-year life of that facility.

I'm glad to see that the government has this week responded to the concerns raised by the Senate committee inquiry into this matter by amending the legislation so that it allows only the storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel from Australian submarines. Those assurances, however, relate only to high-level radioactive waste. We have an ongoing concern that, through this legislation, Australia could become a dumping ground for low- and intermediate-level nuclear waste from the US and the UK. Those concerns have not, at this point, been addressed or assuaged by the minister in his responses to questions about the issue.

Australians already lack certainty about the potential risks of the AUKUS agreement. Recently we learned that either or both the US or the UK could terminate their current commitments under the scheme with as little as one year's notice. We also learnt that Australia has agreed to take responsibility for nuclear safety risks and that we will indemnify the US and the UK against any liability, loss, costs, damage or injury arising from the nuclear risks connected with the design, manufacture, assembly, transfer or utilisation of any of the materials or equipment involved in the submarine program. This is an extraordinarily one-sided agreement. We seem to have surrendered a significant degree of our national military sovereignty. The health, environmental and economic consequences of any accidents or adverse events arising from this program could be extreme.

The way in which this government is presenting isolated components of the AUKUS scheme to this House in this manner is depriving the country of an opportunity to look at its bigger picture. We all want to see effective and cost-efficient defence procurement. We all want to be sure that our government is making good decisions in our best national interest. But too many questions about the AUKUS program remain unanswered. Will we ever see these promised submarines? When? At what cost? At what opportunity cost? Will the submarines still be fit for purpose if and when they are received? Can we adequately staff the submarines? Can we provide the technological support required to safely run them? How and where will the waste from this program be stored? How much nuclear waste from the US and/or the UK might be dumped on us? How much will the storage of waste from this program cost us? These are the bigger questions that the government is not putting on the table with this incomplete, sketchy bit of legislation. The people of Australia deserve greater transparency about this very important issue.

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