Matt Thistlethwaite (Kingsford Smith, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Minister for Defence) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The rubber's hitting the road—or maybe, 'The fins are hitting the water,' is a better analogy—when it comes to the government delivering on its commitment to ensure Australia acquires a nuclear propelled, conventionally armed submarine capacity through AUKUS, and the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 creates a framework to regulate the nuclear safety aspects of activities relating to AUKUS submarines, with an objective of promoting the highest levels of nuclear safety. Consistent with the commitment of AUKUS partners, Australia will uphold the highest standards for safety, security and nonproliferation. This includes in relation to facilities that will support AUKUS submarines in Australia.

The focus here is on creating a new regulatory framework to ensure nuclear safety across Australia's nuclear powered submarines. So this framework will establish a dedicated fit-for-purpose nuclear safety framework; set out clear safety obligations for personnel involved in nuclear propelled submarines' maintenance and operation through a licensing regime for persons conducting regulated activities, with serious civil and criminal consequences if there's a breach of the law; establish a new independent statutory regulator, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator, within the Defence portfolio, independent of the Defence chain of command; and empower the regulator to operate within a system of regulation alongside domestic agencies and, where appropriate, to collaborate with our US and UK partners. The Net Zero Economy Authority (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2024 will allow any of the relevant licences issued by the CEO of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency to transition to the new regulator where they will be regulated activities under the legislation. The government is committed to ensuring the bill establishes a robust, effective regulatory framework to maintain the highest standards of nuclear safety.

The Deputy Prime Minister introduced these bills in November 2023, and they were referred to a Senate committee. On 15 May, that committee published its report and eight recommendations but ultimately recommended that the bill be passed. The government has accepted in full, or in principle, all the recommendations of the Senate committee and will make amendments to the bills to address these. In response to those recommendations, the government amendments are to clarify that the bill does not authorise the establishment of facilities for the purposes of civil nuclear power, the enrichment of uranium or the reprocessing of nuclear material; to establish a requirement that a person must not be appointed as, or remain, the director-general or the deputy director-general of the regulator if they've served any time in the previous 12 months as a member of the Australian Defence Force, or a staff member of defence or the Australian Submarine Agency; to establish a ministerial advisory committee to ensure the minister has independent advice relating to the regulator, its independence and its effectiveness; to allow the Minister for Defence to share reports from the director-general with the Minister for Health and Aged Care and Minister for Industry and Science as the ministers responsible for ARPANSA and ANSTO respectively; and to provide greater sharing and application of nuclear safety best practices and additional penalties for obstructing, hindering or intimidating a member of the regulator to further strengthen the regulator's powers and independence. The government will make other amendments to the bill, including to extend the commencement of the bill from six to 12 months, to ensure an orderly transition to the new regulatory framework. Together, these amendments will strengthen the bill and ensure the highest standard of nuclear safety within Australia's conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine enterprise.

Australia has decades of nuclear safety regulatory experience and a robust framework to regulate current domestic civilian nuclear activities in fields such as nuclear science and medical research. However, this framework was not designed to consider the unique activities associated with naval nuclear propulsion in a military context. The environments in which submarines operate are inherently hazardous. That's why the government is taking steps to establish fit-for-purpose, specialised regulatory frameworks for nuclear propelled submarines. While nuclear powered submarines have a number of roles, they are Navy vessels designed to operate in hostile undersea environments. Regulating the nuclear safety aspects of this enterprise requires a system that is calibrated to addressing the unique hazards and risks associated with sensitive military capability. This new regulatory system will consider the needs across the life cycle of a submarine to ensure the highest standards of nuclear safety and protection are applied.

The government has made a decision to establish this new independent regulatory authority within the Defence portfolio. The regulator will remain independent, and its organisations will not be subject to commands from the Australian Submarine Agency, the Department of Defence or the Australian Defence Force in the performance of its duties. Having the regulator accountable to the defence minister is consistent with the need to ensure nuclear safety is unique in the context of defence operations. This approach is broadly consistent with regulatory models in the United States and the UK, which have separate defence nuclear safety regulators.

The government is also amending the bill to strengthen the independence of the regulator by ensuring an appropriate separation period from serving in the Defence Force. The director-general and deputy director-general must not be appointed unless the minister is satisfied that the person has the competence, independence, technical expertise and relevant experience to lead the regulator. ADF members, including reservists, are excluded from being appointed as a director-general or deputy director-general of this body to ensure that the regulator remains independent. The term of the director-general or deputy director-general must not exceed five years, though they may be reappointed for further periods, and the DG must not hold office for a total of more than 10 years. The ANNPS Bill will also include a new definition of 'Defence staff member' to include ADF service chiefs, ADF members, APS employees of the Department of Defence and the Australian Submarine Agency in addition to the secretary of the Department of Defence and the head of ASA. The extra qualification around the appointment requiring a separation period will help ensure the independence of this regulator.

The government is committed to ensuring that Australia is a responsible nuclear steward and maintains the highest standards of nuclear safety in respect of nuclear powered submarines. Australia will not manage, store or dispose of spent nuclear fuel from US or UK submarines. To put this matter beyond doubt, the government will amend the bill to make it clear that nothing in the bill authorises the storage or disposal of spent nuclear fuel from United States or United Kingdom submarines. For Australian submarines, we don't expect that there will be a requirement to manage the high-level radioactive waste until the 2050s, when our nuclear propelled submarines are defuelled at the end of their life. This waste will be stored and disposed of on current or future defence estate sites, and the government will announce the process by which it selects this location in due course. All radioactive waste must be managed in line with international best practice and in accordance with Australia's international and domestic legal obligations and commitments, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, or the Treaty of Rarotonga, as it's commonly known. All radioactive waste will be managed in accordance with Australia's comprehensive safeguard agreements, an additional protocol within the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The government is also strengthening the security and the scrutiny of reporting of nuclear safety incidents. The government will amend the ANNPS Bill to include additional public notification requirements of certain nuclear safety incidents. This amendment addresses the scrutiny focused on different approaches between the ANNPS Bill and the ARPANS Act around incident notification. This provision means incidents must be tabled in parliament alongside any action taken by the regulator on relevant licence-holders. I want to be perfectly clear about this. These bills deal only with nuclear powered submarines, not civil nuclear power. The government will amend the bill to explicitly state that the legislation does not support civil nuclear power activities and does not displace Australia's longstanding moratorium on civil nuclear power. These amendments will make it clear that the bill does not authorise the construction or operation of certain facilities, including nuclear power plants, that are not related to an AUKUS submarine.

The government has been clear that Australia's nuclear powered submarine program, including how it will be regulated, is fully consistent with our longstanding non-proliferation obligations and commitments, and we've worked closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency through every step of the process and will continue to do so.

AUKUS is a core pillar of the Albanese government's national security policy to protect our nation, our interests and our security. Central to the government's approach to AUKUS is ensuring that Australia is a responsible nuclear steward. Australia is committed to the global non-proliferation regime, and the Albanese government is committed to maintaining the highest standard of nuclear safety in relation to our future conventionally armed, nuclear propelled submarines.

James Stevens (Sturt, Liberal Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Government Waste Reduction) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak in support of the second reading of the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023. I comment my colleague, the shadow defence minister, the member for Canning, on the way in which he has, of course, engaged very proactively with the government on all things AUKUS. We are very proud of AUKUS in the coalition, and having served in the previous parliament, one of the great achievements of the Morrison government was undoubtedly achieving this spectacular breakthrough of giving the Royal Australian Navy access to nuclear propulsion technology through the AUKUS agreement. Of course, we know that this is US technology. It's the absolute best technology available for nuclear propulsion, particularly for our purposes. It has a nuclear reactor that does not have to be refuelled every decade or so like most do. This technology allows a fully fuelled reactor for the entirety of its life to be provided to us. That is transformative in our capacity to have that sovereign capability for the Royal Australian Navy.

I remember very well when the announcement was made by the three leaders, President Biden, Prime Minister Johnson and Prime Minister Morrison. There was indeed a great sense of history at that occasion because it had been around 70 years since the United States had decided to provide the United Kingdom with this technology in the fifties, and then, in 2021, agreed to expand that circle of trust, including one other nation, the United Kingdom, to now include Australia. It is a significant marker regarding the esteem that we are held in as a nation and a national security ally with the greatest power on the planet, the United States. They do not share their technology willingly whatsoever, and there are a lot of nations that are extremely jealous of the opportunity provided to us through AUKUS. I note as an aside that it also extends well beyond that nuclear propulsion technology. This is, of course, the most eye-catching component of it, but it is a defence technology sharing agreement that provides enormous opportunity beyond nuclear propulsion. Nonetheless, that is what we are here to debate, and we welcome the opportunity to keep this program moving forward.

As an Adelaide MP, not surprisingly I speak regularly on submarines in this chamber and have ever since I was elected in 2019. I've been involved in the issues of submarine construction for what feels like my entire adult life. I've been at many interesting press conferences for many interesting milestones around submarine construction, particularly out at the ASC headquarters in Osborne. There has been a lot of politics around submarine construction for a long time and the people of South Australia are completely sick of it. We want certainty. We want the jobs that have been promised for a long time, by all sides of politics, to start to flow. So seeing legislation move through this parliament is heartening. We're making progress. Although, I do still have concerns about the pace at which the program is moving and when and what the important industrial and economic dividend for the state of South Australia will be on this project, always remembering that, first and foremost, we prioritise capability in the national security interests of our defence forces and, in this case, the Royal Australian Navy. That is why we very proudly support the acquisition of this transformative opportunity in capability.

It's also very important, particularly on a bill like this, to note, to point out and to keep on the agenda the very important task of holding the current government, the previous government and any future governments to account for the commitments from an industry point of view and from an economic point of view that have been made. I remember back when we were building conventional submarines. There were very dramatic press conferences held by the now foreign minister, Senator Wong, and other senior South Australian Labor members about the words that we used to hear a lot: 'local industry content'. We miraculously don't hear that from the now government, when in opposition, they liked to talk about it so much. I'm very hot on just what proportion of the AUKUS submarine construction will actually happen in Australia, not just Adelaide. Absolutely, the shipyards are in Osborne. There's no question that the pressure hulls will be welded together and that a whole amount of manufacturing activity will happen on site. But there's an enormous amount of supply chain activity when it comes to the construction of submarines, and we want to keep this government on notice that we're watching very closely what decisions are going to be made, from a supply chain point of view, to make sure they benefit Australian industry.

We are happy to be in partnership with the United Kingdom and happy to be building this AUKUS submarine together—designing and constructing it together. And it has to be together. We know the first of class will be built in Barrow-in-Furness in the United Kingdom, and that's fine. That's for the Royal Navy. We equally need to know and understand, at every opportunity when the government spruiks this project, just what are the latest details on timeline and industry content when it comes to the Australian submarines. What we can't stand for, and what we've got to be ever vigilant on—I'm not making an accusation here; I'm saying we have to be vigilant on this—is the risk of governments, and particularly the defence department, trying to make arguments that it might be easier for more and more of this program to happen in parts of the world other than Australia. Sovereign capability comes from the ability to build and maintain these boats in Australia, and, if we start outsourcing more and more of the supply chain—that means componentry—that is a huge impact on future maintenance. I don't level this as an accusation, but, if the worst case happened and people started to say, 'Well, maybe it will be easier to build them over in the UK,' that would be a spectacular betrayal of the Australian people and the defence capability of our nation.

I don't believe that's going to happen, but I think, when we're having debates like this one about this AUKUS program, we've got to reflect on and look at commitments that were made and track them against where we're at right now, because I'm not confident that the submarine yard construction is at the pace that the government said it should be at by now. Hopefully, there will be more information from the government about timelines for building the shipyards out there at Osborne to construct our submarines. There's a little uncertainty about how many submarines we will be building, frankly. There's uncertainty about how many we'll be acquiring, potentially, from the United States. We know we're putting billions of dollars into helping to build shipyards not in Australia—shipyards in Connecticut and Barrow-in-Furness. That's fine if what is actually happening in Australia is properly outlined and reconfirmed to people. As an Adelaide MP, I will always take the opportunity in these sorts of debates to relitigate those points and make sure we're monitoring what the government are telling us and how they're staying on track with commitments they've made that start to slip to being a year or two ago but that need to stay on track to give us the confidence that we are getting what we believe we're getting. There's a lot of money going into this program, and as much of it as possible needs to be spent in this country, both from an economic and industrial point of view and from a national security and national security capability point of view.

The bill, of course, creates a framework for the proper stewardship and custody of nuclear material. I've been very closely involved in the nuclear waste debate for what feels like most of my adult life. The former state Labor Premier of South Australia, Jay Weatherill, undertook a royal commission in 2015 with the objective of storing about half the world's high-level nuclear waste in the state of South Australia. He's from the Labor Left, and it was his position and his government's position that we take half the world's high-level nuclear waste and store it in South Australia. So he and the royal commission have done a lot of work advocating for South Australia to host a lot of nuclear waste, and as Defence continue to move through their processes of determining where the waste will be stored—they've obviously put some parameters around it, particularly that it will be on Defence land—my strong expectation, based on Labor Premier Jay Weatherill's work, is that that will happen in the state of South Australia. It underscores the point, as the government brings this bill forward and talks about it and proclaims its support for nuclear propulsion technology in this country and provides the assurances that the government can handle all components of this program, including the proper custody and storage of that waste, just how that applies to a civilian nuclear industry as much as it does to the waste from reactors sitting in the belly of submarines. It's the sort of maturity that we've got in this debate that we need to have a debate around civil war nuclear power generation in this country.

One of the major issues in any nuclear reactor, whether it's sitting in a submarine or whether it's producing important materials for nuclear medicine like the one we have at Lucas Heights or other reactors that we could have as part of the energy generation mix in this country, is the safe storage of the waste that is produced. What this bill demonstrates and what this debate around AUKUS demonstrates is that we can very sensibly develop proper plans for a safe nuclear industry. This bill is confined to naval submarines, but there's no reason, if we can do it for submarines, that we can't just as equally do it for a civilian nuclear generation industry in this country.

I note the comments being made by the government about some amendments that they've put in talking about clarifying this, that this legislation can't envisage or accommodate anything on the civilian side. The fact they're bringing them forward as amendments shows how political they are rather than genuine. No-one drafting this legislation in the department thought that issue needed to be addressed whatsoever. Clearly the minister has had some questions and queries publicly along the lines of: 'You're creating a framework to manage your custody of nuclear material for the naval shipbuilding program. Why in the world could it not be exactly the same for civilian power generation?' For political purposes we see these amendments being brought in to rule that out because, if it weren't for those amendments, the point is we can. We can do it for a civilian industry as much as we can for the custody of nuclear material from the naval submarine program.

So, as the debate on nuclear more generally progresses, this bill is specific to naval nuclear capability. But, as the broader debate progresses towards the next election, the government are in a very difficult position. They used to demonise nuclear, just generally, and say it was unsafe and dangerous and they put up ridiculous social media content predicting glow-in-the-dark animals and mushroom clouds and all the rest of it. Now, of course, they've come on board to having nuclear submarines, eight of which will be lashed to the docks at Osborne out of Port Adelaide in my home city. They can't justify the demonisation of the technology and the scaremongering around safety anymore because they've signed up to this AUKUS program. So now they're concocting an economic argument around nuclear. We're always happy to debate the Labor Party on anything economic, particularly when it comes to energy and electricity and the promises they've made in that area and what the reality has been since.

This capability is completely transformational for the Royal Australian Navy. It's one of the greatest, if not the greatest, achievements of the Morrison government in Prime Minister Morrison's time. It's one that he often himself singles out as one of his proudest achievements. It's very significant. It took a lot of complexity to negotiate access to this technology. It was also quite significant to walk back from going down the pathway of conventional submarines, but it was a decision made in the interest of our nation. It's a fantastic capability being acquired for the Royal Australian Navy. Also, I'm very proud to represent an electorate in the city of Adelaide where we will be the heart of the future nuclear submarine program.

Luke Gosling (Solomon, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'll say at the outset, whilst the previous speaker is still here, that I acknowledge the work that the previous government did in negotiating the arrangements that led to AUKUS. But thank God we had a change of government, because announcing things is one thing but delivering, particularly at the pace at which we are and the care with which we're doing it, is another thing entirely. But, overall, I am bipartisan when it comes to defence issues, such as caring for our veterans, those who have served us, and getting after this challenge—this enormous national project to defend our land and our interests.

The Australia, United Kingdom and United States—AUKUS—security partnership is committed to promoting a free, open, secure and stable Indo-Pacific region. The first major AUKUS initiative, our acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear propelled submarines will enhance Australia's capacity to defend itself and our national interests. With the passage of the Defence Legislation Amendment (Naval Nuclear Propulsion) Act 2023, the government has already taken the first major step towards establishing that legislative framework for the safe and efficient delivery of that really important capability for our nation.

With the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023, introduced into parliament on 6 November 2023, the Australian government continues with that considered phased approach to building an enduring legislative and regulatory framework for responsible nuclear stewardship. The bill enables the establishment of a fit-for-purpose regulatory framework to ensure nuclear safety within Australia's nuclear powered submarine enterprise and capability life cycle. Can I say from the outset how good it was to be at HMAS Stirling last week or the week before to not only tour the USS Hawaii, which is a Virginia class submarine, the same as what we'll be getting, but also to go aboard and talk to the captain and crew of the HMAS Collins.

From the outset, I just want to say how good our people are. Our submariners are among the best in the world. In fact, as we start to do submarine courses in the UK and the US, not only are we coming top five of the students; we've had one top a course in the UK and one Australian submariner top a course in the US. That's how good our people are. To any young Australians listening or to their parents or their grandparents, can I say that we need great young Australians to be getting into the submarine game, and you will have a great career for as long as you want.

This particular legislation that we're speaking to today reflects the Australian government's recognition of the need to protect the health and safety of our people and the environment from any harmful effects, implement proper operating conditions for regulated activities, prevent accidents and mitigate the consequences of accidents should they occur, unlikely as they are. A little while ago, I visited the US submarine base in Groton, Connecticut and had a tour of the base there. They haven't had an incident. Kayakers were just going down the river, enjoying getting out into the beautiful environment there in the same way that they do at HMAS Stirling and the same way they do in Adelaide, where we'll build this fantastic capability for the future security of our nation. This bill is part of the legislative framework that underpins that capability and our ability to deter at a distance anyone who would seek to do any harm to Australia or our interests.

The bill was introduced to parliament alongside the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2023, which will enable the transition of any licences issued by the CEO of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency. This legislation does not in any way—

A division having been called in the House of Representatives—

Sitting suspended from 11:04 to 11:14

It's good to be able to continue a contribution on the legislative framework around the nuclear propelled submarine capacity and capability that we're delivering. In the spirit of bipartisanship, I just want to acknowledge the member for Lindsay—she and I are co-chairs of the Parliamentary Friends of the United States—and also acknowledge the member for Riverina's work. In this important week when we've handed down the report of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, I acknowledge his work in that space in previous years.

I was speaking about the new regulator that will be called the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator, ANNPSR, within the Defence portfolio but independent of the Defence chain of command. That regulator will, of course, draw on the extensive experience of the United States and the United Kingdom to deliver international best practice in nuclear safety. I was talking about Sub Base Groton in Connecticut earlier. Indeed, for 60 years, the UK and the US have operated more than 500 nuclear naval reactors that have collectively travelled more than 240 million kilometres around our globe without a single radiological incident. That should be reassuring to Australians. UK and US nuclear-powered submarines have never experienced a reactor accident or release of radioactive material that has had an adverse effect on human health or the quality of the environment, so that proven experience offered by the UK and US programs over decades will support Australia in becoming a world leader in nuclear stewardship. Our AUKUS partners set the standard in nuclear safety and radiological protection of the nuclear powered submarine enterprise, so that standard will inform our sovereign approach to nuclear safety and radiological protection, including how nuclear safety is regulated within the nuclear powered submarine enterprise.

I spoke earlier about the deterrence effect and why this capability is so important for the future of our nations. It is important to remind ourselves of what is at stake and why we are embarking on this ambitious project for our nation. Strategically, the AUKUS partnership makes Australia safer from coercion at a distance by putting at risk long-range strike capabilities that would threaten our country in a crisis. The near unlimited range of Virginia class submarines—like the USS Hawaii, which I visited last week in Perth—and, later, of SSN-AUKUS submarines will mean more time on station for our submarines than with the conventional boats like the Collins class that we currently have. Collins will play an important role as we transition to nuclear propelled capability, but the Virginia class and then the AUKUS class will be able to cover a much wider patrol area in our northern and eastern arcs for longer. When you represent a place like Darwin, as I'm so proud to do, you realise that the Indo-Pacific contains two enormous bodies of water: the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Also, south of Australia we obviously have the Southern Ocean. The near unlimited range means that we can be anywhere and we can be on station for a lot longer.

Why is this important? It puts question marks in any adversary's mind, because they don't know, as I said, where we are. Deterring any potential adversary—and we always have to be prepared for that; that's our duty and our solemn responsibility—means that if they attempt to sever our sea lines of communication or blockade our ports—and obviously, for us as a trading nation, it is so essential that our ports remain open—or if they try to encircle us strategically, project force against us through our northern approaches or sever our connections, as happened in World War II—if an adversary tries to sever our connection to the continental US then this capability becomes so important—all such aggressive courses of action would be much more likely to fail with our nuclear propelled submarines lurking within striking distance. An adversary would be much less likely to be tempted to use them against us in a war. The odds would be stacked a lot higher against them. Their ships would be vulnerable to being sunk while they staged any assault or attempt to cut us off. Their submarines would be liable to being stalked and destroyed by the best submariners in the world. Their forces couldn't sail towards Australia free of fear that they might be next to go to the bottom of one of those oceans.

All Australian warships, including our submarines, are Australian sovereign assets. This point of sovereignty is another one that people having a go at AUKUS like to parrot. Our sovereign assets, our submarines, like our warships, will be commanded by Australian officers and be under the sovereign control of the Australian government. We, the Australian government, alone will determine the deployment of our armed forces on conditions of our duty, in close cooperation with our allies and partners. This parliament, and this parliament alone, will provide the budgetary and legislative oversight, as we are beginning with this legislation, that will oversight Australia's use of force.

AUKUS submarines are undoubtedly trilateral in origin. They're initially made in the UK—this is the SSN-AUKUS—with British and US technology, a collaboration with our great partners and allies. Let us be clear: we could not be doing this and having this awesome capability without our partners, but, as I said, it will be a sovereign capability, built and directed by Australians. This bill advances that great project.

I think it is important also for those listening to appreciate and understand that this collaboration is not new. For decades we have had Australian submariners on UK boats. For decades we have had Australian submariners on US boats and vice versa. Even on the Collins submarine, our current capability, which is a deterrent, just not as good a deterrent for the reasons I outlined earlier, we have the same weapon operating system and conventional weapons. So we are going to be able to transition this capability. We are going to be able to build this sovereign capability in the future in Adelaide as well. That will be a great thing for our nation. I'm sure that, working together across the parliament, we can get the facts out there about AUKUS and how important it is to the future of our nation and how it's in the best interests of the Australian people.

Michael McCormack (Riverina, National Party, Shadow Minister for International Development and the Pacific) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

At the outset, I will acknowledge the member for Solomon's service to our nation. I thank him for most of the content of his speech. He, like me, wants our nation to be the most secure it can be. He, like me, wants the very best in capability and the very best in defence personnel. Whilst he was in uniform, he was one of those. He was the very best our nation could offer to be prepared to go and fight, if necessary, for our nation. Again, I thank the member for Solomon for his words.

The price of peace, as has often been said, is eternal vigilance. This legislation and the entire AUKUS framework is based on being well prepared and ever vigilant. As I speak, we have Greens party members throwing manure at police horses in Melbourne. The Greens want horseracing stopped. Just bear with me; this is relevant. The Greens want horseracing stopped in Melbourne, which is the home of the world's greatest handicap horserace, the Melbourne Cup, yet they are at an antiwar, anti-Israel, pro-Hamas protest at the moment, throwing manure at police horses. That is a disgrace.

In a moment, we're going to hear from a couple of Greens on this particular bill, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023. If the defence of this nation—the security of Australia—is left to the Greens, then God help us. What we see from the Greens—their antics in the House of Representatives and the Senate and at protests not just in Melbourne and not just in our capital cities but, indeed, in regional centres right throughout Australia, including in my home town of Wagga Wagga at the moment—is nothing short of abhorrent. I truly worry that, after the next election, we will be left with a government which has to rely on Greens votes to get legislation passed, so it's good that we're passing this legislation today or in the not-too-distant future. When it comes to ensuring that national security is, as it always should be, the No. 1 priority of a government, there are a lot of commonalities between Labor and the coalition.

Australia is an island nation. We are surrounded by water. Ensuring the safety and security of our coastline and our nation is going to be underpinned by our nuclear naval capability. The Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill is integral in ensuring that we have the right fleet, the right personnel and the right build going forward to ensure that we meet our commitments to keep Australian people's safety as our No. 1 priority.

This is a legacy of Scott Morrison. When he met in the margins of the G7 Summit in Carbis Bay on 12 June 2021, I was the Deputy Prime Minister at the time. I'm very proud to say that this had been months in the making. The AUKUS arrangements, the agreements that we have entered into with the United States of America and the United Kingdom, were vital to our nation, not just in the here and now but for decades going forward. I want to commend former prime minister Morrison for the work he did, the negotiations he managed and the ability to achieve this historic deal.

Prime Minister Morrison and President Joe Biden discussed a number of issues of mutual concern, including the Indo-Pacific region. I was fortunate enough to go to the Australia-America dialogue after being invited to do so by former speaker Tony Smith. When we had the briefings with the US at those particular meetings, the need to have a good Navy presence in the Indo-Pacific became even more apparent. President Biden and Prime Minister Morrison agreed that the strategic context in the Indo-Pacific was changing—and it is. It's very much altering. They agreed that there was a strong rationale for deepening strategic cooperation between the three governments: the UK, the US and Australia.

Of course, they welcomed at the time the forthcoming visits and exercises in the Indo-Pacific by the carrier strike group led by HMS Queen Elizabeth. What our Navy does—indeed, what our Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force do as well—is have the very best training exercises. They do a lot of those over the Top End, in northern Queensland and in the Northern Territory. The presence in Darwin of our ADF personnel mixed with the finest American Marines is quite integral and important to our future defence operations. Speed is of the essence with the Australian Naval Nuclear Safety Power Bill and the transition and making sure we get on and build the subs.

We support this bill. The coalition agrees with this bill. Obviously, this will be followed by Senate scrutiny, and it's vital to our long-term defence capability and the security of Australians. It's in the best interests of our nations that AUKUS succeeds. It's in the best interests of our nation that the Greens do not succeed, because they are bringing to this parliament and to our nation a change in the social fabric of society. They want to tear down all those traditions that we are, quite frankly, proud of. I worry. Even in Wagga Wagga, where we've got a local government election this Saturday, the Greens are already on the council. They've had a deputy mayor in recent times.

Wagga Wagga is a garrison city. We have the home of the soldier, Kapooka, Blamey Barracks and the 1st Recruit Training Battalion. If you're joining the army as a recruit, you do your training at Kapooka, at Wagga Wagga. If you spend any given time in the Royal Australian Air Force, you will more than likely end up at RAAF Base Wagga. Indeed, connected to and a vital part of RAAF Wagga is a Navy presence, with dozens upon dozens of Naval personnel in Wagga Wagga—very much landlocked, a long way from the nearest drop of seawater, but we're very proud of having those Navy people. The best, the bravest and the finest that the Navy produces often end up at Wagga Wagga as well.

I'm also very proud that, when we were in government and I was the Deputy Prime Minister—indeed, in previous portfolio errors I was Minister for Veterans' Affairs and also Assistant Minister for Defence before that—Wagga Wagga secured $561.9 million for vital upgrades to RAAF Wagga to ensure that it had accommodation that was fit for purpose for 2024, let alone beyond. They were living in quarters that were built in the 1950s. It also received $846.8 million for Kapooka for vital upgrades for the Army base. I say that in the context that we need to be prepared not just on the coastline but, indeed, right throughout our strategic training bases throughout our military presence in Australia.

Now, I won't read all of this—if people want to look at it, they can go on the Lowy Institute website and read it in full. I will selectively quote some of the lines from Sam Roggeveen's article of 12 September 2022, 'AUKUS, one year on', which talked about how details were needed. I don't necessarily disagree with that. Some lines in the article talked about how this was brought about very hastily. Well, it needed to be. You can't have a multipronged tripartite defence agreement and just have a national discussion about the pros and cons of that, because, once the Greens start talking about it, nothing will ever get done. Sometimes these do need to happen behind closed doors and then be worked towards a sensible outcome for the nation. In the article he says:

On 15 September 2021, Prime Minister Scott Morrison joined his British counterpart Boris Johnson and US President Joe Biden to announce AUKUS. In so doing, Morrison set Australia's foreign and defence policies on a profoundly new course, a course now firmly embraced by the new Labor government led by Anthony Albanese.

He continues:

If the submarines are all delivered, Australia will join the high table of the world's military powers.

I think that's a good thing.

Nuclear-powered submarines are the apex predators of naval warfare and Australia is proposing to acquire at least eight, more than the UK and France now have, or plan to have. Nuclear power gives these submarines almost infinite range and endurance, and they will carry missiles that can strike targets thousands of kilometres inland. For the first time in its history, Australia will have global strike capability.

There's nothing wrong with that. He writes:

Above all, AUKUS is a profound step because of what it says about the Australian government's attitude to the US alliance.

I'd almost say there's nothing wrong with that either—I would say that, in fact.

He refers to AUKUS being a big bet on America. At the end of the day, I was once told that a definition of a friend is someone who has the same enemies as you have. Whilst I'm not going to detail any enemies that we do have, we do need to be prepared. We do need to be strike ready. We do need to have, not just personnel committed to going into battle if need be—and I hope that is not the case—but we also need to have the weaponry, the equipment and the capability if the need arises. To be able to do that, we need to have a very good submarine fleet, given the fact that we are an island nation, and given the fact that we are in a volatile geopolitical Indo-Pacific region, and things are changing. They are changing fast.

Australia's target date for achieving the sovereign ready milestone is the early 2030s. US and UK nuclear submarines will be forward rotating through HMAS Stirling in Western Australia from 2027. We will want to have our people upscaled and our facilities upgraded by that time. We don't have a day to waste. We do not. Australia has to prove to the US and the UK that we are a reliable partner. I think we have done that in world wars past; we have done that throughout rotations with the US and the UK in recent conflicts. I can recall being with the member for McEwen at Camp Baird where we heard, particularly from the US, about how proud they were to serve alongside Australians and how infinitely more secure they felt when they were fighting along Australians than any one else in the world—I see the member for McEwen nodding. We were very proud of the level of commitment our troops gave and, certainly, of the level of safety and security that others felt in our troops.

We won't let the US or the UK down. We are making a huge investment, and when the government talks about a made-in-Australia manufacturing initiative going forward, this lies at the very heart of it, making sure that we do, very much, use Australian capability and know-how—obviously, in line with the AUKUS arrangements—to upskill our people. I heard the member for Solomon talking about the wonderful job opportunities that are going to be made available because of this. This is a proud Australian moment; it's a team Australia moment. It's also a great legacy of the former Prime Minister Scott Morrison. I recommend the bill to the House.

Rob Mitchell (McEwen, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Today I rise to speak on the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023. This bill is essential for us to fully implement our AUKUS deal, which is in turn essential for the future security of our country and making sure we're ready for any threats to our borders. AUKUS will also bring thousands of jobs to working Australians, with an influx of ongoing defence industry and research opportunities to our shores. But, to fully realise the opportunities that an agreement like AUKUS can give to all Australians, a bill like this is needed to set the regulations and framework for the industry to operate safely. The bill, at its heart, is the next stepping stone for creating a sovereign industry and workforce to deliver conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines. Due to the scale of this project and the obvious technical complexities of nuclear submarines, this industrial endeavour that the AUKUS agreement brings to our nation is one of the greatest that has been attempted by Australia. Building submarines in Australia requires a truly whole-of-nation effort, but it's an effort filled with opportunities.

The project to build Australia's SSN-AUKUS submarines is anticipated to create around 20,000 direct jobs and see some $30 billion invested in Australia's industrial base, including infrastructure upgrades and expansion amounting to up to $18 billion over the next three decades. The project will transform our skills, productivity, industrial capacity and science and research capabilities. The overall national industrial workforce supporting the construction and sustainment of submarines is projected to be in the range of 6½ thousand to 8,000 jobs. Building this workforce will be a priority for the coming decades. Our fleet will be serviced, maintained and upgraded by Australian workers, and made in Australia for the safety of all Australians.

The implementation of this bill is an important step for Australia to meet the milestones agreed with our closest allies: the United Kingdom and the United States. Here we show our commitment to not only our allies but also our Pacific family. Australia is committed to maintaining the highest level of nuclear safety across the life cycle of our nuclear powered submarines. The Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 will ensure that we do apply the highest standards to submarines enterprise for our country.

I want to address some of the concerns people have raised about the disposal of nuclear waste. This bill is instrumental in creating a proper nuclear waste disposal plan. For Australian submarines, we don't expect a requirement to manage high-level radioactive waste until the 2050s, when our nuclear powered submarines are defueled at the end of their life cycle. The waste will be stored and disposed of in the current or future defence estate. The government will announce the process by which it selects the location in due course.

Of course, Australia already does produce some nuclear waste. With the development of nuclear submarines, the government is working through the plan to hold the nuclear waste being produced at a national level. However, to be absolutely clear, it will only be for our domestically produced waste. We will not be, as some have suggested, a dumping ground for nuclear waste for other countries, and it's important that we put that scare campaign to bed very quickly and very clearly. Indeed, to put the matter beyond doubt, the government intends to amend the bill to make it clear that nothing in the bill authorises the storage or disposal of spent nuclear fuel from UK or US submarines.

Creating advanced manufacturing is important, and we know the risks that come with having a nuclear based industry. What is the purpose of the bill before us? The bill sets out clear obligations for those involved in the nuclear powered submarines enterprise. This includes nuclear safety duties and licensing requirements for persons conducting regulated activities, and the civil and criminal consequences if contravened. It will also establish a new, independent statutory regulator. The regulator will operate within the Defence portfolio, but it will be independent of the chain of command. Along with the regulator, it will establish a dedicated nuclear framework. It will regulate nuclear safety across the nuclear powered submarine enterprise and capability life cycle for the nuclear aspects of the submarine platform. The accompanying bill, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2023, will enable the transition of any relevant licences issued by the CEO of ARPANSA to the regulated activities under the bill.

The Albanese Labor government is committed to ensuring the bills establish a robust, effective regulatory framework to maintain the highest standards for safety. Those listening may know that the bills were delayed slightly due to their referral to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee. The committee has now published its report. It made eight recommendations and ultimately recommended that the bills be passed. The government has accepted, either in full or in principle, all the recommendations from the committee and will make amendments to the bills to address them. We're keen to make sure that we work collaboratively on such technical issues when it comes to building the framework that will underpin national security. The government is happy to address the issues raised by the committee, clarifying that the bills do not authorise the establishment of facilities for the purposes of civil nuclear power, the enrichment of uranium or the reprocessing of nuclear material.

We will establish a requirement that a person must not be appointed as or remain the director-general or the deputy director-general of the regulator if they have served at any time in the previous 12 months as a member of the ADF or as a staff member of Defence or the Australian Submarine Agency. We will also establish a ministerial advisory committee to ensure the minister has independent advice relating to the regulator, including its independence and its effectiveness of the operation of the act. We will allow for the Minister for Defence to share reports from the D-G with the ministers for health and the ministers for industry and science, as the ministers responsible for ARPANSA and ANSTO respectively, to provide a greater sharing of information and an application of nuclear safety best practices. We will add additional penalties for obstructing, hindering or intimidating a member of the regulator, to further strengthen the regulator's powers and their independence. Further, the government is looking to extend the commencement of the bill from six to 12 months to ensure the regulatory changes are fully communicated and implemented in an orderly fashion.

All of this will strengthen the bill and ensure the highest standard of nuclear safety within Australia's conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine enterprise. The bill will provide the framework in which the newly established regulator can undertake their role. It also specifies the nuclear safety duties applicable across the enterprise and the very significant penalties that apply for contraventions, to ensure that the industry is clean from any corrupt or adverse actors. The regulator will also have the power to determine the policies, processes and practices required to undertake its functions.

Through this bill, Australia is ultimately upholding our international legal obligations, especially those relating to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Due to the nature of these machines, nuclear submarines will provide greater longevity and breadth to our defence forces. However—and I say this again to be clear—these submarines will only hold conventional weapons. The nuclear part of nuclear submarines is the energy source that keeps them running. The legislation is explicit that the regulator must have regard to Australia's international obligations in performing its functions. There will be no changes needed to be made to Australia's Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987, which primarily implements those obligations. Indeed, Labor will uphold its proud history of championing practical disarmament efforts, its commitment to high non-proliferation standards and its enduring dedication to a world without nuclear weapons. This is also reflective of the current understanding of international best practice.

I think it's worth reflecting on the fact that we are following our partners in AUKUS, who have been operating over 500 naval nuclear reactors over the course of 60 years without major incidents. These naval nuclear submarines pose no threat to the environment and are backed up with decades of proven experience offered by the UK and the US. Further, we'll be working closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that Australia becomes a world-leading custodian of nuclear waste and to ensure that best practice in nuclear safety is being followed.

The government will ensure Australia is a responsible nuclear steward and maintains the highest level of safety in respect of the nuclear powered submarines. We are committed to ensuring the management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel responsibly, including through an appropriately independent regulatory system. Rigorous processes will determine the site of the nuclear waste facility on current or future defence estate with appropriate public consultation and agreement with First Nations communities to respect and protect cultural heritage. To be clear, Australia will not be responsible for disposing spent nuclear fuel or accepting other high-level radioactive waste from any other country.

Having a strong naval nuclear defence framework will only strengthen our Defence Force and, in turn, Australia's security position and outcomes in the region. We all can acknowledge that we are living in fraught and ever-changing times filled with uncertainty. The bill helps us fulfil the goal of achieving stronger national security. We know that any untoward threats to our borders will come by sea. By pursuing this policy, we're enhancing Australia's national security goals but not compromising on any previous agreements. Our defence policy is founded on the principles of Australian sovereignty and self-reliance. This bill is just a step in building Australia's military defence capability, especially as we look to play our part in a collective deterrence of aggression. By having a strong defence capability of our own and working with partners investing in their capabilities, we change the calculus for any potential aggressor.

To conclude, as I said in the beginning, this bill is the next step to fully implementing the long-anticipated AUKUS deal, a deal that will make our country safer and our borders stronger. Australia's interests lie in the shaping of a region that is peaceful, stable and prosperous, but, as countries become more aggressive or seek to exert more coercive influence, there must be a counterweight to not only balance out the regional power but also solidify Australia's position. The bill protects Australia's interests. It dots the i's and crosses the t's in making sure our naval nuclear industry is safe, and that creates a better and safer future for all Australians.

Keith Wolahan (Menzies, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm proud to rise in support of the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 and the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2023. There are many times when we will have disagreements with the government and seek to hold them to account, but they do deserve credit for their commitment to AUKUS, because AUKUS is one of those nation-changing projects that will only survive if the key requirements of bipartisanship are there. That's bipartisanship not just in motherhood statements but in actually seeing it through.

I give full credit to the previous government and the previous Prime Minister for his leadership in negotiating this trilateral partnership, which has multiple pillars, and full credit to the security agencies and then those from DFAT and Defence who negotiated that agreement and led the way. It was an example of Australia taking a leadership role in the world. Too often we downplay our own role in the world, but that is a credit to the previous Prime Minister and the previous government.

But that's the easy part. The hard part is in seeing it delivered. We know from conventional non-defence and defence projects that projects are often killed by middle management, by cost blowouts, by other priorities or by a lack of commitment. You can foresee that in the delivery of AUKUS over that timeframe, over that cost and over that level of complexity. Nuclear submarines are the equivalent that we have for spaceships. They have the most cutting-edge, difficult engineering and technological challenges you could possibly imagine, so there will be many reasons to delay, to block and to avoid. They are political, technological and often driven by personnel, so it is important that we all lean in at every stage to make sure that this project is driven forward in the national interest.

I'd like to speak about the purpose of AUKUS. There are many commentators, mostly from other nations not part of the trilateral agreement, who see AUKUS as an aggressive act. It's anything but. It's about deterrence, and I'd like to briefly talk about what deterrence means. AUKUS and the submarines and the other pillar 2 technologies are not built to fight a certain war; they're built to prevent future war. Before any conflict in human history has ever been started, there was a point when the key decision-makers decided whether it was worth it and worth it today. That process is called a war game. A war game can be formalised or informal, but there is a point where a decision-maker says: 'Is this in my national interest? Can I win?' The purpose of deterrence is that, in that war game, the answer is this: not today. Our task is to make sure that potential aggressors in the globe wake up and say, 'Not today.' One of the reasons they'll say, 'Not today,' is AUKUS. That's important. Its whole purpose is to create a more peaceful world. That is its whole purpose, and that should never be forgotten.

The other thing in terms of delivery is our role as parliamentarians. When you have three nations in a trilateral agreement, all of those challenges that I spoke about, from middle management to cost blowouts and technological challenges—you name it, it will be there—are all multiplied by three. So our role in the parliament is to reach out and have relationships with our allies in the other parliaments, Congress and the United Kingdom. That's where the friendship organisations and the trips through embassies are very important. We, of course, have our role to play in seeing this move forward, but we must also make sure that we are in constant dialogue with our partners to reinforce that in their nations.

Right now, on my phone—it's on silent—is the US presidential debate. That is a great moment in their democracy. They will make a decision in November, and whoever is elected, whether there's a President Harris or a President Trump, it's in our interest that either regime or either administration knows that there is a friend that is reliable here in Australia. At some stage, we'll go through our own election. So, for this project to survive, it must survive the twists and turns of three democracies. So far, it's doing that. We had a United Kingdom election, and there's a full commitment to the new Labor administration. We must lean in to make sure the new presidential administration in the US is just as committed, along with members of Congress.

The mechanics of the bills before us are quite dry. They're about setting up a regulatory regime, but this is important. Where you have the introduction of advanced technology such as this, it is important that we have the regulatory instruments and those bodies set up, ready to make sure that we do it in compliance with our domestic laws, international treaty obligations and the terms of the AUKUS agreement itself.

I'll single out the Senate in its role as a house of review in the report delivered on this provision. It's always a helpful process, particularly in complex bills like these that have consequences that the House may not get to deliver. The report was excellent. It had a number of recommendations, which, I understand, have been considered and accepted. In conclusion, it is important that we support this bill but that we, on all sides of the chamber, are ever vigilant in making sure that AUKUS is delivered on time and in the national interest. In that respect, it is in the national interest of the three nations. It is essential that it be delivered for all Australians, which we are committed to.

Shayne Neumann (Blair, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm pleased to speak on the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 and the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2023. The Australia, United Kingdom and United States, or AUKUS, security partnership is committed to a free, open, secure and stable Indo-Pacific. The first major AUKUS initiative, Australia's acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarines, will enhance our capacity as a country to defend ourselves around our territorial waters and our national interests. The AUKUS nuclear powered submarine pathway will deliver long-term strategic benefits to all three countries. It strengthens the combined industrial capacity of all three nations, with increased cooperation making trilateral supply chains more robust and resilient.

This bill is the second legislative step in support of Australia's acquisition of these submarines. It builds on the Defence Legislation Amendment (Naval Nuclear Propulsion) Bill that was introduced in May and commenced in July last year. Following the passage of that bill in August last year, the Australian Labor Party National Conference held in Brisbane, where I was a delegate, adopted a statement in detail explaining why we are requiring conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarines. We recognise that deciding to acquire these submarines is a hard choice but a clear one. The Collins class submarines we currently operate have a potent capability, but diesel-electric submarines become increasingly detectable, and they will continue to do so in the future. So we want to make sure we have a leading-edge capability. We need, simply, to take the step of nuclear propulsion.

The statement by the conference in detail explained how a Labor government will go about acquiring conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines. For example, it says:

Labor will ensure that Australian workers will benefit from the massive investments in industry, infrastructure, and common user facilities.

…   …   …

Labor will ensure that Australia continues to meet all its non-proliferation obligations and commitments under international law …

…   …   …

Labor will maintain Australia's longstanding position of not possessing or seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.

…   …   …

Labor will ensure Australia is a responsible nuclear steward and maintains the highest level of nuclear safety in respect of nuclear-powered submarines.

As a delegate, I supported that particular motion and statement, and I continue to do so today.

The Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 in particular is specifically focused on ensuring Australia maintains the highest level of nuclear safety in respect of nuclear powered submarines. It will enable the establishment of a new regulatory framework, including an independent regulator to ensure nuclear safety within Australia's nuclear powered submarine enterprise and capability life cycle. The new framework will harmonise with other schemes, including workplace health and safety, nuclear nonproliferation and civilian nuclear safety.

This bill will establish a new independent statutory regulator, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety. Regulator, to ensure we apply the highest standards of nuclear safety across our nuclear powered submarine enterprise and continue to implement the AUKUS agreement. This is the second legislative package introduced to support the pathway of AUKUS. The new regulator will have the functions and powers necessary to regulate the unique circumstances associated with nuclear safety and also protection across the life cycle of Australia's nuclear powered submarine enterprise, and it includes associated infrastructure and facilities. The regulator will be independent of Australia's Defence Force chain of command and directions from the Department of Defence. It is fundamental that a system of regulation be independent. It will work with submariners, with the safety of submariners, with the Australian and international communities, and with the environmental authorities. The regulator will be a non-corporate Commonwealth entity within the Defence portfolio and will report directly to the Minister for Defence. The legislation also establishes a fit-for-purpose regulatory framework, imposing strict nuclear safety duties and licensing requirements for activities related to nuclear powered submarines.

The legislation is reflective of the government's commitment to workplace health and safety; dealing with environmental issues and the harmful effect of radiation; preventing accidents; mitigating the consequences of accidents; and implementing proper operating conditions for regulated activities. In particular, the bill establishes some nuclear safety duties to apply to conducting regulated activities; creates a licensing scheme for persons who conduct activities in relation to naval nuclear power; and establishes this new regulator, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator, which has some inspectors associated with it. There will be monitoring and compliance powers, offences and civil penalty and provisions. There will be some clarification of certain Commonwealth, state and territory laws. The legislation enables the transition to the new regulator of any licences issued by ARPANSA where they correspond to the regulated activities under the bill before the chamber. The bill ensures that any licences issued by ARPANSA in accordance with the legislation governing it will be treated as Australian naval nuclear power safety licences for the purposes of the legislation before the House. It is consistent with the first tranche of AUKUS related legislation, which passed the parliament previously. By the way, the moratorium on civil nuclear power in Australia has been a feature of our law since the Howard government enacted the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act and the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act in the late 1990s. This robust and comprehensive approach to regulating Australia's nuclear powered submarine program recognises our commitment to nuclear stewardship and upholding the high standards of safety and security.

The new regulator will have access to relevant expertise and experience and will deal with our international partners. The legislation is an important step in ensuring we have nuclear safety and protection across the life cycle of this historic capability. We deliver on our commitment, which is the single biggest investment in our defence capability in our history, and the establishment of the regulator is a critical element in this game-changing capability. It will be a specialised and dedicated regulator, as I said.

We're getting on with the job of making good progress when it comes to bedding down the AUKUS partnership, and it's supported by both sides of politics and supported by our partners. In discussions I've had with US and UK politicians, here in Australia and overseas, there is a bipartisan commitment. For example, there's been a change of government in the UK. I spoke to conservative politicians as well as Labor politicians, then in opposition, who both indicated in discussions with me that they supported AUKUS and strongly did so, whether in the Palace of Westminster or in Edinburgh, where I visited.

AUKUS partners have now signed an agreement that's essential to Australia's capability to safely build, operate and maintain this conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine capacity. This enables the UK and the US to transfer these technologies, items and equipment for Australia's future nuclear powered submarines, and our allies have done this in the past. For example, in my electorate I witnessed the Growler technology that the US has provided our planes, based in Amberley. That's the benefit of having these relationships with our strong allies, like the UK and the US: there'll be continued trilateral communication and exchange of information to nuclear powered submarines amongst our partners.

It's critical for us to have a sovereign nuclear powered submarine capacity from the 2030s, with the transfer of the Virginia class submarines from the US to Australia and the building of Australia's SSN-AUKUS submarines in Adelaide, consistent with our commitment with the other partners to make sure we maintain the highest standards of safety, security and nonproliferation. It's a useful reminder that, while most attention has focused on the acquisition of nuclear powered submarines, AUKUS is much broader than that. It's an effective technology-sharing partnership between three allies.

Complementing this, Australia, the UK and the United States have recently finalised the establishment of an export licence-free trade agreement, which is an environment that creates reform and provides reciprocal, national exemptions from our respective export control frameworks, unlocking billions of dollars of investment and cutting red tape for Australian industry and our AUKUS partners. As of this month, AUKUS partners, industry, higher education and research sectors will now be able to export most military and dual-use goods, technology and services without requiring a licence. It demonstrates the Labor government's commitment, and our AUKUS partners' commitment, to deliver on a collective commitment to streamline defence trade and accelerate collaboration on asymmetric capabilities.

Lastly, when it comes to significant employment benefits that will flow from the AUKUS partnership, the Albanese government has just announced that they will deliver a new exclusive jobs for subs training program for more than 200 young Western Australians to work in the AUKUS submarine program. This new nuclear powered submarine graduate apprenticeship and training initiative is an incredible opportunity for young people. These workers will work on the nuclear powered submarine program, particularly on the Submarine Rotational Force-West, based on HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. As part of this, they will receive training across high-priority disciplines and in essential trades, including span fabrication and machining, engineering and project management, and supply chain operations and qualifications. This will deliver hundreds of jobs and will build the workforce we need to sustain and maintain these submarines.

In closing, the acquisition of these submarines through the AUKUS partnership is the biggest single investment in Australia's defence capability in our history. It strengthens our national security. It contributes to regional stability in response to unprecedented challenges. It builds a future made in Australia by Australians, with record investments in defence, skills, jobs and infrastructure. It will deliver a superior capability and ensure there is no capability gap after a decade of inaction and mismanagement by those opposite.

As part of this we will need a sophisticated security and safety architecture around the nuclear powered submarine program, and that's what this legislation is all about. I want to acknowledge the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence for bringing forward these important measures to ensure the safety of the submarine program. This is a responsible and a necessary step to ensure delivery of the submarines and the safety and security of Australians. It build on the legal architecture to support this endeavour to ensure further tranches of legislation and this work will extend beyond the life of this parliament. We will continue to adopt a methodical, phased approach to building our capacity as a nation to safely and securely build, maintain and operate conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines. Doing this will make all Australians safer. I commend the bill to the House.

Jenny Ware (Hughes, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak in support of the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 and the associated Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2023. This legislation represents the latest of the many legislative reforms required to implement the AUKUS security arrangements between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. This legislation is supported by the coalition, but I do have to take issue with one thing that the member for Blair just said. I was in the chamber when he said this. He said that there had been a 'decade of inaction' by the coalition government on defence issues. I find that a very difficult statement to comprehend in light of the fact that it was the former coalition government that initially signed the government up to the AUKUS arrangement. So I do commend the federal government for continuing the work that was initiated by the former coalition government on the AUKUS partnership for the defence and national security of Australia.

It is important, given where we are located within the world, down in the South Pacific, that we have this trilateral arrangement with both the United Kingdom and the United States. We have very strong ties both historically and militarily with both of these nations. They are important friends. They have been in the past. The fact that both the United Kingdom government and the United States government signed up to this arrangement shows the high regard in which they both view Australia and similarly the high regard in which we view our relationship with both of their countries. In the times in which we live, the United Kingdom and the United States are two very important democracies, like Australia, and that is therefore equally a very important point to make in the context of this arrangement.

When this arrangement was put in place and signed, it was said that it was done to ensure the future defence and national security of Australia. We know that a government's most important priority is the safety and security of its citizens. If we look back to the history of the AUKUS arrangement, it was announced in September 2021 to promote 'a free and open Indo-Pacific that is secure and stable'. In the joint statement that was released by Australia, the United States of America and the United Kingdom in March last year, it was said:

For more than a century, our three nations have stood shoulder to shoulder, along with other allies and partners, to help sustain peace, stability, and prosperity around the world, including in the Indo-Pacific. We believe in a world that protects freedom and respects human rights, the rule of law, the independence of sovereign states, and the rules-based international order. The steps we are announcing today will help us to advance these mutually beneficial objectives in the decades to come.

The first major initiative of AUKUS was a historic trilateral decision to support Australia acquiring conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines. This involves the manufacture of at least three—maybe five—nuclear powered submarines, and these are to be built in Adelaide. I particularly commend this as it will enhance and build upon the nuclear technology that Australia has already developed for many years in our country. I'm very proud to say that in my electorate I have a nuclear reactor which has enabled many technological advancements to be made in nuclear medicine. I think it is very important that we'll now be harnessing nuclear technology for our future defence capabilities.

I'll just take this place briefly through when the AUKUS nuclear powered submarine pathway was outlined. Particularly in relation to this legislation, it said that Australia must be 'sovereign ready' before it can operate a nuclear powered submarine. This means that Australia must achieve the capacity to be the sovereign owner, operator, maintainer and regulator of this very important capability. But there are, of course, a series of steps that will need to be taken, primarily through the next decade, and they'll be taken with the support of the United States and the United Kingdom to achieve this capability as soon as possible. It is most certainly in the best interests of our nation that we see AUKUS succeed. As part of the coalition, I am committed to moving forward and seeing this through to its completion. Australia has set a target date for achieving the 'sovereign ready' milestone in the early 2030s. Therefore, speed on this legislation is important.

In that regard I note that in March of last year Prime Minister Albanese jointly announced with his counterparts—the UK Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, and the US President, Joe Biden—an identified pathway for Australia to acquire the submarines at the earliest possible date. I will now set out that pathway. In 2023, Australian military and civilian personnel were embedded in the UK and US nuclear powered submarines program, and there started to be increased visits by the US nuclear powered submarines to HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. From 2022, we saw the commencement of Australian shipyard design and construction. In the late 2020s, it's proposed that construction of AUKUS nuclear powered submarines will commence. From 2026, UK nuclear powered submarines will commence regular visits to HMAS Stirling. From 2027 to 2032, the Submarine Rotational Force-West will commence, and it will involve one Royal Navy and up to four US Navy nuclear powered submarines conducting rotations from HMAS Stirling. So you can see that there is very much trilateral support for this, not just from having signed a document but also on the ground. We'll be utilising expertise that has been developed by our UK and US friends. These bills are a very important step in the giant leap that we must now take towards becoming a nation that can operate nuclear submarines.

I'll turn briefly to the particulars of the legislation. It essentially establishes a new regulator, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator. That regulator would be able to grant Australian naval nuclear power safety licences to Commonwealth related persons for a series of regulated activities in designated zones. The regulator will also have a series of compliance and enforcement powers. It will sit within the Department of Defence, which is appropriate. I note that the Greens have some issue with that, but I think that the Greens should listen to the two major parties on anything Defence related. Also, the Minister for Defence will be able to give the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator directions as necessary in the interests of national security and in the event of an emergency.

The regulator will broadly be responsible for three main areas: it will be granting the nuclear power safety licences; it'll be responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance with nuclear safety duties; and it will also be responsible for promoting nuclear safety of AUKUS submarine related activities. These are all roles that are entirely appropriate when we are moving into a new world as we are, and it is very important that this is done by an appropriate regulator.

To conclude, this is very important legislation. It builds on an important relationship for Australia. It recognises that the UK and the US have important capabilities that both of those countries have developed, and those countries are interested in and very supportive of Australia also building its capacity with nuclear powered submarines. It reinforces the importance of our strategic relationship with both the United States and the United Kingdom and builds on the friendship that our three countries have developed over centuries. For all of those reasons, I commend this bill to the House.

Steve Georganas (Adelaide, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It gives me great pleasure to rise and speak on this bill, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023. This government is taking the next important step with this bill towards acquiring Australia's own conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarines, which also reflects on our commitment to best practice safety standards and stewardship.

We know that Australia is facing some of the most challenging strategic circumstances since the Second World War. That's why the government is making record investments in defence to keep Australians safe, which is one of the most crucial roles of any government of any persuasion. We also know that keeping Australia safe is one of the most crucial roles. At the same time, the building of submarines within the AUKUS agreement, especially in my home state of South Australia and in Perth, is very important for job creation. We'll see the creation of new technologies, industries and jobs, which is very important to the economy, to my home state and to the nation.

As I've said, Australia faces one of the most challenging times since the Second World War. What we're doing is ensuring that this bill establishes a new regulatory framework to ensure nuclear safety across Australia's nuclear powered submarine enterprise, which is central to the government's commitment to delivering Australia's first conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarines. Some of the things it will do are as follows.

The bill establishes a dedicated, fit-for-purpose nuclear safety framework to support Australia's nuclear powered submarines and related facilities. It sets out clear nuclear safety obligations for personal involvement in nuclear powered submarines and related facilities. This will be done through a licensing regime for persons conducting regulated activities, with serious civil and criminal consequences if there is a breach of law.

It establishes a new independent statutory regulator, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator, which will sit within the Defence portfolio independent of the defence chain of command. It empowers the regulator to operate within a system of regulation alongside domestic agencies and, where appropriate, to collaborate with our defence partners—our US and UK partners, of course.

The Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2023 will allow any of the relevant licences issued by the CEO of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency to transition to the new regulatory system where they would authorise regulated activities under this new legislation.

That gives you a bit of background. As I said, the government is absolutely committed to ensuring that the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill establishes a very robust and effective regulatory framework to maintain the highest of high standards of nuclear safety that the Australian public deserves.

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence introduced these bills back in November 2023. They were referred to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee in May 2024. The committee published this report, made the recommendations and, ultimately, recommended the bill be passed. So it's gone through the process of the inquiry and committees, and the recommendation is that the bill be passed. The government has accepted, either in full or in principle, all of the recommendations of the Senate committee, as we've heard from the minister. Obviously, we'll make amendments to the bill where these amendments are necessary to address these differences.

In response to the Senate committee's recommendation, there will be amendments that clarify that the bill does not authorise the establishment of facilities for the purpose of civil nuclear power, the enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of nuclear materials. It's very important that we understand that. There will also be amendments that specify the requirement that the director-general and the deputy director-general of the regulator must not have served at any time in the previous 12 months as a member of the Australian Defence Force or as a staff member of Defence or the Australian Submarine Agency. That is to clearly have two completely separate entities that will be independent.

The amendments will establish an advisory committee to ensure the minister has independent advice relating to the range of matters, including—but, of course, not limited to—the operation of the bill after it's enacted and the suitability of measures to ensure the independence of the director-general and members of the regulator. They will allow the Minister for Defence to share reports from the director-general with the minister for health and the Minister for Industry and Science, as the ministers responsible for ANSTO and ARPANSA respectively, to provide for greater sharing of information with application to nuclear safety best practices and other issues. They will also ensure a more inclusive and robust offence for obstructing, hindering or intimidating a member of the regulator or persons assisting the regulator, to further strengthen the regulator's powers and its independence.

The government will make other amendments to the bill as well, including to extend the commencement of the bill from six to 12 months to ensure that we have an orderly transition to the new regulatory framework. The government will also address concerns raised by the Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee to clarify the operation of the seizure powers in section 43 of the bill. We know that together these amendments will strengthen the bill and ensure the highest standards of nuclear safety within Australia's conventionally armed nuclear powered submarine enterprise, which is the aim of this bill.

Australia has many decades of nuclear safety regulatory experience and a robust framework to regulate current domestic civilian nuclear activities in fields such as science and medical research. However, this framework was not designed to apply in relation to the unique activities associated with naval nuclear propulsion in a military context. The environments in which submarines operate are inherently hazardous and very different, and that's why this government is taking steps to establish the fit-for-purpose, specialised regulatory framework for nuclear powered submarines. While nuclear powered submarines have a number of roles, they are, of course, Navy vessels designed to operate in hostile undersea environments, so regulating the nuclear safety aspects of this enterprise requires a system that addresses the unique hazards and risks associated with sensitive military capability.

The new regulatory system will consider the needs across the life cycle of a submarine to ensure the highest standards of nuclear safety and protection are applied. The government has made the decision to establish this new independent statutory regulator within the Defence portfolio. Again, the regulator will remain independent, and its organisation will not be subject to directions or commands from the Australian sub agency, the Department of Defence or the Australian Defence Force in the performance of its duties.

Having the regulator accountable to the defence minister is consistent with the need to ensure nuclear safety in the unique context of defence operations. This approach is very consistent with the regulatory models in the United States and in the United Kingdom, which also have separate defence nuclear safety regulators. The government will also be amending the bill to strengthen the independence of the regulator by ensuring an appropriate separation period from serving in the Defence Force, which we see as very important.

This bill is extremely important to giving confidence to the Australian public that safety is of the utmost importance to our citizens and to the men who will be serving on these submarines, and to giving confidence to the public and to the defence forces that will be using them that they will be absolutely safe. As a South Australian, as I said earlier, the build of the submarine and the AUKUS project are huge for us. I think of South Australia, my home state, and different periods in time when manufacturing has taken off. Naturally, for my home state you think of car manufacturing, which was a huge thing in the forties, when it was announced by the then Chifley government, I think it was, that we would be putting money into a particular precinct to build manufacturing. This included Premier Playford at the time, and it created thousands and thousands of jobs but also created what for its time was cutting-edge technology. That served South Australia and its economy for 60 years, right through to 2017, when Holden closed its doors—Mitsubishi a bit earlier. It paid thousands of wages, millions of dollars, to families to put bread and butter on the table.

I see this next round of manufacturing through AUKUS and through the submarines as the next cutting-edge revolution of manufacturing in my home state. It will deliver thousands and thousands of manufacturing jobs, thousands of sustainable jobs that will keep our economy going for generations to come. That's why it's important that we get it right. It's important that we give confidence to the public that safety is paramount and confidence to the defence forces that will be using the submarines and the workers that will be maintaining them that everything will be checked and balanced to ensure that we have no issues with it. This bill is about giving confidence to the public, ensuring that they will be able to have confidence in whichever government of the day that, once the regulators are in place and once the bill is implemented, the builds for the first lot of submarines going out will have safety aspects that have gone through the wringer and will continue to go through that particular check continuously.

It also takes me to the point of ensuring that we maintain our capabilities in our region. These submarines certainly will be doing that for us. We know that the nuclear powered submarines are quieter. They can go out to sea for longer than we currently have now with the Collins class and diesel. They will certainly be something that, with our defence partners, will be able to play a bigger role in defending our nation. As I said when I started this speech on this bill, one of the highest priorities that any government has is to keep its public safe. We do that by ensuring that we have the capabilities to do that in a manner that is consistent with our defence partners and in a manner that ensures the utmost safety and the utmost confidence in governments that they are doing everything that they can to ensure that safety is the No. 1 priority.

Barnaby Joyce (New England, National Party, Shadow Minister for Veterans' Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm going to start this a long way from the sea. Back in 2001, I was in Cloncurry. I was a campaign for a Senate seat, which was successful. I was having an argument with a guy from the Port of Newcastle, and it almost turned into a physical altercation. Common sense got the better of my valour, and I went to my hotel at around half past 10 or half past 11. I turned on the television and there was what I believed to be a Bruce Willis movie on. I wasn't really interested. The strangest thing happened. I turned to the next station, and you wouldn't believe it, the same movie was on. So I changed to the third station and the same movie was on. Then I realised it was not a movie. It was the anniversary of today. It was 9/11. Terrorists had just flown a plane into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, and thousands of people were killed.

What is important about that? It was the first instance of the rise of totalitarianism in a very emphatic way. The world changed, and it changed right at that moment. The rise of totalitarianism has continued. You would have to say that, since 11 September 2001, it has not got better; it has got worse. We've seen Putin and his incursion into Ukraine. Most especially, in our region, we've seen the actions of a totalitarian regime in the Chinese Communist Party—not the Chinese people, but the Chinese Communist Party—and its unilateral actions that work against democracy. Democracy is on the wane. Democracy is becoming smaller. And we have to understand how history works. If we deny history, we're not only fools but also dangerous. History pulsates in and out. Power pulsates in and out. Democracy pulsates in and out. Totalitarianism and the rise of one power to subjugate another to take over areas is just the nature of history. It's the nature of humankind. So we need to become as powerful as possible as quickly as possible. It is absolutely indelible in what this nation has to do.

We need a defence force. Without a defence force, we wouldn't have to worry about Indigenous policy because there would be no Indigenous policy because we wouldn't have a nation. We wouldn't have to worry about climate change anymore because we wouldn't have a nation anymore. You wouldn't have to worry about your house because that would no longer exist. Forget about your super—it's irrelevant; it's gone. Most importantly, the freedom for your children would also be gone. At best, they would live in a vassal state as supplicants and subject to an iron boot at worst. People say that's excessive. It's not. That's just the history of the world. That's just how it works. We have a massive step to take, and we better do it in a big, big hurry.

If that round that was fired at former president Trump had gone about an inch and a half to the right, the United States of America would be an entirely different place. It would have no doubt fallen into a form of civil strife. What is relevant to that is that it would have had a huge effect on Australia. What would be their concentration on foreign policy when dealing with massive issues on a domestic front? The issue for us is that other people would note that straightaway. They would say, 'You are now weak; you will now have a different attitude to what we say to you and the demands we put on you.' Remember, the Communist Party of China has already put its demands on Australia. It's not hidden; it's written. We know what they are—they're there. Are we in a position now where we're ready for that? Are we in a position now where, if others who we rely on were distracted, we'd feel confident that we could defend our nation and all the issues we hold dear, whether we're from the right or left?

We had to take a huge step, and AUKUS was a huge step. When I was deputy of the National Security Committee, starting this process was an imperative issue. We've heard so much about the technicalities of this legislation, and the historical memoir of it is part of this, but it is only one part. We have so much more to do. We have to become as powerful as possible, as quickly as possible. To do that, it's AUKUS but it's also everything else. We have to be the best at agriculture. We have to have an education system which matches places such as Singapore. We have to have a manufacturing sector that thrives and grows and is absolutely at the forefront. We have to have the capacity to produce pharmaceutical goods. There is a whole breadth of issues that we have to go to the forefront of.

Apart from the defence mechanism of nuclear submarines, there are also demands on Australia to become vastly smarter and vastly more competent. It is going to require thousands of highly skilled technicians, nuclear scientists, boilermakers, fitters and turners—the whole gamut. In fitting that process in, we have to have a wider agenda within Australia to grow and to nurture this. These people will not just turn up overnight, nor do we want them to just disappear when they're finished. It's one of the reasons why we also need a nuclear power process in Australia. It fits hand in glove with this. As part of this debate, we have to acknowledge that, in the defence of this nation, we need this skill set to work with it.

I want to dispel a couple of notions for people. First of all, nuclear power works with about three to five per cent enriched uranium. We've had black rocks that boil water, create steam, turn a turbine and create power—that's called coal. We have another rock that boils water, creates steam, turns a turbine, superheats gas and creates power—that's nuclear, and that's three to five per cent. Highly enriched uranium is about 98 per cent. Australia is developing nuclear reactors that are highly enriched to drive nuclear submarines, but not in Australia. Rolls-Royce is doing it for us in the United Kingdom, but we are paying for it. That's right at the cutting edge of technology.

We show the willingness to do it in an area where it really does require a skill set, and nuclear power is actually way down at three to five per cent, as opposed to 98 per cent; it's completely different. In fact, sometimes the fuel source for nuclear power is decommissioned nuclear weapons. In Australia, we know where we are. We have got to take this step or live in the complete naivety that the world will just leave us alone. It is so dangerous to think like that, because it just won't. It never has done and it never will. If you doubt that, turn on the television and have a look. Whether you want to look at the Gaza Strip or Ukraine, or all the other wars that don't even make the news, there's one thing in common: the rise of totalitarianism. It is absolutely ubiquitous across the globe. If you have a desire to protect our liberties and freedoms—gender, sexual preference, the environment and everything that we have—then you'd better be able to defend it. If you can't defend it in the most exact form, then you can't defend it at all.

Let's just go through a couple of things in this process, because I understand the role of intermittent power. It's not renewable; it's intermittent. One of the problems you have with intermittent power, just on a technical level, is what they call sawtooth power. It works at around 50 hertz. All power has to work at 50 hertz, otherwise power just doesn't work. It's just physics. So you have intermittent power. Basically it's generating direct power. It has to be converted to alternating power. You can't have too much of it. Industry won't work with it.

If you ask, 'How long does it take to build a nuclear reactor?' I will tell you a country that built one in six years: Australia. Australia built one in six years. It's called the OPAL reactor. It took us six years to do it. Let's dispense with the idea that it is going to take 20 years. Of the 12- to 15-year build put to date, about six years of that is paperwork before they start moving dirt. Once they start moving dirt, it's about six to eight years and they've got it built. Isn't that what we should be doing, hand in glove with this? We've got to get out of this naivety that we are smarter than everywhere else in the world. We're not. And we've also got to take the leap. For goodness sake, if Greta Thunberg can support nuclear energy then I don't think it's a huge leap for us to. It stands to reason.

If AUKUS is to work and we are looking decades ahead—and, by gosh, I want it to work—we also have to have a look at what is happening in the world right now. Right now, as we speak, there is a debate going on in the United States as to the prospect of where they are heading. Vice President Kamala Harris and former president Donald Trump are having a debate. You have two alternative foreign policies that will be part of that. That will change in minutiae, we believe, how Australia's works, and I hope that is the case. But you can see that there is variance. There is fluidity. It is a discussion. There are discussions in the United Sates about AUKUS—overwhelmingly in support of us but not entirely.

Our biggest threat is if this thing falls over, because where do we go next? What's the next step? Do we honestly believe that, when Wang Yi is going to Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, the Solomons, Vanuatu, Fiji, and having discussions with the Cook Islands—do we just think this is by chance? These are tactics against Australia—it always is. It's encirclement. You don't have to invade Australia; you just have to cut it off. If you cut it off, you win. We have to take conditions. Are we formidable enough to say, 'That would be a dangerous move for you to do that'?

We have six Collins class submarines. Sometimes we can't get one in the water. We have three warships, and calling them warships is—it's looking after the explanation. We have eight frigates. We have a defence force which is actually getting smaller, not bigger. Cutting-edge technology is important, but it's not made here. If things turn against us, we're in a world of strife. We have one big thing in our pocket, that we have a military agreement with the United States of America. Let's go into that before I close. Your belief is that the good mums and dads of Tennessee, South Dakota, Carolina, New York and Los Angeles will happily send their family members over to be killed on behalf of Australia? What you're saying is that they'll happily do that. I'm telling you that the mums and dads there are just like the mums and dads here. They might have other ideas about that. They might have a big say in the future about how they feel about that. They might say, 'I think we're just going to concentrate on the United States for a while.' If that's the case, those who wish to do us harm—and they exist. Remember, we've had military lasers put on our planes from Chinese ships in our exclusive economic zone. We've had flares put out in front of a Seahawk helicopter. We've had foil in front of a P-3 Orion plane. We've had spies in this parliament. We've had it; we've got it.

This AUKUS agreement is fundamentally important. I'm so glad that we have a bipartisan approach to it. I call to the Australian people and to all to just understand history. Don't understand my politics, disregard me completely and dislike me as much as you like, but like a history book. Really have a good read of that and, as you have a read of that, think of all the things that you cherish about Australia and the particular causes you want to pursue and want to sustain. The only way you will sustain that is if you have a formidable capacity to defend your nation. We have a formidable gap to fill before we'll have the capacity to do that, and AUKUS is fundamental in that process.

Zoe Daniel (Goldstein, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Transparency and accountability are among the keys to voter confidence in public policy. If ever there were a textbook example of what not to do it is AUKUS. What we have before us in this legislation, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 and related bill, is not the opportunity to decide the principles of AUKUS; it's merely to determine some of its operational contingencies, in particular the management of nuclear waste and arrangements for independent oversight. We have had relatively few opportunities in this parliament to debate AUKUS, so, before I go to the specifics, I will take a little time to discuss the backstory leading to the legislation now before the House.

I want to make it clear that I am not opposed to AUKUS, but I retain serious concerns about the way it was developed and then presented to the people as a fait accompli, as the best and only way, with no discussion. Nothing that's happened since that surprise announcement from Scott Morrison, Joe Biden and Boris Johnson on the morning of 22 September 2021 has alleviated those concerns. It is, after all, the most significant shift in Australian defence policy since the 1980s when we formally ended the doctrine of forward defence whose apotheosis was the involvement in the Vietnam War for the primacy of the defence of Australia. That shift followed recommendations in a review commissioned by the Hawke government and produced by distinguished defence strategist Paul Dibb, followed by a white paper. Before the new doctrine began to take shape, with defence assets and infrastructure moved north and west, there was substantive public discussion and debate. That government sought to bring the public with them. That could hardly be said to be the case with AUKUS, conceived in secrecy and Labor given less than 24 hours to make up its mind. Not surprisingly, the then opposition acquiesced given its awful memories of having been wedged by John Howard over the Tampa saga.

As national security expert James Curran, who has written extensively on AUKUS in the Australian Financial Review, says:

… Treasury and the Department of Foreign Affairs were excluded from the process; and serious risk and feasibility studies were largely sacrificed in the name of securing a politically symbolic deal.

Treasury was kept in the dark about an initiative hinging on the expenditure of at least $368 billion of taxpayers' money. DFAT was kept out of the loop on an initiative with significant geopolitical consequences for our nearest neighbours. It doesn't matter whether China is the reason for this strategic shift. If China perceives that to be the case then Beijing will respond as if AUKUS is a threat. South-East Asian knows what it is to be in the cockpit of big power rivalry, from the millions of deaths and economic suffering resulting from the years of conflict between Japan, Australia and its allies in World War II through to Vietnam.

Given the way AUKUS was dumped on an unsuspecting Australian public, it's not surprising that voters are proving more than a little sceptical, ambivalent at best. We the people were never let in on this discussion, let alone allowed a debate. A recent poll conducted by the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney found 42 per cent of those polled thought that the AUKUS submarines are not worth the cost. At the same time, 46 per cent thought AUKUS is good for creating jobs. A poll conducted by the Lowy Institute got a different result but still found that 32 per cent of respondents—a significant number—were opposed to the acquisition of nuclear powered submarines.

Our strategic realignment in the 1980s was an assertion of sovereignty, an assertion that we should be as self-reliant as possible. Almost overnight and with no debate at all, the previous government, with the acquiescence of the Labor Party, agreed to an entirely new approach which, as the distinguished former DFAT chief Peter Varghese points out, reduces our sovereignty and ties us ever closer to the United States. Mr Varghese served both sides of politics in very senior and responsible roles, providing them with frank, fearless and objective advice regardless of which party they came from. He was respected, in short, by all he served and rewarded for his intellect, insights and advice. Here's what he had to say about AUKUS in the Australian Financial Review, and it's worth quoting at some length:

The real test of sovereignty is whether you can defend yourself and credibly deter an attack on your territory.

Is that what the nuclear submarines deliver? Or would it be smarter to design a defence capability, including the best conventional submarines, which may give us less to offer in a war in north-east Asia but which may be more affordable and more effective in the defence of continental Australia?

I do not pretend to know the answers to these questions. But I would have thought that before we took decisions as momentous as the AUKUS submarines that there would be a proper and forensic public discussion about other options and their underlying rationale.

It may be odd to argue that a decision to acquire a capability which will not be fully delivered for three decades, if all goes to plan, has been made with unseemly haste. No one on the inside would think so. They have no doubt crunched the numbers and the policy options.

But decisions of this magnitude can easily emerge in an echo chamber. And the biggest threat to good policy is a failure forensically to test assumptions and weigh options. Much of that can and should be done outside classified discussions.

'Unseemly haste' and 'echo chamber'—this is not the Greens talking. This is one of the most senior and esteemed public servants Australia has produced. Varghese wrote:

What defence capabilities are we not getting because we have set aside some $360 billion for nuclear submarines?

Varghese was not alone in his concerns about Australian sovereignty. Allan Gyngell was an equally distinguished public servant, concluding his career as Director-General of the Office of National Assessments. Here's part of what he wrote, also in the AFR, about AUKUS in 2021, a year and a half before his untimely death.

Nuclear submarines offer Australia strategic and operational benefits. They go further and faster and stay longer at sea than their conventional counterparts.

But they have one large strike against them. We cannot operate them alone. The capability they provide is only available to us if we cede a degree—quite a high degree in this case—of Australian sovereignty.

Our capacity to operate the nation's most expensive and powerful defence asset will always be subject to American veto and the program will lead inevitably to deeper operational integration with the United States.

This is more than just a theoretical issue. China insists that it will absorb Taiwan one way or the other, and the US is adamant that it will not allow that to happen. This government has repeatedly denied that AUKUS would commit Australia and its new subs to support the US in military conflict with China over Taiwan. But, as recently as April this year, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell belled that cat. What he told a think tank in Washington was cloaked in diplomatic verbiage, but its message about American expectations of Australia was clear:

… what we're confronting now are challenges that require a much deeper engagement with allies and partners. I think the idea over time … will be in a number of potential areas of conflict and in a number of scenarios …

He goes on:

I think those practical circumstances in which AUKUS has the potential to have submarines from a number of countries operating in close coordination that could deliver conventional ordinance from long distances. Those have enormous implications in a variety of scenarios, including in cross-strait circumstances …

'Cross-strait circumstances'—well, I'll assume it's the waters between Taiwan and China that he's talking about. As for 'delivering conventional ordinance from long distances', that's what the US expects to be the role of our AUKUS submarines in the case of war between the US and China over Taiwan. That's what Washington thinks we've signed up for. Apart from informed scepticism expressed by experts in publications read almost exclusively by other experts, the question of the implications for Australian sovereignty rarely breaks the surface in broader discussion about Australia's relations with its most important ally.

For all that, I do thank the Deputy Prime Minister and his stuff for the in-depth briefings offered to me and other members of the crossbench on the various aspects of AUKUS Pillar II, as well as Pillar I, and for the attention he and his staff have paid to my specific interests in some of the detail of this bill. My most significant concern has been the question of storage of nuclear waste, an inevitable consequence of the acquisition of nuclear submarines and the rotation of US and UK subs through Fleet Base West. The original legislative proposal would have left open the possibility that high-level nuclear waste from American and British submarines, as well as our own subs, could have been left to linger on Australian soil. Low-level waste, gloves, hazmat clothing and the like are one thing; high-level waste is quite another, especially given that the UK, for example, has yet to find a way of disposing of the waste from its many decommissioned nuclear submarines, long after they've left operational service. I'm really pleased to see that the minister has listened to these concerns and those of others which emerged during consideration of this legislation by the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee. The government appears to have taken both my concerns and those of the committee at face value, and for that I thank the minister.

I'm pleased, too, that the government is proposing additional amendments designed to ensure accountability, transparency and independence of oversight of the safety provisions relating to nuclear waste. On the face of it, they mirror arrangements for the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, ARPANSA, to protect the community in relation to civilian nuclear waste. There will be an independent regulator to sit within the defence department, as occurs in the UK, rather than the arrangement in the US, where it sits within the Department of Energy for legacy reasons going back as far as World War II and the Manhattan Project. There will also be an expert advisory committee, because there needs to be a second line of accountability. Again, this would report to the defence minister and be appointed by the minister. I'm concerned that there do not appear to be provisions for the expert advisory committee to report publicly, and I would far prefer an independent appointment process.

As I said at the start of my remarks about AUKUS more broadly, transparency and accountability are among the keys to public confidence in policy. These concerns will not end with the passage of this legislation or, indeed, any future arrival of AUKUS submarines. They will remain key for the lifetime of this ambitious and fraught project, and it is incumbent on this parliament to keep its eyes open and on these matters for the lifetime of this exercise.

Sitting suspended from 13:03 to 16:00

Monique Ryan (Kooyong, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The purpose of the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 is to establish a new regulatory framework to promote and regulate the nuclear safety of activities relating to AUKUS submarines. This includes establishing a new independent regulator to be known as the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator. The impetus for the bill stems from the AUKUS partnership, a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. This partnership includes the development and deployment of nuclear powered submarines. Such will necessitate stringent safety protocols and regulatory oversight.

Transparency and accountability are key to the social licence for any significant government endeavour. In this biggest of national endeavours, transparency and accountability are sadly lacking. Instead, we're seeing an initial piece of legislation about the AUKUS scheme which really relates to its back end, and even this seems premature given the very real and outstanding questions regarding Australia's readiness for any form of nuclear capacity. I'm concerned that this parliament has not had an opportunity for a detailed and transparent inquiry into AUKUS—into its rationale, its costs and the implications for nuclear proliferation for Australia, or even just related to the questions related to safe handling and storage of nuclear waste. Naval nuclear power potentially offers this country significant strategic and operational advantages, and I'm not saying that I'm opposed to the AUKUS scheme. But it also comes with significant risks which require careful management.

It is an ongoing concern, for one, that all the oversight and regulation of AUKUS will be through Defence, which does, after all, have a very significant stake in its success. An independent overseer of the safety aspects of AUKUS—such as ARPANSA, which has decades of relevant expertise and experience but no conflict of interest—might well be more appropriate.

Nuclear powered submarines are obvious targets for terrorist attacks or other hostile actions. It's vital that from day one of the program we ensure the security of the vessels and of their nuclear materials. It's also vital that we ensure the safety of waste disposal sites. Addressing these risks involves a combination of rigorous safety protocols, continuous training, robust regulatory oversight and effective emergency preparedness plans. Any doubt regarding those measures will impact significantly on the social licence of the AUKUS scheme in Australia.

The operation of nuclear reactors on submarines involves the handling of radioactive materials. Ionising radiation can be harmful or even rapidly fatal to humans and to other living organisms. Despite even the most stringent of safety measures, the possibility of accidents can never be entirely eliminated. Incidents such as reactor malfunctions, leaks or collisions could well lead to the release of radioactive materials. This would pose immediate and severe risks to submarine crews, nearby human populations and the environment.

These concerns are not academic. Let's not forget that since 1945 the USA has lost no fewer than three atomic bombs and that since 1950 there have been at least 32 so-called Broken Arrow incidents, in which nuclear weapons have been either dropped by mistake or jettisoned in an emergency setting by American forces. And that's just the US. We have no similar accounting for the UK, France, China or Russia. We do know that Russia has lost several nuclear devices off submarines, but we don't know much more than that. In this country just last year, we saw a radioactive capsule literally fall off the back of a truck.

Australians deserve full clarity about the safety of all aspects of any or all nuclear programs in this country. When submarines are decommissioned, the radioactive reactor compartments and spent fuel have to be safely disposed of. Nuclear waste remains hazardous for thousands of years. Accidents during the handling, transport or storage of nuclear waste can lead to the immediate release of radioactive materials—materials which will have severe, immediate and long-term public health and environmental consequences. The storage and disposal of radioactive waste from Australia's nuclear powered submarines will require dedicated facilities and highly trained staff. We have to have surety in the processes of waste transport in sealed and secure containers to storage or disposal facilities. We will need purpose-built facilities for interim storage and then for permanent disposal of that radioactive waste, including spent fuel.

For the moment, the ANSTO nuclear facility at Lucas Heights in New South Wales, which has safely and securely managed low-level radioactive waste in Australia for decades, is probably the best place to put Australia's nuclear waste until we have an agreed and integrated management approach. However, at this point we have no information regarding planning processes for long-term management options of high level nuclear waste. Previous attempts to find permanent sites for even just our low-level nuclear waste have been unsuccessful—most recently, the failed attempt to build a dump at Kimba in South Australia. We've now signalled our intent to construct a storage facility for high-grade nuclear waste. That's a facility which will need to be robust for over 1,000 years. This has not been previously achieved by Australia, the US or the UK.

Both the US and the UK have had nuclear submarines for decades. Neither has yet worked out a permanent solution for their high-grade nuclear waste from those submarines. As of June 2023, the UK had failed to dispose of any of its 22 retired nuclear powered submarines. It stores them in designated dockyards at a cost of at least 30 million pounds every year. A high-level radioactive waste disposal facility which is now nearing completion in Finland has cost a billion euros already, and the estimated cost of the UK's geological facility for intermediate- and high-level waste disposal is over 20 billion pounds.

In March 2023 the defence minister told Australia that we would build a facility on Defence land with the aim of storage and disposal of dismantled reactors, high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. He said in March 2023 that the processes by which this facility would be identified and built would be given to us within a year. That was 18 months ago, and we're still waiting. We really have no reason to feel faith in this government's ability to do better than the US or the UK. It feels very premature to commit to this program when we have no immediate prospect of being able to deliver effective and safe disposal of long-term nuclear waste. I note that the cost of building this high-level storage facility in Australia has not been included in the $368 billion budget for AUKUS at this point. I note that in 2016 a South Australian royal commission estimated the total capital and operating cost of a high-level nuclear disposal facility to be $145 billion over the 120-year life of that facility.

I'm glad to see that the government has this week responded to the concerns raised by the Senate committee inquiry into this matter by amending the legislation so that it allows only the storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel from Australian submarines. Those assurances, however, relate only to high-level radioactive waste. We have an ongoing concern that, through this legislation, Australia could become a dumping ground for low- and intermediate-level nuclear waste from the US and the UK. Those concerns have not, at this point, been addressed or assuaged by the minister in his responses to questions about the issue.

Australians already lack certainty about the potential risks of the AUKUS agreement. Recently we learned that either or both the US or the UK could terminate their current commitments under the scheme with as little as one year's notice. We also learnt that Australia has agreed to take responsibility for nuclear safety risks and that we will indemnify the US and the UK against any liability, loss, costs, damage or injury arising from the nuclear risks connected with the design, manufacture, assembly, transfer or utilisation of any of the materials or equipment involved in the submarine program. This is an extraordinarily one-sided agreement. We seem to have surrendered a significant degree of our national military sovereignty. The health, environmental and economic consequences of any accidents or adverse events arising from this program could be extreme.

The way in which this government is presenting isolated components of the AUKUS scheme to this House in this manner is depriving the country of an opportunity to look at its bigger picture. We all want to see effective and cost-efficient defence procurement. We all want to be sure that our government is making good decisions in our best national interest. But too many questions about the AUKUS program remain unanswered. Will we ever see these promised submarines? When? At what cost? At what opportunity cost? Will the submarines still be fit for purpose if and when they are received? Can we adequately staff the submarines? Can we provide the technological support required to safely run them? How and where will the waste from this program be stored? How much nuclear waste from the US and/or the UK might be dumped on us? How much will the storage of waste from this program cost us? These are the bigger questions that the government is not putting on the table with this incomplete, sketchy bit of legislation. The people of Australia deserve greater transparency about this very important issue.

Max Chandler-Mather (Griffith, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023, which is supported by both Labor and the coalition, is legislation that, if passed, can make anywhere in Australia a nuclear waste dumping ground with no requirement for public consultation, no First Nations input and no warning. The bill allows the defence minister the power to designate anywhere in Australia a high-level nuclear dumping ground, with no public consultation needed. Under this bill, the supposed independent regulator of Defence can be staffed by Defence personnel and report to the Minister for Defence, unlike in other countries where nuclear waste has a truly independent regulator. Under this bill, the same minister would be responsible for the nuclear submarines and for the regulation of nuclear waste, which is a clear conflict of interest.

Australia should not be a dumping ground for nuclear by-products of the US or the UK, and this runs roughshod over not only local communities—who will have no say over whether or not their community becomes a dumping ground for high-level nuclear waste as a result of the AUKUS program—but also First Nations peoples who have a long history of protecting their land from nuclear waste, from Muckaty to Kimba. We have more to say on this in the dissenting report, but it's worth noting that the Greens previously raised concerns that the original version of this bill would have allowed the UK and the US to dump high-level nuclear waste in Australia and, when we raised this issue, we were told that we were fearmongering. Now we find that, in fact, it was entirely correct, so you can forgive us for not particularly trusting this next version of the bill on whether or not we will also see high-level nuclear waste or lower-level nuclear waste from the United States or the UK dumped somewhere in Australia without any recourse to object to that.

Let's be clear about this and what this is doing. This is facilitating the $368 billion AUKUS nuclear sub program, which is ultimately about facilitating the imperial ambitions of the United States in the Asia-Pacific. Let's be very clear about this: it has absolutely nothing to do with Australian security—zero, none, absolutely not at all. In fact, what this program does is make us less safe and drag us into a potential war in Asia. It's incredible, actually, just how subservient Australia and the Labor Party are being to the United States in this instance—spending $368 billion, where we may not actually see any nuclear submarines over the next 30 years. It's an entirely one-sided agreement that hands over Australia's ability to determine its own future to the United States. In fact, United States officials won't even confirm that Australia will have complete control over the deployment of these nuclear submarines.

Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

That is rubbish.

Max Chandler-Mather (Griffith, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It's entirely true, but it's good to see that we're uniting the Labor and Liberal parties, the true coalition in this place. There are multiple 'get out of jail free' cards for the US under this agreement. If at any point the US think that providing nuclear submarines to Australia would not be in their interest, they can just back up their bags and leave, taking all their tech and all their money with them. This is deeply concerning, as Australia has already begun paying the US and UK nearly $10 billion in public funds. If the US and the UK withdraw, they have the right to take back and/or destroy all material and information provided, and the UK and the US only need to provide one year's notice.

The agreement also puts Australia on the hook to indemnify the UK and the US for any liability, loss, cost, damage or injury associated with the use of the nuclear submarines. That means, if something goes wrong with one of the US second-hand nuclear submarines, it is Australia that is liable. Again, this would be a sick joke if it weren't so serious and if the consequences of a nuclear disaster weren't so serious.

The UK and the US will even be allowed to determine the price of the highly enriched uranium they are selling to Australia. AUKUS also allows the US and the UK to intervene in Australia's relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Australia gets a guarantee of nothing. We have no recourse if the US walks away, we don't get independent consultation with the IAEA, we don't get fair prices for the fuel, and we don't even get a guarantee of nuclear submarines. But, if the whole thing blows up in our face and something goes wrong, we are financially responsible to the UK and the US. This is the deal of the century for the US and the UK, who must be chuckling all the way to the bank, having found an Albanese Labor government who's willing to dish out hundreds of billions of dollars to the United States and the UK for their own imperial ambitions.

On average, this will cost $12 billion a year for the next 30 years, in the middle of a cost-of-living and housing crisis. It is genuinely remarkable. Imagine what $12 billion a year could do to tackle the housing crisis. Imagine how many hundreds of thousands of good public homes that could build. What if we put our industrial capacity and our creative capacity not towards helping the US facilitate another disastrous war but instead towards helping people in this country by building enough homes, making sure we put dental and mental health into Medicare, transitioning to 100 per cent renewable energy and creating new industries that create wealth in this country? Instead we're dishing out hundreds of billions of dollars to the United States so they can project more power into the Asia-Pacific and make us all less safe.

Let's be very clear about this. If the ultimate outcome of all of this is a war with China, we lose. There's this flippant way that the political class in this country talks about war: 'Let's just continue to fund and expand the US's imperial ambitions in the Asia-Pacific and help create and enhance tensions as if this is some game.' Well, the consequences of war for future generations in the Asia-Pacific are devastating. No-one wins. There would be hundreds of thousands if not millions of people dead. Sons and daughters would be sent to war, for what? For a war created by the tensions created by political decisions like this. Have the Australian political class learnt nothing?

I note that there's a Liberal member in this place who had a bit of a go at me then. Well, the Liberal Party in this place has never reckoned with the disastrous invasion of Iraq and backing the United States in that. It has never reckoned with the disastrous invasion of Afghanistan. There were a million dead in Iraq. What did you do there? Australia went to war in Iraq, again backing the imperial ambitions of the US. What did we end with when you invaded Iraq? ISIS. Yes, great work—really good work! That's a fantastic foreign policy decision! What about Afghanistan? Trillions of dollars ended up being spent there in that disastrous war, with the stated intention of getting rid of the Taliban. And what did we end up with 20 years later, after death, destruction and more international instability? We were left with a more radical Taliban. What is it going to take for the Labor and Liberal parties to realise that tying ourselves to the hip of the United States and participating in their disastrous wars—which are never about peace or security and always about their own foreign policy ambitions—render us less safe and cost us money and precious lives? What is it going take?

At the end of the day, what we eschew and abandon is the capacity for Australia to pursue its own independent foreign policy. We could be a proud middle power that pursues and facilitates peace in the world. Instead, what we're doing is entirely surrendering our foreign policy to the interests of the United States, despite the fact that every time Australia has done that and participated in an overseas war it has led to death, destruction and less international security, making us less safe; losing our men and women, who die in wars they should not have been sent to; costing the country billions of dollars; and leaving the world a lesser and more dangerous place.

Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

If you want an example of why you should not vote for the Greens, we just heard one from the member for Griffith. For the member for Griffith or anybody who is even contemplating voting for the Greens at the next election or any election, here is a bit of a history lesson. It's called 1942. In 1942, we faced an existential threat. Our traditional ally up until 1942 was mother England, but the Labor government of the time—rightfully, in my view—changed this. As a result of the fall of Singapore, Australia was in great peril. Who came to the aid of Australia? Who was it? It was the United States. The United States came to the aid of Australia in the Battle of Guadalcanal. Thousands of Marines from across mainland United States came to a place that they had never heard of to fight a war that they really didn't have a fight in, and thousands of them died. Thousands of them fought to defend Australia. The Battle of Milne Bay and the Battle of the Coral Sea changed the face of World War II. But for the actions of the United States in literally saving Australia, Australia would look very different today.

But the Greens would have you believe that all of that is in the past, that we ought not even consider these things. My grandfather served in World War II. He served on HMAS Kanimbla. I grew up as a young boy constantly hearing this sentence—it's really simple—'Thank God for the Yanks.' I grew up hearing that time and time again because the reality was that Australia in 1942 could not defend itself. Today in 2024 Australia can't defend itself. That is a shameful position to be in. But the reality is, peer on peer, if we were to face a peer competitor, Australia would not be able to defend itself on its own, in the same way that we were not able to defend ourselves in 1942.

They say if you refuse to look at history you're destined to repeat it. If we did what the Greens want to do as is in their political manifesto we'd decimate the Australian Defence Force. That's exactly what the Greens want to do. At a time when we live in the most geopolitically unstable period since 1945, the Greens want to decimate the ADF. That's what they want to do. They want to decimate the ADF. They want to rip the guts out of funding for it. They don't believe in defence. They don't believe in ADF personnel. It's very clear. I'd love to know how many Greens members are protesting—

I'm surprised you're here today and not in Melbourne, Member for Griffith. I'm surprised that the member for Griffith is here and not in Melbourne, supporting his mates throwing rocks at VicPol.

But I digress. I apologise for digressing. The member for Griffith winds me up because the member for Griffith and people like him have no appreciation for history and have no appreciation for the loss and sacrifice that generations before us have made. They think that this democracy that we live in today just kind of appeared. The lives which we enjoy today in this country came off the back of service men and women from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Great Britain and the United States. It didn't just happen. It is because countries like us stood up against tyranny in both World War I and World War II and said: 'We will not stand for this. We know it's going to cost money. We know it's going to cost lives, more importantly. But when countries do not stand up against that sort of tyranny the world falls apart.' But for the Greens it's all peace, love and mung beans, baby, and it doesn't matter because the world is a beautiful place.

Try telling that to the Ukrainians. Try telling that to the Israelis. Try telling that to so many other countries that have been violated, invaded and attacked. Life just doesn't work like that. In a nirvana, it would be wonderful. It would be wonderful, wouldn't it, shadow Treasurer, if you didn't have to find the sort of money you'd need to fund our Defence Force? In a nirvana, it would be perfect. But you know what? We don't live in a nirvana. Sadly, we live in a world where people like the President of Russia have invaded Ukraine. President Xi has told his senior military to be prepared to take Taiwan by force, if necessary, by 2027.

That is why this bloke, at the next election, will need to find the money to fund AUKUS. That is why Jim Chalmers, the current Treasurer, has to find the money to fund AUKUS. Parties of government have a responsibility to ensure the peace and security of this country. Parties like the Greens and Independents can promise the world and give you an atlas. But, sadly, we live in a world that is the most geopolitically unstable. Almost everybody agrees with that—since 1945. That is why this bill, that is why AUKUS, is so incredibly important. It's not just about nuclear powered submarines. There is so much more to AUKUS than submarines.

I welcome the Minister for Defence into the chamber because the member for Griffith and I have just had a wonderful exchange about the need to properly equip the ADF with some of the most stealthy submarines available today. I reminded the member for Griffith that peace comes at a price. There's a very old phrase that has been bandied around for millennia. You know the phrase, don't you? The phrase goes something like, 'If you want peace, prepare for war; if you want to provoke your enemies, then be weak.' That is exactly what would happen if the Greens ever had control over the government Treasury benches.

We face a very real prospect. And I'm really pleased that the Minister for Defence is in here right now because I earnestly believe—and I'm probably going to regret saying this in public—that the Minister for Defence is a good man. It's true. I do believe he's a good man. I do believe he has the interests of this country at heart. We face a very real prospect at the next election that Labor and the Greens will be in some sort of a power-sharing arrangement. It'll be a power-sharing arrangement. It'll be a coalition. God knows this bloke could be the new defence minister because he's so committed to the defence of this country! And the Greens will say to the Prime Minister, if it comes to this, 'If you want to remain Prime Minister, Prime Minister, you need to have us at the cabinet table. You need to have us at the policy formulation table.' The Greens will exact a very heavy price, Minister for Defence. You know that. I know that. We know that on this side. The Greens will exact a very heavy price on this government.

And you know what? I hope we win the next election. I really do. That's what we're fighting for. But do you know what? If we don't win it, I hope the Labor Party win a majority government, because the worst thing that could ever happen to this place, to this country, is you guys ever being in a power-sharing arrangement with the Greens. God help us. God help this country if the Greens are ever sharing power with the Labor Party again, just like they did in the last Labor government.

I'm making a plea to anybody who's watching this, anybody who is even thinking remotely about voting for the Greens. In the words of President Biden: 'Don't.' Don't do it, because you will significantly weaken the defence capabilities of this country and the region. It would not even surprise me if this government came under pressure on all things that we don't want to see. So I also want to encourage the government not to accept preferences from the Greens, the Member for Griffith et al, because of the reasons I have outlined about a power-sharing arrangement between the Greens and the government, which would only come into force by virtue of a preference arrangement.

I've sat and watched in the chamber for weeks and months as the government and the Greens fought over this, that and everything, but, if the government is so against what the Greens have been doing in recent times, particularly in relation to Gaza, then the Labor Party should stand up and say: 'Well, you know what?' Just as they said to us decades ago, 'You shouldn't accept preferences from One Nation,' I say to the Labor Party, 'You shouldn't accept preferences from this mob, because they will bring you down.' As sure as God made little green apples, this lot will bring you down. Not only will they bring you down; they will make this country a far less safe place than it is culturally, defence-wise and certainly economically. We cannot afford a situation where these guys get anywhere near the Treasury benches, because it will ruin this country.

Anybody who is listening to this on the radio or watching this: you probably need to get a life! But I would encourage you: please don't support the Greens.

Richard Marles (Corio, Australian Labor Party, Minister for Defence) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Firstly, I thank all members who have contributed to the debate on these amendments, particularly having heard the last speech. I thank the member for making that speech; clearly, I chose the wrong tie today! I'd also like to thank the opposition for its bipartisanship and support in progressing these bills through the parliament. These bills are the critical next legislative step in establishing the highest standards of nuclear safety and stewardship of Australia's future conventionally armed nuclear powered submarine enterprise under the banner of AUKUS.

The government has listened closely to the contributions of those who have engaged in the consultation processes around these bills, including through the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee. That committee considered the bills and made seven recommendations to improve the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023, ultimately recommending that the bill be passed. The government has accepted, either in full or in principle, all of those recommendations, and I can foreshadow that I will shortly move amendments to address these. The government thanks the committee for its work in thoroughly considering the bills and acknowledges all those that supported the inquiry process.

The Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 will establish a new fit-for-purpose regulatory framework—including an independent regulator, the Australian Naval and Nuclear Power Safety Regulator—for nuclear safety within Australia's conventionally armed nuclear powered submarine enterprise and capability life cycle. This new framework will be harmonised with other schemes, including those relating to work health and safety, nuclear nonproliferation and civilian nuclear safety. This new regulator will have a range of functions and comprehensive powers and will work with existing regulators to promote the safety of our submariners, the Australian and international communities and the environment.

The Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2023 supports the transition between the existing regulatory regime and the new regulatory framework that will be established through the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Act 2023 on commencement, designed specifically to regulate nuclear safety aspects of naval nuclear propulsion and the nuclear powered submarine enterprise.

Throughout the development of the legislation, the government has demonstrated a clear commitment to consultation, engaging with targeted stakeholders across state government, local councils, unions, industry, First Nations representative bodies, relevant Commonwealth and state agencies, academia and training providers. We welcome all these contributions and encourage engagement as we proceed. This commitment will continue as we progress further on the pathway to acquiring nuclear powered submarine capability for our nation.

These bills are critical to Australia's acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines. I commend these bills to the House.

Zoe McKenzie (Flinders, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The question is that this bill be now read a second time.

Question unresolved.

As it is necessary to resolve this question to enable further questions to be considered in relation to this bill, in accordance with standing order 195 the bill will be returned to the House for further consideration.