Cameron Thompson (Blair, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is an honour to rise in this chamber to speak about Australia’s defence relationship with the United States and in doing so to make comment on and recommend to the House and to Australians generally the report of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade entitled Australia’s defence relations with the United States. In recent years international events have forced countries around the world to rethink their defence capabilities and strategies. Known threats such as those experienced in the Cold War and in the years of communism have joined unilateral actions as belonging in the past. Today non-state threats—terrorism—are the top priority. Threats to our defence have become truly global, with country boundaries not dictating sources of threats nor cohesion in their preparation. Our security is no longer separable from international security. We need to stay at the top level of defence preparedness and ability. To do that we must have the support, shared intelligence and involvement of the US, a country beyond all others in scale and capability when it comes to defence.

I would like to reflect for a moment on what has been for some time Australia’s defence doctrine, as espoused in the 2000 Defence white paper and the 2003 update of the white paper. The goals set out within that doctrine are: to ensure the defence of Australia and its direct approaches, to foster the security of our immediate neighbourhood, to work with others to promote stability and cooperation in South-East Asia, to contribute in appropriate ways to maintaining strategic stability in the wider Australian Asia-Pacific region and to support global security. The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade recommends that the ANZUS treaty be maintained in its current form and treated as a document that evolves with threats and binds countries of shared values. The ANZUS treaty has served us well. I will reflect on that shortly. Firstly, I want to speak about the framework that produced this report and then reflect some more on some of the recommendations it contains.

The focus of the report was set out in its terms of reference, which included: the applicability of the ANZUS treaty to Australia’s defence and security; the value of US-Australian intelligence sharing; the role and engagement of the US in the Asia-Pacific region; the adaptability and interoperability of Australia’s force structure and the capability for coalition operations; the implications of Australia’s dialogue with the US on missile defence; the development of space based systems and the impact this will have for Australia’s self-reliance; the value of joint defence exercises between Australia and the US, such as Exercise RIMPAC; the level of Australian industry involvement in the US defence industry; and the adequacy of research and development arrangements between the US and Australia.

On 14 October 2003, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade commenced the inquiry into defence relations with the US. There has been a new level of cooperation reached between the US and Australia in recent years. That has been evident in our joint involvement in the Gulf War, in the Afghanistan and Iraq coalitions and in other international operations. This has been in part because of a new level of need for cooperation caused by, as I discussed earlier, the emergence of terrorism as a worldwide threat and coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to tackle terrorism threats.

Let me speak for a moment about the relevance of the ANZUS alliance, which is the security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America. This document was signed in San Francisco on 1 September 1951 by Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America, although it did not come into force until 29 April 1952. Its purpose, at the time of the Cold War, was to address increasing regional instability and the increasing power of communist states and aggression. An attack on one member of the treaty would be an attack on all members under the treaty. Article IV of the treaty says:

Each Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

The impact of this, according to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, is not in the US coming to our defence but in making potential attackers aware of the magnitude of any such action. The treaty provides options for a response to attack. If Australia is attacked, the US may choose to engage in a military response or assist Australia through the supply of military equipment, diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions or a combination of these. The US Department of Defense described the defence relations between our countries as being based on ‘shared values underpinned by a considerable history of common sacrifice’.

In relation to intelligence, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, ASPI, in its submission, said:

Without the alliance, Australia would be substantially blind in many critical areas of intelligence gathering and assessment. We cannot afford the investment levels necessary to duplicate America’s intelligence gathering capability.

The committee supports enhancing this intelligence sharing while ensuring our own capability to analyse US intelligence is sufficiently invested in.

In relation to access to the US defence market, the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources stated in a submission that the US was:

... poised to spend more on defence in 2003 than the next 15-20 biggest spenders combined.

The future of our defence relationship with the US has to be built on our very solid foundations, which will grow with developments that occur throughout the world. The benefits we reap from this relationship include shared experience, intelligence sharing and access to defence equipment. We can gain from the relationship greater knowledge of methods and resources in defence, and cooperation in exercises and in action. The alliance has proved quite flexible and has grown with international developments over the last 50 years.

In the short time remaining to me I want to reflect on a couple of the comments in this report, particularly in relation to our relationship with the US and the interaction we have with our near neighbour Indonesia—probably the key defence issue in our region. There are some very interesting comments in relation to Indonesia in this report. It says in the section under ‘Indonesia’, in relation to Australia’s US relations in the Asia-Pacific:

Australia has a key role to play in supporting the development of Indonesian democracy. The US has been constrained in its ability to support the development of the security force structures in the world’s third largest democracy by restrictions imposed by the US Legislature. As a result, the US values the relationship Australia has established with the Government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and ongoing practical measures between Australia and Indonesia, particularly at the military level.

Earlier in the report it also states that, during the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Australia’s success in winning a softening of terms from the International Monetary Fund for a financially extended Indonesia to repay or extend loans was gratefully acknowledged by Indonesia. However, despite these efforts to positively influence US and international policy in relation to Indonesia, the Australian military intervention in East Timor in 1999 coincided with a temporary perception in some quarters that Australia endorsed the Bush administration’s new pre-emption strategy directed against rogue states. Those are just a couple of issues on which our alliance with the US has benefited our region directly, particularly in that key relationship with Indonesia—something that is manifestly evident in this report, which I commend to the House.

Debate (on motion by Mr Baird) adjourned.