Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006 amends the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003. Its principal purposes are to simplify the procedures for making changes to maritime ship and offshore facilities security plans, to clarify measures relating to the plan approval process, to make a number of technical amendments to clarify the intent of the act, to make amendments to various acts consequential to the enactment of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 and to make a technical amendment to the Customs Act 1901. These provisions are of course now far more important in the minds of many, given the events in 2001 and the concern that we all now have to ensure that threat from not just criminal activity but terrorist activity is minimised.

The bill before us has three schedules. Schedule 1 deals directly with the act. Schedule 2 contains only technical amendments as a consequence of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 and is quite formal. Schedule 3, similarly, is formal and updates the Customs Act to reflect the new short title of this act as changed in 2005. I therefore refer to schedule 1 of the bill, which deals directly with the matters under consideration. The main purpose of these amendments is to require various ships, ports or offshore facilities to have security plans in place to minimise the danger to them and to Australia from terrorism or other acts of violence. Maritime security plans identify security measures to be implemented when different maritime security levels of threat are in force.

‘Maritime security plan’ simply means a plan prepared for the purposes of part 3 of the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003. Such plans must be approved by the Secretary of the Department of Transport and Regional Services. An example of the sorts of changes to the process of approval of security plans that is contained in the bill is that the secretary will now have 60 days to approve a security plan instead of the current 90 days. This is obviously intended to streamline the process, and we welcome that. However, I note that the secretary will effectively be able to extend this time by a further 45 days when additional information is required in order to make a decision on a security plan. I would expect, though, that the department and the government, in implementing this, and industry, in complying with it, would seek to expedite those plans on the shorter time frame.

Clause 1 of the bill involves the repeal of the existing section 47(1)(c) of the act. That section requires that maritime security plans include the contact details for a responsible maritime security officer. The substitute wording for that requires a participant to designate by name or position all of the security officers responsible for implementing a maritime security plan. That is a sensible improvement. Labor understands that designated security officers might move on to other employers or indeed to other positions with their existing employer. This amendment allows flexibility by designating the position rather than an individual’s name. It is a sensible, straightforward alteration to the act. The bill also enables variations to a plan to be submitted. This is a far more workable alternative to the current situation, which requires a new plan to be submitted rather than simply amending an existing plan.

The bill has valid improvements to security, but there are still many serious maritime security issues that this government has failed to address and that cause those on this side of the parliament grave concern. We have in the past warned the government about the dangers of ammonium nitrate being freighted around our coastline by foreign flagged vessels with foreign crews that have not undergone any background check or security clearance. Ammonium nitrate, when mixed with fuel, is a high-end explosive. Indeed, it has been an explosive of choice by terrorists in a number of attacks in the last couple of decades.

When the French freighter Grandcamp, carrying 2,300 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, was docked in Texas City after the Second World War in April 1947, an explosion showed just how serious the consequences could be. On that occasion, when the deck caught fire the ammonium nitrate exploded. The explosion was heard as far as 150 miles away and there was a mushroom cloud that rose 2,000 feet above the city. Locals thought there had been a nuclear bomb. The Grandcamp’s 1½-tonne anchor was flung two miles from the ship’s berth and was embedded 10 feet in the ground. Texas City was devastated. The explosion killed at least 567 people. It is simply irresponsible that the government, having been warned about these dangers, refuses to fix the problem.

Labor has also pointed out that Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiah, two terrorist groups in our region linked to the Osama bin Laden network and al-Qaeda, have the skills and opportunities to launch a maritime terrorist attack. Reports from United States intelligence sources have indicated that al-Qaeda’s operations extend to owning or having long-term charters on a fleet of between 15 and 18 bulk carriers or general cargo vessels. Whilst it is believed that these vessels are used to generate revenue and/or support the group’s logistics network, it is nonetheless feasible that one of the vessels could be used as a floating bomb in a suicide mission, heavily laden with ammonium nitrate. There is a real threat of a ship being used as a weapon in a terrorist strike, just as a jet was used in 2001. A maritime vessel can be used against a population centre adjacent to port facilities or shipping lanes. It can be used to damage the port or to block access to the port.

Labor have been calling for urgent improvements in maritime security for some time, but unfortunately we get precious little from this government and this minister. We do welcome this bill, which makes a number of improvements but which ignores so many other vital areas. As a result of those concerns, I will be moving an amendment to the second reading. I want to take some time to talk about the areas of concern that are set out in the amendment. They are of genuine concern not just to those on this side of the House but to those in the industry as well.

In the past the government has enacted legislation with the support of the Labor Party and then failed to properly administer it. One of the areas of grave concern is the way the government has allowed ships to come to our ports without any prior notice or advice of cargo or crew. In fact, with the support of the Labor Party, the government enacted laws to require all ships to advise details of their cargo and crew 48 hours before they reach an Australian port. Yet the most recent information given to the Senate on this tells us that just 67 per cent of ships coming to Australian ports actually comply with that requirement to advise 48 hours before they arrive. About one-third of all the ships coming to Australian ports do not comply with the legislative requirement to inform the Australian authorities of their cargo and crew, and the government does precious little about that.

It is not much use having laws passed in this parliament if the incompetence of the Howard government sees them poorly administered. In this vital area of maritime security, one-third of the ships coming to Australia flout the law, and the government does nothing about it. Not only do they fail to advise of their cargo and crew before arriving but, on the figures given to the Senate just a few months ago, 15 per cent of those ships do not even tell the authorities what their cargo or crew is until after they have berthed. Think about that for a moment. With 15 per cent of ships coming to Australian ports the authorities have no confirmed knowledge of who is on the ship or what cargo they are carrying. There is not a lot of point in having bills like the one before us being carried in this parliament when the government is so free and easy in the way in which it implements them.

Restricting ships coming to your ports is a serious matter, but, in fact, other countries in the world monitor their ports adequately. In the United States they have a similar requirement that a ship must advise the authorities of crew and cargo 48 hours before the ship berths. If ships do not provide that information 48 hours beforehand, they are required to stand offshore and, if need be, the Coast Guard will make sure they do. In Australia we do not require them to stand offshore and we do not have a coastguard to stop them anyway. The Howard government are quick to talk about these security matters; they are appallingly slow in doing anything about it. In the area of national security that relates to our ports, they have been found sadly wanting.

That is only part of the sad story of the Howard government’s incompetence in the handling of maritime security, I have to say. Effectively, the government conduct no security checks on foreign crews whatsoever. So even those ships that do inform the authorities of their cargo and crew are not able to be verified—at least not before they arrive in port and the manifesto and details of the ship’s crew are provided to the authorities. Those names are then checked against existing databases to see if there are people on the list whom we might not want to have come into Australia, but there is actually no way of knowing at that point whether the people on the ship are who they say they are. There are no security checks done in any event on any of them.

That stands in stark contrast to Australian seafarers. Australian seafarers undergo a rigorous and thorough security check by the Australian Federal Police and by ASIO. They have to have a maritime security identification card, or MSIC—the same sort of card which many members and people in the community would know of at airports. Aviation security identification cards certify that the holders are people of good character and good background who can work in security sensitive areas, and we can all rest easy knowing they are there. The background checks that are done on Australian seafarers are not done on any of these flag of convenience crews. And yet the Howard government hand out permits for those flag of convenience crews like it was a Friday night chook raffle at the local pub.

The simple fact is that, under the Howard Liberal government, permits for foreign flagged crews to trade the Australian coastal route in place of Australian ships and crews have become commonplace. Those permits were originally designed to pick up the slack—to be there for peak periods of demand. The Howard government have changed that process from one in which those permits were there to deal with peak demand to a system where, now, they are used to replace Australian ships and Australian crews. The government might have an industrial relations agenda underneath that plan, but they expose Australians to a serious security risk. They appear willing to sacrifice security in order to pursue their industrial relations agenda.

The simple fact is those foreign crewed vessels are carrying dangerous chemicals, as well as ordinary goods, around the Australian coastline. Last year the Leader of the Opposition, Kim Beazley, and I went to Gladstone to conduct a press conference overlooking Gladstone Harbour, where a ship had just come in to berth. The ship was the Pancaldo. The Pancaldo was carrying 3,000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate. I have just mentioned that ammonium nitrate has been an explosive of choice for terrorists. An explosion in 1947 of 2,000-odd tonnes of it was seen and heard by people who thought it was a nuclear explosion. There were 3,000 tonnes on the Pancaldo in Gladstone last year when Kim Beazley and I were there. It was on a flag of convenience ship crewed by people that the Australian government had no background knowledge of whatsoever. There were no security checks done on any of the crew. In fact most of the crew came from former Soviet republic nations, Eastern European nations. If memory serves me correctly, the ship was actually flagged out of Panama, one of the major flagging nations for ships of convenience, where you can get your ship flagged with no questions asked.

The government has been quite happy to allow ships of convenience with foreign crews we know nothing about to carry dangerous materials around Australian waters and to place Australians around the coastline in serious threat. The Labor Party have made it clear that we think that is wrong. We have made it clear that ships that come to Australian ports should be obliged to provide the details of their crew and their cargo at least 48 hours before arrival. If they do not, then we should do exactly what the United States does, and that is to prevent their entry into our ports. Similarly, we take a clear view in the interest of Australian security: only security cleared crews on safe and sound ships should be carrying dangerous materials around the Australian coastline.

Whilst ammonium nitrate has been the explosive of choice for terrorists on a number of occasions, it is also the standard explosive used in the mining industry, so it is widely used in Australia. It is not something we can easily eliminate. We need to ensure that the protocols put in place for handling ammonium nitrate do not place Australians at risk. We need especially to ensure that people who would do harm, those who might be involved with terrorist organisations, do not have the opportunity to turn one of those cargo ships into a floating bomb. The Howard government, along with the state and territory governments, has quite properly put in place new laws to restrict the way in which ammonium nitrate can be used once it is taken off the ship. There are quite rigid controls for the records that are kept. I recall that it upset some of the National Party members because ammonium nitrate is used in the agricultural industry as well.

Governments of all persuasions, including the Howard government, have acknowledged the need to provide those restrictions on the use of ammonium nitrate in Australia once it is here. But when it comes in bulk by the thousands of tonnes in a container ship, the government does nothing to inform itself about who is carrying the ammonium nitrate, what the background of the crew is and who owns the ship. Is the ship owned by Osama bin Laden or al-Qaeda? Is it one of the estimated 15 to 18 cargo ships that the al-Qaeda network either owns or leases? Frankly, the government would not know. It beggars belief that the government can seek to make so much of national security matters while it so incompetently handles that issue.

But it does not just stop with dangerous chemicals and flag of convenience vessels. At the moment, the government proudly boasts that it X-rays about 10 per cent of the containers that come off ships. That leaves about 90 per cent of the containers that go unchecked. The odds are pretty good if you happen to want to hide something in a container. In a number of speeches I have referred to earlier examples of where explosives have been found in containers. Indeed on one occasion—and this comes from the department of foreign affairs own reports on these matters in 2003—they found a stowaway who actually had aviation security passes for the United States, false passports and equipment that clearly identified him as a person who was involved with terrorist organisations. He was housed inside one of the containers and found by accident because he opened one of the vents to let a little more air in and, as he did it, there happened to be some workers beside the container who got suspicious. In the Australian context, he would have been in the 90 per cent of shipping containers that we do not even look at.

The government cannot come before the people of Australia or this parliament and say that they are doing their job when they allow 90 per cent of containers to come through our ports without being checked at all. In Hong Kong they understand the importance of security in these matters. Of course, maritime trade is vitally important to Hong Kong. It is one of the busiest ports in the world. They have nine terminals. At the moment in two of the nine terminals they are trialling new systems with new equipment to X-ray 100 per cent of the cargo. Every single container going out of the port of Hong Kong in two of their nine terminals is now being X-rayed because they understand that one incident is one too many. One terrorist or one bomb on a container going from Hong Kong to San Francisco or Sydney is one too many. So they are trialling a 100 per cent screening process. It is being spoken about by legislators in the United States who are looking at that Hong Kong model as a way forward to help protect the United States against the threat that maritime security problems present.

But here in Australia the government are asleep again—on this occasion, at the helm of the ship. They do not think it matters a great deal and in fact boast about the fact that they X-ray 10 per cent and forget about the other 90 per cent. I do not think too many Australians would share their view that that is an acceptable performance. It is little wonder that these problems occur when the government have not been willing to make the hard decisions, knock a few heads together and create a homeland security department so that there is one government department with responsibility for all of these matters. Instead of having four ministers and something like a dozen different agencies underneath them with responsibility for these things, as the government do now, the proper course to follow would have been to establish a dedicated department to bring together all of these areas of government that have to work closely if we are going to maximise the security of Australians here at home.

One of the most important areas where that happens is with our border security, our ports. It is also very hard to do that if you do not have a dedicated coastguard—not a navy—for the purpose. The Navy is there as part of our defence forces to conduct a range of activities. We have seen it in many roles over the years but principally the Defence Force is there for one reason: to defend the nation. It is there for warlike activity. However we may characterise these responsibilities, they are not actually warlike.

That is why in a number of countries—and the United States is often mentioned because I guess most people are familiar with the United States Coast Guard—including some in our region, like Malaysia, are forming coastguards. It is why the international maritime community is working together to create a multinational coastguard for the African coastline. The reason they are doing it off the African coastline is that they are victims of one of the highest levels of piracy in the world.

The only place in the world that has more piracy than the African coastline is our backyard. The world’s worst place for piracy is the straits to our north-north-west. The Strait of Malacca and the areas around Indonesia and Malaysia are more prone to piracy than any other waters in the world. Last year two ships reported piracy incidents and four were hijacked. That actually understates the problem because a number of shipowners will not report the incidents because they are not very good advertisements for their shipping lines. It understates quite significantly the problem of piracy and hijacking of ships on the high sea. The waters to the north-north-west of our coastline are the area of the world that endures the greatest amount of piracy of all of the shipping lanes in the world.

We should do what other countries confronted with this problem have done, and that is establish a dedicated coastguard for the purpose. Here too the government have dropped the ball. I have heard many commentators on this make the observation that the government would have set up a homeland security department and created an Australian coastguard years ago except for the fact that it was Labor policy years ago and they cannot bring themselves to do it. They should take the lead from a number of countries in the world who understand the difference between the role of a coastguard and the role of a navy. They should have a look at the work that is being done by the international community off the coast of Africa and by our neighbours in the region who are establishing and strengthening their coastguard—not navy, but coastguard—to deal with these threats.

Maybe if we had a coastguard we could enforce the laws that the government wanted and the Labor Party supported that require ships to provide notification 48 hours before they arrive in port of who their crew are and what their cargo is. Maybe the government would have the capacity to implement those laws. They are sound and sensible but this government has failed to properly implement them.

The bill before us is quite brief and straightforward and makes a number of small adjustments that Labor supports. Sadly, it does not address the range of maritime security issues to which I referred and which my second reading amendment addresses. I hope that the provisions in this bill are acted on and implemented with a greater degree of competence than has characterised this government in its dealings in transport security generally and in particular here in relation to maritime security.

We are a maritime nation. Our seagoing industry has been vitally important to the country for many years, and with a coastline of 37,000 kilometres it remains vitally important to us. I trust that the government will prove to be more competent, although I do not hold out great hope, in administering this brief bill than they have proven to be in relation to the broader issue of maritime security. I move:

That all words after “That” be omitted with a view to substituting the following words: “whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House condemns the Howard Government for its failure to provide necessary maritime security and protect Australians, including:

(1)

the Howard Government’s failure to conduct security checks on foreign crews;

(2)

the Government’s continued failure to ensure foreign ships provide manifestos of crew and cargo before arriving at an Australian port;

(3)

the ready availability of single and multiple voyage permits for foreign flag of convenience ships including the ready availability of permits for foreign flag of convenience ships carrying dangerous materials in Australian waters and ports;

(4)

the failure of the Howard Government to examine or x-ray 90% of shipping containers;

(5)

the Government’s failure to create a Department of Homeland Security to remove dangerous gaps and to better coordinate security in Australia; and

(6)

the Howard Government’s failure to establish an Australian Coastguard to patrol our coastline”.

Harry Jenkins (Scullin, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Is the amendment seconded?

Michael Hatton (Blaxland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I second the amendment.

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The original question was that this bill be now read a second time. To this the honourable member for Brisbane has moved as an amendment that all words after ‘That’ be omitted with a view to substituting other words. The question now is that the words proposed to be omitted stand part of the question.

Michael Hatton (Blaxland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In the two minutes or so until we go to the adjournment I will address a very small part of this simple bill, the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006. I will come to the broader question in terms of the opposition’s amendments to this bill later when I get a chance to speak again.

In the second paragraph of the second reading speech the Minister for Transport and Regional Services outlined more of what is in this bill than you could do in almost a month of Sundays. It says the particular instruments that are involved here are affected in this way:

The act implements a preventative security regime to enhance security at ports, terminals, offshore facilities and on board ships, giving effect to Australia’s international obligations under the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code under chapter XI-2 of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention 1974.

How does it do it? Essentially it changes the administrative arrangements for people who are in the maritime industry to allow them to make amendments to their previously put forward security plans and to not have to put a completely new plan into place, so that when an amendment is put it can be dealt as a variation and that variation can have the same onus as the original plan and can be allowed through. Secondly, a particular person is not designated to be in charge of implementing the act, so significant changes do not have to be made if the person changes his job.

Debate interrupted.