Jason Wood (La Trobe, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Today I stand in support of the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2005. Before I start, I would just like to touch on a couple of points raised by the member for Brisbane. One is that I respectfully share his concerns about foreign ships. We need to ensure that we have everything done to ensure that those who enter our waters are properly checked. However, he did raise the point that this government has done very little for security. The sad reality is that, if we had a Labor federal government, we would just have to look at what they have done at the state level with regard to security.

We have the absolutely ridiculous situation that across this country people can purchase or get hold of explosives licences using false identification. This is in the realms and control of the state governments. That needs to be urgently changed. At the same time, there is no national database. Where a person purchases explosives in one state and moves to another state and the police check that person again, they have no ability to find out whether that person actually had a licence to possess explosives. The same goes for chemicals, and we have heard about ammonium nitrate fertiliser.

This bill is intended to enhance maritime transport security while benefiting the Australian economy and reinforcing Australia’s international obligations. Its provisions are consistent with this government’s policy of awareness of the very real possibility of a terrorist attack. Although the Australian people have fortunately not seen a terror attack on home soil, they have nonetheless suffered at the hands of terrorism.

Ten Australians were killed in the attacks on 11 September 2001 and numerous others were injured. Of the 202 killed in the tragic Bali bombings in October 2002, 88 were Australians. The London bombings have not left Australians unscathed. Twenty-eight-year-old Australian citizen Sam Ly was a victim of one of the bus bombings, and in recent times we have seen more arrests in London.

On 9 September 2004, a car bomb exploded outside Australia’s embassy in Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta. Though no Australians were among the 10 killed in the explosion, the attack has been seen as a threat directed towards Australia. The suffering and fear engendered by terrorism is repugnant to this government and, I am sure, to all members in this House. We will not tolerate these attempts to terrorise the Australian people.

Terror knows no bounds. We have seen attacks on land and from the air. But terrorists have also attacked at sea. On 12 October 2002, as the US navy destroyer Cole docked briefly to refuel, a small boat approached. It was laden with explosives. The suicide terrorist attack killed 17 members of the ship’s crew, wounded 39 others and seriously damaged the ship.

In 21st-century Australia, international terrorism on the land, in the air and on the sea is a reality we are forced to confront. In recognition of the fact, the International Maritime Organisation established the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code in December 2002. The ISPS code is an addition to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974, to which Australia is a party. The code creates an international framework for detecting and assessing security threats to ships and port facilities and for taking preventative measures against them. It creates international cooperation on the maritime front.

In Australia, the requirements of the ISPS code have been implemented through the Maritime Transport Security Act 2003, recently amended and now called the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003. Today’s bill amends that act. The act establishes maritime security zones, which are zones in ports and on ships that require additional security measures. The zones enable maritime security guards to monitor and control access to security regulated ports and ships and prevent unauthorised access to those areas. The act also provides for three maritime security levels and heightened levels in times of higher security risk.

From July this year, people requiring unmonitored access to maritime security zones must display a maritime security identification card when within maritime security zones. The card is nationally consistent and confirms that the holder has met the minimum background checking requirements to work in a maritime and/or offshore security zone.

At present, the 2003 act provides maritime security guards with the power to restrain an unauthorised person and to detain them until a law enforcement officer arrives. However, maritime security guards are prevented from requesting identification from a person within a maritime security zone, asking why he or she is there and requesting that he or she move on if it is established that his or her access is unauthorised. They are also prevented from removing vehicles or vessels found to be in a maritime security zone without authorisation. These limits inhibit the effectiveness of security within the higher risk zones. They would also limit the effectiveness of the new ID card system. That is why today’s amendment bill has been brought to the House.

Schedule 1 of the bill provides for increased efficiency in dealing with potential threats to maritime security by creating a quick response mechanism for dealing with unauthorised entrants to maritime security zones. As a former police officer, I cannot speak too highly of the need for effective and swift measures for dealing with unlawful behaviour. This is particularly so in the present international climate, with the heightened threat of terrorism.

Today’s amendment bill provides maritime security guards with the power to request that a person found within a maritime security zone provide identification and a reason for being there. They may also request a person they reasonably believe to be in a security zone without authorisation to move on and are permitted to remove them if they refuse to comply. Similar provision is made for the removal of vehicles and vessels found in a maritime security zone without authorisation. A maritime security guard must first make reasonable efforts to have the person in control of the vehicle or vessel remove it, but may then remove it themselves or cause it to be removed.

By giving limited additional move-on powers to maritime security guards, potential security breaches can be dealt with immediately. Without this amendment, maritime security guards are required to detain unauthorised entrants to maritime security zones until a law enforcement officer, usually a state or territory police officer, arrives. The proposed changes mean that resources need not be diverted from these law enforcement agencies. In the fight against terror our police forces need to be assisted in every way possible. While police officers can still be called in when required, the new arrangements allow ports to deal immediately with perceived threats to maritime security. Ports can deal promptly with unauthorised entrants into zones without needing the additional support of police resources.

I commend the Attorney-General and his department for the work that has gone into this legislation. It recognises that a balance must be struck between the legitimate use of force to protect maritime security zones from unauthorised entry and the rights of the individuals to whom the provisions may apply, and the reasonable care of property.

The amendment bill requires that a maritime security guard exercising the new powers identify himself or herself, advise the person of his or her authority to request information, and tell the person that non-compliance is an offence under the act. In the case where a person is found to be in the zone unauthorised, as I mentioned earlier, the guard may remove them. In the process, that person must not be subjected to greater force or indignity than is necessary and reasonable to remove them. These amendments, while safeguarding the rights of individuals and reasonable care of property, mean that matters of maritime security can be dealt with simply and immediately, keeping our ports and ships secure.

This legislation will affect every maritime security zone in Australia. Affected ships may be cargo ships, with at least 500 gross tonnes of cargo, or passenger ships. So we are not just talking cargo here—we are also talking people. The people of my electorate, La Trobe, will be affected by the proposed legislation. Station Pier, in Victoria, houses the Spirit of Tasmania. This pier is part of Melbourne Port and is classified as a maritime security zone. The proposed amendments mean that passengers travelling on board the Spirit of Tasmania can be confident in greater security on board the ship and within the ports where the ship docks. The same could be said for other passenger ships and ports that have been classified as maritime security zones. This goes directly to helping the people of La Trobe, and Australia, feel confident that adequate security is provided at our ports. We must not succumb to a fear of the threat of an attack by sea.

Nor should trade be hindered by a fear for the security of cargo and trade vessels. Australia’s geographical isolation means that our success in international trade is dependent on maritime trade. With credit to this government’s sound economic policy and economic management, Australia currently has just over 12 per cent of the world’s shipping task and seaborne trade, worth approximately $188 billion a year. Australia must maintain international confidence in the safety of its trading ports. The enhancement of security arrangements at ports and on ships helps to ensure Australia’s continued economic strength and competitiveness internationally. As for the cost of implementing the changes, that is covered by ongoing funding to the Department of Transport and Regional Services, as part of its responsibility for maritime security.

The miscellaneous amendments contained in schedule 2 of today’s amendment bill clarify the meaning of some of the terms in the 2003 act. They also deem the interpretation of certain terms to be consistent with the meaning found in the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, reinforcing Australia’s commitment to its international obligations. The schedule clarifies that a higher security level relevant to particular waters can apply to a regulated Australian ship. These changes help to ensure that our maritime security structure is clear, again making it more effective. This government is delivering on its promise from July 2004 to grant limited move-on powers to maritime security guards.

Security is an immensely important issue in these times. While respecting the rights of individuals and property, this bill will enhance Australia’s national maritime security regime through more effective law enforcement. It will help to maintain Australia’s significant role in international trade. It will promote international cooperation in maritime security across the globe through consistency with the ISPS Code and the SOLAS convention. 

In the face of global terrorism, Australia must continue to develop strong counter-terrorism policies and measures that enhance national security. The maritime front is one of natural vulnerability, where one side —the water side—will always lie exposed. As we have seen in the USS Cole attack, terrorists are prepared to attack at sea. This government is standing up to that threat. That is why I support this bill. In closing, I would like to thank Elisa Parham, a young and talented lady, for her assistance in undertaking research and her keen interest on maritime security. Again, I strongly support this bill, which reinforces the Howard government’s commitment to national security and the war against terrorism.

Chris Hayes (Werriwa, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is timely that the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2005 comes before the House today for debate. In a few days time it will the fifth anniversary of the September 11 attack on the United States. It will be five years since a major terrorist attack went from being considered to have a relatively low probability of occurring in this country—and other Western nations, for that matter—to being a serious concern for the people of this nation. This 11 September will also mark five years of Howard government inaction when it comes to introducing measures to protect the community—measures which it promised to deliver. This 11 September, in a few days time, will mark five years of this government preying on the fears of the community rather than protecting its people.

Earlier this week it was revealed just how easy it would be for a direct attack to occur on Australian airports. This government has failed to implement the Wheeler report’s expert recommendations on regional airports, leaving more than 3.9 million passengers a year at risk. It is not just the regional airports that do not have baggage screening in place. Even in major centres, capital cities, airports do not have the required level of baggage protection recommended in the Wheeler report. Tens of thousands of passengers have travelled from 11 regional airports into the heart of Australia’s largest city, Sydney, without having had their bags screened. That is, nearly 67,000 regional flights in this country go unchecked each year.

The failure of this government on this and other security measures is reason enough for the government to support Labor’s second reading amendment that, among other things, calls for the establishing of a department of homeland security to enable the security gaps that have been identified and that can expose our population to be closed. It is a concerted attempt to coordinate the efforts and to make sure that our people are secure.

Another important aspect of Labor’s second reading amendment goes to the heart of the bill before us today. Too much time has passed with Australia not having a coastguard. There is only one group of people to blame for the failure to implement a proper, trained, adequately resourced coastguard, and that is this government. For many years now, the Labor Party has called for the establishment of an Australian coastguard. The establishment of a coastguard goes to the heart of the bill before us because, as the government has claimed, this bill is aimed at strengthening maritime transport and empowering maritime security guards to respond to unauthorised vessels, including the extension of a range of information-gathering powers. The stated purpose of the bill before us is to improve Australia’s maritime security, and that is precisely what Labor’s second reading amendment seeks to achieve.

This bill has been introduced on the premise that there are problems within Australian maritime security. The government has accepted that Australia’s maritime security is grossly inadequate. Through this bill, the government is setting about correcting its failures in maritime security by providing limited move-on powers, some further information seeking and gathering powers and some powers that will allow maritime security guards to remove vessels found in maritime security zones without authorisation. There is no doubt that these are important developments and should be supported—they certainly do improve the security of our coastlines—but the question remains as to whether this is an adequate response.

The government has already accepted that it has failed miserably in securing our coastline. Even after the provisions of this bill have been enacted, that situation will remain. Australia is an island nation and with an island nation comes a large coastline to protect. A porous border, a coastal one, should not be allowed to continue. Australia’s coastline is approximately 37,000 kilometres. It is no mean feat to secure such an extensive coastline. It is a task that would be greatly assisted through the establishment of an Australian coastguard such as the one Labor has advocated for a number of years.

The United States Department of State’s Report on Terrorism 2005, released earlier this year, noted that there is a problem in our region with maritime security. It made the following observation:

JI has had links to al-Qaeda and was responsible for the August 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta and the bombing outside the Australian Embassy in September 2004. While Indonesia has significantly improved its efforts to control the maritime boundary area with the Philippines, the area remains difficult to control, surveillance is partial at best, and traditional smuggling and piracy groups provide an effective cover for terrorist activities in the area.

The International Maritime Organisation reported that nearly half of the world’s reported piracy incidents occurred in South-East Asian waters. Of 266 cases, 117 were in the South China Sea and around the Indonesian Archipelago. It takes resources to protect and secure a coastline of 37,000 kilometres. That is not disputed. It takes resources to stop the more than 13,000 suspected illegal fishing boats that were sighted last year in Australian waters. Government members will claim that the government has dedicated resources to the task, and they will claim that as recently as the last budget the government committed to doubling the number of illegal fishing boats caught in Australian waters. Well, last year they caught 200. Their commitment to doubling the number caught means that they will aim to catch 400 illegal fishing vessels, so more than 12½ thousand will still sail by.

Despite the passage of this legislation, and despite the impressive commitment to catch double the number of vessels this year, ships will sail through Australian waters uninhibited. Illegal fishermen will continue to land on our shores, set up camps and moor their vessels well upstream. We know this already happens, and we know that it will continue to happen. If fishermen can get through and set up camp in Australian waters uninhibited, as occurs presently, what else might be happening?

This is one reason, among others, that part of Labor’s plan to secure our coastline has been the establishment of an Australian coastguard. It was a policy proposal put forward at the last election that included the acquisition of a further eight vessels and additional aircraft, as well as the recruitment of some 250 personnel to serve in an Australian coastguard.

Through this bill the government is edging closer and closer towards the establishment of a coastguard. Its first tenuous steps are to develop and, now, to further empower maritime security officers. But this edging towards a coastguard is not getting there quickly enough. As the polls reported in the Telegraph a week or so ago show, people want this government to act when it comes to protecting them from the threat of terrorism. I hope this government is not resisting serious considerations to establish an Australian coastguard solely because it was a policy development of the Australian Labor Party. Bipartisan support on matters of security is essential if we are to genuinely protect Australian people. Hence there is bipartisan support for the initiatives that have been introduced in the bill before us, to develop and further empower maritime security guards. This is because, as I said earlier, they assist in the security of our borders and enhance our level of security. But in dealing with that in any tangible way and being in a position to protect Australian waters, given that we know that even last year there were 13,000 illegal fishing vessels sighted, we need the development of a properly resourced and properly trained Australian coastguard. People want action when it comes to security; they do not want the government rejecting ideas solely because they were not their own.

I note that the bill includes the extension of a number of powers of maritime security guards. Maritime security guards are not all that dissimilar from their airborne colleagues the aviation security guards. They have broadly similar tasks and responsibilities, and they undergo training and receive a level of qualification which I think is broadly similar. I understand the maritime security guards are required to have a certificate II in security operations or an equivalent qualification or training. The maritime transport security regulations of 2003 also require the guards to have ‘a working knowledge of the act and these regulations’. The passage of this bill will extend some of the powers and responsibilities of these guards. One of the provisions of the bill will grant operative maritime security guards a limited move-on power, which certain police already have. They are also given powers to request information, so it is an enhanced information-gathering power. They will be granted the power to remove, or have removed, vessels found in a maritime security zone without authorisation.

Maritime security is a specialist area and requires special security guards. As someone who has spent some time with professional bodies representing state and territory police and other law enforcement organisations, I understand the importance of providing those tasked with enforcing laws and protecting the community with the proper equipment and training. It must go through to the actual qualifications that some of these people are required to get to exercise these powers on behalf of the community. It concerns me that, as I understand it, maritime security guards will only receive quite limited training, which I suggest a level II certificate might be. Compare this to the typical police officer, who is trained by a state or territory police force and required to undergo some 12 months of training and a further 12 months on-the-job training to complete probation. Or you can compare it to our Australian Federal Police officers, who, depending on their area of expertise, could be training for years. Indeed, there are also Australian protective security officers of the AFP who I think undergo about 10 weeks of training, which is quite extensive, to be able to serve in an airport. Not only are they trained in the matters at hand; they are also licensed to carry firearms. To that extent they form a first line in a response to terrorism. In addition to all that, AFP protective security officers are subject to the new Commonwealth integrity regime. I think that is rightfully so.

With the extension of power comes an extension of responsibility, and therefore to be subject to the integrity powers of the Commonwealth would, I think, have been appropriate. But the responsibility is not only on those who exercise the powers under this bill; it is also the responsibility of the government to make sure that those who are granted these legal rights are trained to exercise those powers properly. I trust that the government will be investing money in the ongoing training of our maritime security guards in the future. I hope that it is reviewed to the point that they are the equivalent of Australian Federal Police protective service officers.

Five years ago the world changed. The Western nations, Australia included, that had not had direct experience with non-state terrorism were shocked by the realisation of the September 11 attacks on the United States and what they meant—that terrorism could strike anywhere at any time. The Jakarta bombings showed that the threat was at our very own door. The London bombings showed that the threat could come from within. The one clear fact from all these instances was that non-state terrorism displayed a capacity to strike at any time. It demonstrated and reinforced how security failures can be lethal, can disrupt our communities and our economies and can undermine public safety and confidence. Border control and the protection of our nation’s population have always been a central plank of the task of our federal government, but events of the last few years have shown that the stakes are now particularly high. Every effort must be made to protect our borders at sea and in the air.

In the United States, border security, as you appreciate only too well, Mr Deputy Speaker Kerr, has been given the highest priority, yet still problems exist. The Government Accountability Office reported that material that could have been used to conduct acts of terror has been able to get through US border checks. This is in a country that has dedicated itself to the task of protecting itself from acts of terrorism.

Given the resources that have been allocated to that task by the United States government—and they still cannot guarantee success—it is somewhat disappointing that this government seems to take the optimistic view that Australia is making good progress. I do not know that it rates as good progress that last year 13,000 illegal fishing vessels were spotted off our coast. I do not know that you can rate it as good progress when you discover that illegal fishing vessels are not only landing on our mainland but setting up camp on rivers. The Howard government has dropped the ball on maritime security, just as it has on airport security, and this situation needs to be rectified immediately.

I particularly support Labor’s second reading amendment because it goes a long way towards protecting our maritime borders. The best way, and the only way, to do that properly is to clean up the maritime industry through the introduction of an Australian coastguard. That should be the immediate priority of the government.

Peter Slipper (Fisher, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

There has been a significant amount of debate in this House over the past few years in relation to national security and safety. Topics have related to the Federal Police, defence forces, regular police, Customs and the like, and often the discussion has focused on issues such as terrorism and terrorist organisations. Clearly, the debate has increased dramatically, not only in the parliament but more generally in the community, in the wake of attacks such as those on the twin towers in New York and the Sari nightclub in Bali, the train bombings in Spain, the terrorist attacks in London and so on.

Personally, I have been involved in discussion of these issues through various bills. It could be said that the security environment around the world is in a dynamic and fluid state. Adjustments are regularly made to security safeguards and the global security situation is still adjusting to the ongoing repercussions of terrorist attacks. It is pretty clear that this situation will continue as the world adjusts to the security demands in the aftermath of those events. Changes to Defence, policing and Customs programs are needed from time to time to ensure that safety remains at very high levels for all of us in Australia.

The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2005 has the purpose of increasing further the measures available to enhance national security. In the overall scheme of things, the new measures that will be introduced by this bill are relatively minor, but they are sensible and practical nonetheless. The most significant measure to be instigated by this amendment is beefed-up move-on powers for maritime security guards.

Safety threats have the potential to come through any number of entry points into Australia, from threats at our airports through to illegal boat landings on remote coastlines, and the potential at our ports is also a matter of concern. Australia can never let its guard down in an uncertain world. The bill gives maritime security officers stationed in and around these ports of Australia the legitimate powers and therefore the confidence to take the necessary steps to ensure that their zone is safe—in particular, those zones that are deemed to be maritime security zones.

The bill gives maritime security guards the power to request identification from those found in sensitive locations, and the bill gives maritime security officials the additional power to order unauthorised people found in those areas without authority and without a reasonable excuse to vacate the area. The move-on provisions of the bill also extend to vessels and vehicles that are found to be in those security zones. The bill gives the guards the authority to remove from a security zone those who fail to adhere to security guards’ advice and requests to move on.

Security officers will require some additional training in line with these changes, and, of course, these extra powers for security guards will not replace the use of police in all situations where a significant disturbance or threat is identified. This bill does, however, give those who are already on site significant first-response powers to address problem situations.

The ongoing legislative and security changes that are continuing throughout the world as a result of terrorist attacks all have the aim of improving safety levels. Those companies that have the duty to manage the daily operation of our ports cannot be lumbered with the responsibility of playing a part in the protection of Australia if they do not have the relevant tools and laws available to them to support them adequately in fulfilling that role. This bill gives them the ability to meet those responsibilities.

These port operators will breathe a sigh of relief that a legal difficulty will be removed with the passage of this bill—a legal situation whereby they wanted to maintain highly secure operations and they were responsible for maintaining acceptable security levels in waterside zones, but they may not have all the legislative backing to enable them to do the job properly. The port operators will be able to focus better on the larger requirement of those businesses—that of facilitating the efficient transport of goods in and out of our country.

The total financial cost around the world in relation to terrorist activity since 2001 is continuing to accumulate and, unfortunately, Australia is not immune to these costs. The financial implications of this bill, however, are negligible compared with the improved safety standards it will deliver. The costs will include those associated with retraining security staff or hiring staff who hold the relevant qualifications. The government will maintain an ongoing relationship with industry to facilitate the implementation of these changes. The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2006 is another vital weapon to be placed in Australia’s security and safety toolbox, and I am pleased to commend the bill to the House.

Duncan Kerr (Denison, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank the member for Fisher and take this moment, while we are waiting for another speaker, to congratulate him on his recent marriage. I am certain all members of the House would join with me.

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

We find ourselves in a slightly strange situation of debating two bills on the same subject with almost identical titles in the same week. I cannot blame the honourable member for Fairfax for speaking on the wrong bill on Tuesday, but I have made quite sure that I have brought the right speech with me today. The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2005 is a response to demands from the maritime industry to tighten the security regime at Australian ports and on offshore marine facilities, such as oil-drilling platforms. The bill gives maritime security guards the power to request a person found within a maritime security zone to provide identification and a reason for being in the zone. It gives them the power to request a person found in a maritime security zone without authorisation to move out of the zone and, if that request is not complied with, the power to remove the person from the zone. It also gives the guards the power to remove or have removed vehicles or vessels found in the maritime security zones without authorisation. These provisions are sensible and necessary and reflect the wish of those who work in the maritime industry for a more rigorous regime in ports and maritime facilities. For this reason, Labor welcomes these provisions. Labor has repeatedly argued the need for specialised security guards in Australian ports with defined powers, because we recognise that the maritime security environment requires specialised people to upgrade and maintain security.

This bill is another in a series of bills which make piecemeal changes to Australia’s maritime security environment. As I said in my speech on the first of these bills earlier this week, it is the opposition’s view that these changes do not go far enough and that the government has not done enough to tighten Australia’s maritime security system. That is why, although we are supporting the bill as far as it goes, we have moved a second reading amendment, which was moved by the honourable member for Brisbane, the shadow minister for homeland security. This amendment condemns the Howard government for its failure:

... to provide necessary maritime security and protect Australians, including:

(1)

its careless and widespread use of single and continuing voyage permits for foreign vessels with foreign crew who do not undergo appropriate security checks;

(2)

permitting foreign flag of convenience ships to carry dangerous goods on coastal shipping routes; and

(3)

failing to;

(a)

ensure ships provide details of crew and cargo 48 hours before arrival;

(b)

x-ray or inspect 90 per cent of containers;

(c)

establish and properly fund an Australian coastguard; and

(d)

establish a Department of Homeland Security to better coordinate security in Australia”.

That is our second reading amendment. Yesterday we had clear confirmation of the correctness of the charges made in this Labor amendment. This confirmation came from none other than the Minister for Transport and Regional Services. In the Main Committee yesterday morning, the minister was summing up for the government in the debate on the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006. As is appropriate in the Main Committee, I used the intervention process to ask the minister whether he would comment on the fact that, while liquefied natural gas ships coming into Japanese or Korean ports must meet very strict security guidelines for seamen who are on the ships, this is not the case in relation to Australian LNG shipping. The minister replied that we do have strict requirements in relation to security and checking of the seamen on vessels coming into this country. He failed to mention the fact, which I referred to in my speech on the bill on Tuesday, that a full third of all ships coming into Australia do not comply with the government’s own safety regulations—that is, we do not know who the crews are of a third of the foreign ships that come into Australian ports—and nothing is being done to enforce Australia’s laws.

The honourable member for Batman also used the intervention process in the Main Committee to ask the minister to give an assurance to the House that all ships berthing in Australia are supplying their crew manifest prior to berthing, as required by law. The minister dodged the question, saying that the law exists and that there are penalties for those who fail to comply with it. He avoided giving the commitment that the member for Batman asked for. It is hardly a radical commitment; just a commitment that the existing law, passed by this government, was being complied with. The honourable member for Batman then asked the minister if he could advise how many successful prosecutions had been launched against shipping companies not meeting the requirements of Australian law and what fines were being imposed on the shipping companies. The minister gave a truly extraordinary answer to this question. He said:

Obviously I would have to take a question of that detail on notice, but I remind the member the regulations have been recently amended and changed. Because of the tightening of recent rules and the relatively recent action of that, it would not surprise me if there had not been any prosecutions yet because those rules have not had time to take effect.

So the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the minister responsible for Australia’s maritime security, in the space of five minutes in the Main Committee yesterday did the following: (a) he refused to give a guarantee that Australian law would be enforced at Australian ports; (b) he admitted that he did not know how many ships were failing to comply with Australian law; (c) he admitted he did not know how many shipping operators, if any, were being prosecuted; and, finally, (d) he gave a convoluted and unconvincing explanation for why it might be the case that no prosecutions at all had been launched.

This is one of the worst performances by a cabinet minister that I have seen since I have been in this House, since 1998. Coming from a minister responsible for a large area of Australia’s security policy it was astonishing and alarming. It really is a disgrace that this government, and particularly the minister, have no idea of what is going on in Australian ports and apparently have no intention of doing anything about it. Five years after September 11, ministers in the Howard government do not seem to care that Australian ports are still wide open to terrorist attack and that port communities, such as my community of Port Melbourne, are being left unprotected.

The threat of attacks on Australian ports is not an idle threat. As I said in my speech on Tuesday, we live next to a part of the world with the highest rate of maritime piracy in the world. The member for Brisbane gave some of the detail of that in his opening remarks on this bill and our amendment. Half of all the incidents of maritime piracy, including the hijacking of ships, take place in waters around Indonesia and the Philippines. As the US State Department points out, this area is rife with smuggling and similar activities that provide a perfect cover for terrorist planning.

During the debate on this series of bills, Labor members have repeatedly pointed out that it would be easy for terrorists to hijack a ship loaded with ammonium nitrate and use it as a floating bomb in an Australian port. For people in the gallery who may not know what ammonium nitrate is, it is a commonly used agricultural fertiliser but it is also the preferred method of terrorists for blowing up places, like they did in Oklahoma and in Bali. It may be argued that no-one has ever attempted to do such a thing. The reply to that is, of course, that before 11 September 2001 no-one had ever attempted to hijack an airliner and fly it into a skyscraper. Now we know that such things are possible.

In the case of ship hijacking we at least have the advantage of having thought of that possibility. We can bet that if we have thought of it so have al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah. But our precautions against such an attack are totally inadequate. Even those precautions we do have, such as the requirement that ships advise of their cargoes and crews 48 hours before they dock, are not being enforced. As I said in my speech the other day, 33 per cent of foreign ships coming into Australia are defying the Australian law. The Australian government has launched no prosecutions against them and we are having these crews just arrive in Australia and we have no idea of who they are before they enter into such places as Garden Island in the middle of Sydney, Port Melbourne, Port Adelaide et cetera.

As well as the security aspects, the matters raised in this bill and by Labor in its amendment have serious implications for the Australian economy. Australia lives by its export trade, and the bulk of that trade is still conducted by sea. To reach our principal export markets in China, Japan and Korea ships must pass through the waters of South-East Asia which is, as I have said, the location of half of the world’s maritime piracy incidents. A particular concern is Australia’s growing export trade in liquefied natural gas, or LNG. The security of Australian LNG is one of Australia’s most important marketing advantages in the global LNG market. Australia’s reputation as a reliable supplier is one of our key selling points with our Asian customers, and our ability to guarantee the security of our LNG carriers is a key component of that reputation.

That is why the use of Australian shipping and the use of skilled, qualified Australian crews is an important part of a strong maritime security regime. Australian LNG tankers, crewed by Australians, have a demonstrated commitment to the highest levels of maritime security, aimed at maintaining the security of both the LNG tankers and their cargoes. That is why this government’s lack of commitment to maintaining an Australian shipping industry and Australian crews is so short-sighted. A report produced in 2004 by Sandia National Laboratories, under contract to the United States Department of Energy, entitled Guidance on risk analysis and safety implications of a large liquefied natural gas (LNG) spill over water stated that the Australian LNG risk management strategies represented world’s best practice and safety in shipping LNG.

It is obvious that the same level of risk assessment and commitment to high-quality risk management strategies cannot be guaranteed, and will not be maintained, if the Australian government allows the use of underpaid, undertrained foreign crews and flags of convenience ships. This is not an attack on non-Australian seafarers. It is an attack on a small number of shipping operators who seek to maximise their profits by exploiting their crews, many of them drawn from low-wage and poorly skilled countries, and who notoriously cut corners on safety, environmental protection and security. It is a scandal that this government consistently favours this small minority of unscrupulous shipowners at the expense of Australian seafarers. This is the view of not simply people employed in the shipping industry, the employees. This is the view of the Australian shipping industry. This practice of the Australian government is at the expense of the responsible majority of shipowners and at the expense of Australian security.

This government is fond of blaming the unions for everything that goes wrong in Australia’s transport system. In particular, it has spent more than a decade demonising the Maritime Union of Australia. But when it comes to maritime security the MUA has a much better record than this government does. After all, its maritime workers and their families will be the first to suffer if there is an attack on an Australian port or a hijacking of an Australian ship. The MUA members in my electorate are as much concerned about Australia’s security as any member of this government, and they have shown that concern in practice.

The MUA supported and fully cooperated with the introduction of the maritime security identification card, MSIC, from 1 November last year. The MSIC arrangements involve police and security checks on all seafarers and related personnel who require access to maritime security zones and the facilities and ships within those zones. The MUA fully cooperated in this despite the fact that there was a risk of some of their members losing their jobs because of having minor criminal convictions long ago, not related to security but sufficient for them to fail the eligibility requirements. The muddle and confusion that has surrounded the introduction of the MSIC, just like the confusion over the aviation security identification card which I spoke about a few weeks ago, is entirely the responsibility of the government.

Let me conclude in the same way I concluded my remarks on the previous bill: if we are serious about maritime security, Australia needs a minister for homeland security, a full-time Inspector of Transport Security and a full-time professional coastguard so that Australian law can be enforced. Only then will Australia have an acceptable level of maritime security, and only under a Labor government will we get these things.

I cannot emphasise this enough: the 33 per cent of shipping coming into this country without the laws of Australia being enforced is an open invitation to the terrorists of this world who are active in the South-East Asian region to exploit the situation. Until these loopholes are closed, the Australian government will be negligent in the area of maritime security. We support this legislation and we argue for our amendment, but the government’s stance on maritime security is quite pathetic.

Michael Keenan (Stirling, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the important Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2005 that will help the Howard government go even further to lock in security for the Australian people and to secure our seaborne trade routes and help the Australians who work within them. There can be no doubt that, following the attacks of September 11 and the subsequent shocking terrorist attacks in places such as Bali, London and Madrid, the Australian people expect the Australian government to do everything in its power to protect our way of life.

Our strong and ongoing commitment to border protection and the defence of Australia is reflected in the half-a-billion dollars worth of measures to boost surveillance and interdiction in the north, which is particularly important to my home state of Western Australia, and the Howard government’s commitment to increase the defence budget by three per cent per annum until 2016.

The feedback I get from the people of Stirling tells me that the protection of our borders and the defence of Australia is a high priority. I am a strong advocate for the increased measures that the Howard government continues to take in the area of national security. It is an issue that has become increasingly important, and it has been given greater prominence as we approach the fifth anniversary of the September 11 attacks with the threats of terrorism and the possibility of failed states on our doorstep.

Australia needs to be prepared for a variety of security threats against a number of facilities, not least of which are our seaports and sea routes. Terrorist attacks around the world have spurred the international community to resolve to implement a system to secure the maritime transport sector. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, the ISPS Code, developed through the International Maritime Organisation at the end of December 2002, was the result. With about 90 per cent of world trade being moved by sea, including 99.5 per cent of Australia’s overseas trade by volume and 75 per cent by value, the impact of a terrorist attack on Australia’s seaborne trade could have a significant impact on Australia’s economy as well as the lives of those directly affected by an attack.

The Maritime Transport Security Act 2003 sought to strengthen the security in the maritime industry and to implement the ISPS Code in Australia, both of which came into effect on 1 July 2004. Australia’s maritime security regime has been reviewed a number of times since implementation to take into account the international changes to security regimes and our own experience of implementing these protocols. These changes, through legislation and regulation, have better enabled our seaports and sea routes to be protected in the changing security environment. The amendments we are currently debating add to this responsible approach. In June 2005 the act was amended to cover Australia’s offshore oil and gas facilities. These amendments resulted in provisions for new security identity cards for maritime and offshore industry personnel and included the renaming of the act to the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003. Australia’s maritime security regime now covers the security arrangements of nearly 470 members of the maritime industry, including 70 ports, 184 port facilities, 97 port service providers, 59 Australian flagged ships and 58 offshore oil and gas facilities.

Members of the maritime and offshore oil and gas industries are now all being guided by the one act and its related regulations. By standardising the regulations and the responsibilities of the industry participants the left hand now knows what the right hand is doing. This will give clarity to the industry and confidence to people involved in the industry and to people who rely on maritime trade. All participants are now moving in the same direction. The Howard government is implementing a preventative security regime to enhance security at ports, terminals, offshore facilities and on board ships, fulfilling Australia’s international obligations under the International Maritime Organisation’s ISPS Code.

Our economy relies heavily on our ability to trade internationally. Imports, exports and the nation’s energy supply all rely upon secure maritime transport. This bill will enact safeguards for our key strategic assets in the maritime industry, namely a regulatory framework centred on the development of security plans for ships, ports, port facilities and offshore facilities so these areas are better protected.

Maritime, ship and offshore security plans play a crucial role in the maritime transport and offshore facility security regime. This bill will introduce measures regarding the submission and approval of maritime, ship and offshore security plans aimed at slashing the administrative burdens faced by the maritime industry. These amendments will streamline the plan approval process and make it easier for participants to submit changes to security plans.

The measures contained in this bill are an example of the continued and successful cooperation between the Department of Transport and Regional Services and Australia’s key maritime industry representatives. It is a strong relationship based on consultation and cooperation, and I commend the minister for his ongoing and dedicated work in bringing key players together on this important issue.

Peak Australian industry groups representing shipowners and port operators are supportive of the changes contained in the bill aimed at improving the flexibility in the administration of maritime transport security plan development and implementation. Schedule 1 amends the act to ease the plan approval processes and procedures for the establishment of security zones, shorten the time for plan approvals, facilitate changes of contact details for security officers and clarify when the plan approval period begins.

Security plans are submitted to the secretary for approval. A maritime industry participant may also request the secretary to establish port or offshore security zones within or around a port or offshore facility. Currently, participants cannot change a plan without submitting a revised plan. The bill will enable participants to submit a variation to an existing plan. The test for approving the variation will be the same as for a revised plan. As it stands, the act anticipates that security zones will already be established independently of the submission of a maritime security plan or an offshore security plan. However, the secretary generally establishes security zones following proposals made to the secretary in a maritime security plan or an offshore security plan. These conditions are being amended to reflect instances where port and offshore security zones have not yet been established by the secretary.

Currently, security zones are established when the secretary has given the operator written notice establishing the zones. This written notice is separate to the written notice which the secretary gives an operator for approval of security plans. This bill will make amendments to simplify this process so that doubling-up is eliminated. When the secretary gives a notice to the participant approving the maritime or offshore security plan, it will also be taken to mean the secretary has given the port or offshore facility operator a notice establishing the maritime or offshore security zones as proposed in the plans.

It is difficult for the department to know when a plan approval period commences under the act because it is not always possible to know when a participant has given a plan to the secretary. The bill provides that the approval period will commence when the plan is received by the secretary. The bill will reduce the time allowed for the approval of plans from 90 days to 60 days to align with the Aviation Transport Security Act. There is also provision for the 60-day plan approval time to be extended for a maximum of 45 days to allow the secretary to seek further information from the participant.

At present, maritime, ship and offshore security plans must include contact details for the participant’s security officer so that any change to contact details requires an amendment to the security plan. The bill removes this requirement for contact details in the act, requiring instead that the participant designate by name, or reference to a position, all security officers responsible for implementing or maintaining the security plan, thereby removing the need to amend a whole security plan when such a minor alteration as security officers’ contact details change. This will obviously save time and energy in the process.

Schedule 2 of the bill contains technical amendments to acts relating to legislative instruments as a consequence of the enactment of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003. These amendments are included in this bill to reduce the size of that act. Schedule 3 of the bill contains an amendment to the Customs Act to reflect the change of name of the Maritime Transport Security Act to the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act.

The bill will streamline the process of maritime, ship and offshore security plans and the establishment of port and offshore security zones. I am confident that the measures introduced in this bill will enable the maritime industry and participants in that industry to focus on implementing and maintaining the security measures outlined in their security plans. That will contribute to the strengthening of Australia’s maritime security arrangements, which is really the whole purpose of this bill. The bill will also make sure that Australia meets its obligations under the ISPS Code, including those regarding the rights, freedoms and welfare of seafarers. It will reduce the vulnerability of Australian ships, ports, other ships within Australia and our offshore facilities to terrorist attack without undue disruption to trade.

The bill makes sensible amendments to our existing arrangements to enable people within the maritime industry to provide a safe and secure environment for those operating within it, without creating an unnecessary and burdensome regulatory environment. They have been brought into force following the changes that have occurred in our security environment in the past five years and the heightened threat of terrorism involving our maritime and offshore facilities. It is important that Australians understand how these regulations guide our operations and that the changes in compliance have resulted in our economic protection because of the security of our operations as well as the safety and security of Australians who work within the industry, who will now be protected further.

The main purpose of the bill is to make procedural changes to streamline processes and to reduce the burden on people involved in the industry. The changes will not cost anything. There are no financial implications to these amendments—although there will be financial implications for the people involved in the industry, because the red-tape burden on them is being reduced. I am confident that the measures introduced in the bill will enable participants within the maritime industry to focus on implementing and maintaining a sensible security regime and will contribute to the strengthening of Australia’s maritime security arrangements. I commend the bill to the House.

Warren Snowdon (Lingiari, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Northern Australia and Indigenous Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Deputy Speaker Kerr, I might say how the hell are you and how long are you going to be here? Where the hell will you be next week? We know where he will be next week: flitting off to New York to be one of Australia’s parliamentary representatives to the United Nations General Assembly, the lucky dog! I have to say that, whilst this is not quite the subject of the legislation before the House, you will be able to attune yourself to the bureaucratic malaise that might or might not exist within the United Nations. You will be able to acquaint yourself with the rather Byzantine processes of consultation, communication, discussion and even decision making. You will enjoy the fraternity of some very good people working with the Australian mission, and of your colleague Mr Baird, who I understand is travelling with you. No doubt you will enjoy the company of many New Yorkers.

As someone who is lucky enough to have been at the United Nations in this role, I can tell you that it is a most rewarding and educational experience. I am sure you will come back much more informed—not necessarily better informed—than you currently are about the way in which the United Nations works and the politics of decision making. It puts what we do here into a very different perspective, let me tell you. The way in which decisions are made in the UN makes lobbying here look fairly amateurish. Sometimes big bats are used to belt people in a not too subtle way to make sure that they vote in a particular way, with countries using all sorts of pressure points to get a decision that they feel comfortable with. You will be watching nations come together, no doubt talking about maritime transport and offshore facilities security at some point or other. Certainly, they will be interested in aspects of this discussion—

Duncan Kerr (Denison, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I wondered how the member was going to make this relevant to the bill before the House. I thank the member for his comments.

Warren Snowdon (Lingiari, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Northern Australia and Indigenous Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am about to draw your attention to the role the United Nations might play. It has a significant interest in international law, as you would well know, being a lawyer of some repute yourself. I think you are a Senior Counsel—we will not refer to you as a Queen’s Counsel—with an interest in international law. You have written a very interesting book about the United Nations, so we understand your interest. I am sure you would appreciate the international legal implications of maritime security. Therefore, no doubt informed by the very intelligent debate which is taking place in this chamber, you will go across to the United Nations knowing that if there is a discussion about this issue you will be able to participate. So I am pleased you are here. Others are pleased you are here, too.

The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2005, for those who have an interest in this subject, amends the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003. It does a number of things which are of interest to us and which we would support. It empowers a maritime security guard to request that a person found within a maritime security zone provide identification and a reason for being in the zone—a matter of common interest, I would think, throughout our region. It empowers guards to request that an unauthorised person move out of that zone. It empowers a maritime security guard to remove, or have removed, unauthorised vehicles and vessels found in maritime security zones. A little later I will come to an issue which I am sure will be close to the heart of many of the people you will meet in the United Nations—piracy.

This legislation has two schedules. The first schedule contains provisions which determine the nature of the work of maritime security guards and how they might undertake that work. The second provides a number of miscellaneous amendments to the act, especially definitions. For instance, a cleared area means an area that may be entered by persons, goods, vehicles and vessels that have received clearance. Items 4 and 5 substitute the reference to 500 or more gross tonnes.

It is interesting to think about schedule 1, because we need to comprehend what in fact maritime security guards are going to be empowered to do under this legislation. As I have said, they will be able to request that a person found within a maritime security zone provide identification. They may request that a person move. They may remove vehicles and vessels.

If you think of the waters of Northern Australia, as I do constantly, and you note the now accepted abysmal failure of the government’s border protection policies and the very porous nature of Australia’s borders, leaving aside the issue of people wanting to come to this place as refugees, the number of sightings and landings of foreign fishing vessels in Australian waters raises very significant questions about the way in which we look after our national interest. In that context, it is relevant to consider the amendment which is being proposed by the member for Brisbane, Mr Bevis. Amongst other things, it:

... condemns the Government for its failure to provide necessary maritime security and protect Australians, including—

and this is important—

(1)

its careless and widespread use of single and continuing voyage permits for foreign vessels with foreign crew who do not undergo appropriate security checks ...

You would think, would you not, given the implicit threat that we understand to exist around the world at the moment, that you would want to find out who the hell was coming to Australia and whether they were coming as passengers on aircraft, passengers on vessels or crew. The provision of single and continuing voyage permits for foreign vessels without enforcing security checks upon those crew members ultimately raises significant questions for all of us. Whilst we do not know that anything has happened to date, we have seen vessels come to Australia which have later been shown to be involved in activities which we do not like and did not sanction, whether it is smuggling or otherwise. Therefore, I would have thought it very important to understand who is sailing these vessels.

Then of course there is the concern expressed by the member for Brisbane about permitting foreign flag of convenience ships to carry dangerous goods on coastal shipping routes, failing to ensure ships provide details of crew and cargo 48 hours before arrival, failing to X-ray or inspect 90 per cent of containers that hit Australia’s shores, failing to establish and properly fund an Australian coastguard and failing to establish a department of homeland security to better coordinate security in Australia. I would have thought that, if we had learned any lesson over the last few years, we would have learned that not all wisdom resides on either side of this chamber. In fact, the collective wisdom is what we should be bringing to this issue. I cannot for the life of me understand why the government does not accept the propositions that have been put here by the Labor Party about the need for an effective coastguard or the need to establish a department of homeland security.

I have to tell you, Mr Deputy Speaker, that initially I was not that supportive of this idea of a coastguard. In fact, I was very equivocal. But over the last couple of years I have come to see how important this is. That is not to decry or malign the very important and magnificent work that is done by the Australian Navy in the waters around Australia, particularly those waters to our north, or the Australian Coastwatch or Customs. They do great work, but clearly not enough is being done and insufficient resources are being made available to focus on the key issues—that is, how to ensure that our border is not porous, how to make sure that we get sufficient intelligence to know who it is that is sailing in our waters and how to prevent the possible incursions of individuals or groups of people who may be contemplating actions which are against our national interests and against the interests of the community in the region.

When this issue was first introduced, during the debate in the Main Committee on the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006, Minister Truss demonstrated the government’s singular lack of performance and knowledge of what is happening in our waters. The minister admitted that he did not how many ships entering Australian ports failed to comply with the requirement that they provide details for crew and cargo 48 hours before arrival and admitted that there have been no prosecutions for failure to comply with this requirement. I think the casual observer would have to ask: ‘Minister, why not? Presumably your department has sufficient records or has the ability to access the records to provide you with that very important piece of information, given the security demands that are being placed on the Australian community internally, the vetting of Australian people when they travel on aircraft and when they walk into this building.’ Any person walking into this building is searched—the merits of that are perhaps debatable at times, but nevertheless they are searched. They are searched in the sense of having to go through a security vetting.

Now we have an admission that they cannot give us the fundamental information about the security of Australian ports in terms of people arriving in this country. They cannot do it. I am not sure which comic-book character the minister is trying to emulate, but I would have thought having your head in the sand is not an appropriate way to do business when you are looking after the security of our country. We know that the member for Brisbane has indicated the areas of concern in his amendment.

This bill has been the subject of a review by the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee and the committee supported the bill and recommended that the bill proceed. Comments by the Labor senators of that committee—Senators McEwen, Sterle and O’Brien—raise a few concerns with the processing of this piece of legislation. Firstly, they note that the operation of this legislation will be through its regulations, and the draft regulations were not made available to the committee. So how the hell, given that the effects of this legislation will be through the regulations, can we properly contemplate the impact of the bill until we see the regulations? What we are asked to do here is effectively give the government a blank cheque to devise a set of regulations that will carry out the purpose of this legislation without having the scrutiny of the parliament before they are implemented.

I would say that, when you are in New York and you are talking to people about a subject—say, democracy and decision making, because we know that there are particular countries in this world that have the view that democracy looks a particular way—you might well ask if the decision making processes in this place affect all that we would want them to affect and give people a democratic right and a role in decision making in a way that I think the founders of this nation would have considered when they were drafting our Constitution and setting up the rules of this parliament. I would think it entirely reasonable under those circumstances for us to understand what the impact of this bill will be if the regulations are written prior to our passing this legislation through the parliament. It is a basic tenet of decision making.

The committee flagged its concern that ‘maritime security guards should have training commensurate with their increased powers’. The Maritime Union of Australia said:

Clearly maritime security guards are operating at a different level of responsibility to say a guard on a gate a factory or outside a shop.

I would have thought that was clear to all of us. It continued:

On this basis there must be a requirement for a higher standard of training.

The Association of Australian Ports and Marine Authorities voiced its concern about the level of training. The MUA argues, I think legitimately, that a higher training level should be consistent across jurisdictions to allow for portability of qualifications. As noted in the Senate committee’s report on the bill, the MUA in their submission argue:

... a maritime security guard should be a dedicated position, to avoid the situation where guards sourced from labour hire companies are ‘responsible for a council swimming pool one day and guarding our critical maritime infrastructure on another.’

Again, in your discussions in New York with our friends from other countries, they will ask: ‘What do you do in your country to safeguard your interests? Do you get the bloke who guards the council swimming pool to look after your ports the next day?’ You would have to answer that question, wouldn’t you? You would have to say, ‘Well, as a matter of fact, it seems you can.’

I want to hit on piracy, because that could well be an issue of some discussion for you and your colleagues in New York, Mr Deputy Speaker Kerr. It demonstrates the need of this country to have a properly constituted maritime security framework, one we currently do not have and one which has been identified by the Labor Party as an absolute priority. Again, I would have thought the collective wisdom of this place would tell us that it is in our national interest to do so. Let me share with you some information. The International Chamber of Commerce’s Commercial Crime Services provides a weekly piracy report based on broadcasts from the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre. It is reported that, on 31 August this year—that is, just last week—in Indonesian waters, waters not too far from our northern shores:

... four robbers boarded a bulk carrier and entered the engine room via funnel by cutting the grills on the funnel floor. They stole engine spares and escaped in a boat waiting with an accomplice.

That happened not too far from our northern waters. The annual report from the International Maritime Bureau reveals that piracy in this region is not uncommon. According to that report, Indonesian waters are the most piracy prone in the world, with 79 attacks occurring in 2005. That represents nearly 30 per cent of all reported attacks world wide. In the Strait of Malacca, between Indonesia and Malaysia, there were a further 12 attacks in 2005. We should be concerned, lest those sorts of things start to happen in our waters. I have spoken on a number of occasions in this place about illegal fishing vessels. It is not too big a jump to ask this. If illegal fishing vessels can enter Australian waters sight unseen—or even sighted but not intercepted—what other vessels might be engaged in coming to Australian waters not seen?

Let me give you an estimation of the extent of the problem we currently have. Rear Admiral Crane, in his advice to a Senate estimates committee, said that in 2005 there were 13,018 sightings of illegal vessels. He said that that was a 35 per cent increase on the previous year. In the same year only 280 illegal vessels were apprehended and only 327 boats had their fishing gear and their catch confiscated. That represents 4.6 per cent of the total vessel sightings that year. There, in itself, is sufficient excuse for the collective wisdom of this place to decide that in fact the Labor Party has struck on a bloody good idea. What we as a community, working together, ought to do is implement that idea. But that is not what we get. We get all sorts of obfuscations and excuses for why it cannot happen. The fact is that we need to provide the assistance that we need in this country and provide Australia with appropriate maritime security. (Time expired)

Robert McClelland (Barton, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Defence) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to support the motion moved by my colleague the shadow minister for homeland security, the member for Brisbane, to amend the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2005. The bill is part of the current maritime security framework established initially by the Maritime Transport Security Bill 2003. Its stated purpose is to assist the maritime industry participants to police their maritime security zones. The bill would give maritime security guards—which are essentially private security guards—additional powers, including the ability to request a person found within a maritime security zone to provide identification and the reason for being in the zone. In that sense, the power is comparable, I suppose, to the powers given to Australian Protective Service officers at airports, who have been provided with similar legislative powers. The second power is the ability for the private security agents to request that a person move out of a security zone and, if that request is not complied with, to move the person out. The third gives the security guards the power to remove vessels or vehicles.

There are a couple of points to make in respect of the bill. The first is that it leaves primary responsibility for policing within ports to the states and territories, in this case facilitated with a network of private security guards. But the reality is that some states, because of their income or relatively unmanageable coastline, have been able or unable—depending on those criteria—to introduce effective policing measures. Clearly, it will be easier for New South Wales or Victoria, which have smaller coastlines and more substantial economies, to afford policing resources—both manpower and boats—for their ports than it would be for Western Australia or Queensland, which have substantially greater coastlines and less substantial economies. The point I would like to make is that security of ports in Australia should not be dependent upon the resources of individual states. We learn time and time again that terrorism tends to strike at the weakest link. Partial target hardening is not hardening at all; it is simply a direction to the weakest target for terrorists to attack. In summary, port security must be addressed on a national level, not with policing left to the states and territories.

I also note that the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee, which examined the bill, was quite critical of the government for proceeding with legislation before appropriate regulations had been drafted and circulated to all industry participants and all governments and, clearly, that is a concern that should be recognised by the parliament. Australians are entitled to question at the end of the day whether the security of our ports should be based on, as the current legislation anticipates, a network of private security guards. For instance, in their submission to the Senate inquiry into the bill, the Association of Australian Ports and Maritime Authorities said:

Port authorities and facilities generally employ contractors as security guards ...

In relation to the level of training provided to those security guards, they said:

It is certainly nowhere near the level of that provided to law enforcement officers, yet MSGs—

maritime security guards—

are expected to carry out the duties set out in the Bill.

The previous speaker commented that a security guard will perhaps one day be guarding a council shopping centre and on another day be required to exercise these very important and now significant powers with respect to the policing of our ports. I question whether that is appropriate. Clearly, we have a network of Australian Protective Service officers at the very least supervised by the Australian Federal Police at our airports. One would think that at the very least that same regime should apply at our ports where, in many ways, a much more substantial infrastructure exists.

The other point I want to make is in respect of the government’s rhetoric on border security. A couple of weeks ago, on 16 August, the Minister for Defence, in answering a question without notice, referred to illegal foreign fishing vessels and mentioned an episode he saw on the TV program Border Security. He said:

We saw a Royal Australian Navy patrol boat coming alongside an ice boat, a foreign vessel fishing illegally in Australian waters. The first thing that this foreign fishing vessel met was a Navy vessel. The first thing the XO of the ship said over a megaphone, accompanied by another sailor holding a firearm, was, ‘This is an Australian warship.’ Following that, rounds were fired from a 50 calibre machine gun and a boarding party went aboard that foreign fishing vessel.

That statement was intended to convey the impression that our maritime borders are patrolled exclusively by the Australian Navy. That would be an acceptable proposition if it were in fact the case, but the reality is that our exclusive economic zone, which covers something like 16 million square kilometres—an area more than twice the landmass of continental Australia—as well as 37,000 kilometres of coastline, is patrolled by just 12 naval patrol vessels and eight Customs vessels. I grant that the government is supplementing that available resource by two minehunters, taking it up to 14 naval vessels. Nonetheless, eight Customs vessels are very much part of the available fleet. That is equivalent to about 50 police cars patrolling the entirety of Australia.

That is the guts of our maritime interdiction capacity. I accept that other surveillance resources—indeed, sophisticated electronic resources—are available for surveillance, but in terms of holds on the water to carry out actual policing work and interdiction, that is the guts of Australia’s, this nation’s, water protection capacity. It is not just Navy doing this but a combination of agencies. Indeed, that is the reality. No single agency has the core role of law enforcement and border protection in Australia’s maritime jurisdiction.

A number of agencies have an interest in maritime border security, including the Australian Fisheries Management Authority, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, Environment Australia, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, the Australian Federal Police and Australian Search and Rescue. They all bid, if you like, for a timeslot of those surveillance and interdiction resources. No border surveillance is undertaken or coordinated through the one legislatively authorised body. It is conducted by the Joint Offshore Protection Command, the head of which, although he is an admiral, as I understand the position, is nonetheless employed and paid under the portfolio of justice and customs and, ultimately, is under the direction of the secretary to the department of customs. It is far from the situation implied by the minister that our Navy is responsible for the coordination of patrolling our maritime zone.

The head of the Joint Offshore Protection Command has available to him the use of naval vessels and resources, but those vessels during their operation are under the control of the military. By way of example, if coercive authority is required on the part of those naval vessels and naval officers, they are required to do so in accordance, appropriately, with the naval rules of engagement as determined, ultimately, by the defence hierarchy. If, on the other hand, a Customs vessel and Customs officers are required to use coercive force, their authorisation and legal authority comes through separate legislation and, ultimately, under the direction of the secretary to the department of customs. We have quite evidently, even on that point, a fragmentation of the important use of coercive authority obviously used in the interdiction of vessels. In other words, there is no agency with the core role of, and thereby legislative authority for, overall law enforcement in our nation’s maritime jurisdiction. No single agency is given commanding responsibility in this vital area of national interest and potential security command.

I want to say a few more things about the Joint Offshore Protection Command in case it is suggested that it is anything akin to what Labor has proposed, and that is the establishment of a coastguard. Labor interrogated Customs officials during the Senate estimates procedure in respect of the ministerial arrangements applying to the Joint Offshore Protection Command and we were advised:

It is a fairly tricky set of ministerial responsibilities ...

That has to be an understatement. We were also advised that, in relation to the interdiction capacity of the Joint Offshore Protection Command, it is not empowered to do anything other than collect information that Customs officials, in fact, were already receiving prior to the establishment of the command. Specifically, when we asked whether the command would increase our ability to intercept and board suspect vessels, departmental officials responded that it is only concerned with:

... information rather than a power to actually do anything.

So the suggestion that there is an adequate degree of coordination of our border policing functions by this body is farcical.

Without legislation defining its role and powers, the effectiveness of the Joint Offshore Protection Command will remain inadequate. It is not sufficient that our coast watch capacity and interdiction is coordinated through mere administrative arrangements with different departments having responsibility, in particular for the use of coercive force. It has been pointed out time and again that the inherent difficulties with these interagency administrative arrangements will compromise the effectiveness of our maritime border protection. The risks apply not only to illegal immigration, fishing and smuggling of narcotics and, potentially, weapons but also to our economy should, for instance, an illegal fishing vessel land on our coastline, as they frequently do, without any customs or quarantine inspection having occurred.

The other point I want to make, with respect to an issue which has been topical, is that of asylum seekers potentially coming to Australia from West Papua. We recently saw what can only be described as a dramatic overreaction by the government when they effectively sought to excise from our immigration zone the entirety of Australia. That was a panic response from the government—a panic response that resulted from our limited ability to patrol the Torres Strait Islands, which these asylum seekers are likely to travel through on their way to Australia. The reality is that the substantial naval and Customs patrol vessels that we have are limited in their ability to patrol the Torres Strait, largely as a result of reefs to the south of the area and mudflats to the north. They have difficulty navigating through those areas—a fact which all foreign fishing vessels that come into the area recognise; hence they head for those areas in order to escape interdiction. Essentially, our vessels are limited to patrolling the east-west passage through the region. That is clearly something that needs to be addressed with additional resources.

An issue more specifically covered by the bill is port security. As I previously indicated, we have a situation in Australia where primary responsibility for policing ports remains with the states. I have commented that this is an entirely unsatisfactory situation. We have literally billions of dollars of infrastructure existing all along the Western Australian coast. Damage to that infrastructure could have potentially catastrophic effects on the national economy, yet we are saying the responsibility for port security in relevant ports along the Western Australian coastline falls to the Western Australian government. That simply cannot happen.

The previous speaker, the member for Lingiari, somewhat jocularly said to Deputy Speaker Kerr that he would experience a different approach when he visits the United States in the near future. That is most certainly the case. I had cause to visit the United States Coast Guard the year before last and was informed of and saw the program involving sea marshals. The role of the sea marshals in the United States is both to coordinate port security in coordination with specific task forces charged with that purpose and to board ships carrying dangerous substances, such as petrochemicals or ammonium nitrate, a distance away from the entry to the ports. Usually there are four sea marshals allocated—two will go to the bridge and two will go to the engine room after conducting relevant interviews and basic tests to detect possible radioactivity and the like. Their brief, if they detect anything untoward, is simply to stop that vessel through the control room of the bridge or, if necessary, by shutting down the engines pending the arrival of a task force to board the ship, most likely by helicopter or fast boat, to provide additional resources to apprehend the vessel. That is, they prevent a vessel carrying potentially dangerous substances from entering their ports.

Indeed, back in the time of the Second World War, Albert Einstein wrote to the President of the United States pointing out the potential danger of a nuclear device being smuggled into a port on board a cargo ship and the potential devastation it could cause. It has been known for over 60 years that this is a potential catastrophe that exists for modern economies. And what do we say? The Commonwealth does a Pontius Pilate: ‘It is not our responsibility; it is the responsibility of state and territory policing authorities.’

That is simply not good enough. There is no justification for not introducing sea marshals. We have air marshals that board international flights. There is clearly a program in place in the United States which is effective. That program should be implemented in Australia and those sea marshals should be given responsibility for supervising port security.

The final point I want to make in the brief time available to me also concerns the government’s promotion of the use of vessels under foreign flags of convenience plying their trade around our coastline. One would think that the greatest defence you can have against potential terrorism, piracy and so forth is Australian eyes and ears around our coastline. Yet the government has actually promoted foreign vessels.

If anyone is in doubt about the risks of that, I draw their attention to a question on notice that was answered on 12 May 2004 regarding the number of foreign seafarers who deserted their ships and have been at large in Australia. The number is considerably in excess of those who would seek to enter Australia as asylum seekers through our waterways. Those people have deserted their ships in ports all over Australia, from Townsville to Esperance, Wollongong, Hay Point, Dampier and Cairns as well as the major ports. The government must recognise the risk of these foreign flag vessels, and it is failing to do so.

In short, the government is big on rhetoric about border security but when you conduct a cursory analysis it is really pathetic in the context of the 21st century and the threats that this nation faces.

Michael Hatton (Blaxland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am happy to follow the shadow minister for defence, the member for Barton, in this debate and to put Labor’s arguments on the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2005, which has eventually got to this place.

I am also happy to support Labor’s amendment to the bill. At first glance it might not seem to be directly connected to the operation of the act, but the fundamental elements reinforce issues relating to a bill that we debated earlier this week, the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006. That bill concerned the general safety of Australia’s offshore facilities and the question of access to Australian ports. Like the shadow minister for defence and a number of other members of this House, I spoke on that bill and pointed out that the measures being taken were more than timely. In relation to the proposed amendments to that bill, we argued—as we do with this bill—that not enough is being done.

Let me do a simple comparison between the provisions of the bill we debated earlier in the week and what happens in the aviation area. Even though a great deal is not being done to properly secure us in the aviation area—as any investigation into Sydney airport that goes beyond what the TV shows will demonstrate: any investigation at a deeper level will indicate that the securing of something that is as simple to secure as an airport is a difficult business, because of the manner of operation, historically—it is a hell of a lot harder when it comes to the operation of a port. The key point that I made the other day was that, whereas securing an airport is effectively a lateral situation, with a port there is a multilateral situation. It is horizontal and vertical. It is in the sky and under the sea, and in the approaches to the port by sea and by land, that we have to protect the port.

The provisions in the other bill and the provisions in this one tell us something about the government’s approach, but the opposition’s amendments tell us a great deal more. The reason is very simple: what has not been done to effect our maritime security is reflective of the fact that there have not yet been any maritime attacks within Australia on our fundamental infrastructure, our ports or our vessels. That has not yet happened. The attacks here and overseas have been on aircraft or involved the hijacking of aircraft to be used as ballistic weapons of great power because of the aviation fuel involved.

The attacks in 2001 were five years ago now. We are approaching the anniversary of the attacks on New York and Washington and the attempted attack by the flight 93 plane, which was brought down in the fields in Pittsburgh. There were those attacks together with the train attacks in Madrid, the train attacks in London and a series of attacks. But there are only two examples of the attacking of vessels. One involved the MV Limerick, a passenger ferry; the other was USS Cole, then stationed in Yemen. That attack indicated that al-Qaeda and its associated organisations had a program that involved all facilities—both those regarded as general commercial aviation, as we have seen recently, and also ground based facilities, as we have seen in the attempted attack on the Australian High Commission in Singapore, attacks on facilities and embassies in northern Africa and attacks elsewhere. There were the sea based attacks on a US warship and the attendant loss of life. There was the 1994 attack—this goes back a very long way—on the World Trade Centre, when people attempted to bomb the basement. We can trace the very long period that has been tagged as the war on terror. It came into focus in 2001 but the antecedents occurred over more than a decade and in fact go back to our intervention in the Middle East in the first Gulf War and Osama bin Laden’s ideological response to that, his attack on the Saudi Arabian government.

Our war on terror ends up in bills like the one we are debating today. We have maritime security guards. The focus of that is not drawn from other loci or other foci. Fundamentally, it is a question of the larger picture of the war on terror.

It is also interestingly indicative of the different approaches that have been taken. You can secure an airport; how well or how poorly has been indicated by the arguments of the opposition about regional airports in Australia, where scanning capacity is either nonexistent or not good enough. The opposition has argued that consistently; there have been some government attempts to redress it. I still think that more than $64,000 to put a ring road around the airport in my electorate, Bankstown Airport, which is virtually co-located with Kingsford Smith airport, is not enough to secure it and its potential use. If you look at what has been done generally to secure Sydney and the other major airports and at the powers given to air marshals both in Australia and elsewhere, and then if you look at the powers given to maritime security guards, you see a big differential. Part of the differential is that the powers given to air security guards are not as great as those expressed in this bill. Air security guards can do so much and no more. The fundamental power still rests with the police forces.

However, what is highly unusual in this bill and what has been brought into focus is probably an effect that is expressed as a result of the complexity of trying to deal with ports. You often know where the major centres in our major airports are; even though they are small, they are not such loci of attention. But our ports are spread continent wide, and the activities associated with them are much greater in frequency and more difficult to control. There is a broader area to cover because you are not just dealing with landing and then turning up to where people are going to offload in absolute centre points. You are dealing with a number of different axes of access to those ports that have to be protected. So this bill is almost unprecedented, in that the powers given to the security guards cover such a great layer of responsibilities and actually take up normal state police powers. I expect the reasons for that are that there is such a broad area that they have to cover and that unaided assistance is generally not directly available to them. It would take time for those forces to go and help them.

But that also underpins other fundamental questions about the extent of the powers given to the security guards. Those questions are how well trained they are and who will take responsibility not just for the training but for the operation of these security guards. In a theoretical context you would think that you would not have worries about this; security guards are security guards whether they are at airports or whether they are operating as air marshals. You would expect them to be well trained and to do the job; you would expect that there would be someone fronting up to take responsibility for it. But I do not think the case is as simple as that. The member for Lowe—absent from the chamber now, but who will be sitting next to me at question time—has undertaken over a period of time a fundamental investigation of the security operation of Sydney airport and has pointed out that there are significant flaws there, with security cameras being turned against the wall and the fact that what should happen is not happening. Likewise, I have pointed out a number of times in this parliament that the actual operation of security at Sydney airport is not what it should be because of the contractual arrangements that operate at the airport.

This is the great failing of Australia; this is the one thing in which we are not American enough. The Americans actually believe in public responsibility. They believe that state and federal governments not only audit and benchmark but they also actually have to do things and take responsibility for things. So you will not find, either at the maritime level or at the air security level, the United States government passing its responsibilities over to private contractors. But that is exactly what you will find at state airports in Sydney and elsewhere, and that is exactly what you will find in the securing of maritime ports and of offshore facilities. This bill gives extraordinarily broad powers to those people—powers of arrest, of detainment and to lock up or stop vehicles. If it was a government entity—whatever its faults—I would have greater faith in the operation of those powers, the way they are used and the constraints on them than I have. This is because of what has happened, in particular in my state of New South Wales at Sydney airport. Time after time we have had, and—let me tell this House—we will have further examples in the future, not just of baggage handlers who turn out to be terrorists but also of the operation of an airport where a number of those operations are corrupt or are run by people who are not interested in anything much but criminal activity. There is an enormous incentive because of the amount of contraband—and, in particular, drugs—that run through those airports. The member for Lowe and others have highlighted the fact that those enticements can lead to all sorts of contrary effects.

But I think the key to it is simply this: instead of having a government entity in charge and therefore ultimately responsible to a government department, there are a chain of private companies involved. When Qantas had their own security guards in 1996, those security guards were summarily disbanded and sacked when this government came to power. The person who is still running security at Kingsford Smith airport told those security guards they would be sacked if there was a change of government. The contract went to Wackenhut, a United States operation that has also operated our detention centres. It is a private company that has licensed other people further down the track. People in my electorate and in other electorates in Sydney have got security companies who have then employed people. They have said, ‘Oh yes, these people have got security clearances.’

But the critical question of how successful our security apparatus can be in the end rests on the cascade of the delegation of responsibility down to people who are relatively untrained and whose fundamental position is not secured. That is why there has been an attack over the past couple of years by the opposition on the question of security behind what are supposed to be secure gates at Sydney airport and others. The fundamental problem is that the Australian government will not take responsibility for the securing of our assets, either on the air side or, in the case of this bill, in our maritime area.

No more fundamental attack could be made on Australia’s future prosperity than an attack on our onshore and offshore facilities in Western Australia. The greatest attack that could be made in terms of the psychological impact on Australia would be running a ship into the middle of Sydney Harbour full of ammonium nitrate, blowing it up and demolishing not just the whole of Sydney’s CBD but a good proportion of Sydney itself. Maritime guards will not prevent that situation. You need a panoply of government resources and an anti-terror approach directed towards it.

As I said on the past bill, I have enormous faith in the defence forces of this country. I do not have as much faith in the directions they are given and in the fact that a conditioning process is operative here. That conditioning process is very simple. People extrapolate from whatever their experience in the past has been into the future. It means that the mistakes of the past are fixed, but they do not identify the mistakes they will make in the future.

Where are we wide open to terrorist attack? In our massive infrastructure off the North West Shelf in Western Australia. Where have we done least to protect it? There, and also down through Kwinana and other areas in Western Australia that are open to attack. I am happy to know, because I have spoken to the people involved in securing this and have pushed for it, that that is being actively monitored, but I want a great deal more done. If the trains of LNG on the North West Shelf were destroyed, it would devastate Australia’s economy, not only now but for decades to come.

We need to think about the operation of this act and the powers we give to maritime security guards. I hope they use them well. I hope that the controls that we have in relation to the companies who take out the contracts in every port in Australia are secure enough to ensure that we do not have the least capable person utilising what are effectively police powers and that they will not use them in bullying ways but will be sensibly trained. I hope that they will know what their constraints are and that, if they identify people who end up being terrorist suspects, they will follow the specifics of this bill, which demand that they identify themselves, state what their powers are and ask those people to leave those areas.

If you look at the specifics either in the explanatory memorandum or in the bill itself you will find that there are three particular areas. Security guards can:

... request that a person found within a maritime security zone provide identification and reason for being in the zone;

There is a let-out clause in regard to this that ensures that you are not going to end up in the slammer just because you have not popped up with your identification; they expect some reasonableness to operate. The second thing is that they may:

... request a person found in a maritime security zone without authorisation to move out of the zone, and if that request is not complied with, remove the person from the zone;

That of course brings into train the issue of appropriate force. Throughout all these regulations there are the normal provisions in relation to appropriate force being used. The third and final provision in schedule 1 is:

• a maritime security guard may remove, or have removed, vehicles and vessels found in maritime security zones without authorisation.

Here they are not in the same position, as indicated by the shadow minister for defence, as in the US. The powers open to maritime security guards within the US Coast Guard system are much greater than what we have here. They are actually on the vessels and in the wheelhouse, meaning they are in a position to stop a ship full of ammonium nitrate steaming into Sydney Harbour and blowing the whole joint up. That position is not available to us here in any measure. These are the fundamentals.

Some people might be fundamentally concerned that powers as extensive as police powers extended to these security guards are as great as they are. That is not my fundamental concern. My fundamental concern is that we have a coalition government that, since 1996, with the first yellow-covered booklet on the National Commission of Audit, has refused to take any responsibility whatsoever except to audit and benchmark activities of the Australian government.

They did not want to run any programs at all. That is why you will not find in Australia, as you will in the United States, government employees being maritime security guards. You will not find Australian government employees, except for people in the Navy, directly responsible for securing our borders. You will not find this government taking direct responsibility for securing us against terrorist attacks, and that is our point of greatest weakness and greatest danger. The United States government, for all its faults, whether Republican or Democrat, believes in public service and in the federal government’s responsibility to control its borders and secure the American public using its own employees. I wish the Australian government could follow them in that. (Time expired)

Kim Wilkie (Swan, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I welcome this opportunity to discuss the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2005 and the worthy amendment moved by the member for Brisbane. If I could beg the Speaker’s indulgence in the few minutes before question time, I would like to briefly reflect on the death earlier this week of writer Colin Thiele. The mention of Mr Thiele at the start of my discussion on the bill before us is not as strange as it may seem. I know a generation of my constituents will have grown up reading the works of Mr Thiele, especially his iconic novel Storm Boy as well as other well-known works such as The Fire in the Stone and Magpie Island.

Colin Thiele served in the Royal Australian Air Force during World War II and had a long association with schools and educational institutions. Mr Thiele had a particular talent for evocative portrayal of the Australian coastal landscape. For students growing up in the 1970s in some of the larger, crowded urban centres in our capital cities, many of whom arrived from overseas, Thiele’s stories reflected the Australian affinity with the ocean and our proud maritime history. Our sympathies go to his family.

David Hawker (Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Order! It being 2.30 pm, the debate is interrupted in accordance with the resolution agreed to earlier today. The debate may be resumed at a later hour and the member will have leave to continue speaking when the debate is resumed.