Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Law and Justice Legislation Amendment (Marking of Plastic Explosives) Bill 2006 seeks to give effect to the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Montreal 1991. Importantly, the passing of this bill will enable Australia to accede to this convention. The marking of plastic explosives bill implements the obligations of the 1991 United Nations convention, which is the last of the 13 United Nations counter-terrorism conventions to which Australia is yet to be a party. In October 2004 the Howard government announced in its national security policy its intention to accede to the convention. As usual, the turnaround time between the Howard government saying they were going to fix a security problem and actually doing it has proven ridiculously slow and long. They seem to suffer from some permanent jet lag on security related legislation. However, this is a positive bill and the opposition was happy to facilitate its passage through the Main Committee so that it could be dealt with by the parliament before it rises, presumably at the end of this week.

The purpose of the marking of plastic explosives convention and this bill is to provide a means to improve the detection of explosives and to deter the misuse of explosives, by terrorists particularly, by requiring that more detection agent or odorant is incorporated into the manufacture of plastic explosives. The United Nations Security Council resolution 635 of 14 June 1989 and the United Nations General Assembly resolution 44/29 of 4 December 1989 urged the International Civil Aviation Organisation to intensify its work on devising an international regime for the marking of plastic or sheet explosives for the purpose of detection. This bill makes possible special machines or sniffer dogs to sense the odorant and make it easier to detect plastic explosives.

The danger with plastic explosives is that they are a very malleable product—easy to mould, for example, inside the lining of belts, shoes, bags and other devices. They are almost odourless. Typically, plastic explosives will not set off metal detectors and they are generally stable and resistant to temperature changes. That makes them a significant threat in the current environment.

This bill inserts a new subdivision B into division 72 of the Criminal Code and creates offences for trafficking in, manufacturing, possessing, importing or exporting unmarked plastic explosives. The bill gives the Australian manufacturers of explosives a total of 12 months in which to comply with the provisions of the bill. The bill has a six-month delayed commencement clause to allow Australian industry time to retool their manufacturing methods to comply with these new standards, and we think that is appropriate.

The convention and this bill arose as a consequence of the terrorist bombings on Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland in December 1988. That attack killed 259 people on board that flight and 11 others on the ground. This, sadly, was not the first, nor has it been the last, incident in which plastic explosives have killed innocent people. Canada was one of the first countries to mark plastic explosives for the purpose of detection because of events in 1985. In 1985, two Air India 747 aircraft began flights from Canada. A plastic explosive device is suspected to have caused the crash of one flight in the Atlantic Ocean, south of the Republic of Ireland, killing everyone on board. A bomb in the luggage from the other flight detonated in the baggage-handling area of Narita airport, outside Tokyo in Japan.

In December 2001, passengers subdued a man on a flight from Paris to Miami in trying to stop him from igniting his shoe, which contained a bomb made from C4 plastic explosives. In the United States in 2003, undercover investigators for the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General sneaked weapons and explosives past security at 15 airports. This serves as a reminder that the legal means to combat plastic explosives must be accompanied by the political will to implement detection equipment or to train and deploy sniffer dogs or other similar devices.

In August 2004, Russian officials said they detected traces of the RDX high explosive in the wreckage of one of two crashed jetliners. RDX is a common explosive. When it is in a raw powder form and mixed with compounds to a consistency of putty, it effectively becomes a plastic explosive. RDX is second in strength to nitroglycerine amongst the common explosive substances. Clearly, it is a very dangerous material. As part of a counter-terrorism exercise in 2004, French police randomly planted a plastic explosive in a passenger’s suitcase at Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris.

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Just to test them.

Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

To test them, as I am reminded by my friend and colleague. Unfortunately, the police failed to monitor the bag on the conveyor belt and throughout the airport. It ended up rolling out into one of the 90 planes with an international destination and was lost in the luggage of an innocent passenger. It still remains missing. This was a gross mistake on the part of the French police but that error does serve to demonstrate the dangers that have to be fixed and addressed. Hopefully, this bill will go some way towards ensuring that, whether it is an exercise or the real thing, such an event could not occur again.

X-ray machines detect metal but they are not good at detecting plastic explosives. New technologies have emerged since 1991 so that many explosives, even those without the odorants added, can be detected. Such equipment must be properly installed, carefully maintained and expertly operated to successfully interdict plastic explosives.

Australia’s accession to this convention is desirable. It sets a good example for others to follow. Much of the world could not easily purchase and seamlessly implement the new technologies that are now available to detect plastic explosives. In any event, the sorts of examples I have just given indicate that further procedures are required. If this convention and this bill encourage countries to add odorants to their explosives and to train sniffer dogs to detect such odorants then the travelling public and the world at large will be a safer place.

We have seen too many security blunders at Australia’s airports under the current government. The September 11 2001 terrorist attacks put the Howard government on notice to fix aviation security dangers. The airport security review conducted by Sir John Wheeler again put the government on notice to fix these errors, although you would have to ask yourself why it was that, four years after September 11, we needed to have a British expert come here and write 150 pages about what we should have been doing in the four years in between.

In the last year or so we have seen baggage handlers going through passengers’ luggage and stealing a camel outfit and wearing it around at Australia’s largest airport. We have seen unauthorised public vehicles driving around in security areas at Sydney airport in a road rage incident. Labor has raised concerns on many occasions about the security at regional airports and most recently, this year, about security on flights from regional airports, in particular Dubbo, Ballina, Devonport and Burnie, to major cities. It was not that long ago that grenades were found on a flight that landed at Darwin airport. The government recently tried denying the famous ‘plank of wood’—the door-chock security located on the public side of a doorway at Sydney airport. All a terrorist needed to do was pick up the loose-fitting piece of timber on the public side of the sliding door and they would have been given immediate access to the runway. The government denied that for days until photo evidence was provided to prove the point. That is not good enough. The Howard government’s incompetence and arrogance in these matters has put lives at greater risk than should be the case.

This bill is a useful bill. It will assist law enforcement agencies to ensure that those who would use plastic explosives to disrupt the normal run of life and the freedom of citizens will find that much more difficult. I commend the bill to the House. What we now look forward to is a competent government enthusiastically, vigorously and effectively implementing it. I hope that we will have such a government after the next election.

Cameron Thompson (Blair, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is an honour to speak in this debate on the provisions in the Law and Justice Legislation Amendment (Marking of Plastic Explosives) Bill 2006 to mark plastic explosives for the purpose of their detection. This initiative on behalf of the government flows from a decision of the government to endorse the MARPLEX Convention, which is the last of the 13 United Nations counter-terrorism conventions to which Australia previously had not been a party.

The proposals for the marking of plastic explosives resulted from inquiries and the courtroom saga which followed the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103—the airliner the Maid of the Seaswith a bomb that was detonated in the aircraft above Scotland on 21 December, 1988. In that explosion, 243 passengers and 16 crew on board the aircraft were killed as a result of between 340 and 450 grams of plastic explosive being detonated in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft and triggering a sequence of events that led to its rapid destruction, with the aircraft falling on Lockerbie, Scotland. The consequences of that incident shook the world. In 2001, one of two Libyans accused of the bombing was found guilty.

It is understood that the bombing occurred when the plastic explosive was put inside a radio cassette recorder and loaded on board the plane. Even a small quantity of plastic explosive for this terrible purpose creates a very real danger. So it is a good thing that, in lining up with the UN counter-terrorism conventions, Australia’s government has come on board with something that will effectively make it much more difficult for terrorists to be able to use this type of material in such an evil way.

The process of identifying where the bomb came from in the case of the Lockerbie disaster was exhaustive. The court case with Mr Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, a married man with children, was a long and difficult process. There were 230 witnesses; there were 10,230-odd pages of transcript generated by that trial. But there is no doubt that all involved in that investigation, beginning on the day of the terrible crash, really did get to the very bottom of that incident, and in 2002 the appeal by Mr al-Megrahi was rejected, and rightly so.

I want to speak about the implementation of obligations under the UN convention on the marking of plastic explosives for the purposes of detection. The convention is known as MARPLEX. Australia is one of 128 parties to the convention, which has been in force since June 1998. The coalition government made this an election commitment in 2004. The convention followed the Lockerbie bombing, and the bill will provide a scheme to detect plastic explosives and continue the work of this government against terrorism. We can learn from those horrific experiences of the past and put into place all we can to stop them from recurring.

The bill tackles the risk of legitimate plastic explosives being diverted to uses such as terrorism. Closer management of the stocks of plastic explosives will greatly decrease the opportunities for people wanting to engage in criminal activity. The acts changed under this bill include the Criminal Code Act 1995, the Customs Act 1901, the Australian Federal Police Act 1979, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, the Crimes Act 1914, the Foreign Evidence Act 1994, the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 and the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979. There will be new offences created under this bill of manufacturing, trafficking, possessing, importing or exporting unmarked plastic explosives.

People who traffic, import or export unmarked plastic explosives will face up to 10 years imprisonment under this legislation. An individual engaged in the process of manufacturing, as well as the person operating behind that individual such as an employer or a manager et cetera, would face two years imprisonment. The same penalty applies for a person in possession of unmarked plastic explosive. To assist our legitimate manufacturers there will be a six-month delay in the commencement of the bill and a six-month transition period, giving 12 months for manufacturers to comply with the provisions therein. The provisions of the bill will require that a marker be incorporated in the manufacture of plastic explosive. It will impose on state parties the obligation to control the possession and transfer of existing stocks of unmarked explosives.

The first marking requirement is that the plastic explosive contains a minimum concentration of one of the four markers and that the marker is distributed homogeneously throughout the explosive. Secondly, not less than 10 years should have elapsed since the manufacture of the explosive, as marking agents deteriorate over time. This marker ensures that they are used or destroyed by the end of their shelf life. As well as amending the Criminal Code, the bill also amends the Customs Act. This amendment provides our Customs officers with appropriate powers to search and seize in accordance with this legislation during their policing of our borders.

In dealing with this legislation, the government is taking a measured and effective response in line with authorities the world over. I think it is a mark of this government that we have acted to ensure that appropriate steps are taken without unduly inconveniencing or undermining people’s right to go on with their daily lives. It is an important part of dealing with terrorism that we do not throw away some of the basic freedoms of our country in seeking to defeat the terrorists, because in doing such a thing the terrorists would, of course, have won. This is a common-sense measure that will allow plastic explosives used for legitimate purposes in our country to be marked and therefore to be immediately identifiable and allow their manufacture and handling to be much more effectively policed.

The amendments to the Customs Act provide that the packaging of explosives will also be served by the bill, with packaging and legible information displayed on the packaging to be undertaken within 24 hours of manufacture. It must be enclosed in a wrapper with the clear upper-case lettering ‘PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE’ together with the date of manufacture, the name of the detection agent, that agent as a percentage of the mass and the type of plastic explosive. This is more stringent than the UN recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods, the current Australian standards or the Australian explosives code—all specify no more than a general identification as an explosive or demolition product.

There will be exemptions to allow the ADF or Federal Police to use unmarked plastic explosives for a seven-day period before requiring authorisation. The exemptions are: an exemption from marking of existing stocks for three years, an exemption for defence and police purposes for 15 years, and an exemption on explosives used for research purposes.

Since the process began way back in 1988 with the investigation into the initial explosion and the killing of the people at Lockerbie, there has been a very diligent process that has looked into all the possible ramifications. That has tied up the loose ends on that bombing and has done it, I think, very effectively. Its impact on our daily lives is apparent in legislation such as this. A similar process is still ongoing in relation to the September 11 bombings in 2001. It is interesting to note that by the time September 2001 came about, the bombing at Lockerbie had already resulted in the conviction of Mr Ali al-Megrahi.

The behaviour of terrorists and the ramifications of their behaviour need to be carefully examined by governments. There is no way that we can accept a trailing off in the response to terrorism, even over long periods when terrorism activity, at least within our sphere here in Australia, appears to have been on the wane.

We need to respond effectively and to maintain the vigilance that we have had over the period since September 2001, in particular, but also as a result of incidents such as this one. There are still ramifications of the Lockerbie bombing that may yet impinge and affect our prospects within Australia of being able to go about our daily lives in a peaceful manner. The prospect of such a small quantity of plastic explosives being sufficient to bring down an airliner still remains and, while marking explosives will provide assistance, it will not, at the end of the day, guarantee us any kind of ongoing protection from the use of plastic explosives in such a way. Sadly, there are also many other ways and many other manners in which terrorists can act to bring down aircraft, and the grim reality of that was revealed on 11 September 2001 and in other incidents.

Within Australia we are taking steps that provide greater security at our airports. We are taking steps that ensure that the monitoring of agricultural chemicals and other similar products that can be misused by terrorists is ongoing. We are being, I believe, entirely responsible in taking up those issues. The member opposite who spoke previously did raise a number of incidents and, while those incidents were obviously matters that he felt worthy of being raised, what is important is the way in which the government responds to those incidents. I think the response in every case has been appropriate and measured, and that reflects well on the authorities that are handling those issues. Even with frivolous issues, such as people acting inappropriately on airport tarmacs—for example, the incident where the person was driving around with a camel suit on—all of those things have ramifications for the way in which we manage our affairs. You will not stop people from misbehaving from time to time, but when those things do inform the debate, I think we can trust the authorities to respond effectively. Certainly, in those cases, it has been revealed that they have responded very well.

As I said earlier, there are exemptions affecting the ADF and the Federal Police. Research, however, covers the development and testing of new or modified explosives, development or testing of explosives detection equipment, training in explosives detection and forensic science. The government is undertaking this type of research in a manner that goes beyond the provisions of the convention, as does the authorisation for the ADF and AFP to destroy unmarked plastic explosives obtained in the course of overseas operation and the forfeiture and surrender of unmarked plastic explosives. It is the latest in a long line of counter-terrorism measures undertaken by this government and it will continue the comprehensive approach it has taken to cover any foreseeable risk areas. I commend the bill to the House.

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Law and Justice Legislation Amendment (Marking of Plastic Explosives) Bill 2006. As the honourable member for Brisbane indicated earlier, the opposition will be supporting this bill, since its purpose is to give effect to the Montreal convention of 1991 on the marking of plastic explosives for the purpose of detection. We are, however, once again, highly critical of the government for the length of time it has taken to bring this relatively simple bill before this House.

It is only weeks since we debated the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Bill 2006. I said then that it was a disgrace that such a vital national security bill was being brought in five years after September 11. At least with that bill, however, the government had the excuse that it was a complex bill which required extensive consultations with industry. There is no such excuse with this bill. Important though this bill is, it is a relatively simple one —but that does not make it any less urgent. In fact, the previous speaker, the member for Blair, referred to the fact that the events that prompted it were earlier than September 11—that is, the murder of the poor people who were on that Pan Am flight over Lockerbie by agents of the Libyan government using plastic explosives. If it has been relevant for that long, it ought to have been brought in earlier. Ever since that bombing in 1988 at Lockerbie, we have known of the dangers of plastic explosives. The Montreal convention dates from 1991, and the Howard government announced in October 2004 its intention to accede to the convention. The delay has been bad enough, but it is now two years since that undertaking was given.

I think the member for Brisbane outlined the reasons that we need to do this with plastic explosives—because of their malleable, valuable nature, because they are odourless and because of their ability to survive heat. These have all made them a favourite device for terrorists to use against airline traffic. We saw that with the mad shoe bomber who was arrested recently—a member of al-Qaeda who was based in England—who was trying to put plastic explosives in the sole of his shoes. He was not the only one.

There has been a consistent pattern with the government on these kinds of bills. The Prime Minister and the Attorney-General talk tough on terrorism, but there is a dangerously wide gap between what they say and what they do. We have seen it in the maritime security legislation, and we have seen it with aviation security. We saw it last week with the money-laundering and terrorist-financing bill and now we see it again. What is the problem with the government’s security legislation? They cannot claim it is legislative obstruction, because we on this side of the House have supported all of the government’s antiterrorism bills, with amendments where necessary, just as we are doing in supporting this bill. In any case, since the government now control both houses, they can override any objections and push their bills through if they wish.

In my view, the problem is with the government itself. Despite its tough talk, national security is a part-time responsibility for this government. We have a part-time minister in charge of homeland security, the Attorney-General, who is responsible for a whole range of other things—from copyright, which he was in the parliament yesterday introducing, to family law. I am not denigrating the importance of those, but they do absorb a great amount of time of the Attorney-General. And, in my view, in these days, we need to have a full-time minister dealing with homeland security, just as they do in the United States. We also have a part-time Inspector of Transport Security—again, totally inadequate in these days when we are concerned with the ability of the Australian public to fly safely through any of our airports because of the international circumstances that rightly give people a reason to fear the kinds of problems that are being felt all over the world.

Labor believes that homeland security is a full-time, high-priority matter. In the honourable member for Brisbane, we have a full-time shadow minister for homeland security. I want to acknowledge, the day before our new frontbench is chosen, what an excellent job he has done in that portfolio. Thanks to his work, the days when the Howard government could claim some kind of political advantage over these issues are long over.

I also want to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the honourable member for Brand, the former Leader of the Opposition, who through his 26-year career in this House in government and opposition has been an unswerving champion and advocate of Australian national security, both internationally and domestically. He was generally regarded as perhaps the best defence minister this country has had in the last 30 years. He was a trusted figure in Washington by both Republican and Democrat administrations.

I take this opportunity to say that, in my view, it is a great tragedy that Kim Beazley was denied the chance to be Prime Minister of Australia. He might not have made some of the strategic blunders in national security matters, which this bill is focused on, in the minor way that this government has. He would have appointed a full-time minister for homeland security. He would have created an Australian coastguard for the Royal Australian Navy for operational tasks where it is really needed rather than chasing fishing boats around the Timor Sea. However, I have known the new Leader of the Opposition, Kevin Rudd, for a long time. He is, in his own words, ‘a very determined bastard’. He will provide us with strong and clear-sighted leadership, and I congratulate him and his deputy, the honourable member for Lalor, on their elevation.

I know the new Leader of the Opposition’s views on national security, on issues like the matter considered in this bill and on foreign affairs. They are as strong as Kim Beazley’s. He is rock solid on the US-Australia alliance, while reserving the right of every trusted ally to disagree with particular administrations over particular issues. His experience and knowledge of international security matters as well as domestic security matters—including things as elevated as our relationship with China, our relationship with Indonesia, and the matters before the House today—are unparalleled on our side. I have every confidence that under our new leadership Labor will take to the next election a foreign policy and a national security policy which will meet the approval of the Australian people.

Returning to the matter before us: this bill provides a means to improve detection of explosives and deter the misuse of plastic explosives by terrorists by requiring more detection agent known as odorant to be incorporated in the manufacture of such explosives. It makes it an offence to manufacture, import, export, traffic in or possess plastic explosives which have not been marked with a detection agent such as described in the technical annex to the Montreal convention. The bill allows exemptions where the plastic explosives are manufactured or held in limited quantities for use in authorised research, development and testing of plastic explosives for forensic purposes and authorised training exercises, or when the explosives are destined to be incorporated in an authorised military use.

The bill also provides that existing stocks of unmarked plastic explosives may be used within three years from the date of the convention’s entry into force. That requires that unmarked plastic explosive manufactured and held for authorised defence purposes must be used, destroyed, marked or rendered permanently ineffective within 15 years of the date of the convention’s entry into force.

Labor supports the provisions of this bill, which bring Australia into conformity with the Montreal convention and with standards accepted by our major allies. To that extent, it helps strengthen our defences against the threat of terrorism, but we remain convinced that this government should be doing a great deal more to protect Australia against terrorism, particularly in the fields of aviation and maritime security, and that it should be doing these things much more quickly than it has managed so far. In this and so many other areas, Australia needs new leadership, new direction and new energy. Under a Rudd Labor government that is what we will get. Bring it on.

Michael Hatton (Blaxland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am happy to support the shadow minister and the other Labor members who have spoken to the Law and Justice Legislation Amendment (Marking of Plastic Explosives) Bill 2006. Indeed, I support the government members who have spoken to this bill, because we are in agreement that this bill should be supported in its entirety. Where we differ is on the question of lag and delay in implementation of not only this measure but a series of national security measures. This measure involves the marking of plastics explosives in a particular way—putting an odorant in them so that they are more readily able to be identified and therefore cannot be used for terrorism or other purposes. If there is an attempt to use them, we will be able to get them before it happens.

At the moment, it is a bit of a hit-and-miss proposition. There are specifically trained sniffer dogs, and I know how well those dogs are trained and how good their handlers are in the operation here around Parliament House. In order to secure this house, there is a full-time operation, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, involving not only the security guards that we see on bicycles but also a dedicated dog squad, with dogs that are trained to sniff out plastic explosives, bomb-making materials and so on. They are dedicated to that task. What is the probability that they will ever find anything? Probably about zero or just slightly above, but that does not mean that the resources do not have to be put there to secure this house.

If it would have been easier to give effect to the work that was being done by ensuring that the United Nations convention in relation to the marking of plastic explosives was adhered to by this government then it should have been done. This is the last of 13 United Nations conventions in relation to terrorism that the government has signed up to. You would have thought that by now we would have had enough time to look seriously at these matters and to say, given that it is now 2006 and not 2001, that there was every good cause for the government to take ready, steady and speedy action in matters such as this. But over a whole series of bills brought before this House, I am sorry to report, as I have previously had to argue in relation to maritime security, transport security and security matters at Kingsford Smith airport, that this government has been laggard in terms of taking up the challenge that has been provided to us directly since 2001, with the attacks on the Twin Towers, the attempted attack on the congress building or the White House—we are still not sure what would have happened with that plane in Pittsburgh—and the direct attack on the Pentagon. They represent the biggest instalment up to 2001.

It is not as if we did not have forewarning that there was a significant problem here, and forewarning that certain measures needed to be made—not only made but then undertaken—in order to secure civil populations as well as congressional buildings, parliamentary buildings, government offices and everything else that needs to be made safe on a national security basis.

We know what the recent history has been—and I will come to this shortly in terms of transport security and other related matters in regard to the use not only of plastic explosives but of others. We know about the increasing tempo of the dangers that we face. There were clear and present dangers evident to authorities world wide, but although the clear and present dangers were there, although the United Nations suggested, in putting their convention together, that constituent governments should sign and put into effect those conventions, here we are dealing with the very last of the 13 antiterror bills. You have to ask why.

Let us look at the history of this matter. In 1985 there was the still relatively unexplained destruction of two Air India aircraft originating out of Canada. It is thought that plastic explosives were the cause of those planes being blown up. It is thought there was a direct connection with the religious rivalry between Muslims and Hindus in India. We have seen a series of events since then which would give that supposition greater force and weight. In 1988, an aircraft was brought down over Lockerbie, Scotland. We know without a shadow of a doubt whatsoever that Muammar al-Gaddafi’s government in Libya conspired to bring down that aircraft and that they used plastic explosives to do it.

The plastic explosives were placed on the aircraft which exploded over Lockerbie. In good part, the reason that people did not know they were there was because they had no ready identifiers. Plastic or sheet explosives are used world wide. We know that they are produced in relatively large volume. We even know the designations of those plastic explosives. You would very well know, Mr Deputy Speaker Haase, coming from Kalgoorlie, the biggest electorate in Australia, covering most of Western Australia—and you and I both know, from serving on the industry and resources committee—just how significant the use of explosives is within the mining community. We know that primarily the explosive of choice is ammonium nitrate. We are not dealing with that here. But the bills that we dealt with recently in relation to transport security and maritime transport security go to the issue of how to protect yourself against ammonium nitrate. One thing that was not involved in those bills was the question of whether you should mark ammonium nitrate out and whether you could easily find it. Why? Because ammonium nitrate is used in great bulk in terms of utilisation as an explosive.

The great danger with plastic explosives lies in two areas. Firstly, you do not need much of C4 or Semtex to blast a hole in an aeroplane and bring it down. Secondly, because of the shape and form that it takes, there is not the difficulty that you have to have a whole truckload delivered. You need only a small amount. Also, it is entirely malleable. This is a plastic explosive and, like the plasticine that children play with, you can mould it into different shapes and you can conceal it. These days, with the development of technology for batteries, mobile phones, PDAs or portable computers, one of the reasons they go through the scanners is the fact that you need to physically look at what is there. But what if there are materials within those particular items? What if there are plastic explosives moulded into those spaces?

The new batteries that are coming through are being moulded throughout the cases of computers, PDAs and phones. They are more potent than lithium batteries and nickel metal hydride; they are more potent than the NiCad batteries that were there in the first place. You can get a great deal more battery by using this plastic-like approach. So why is this bill significant and important? Why should it have been signed up to before? Because of the volume of malleable plastic-like materials that are now entering into mainstream use. Because they are going to be used a lot more, you need to say, ‘Whack something in this to make it readily identifiable so that it will stick out and announce itself.’

There could have been—except it would probably have been self-defeating—an associated part of this convention. There is a good reason that it is not there. This basically talks about odorants or other signifiers to indicate that anyone looking for plastic explosives will be able to find them more readily. This convention was generated in about 1991. Certainly the Attorney-General will remember, I have no doubt, that we did not lose office until 1996. So if Labor was tardy and had just short of five years to sign up to this convention, let Labor be condemned. There were enough signifiers in the early nineties that we had a problem.

Apart from the activity on those aircraft, where else have we seen a significant rise in terrorist attacks, and certainly those related to al-Qaeda? We know that the attack on the USS Cole, directed by a fast motorboat filled with a large amount of explosives, was a direct attack. We know that the 1994 attack on the twin towers, where they attempted to blow them up from basement level, failed, but that was an indication that we had a problem with the worldwide terrorist movement. We know that that lead-up to 2001 had larger scale utilisation. We know that ammonium nitrate was used in Bali. We have also had a security problem with ammonium nitrate in Australia, where a train just pulled up, stayed there for half an hour or so and a couple of blokes came along and lifted a whole truckload full of the stuff and took it off. The expectation from the security authorities—and we hope it is borne out—is that it is just common criminals utilising it for their own purposes and not criminals who are associated with terrorist groups. But that is an indication of just how much we have to do to overprotect.

Plastic explosives were used originally—and they were largely C4 and Semtex—during the Warsaw Pact era. The majority of those were produced in Czechoslovakia. They were very effective. The very fact that you could hide them made them a weapon of choice for a series of reasons. If you look at the period post 2001, what is the one major attempt that we know of to use plastic explosives to bring down an aircraft? It was by a fellow called Reid, a British bomber, who was caught trying to light his shoelaces. They stopped him from trying to give effect to using plastic explosives in his shoes to take down that aircraft. If this measure had been signed up to by everyone and if the existing stocks of plastic explosives that we still have now—that are unmarked by the odorant; that do not have significations—had been used up fully, there would be less chance for someone like that to be able to get access to it. We know—the Attorney-General will know this, and others dealing with it will know this as well—there is still a capacity to ‘roll your own’ in this regard and for people to produce their own plastic explosives. And, if that capacity is there in the terrorist organisations, no doubt they will attempt to use it. But the key here is the large-scale access to a source of explosive that is not only potent but relatively small, easily malleable and easy to hide. This bill is about making that much easier to pick up.

If this convention had not been thought up in 1991 but was being thought up now, in 2006, or even back in 2004, the other thing you might think of—and this could in fact go directly against the particular uses of these explosives—would be: why shouldn’t we have RFID, radiofrequency identification, tags in them? They are very small. They have the ability to be put into just about anything: an item of clothing like my suit, a handkerchief—you name it. You can actually have RFID tags, which are being taken up by manufacturers worldwide, in order to track a logistical train of manufactured items around the world. Maybe that is something we should be looking at here.

Whether we have been laggard or not in signing up to this convention—and I would argue that the government has been laggard in signing up to this, the last of the 13 antiterror conventions—it is based on odorant protection. It is a form that was available then, but the dramatic advances in RFID technology would indicate that this is something else we should be looking at. We have a body of plastic explosives that is still there to be used, so there is still a chance that people could get ready access to that. But this should be about going forward and saying to manufacturers what they should be looking to produce under this set of laws. I trust that the Attorney-General, being as open as he is in these areas, will look at ways in which we can better improve our national security. We should have a look at the technical possibilities. This is a most dangerous substance because of all its properties. It is one that has not been used as much by terrorist organisations as we might have expected. It used to be the choice of certain intelligence organisations and certain terrorist movements overseas. It fundamentally has not been used by the ones we have been most concerned with recently, and that is al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah, but that does not mean they will not use it in the future.

So my recommendation would be that, while supporting the bill completely, we always need to look more broadly. We can secure ourselves in relation to the production of plastic explosives and making it easier to find them, but it would be a hell of a lot easier to find this stuff if we used a current technology that is extremely well developed and that is not totally standardised, where you have very small RFIDs which would enable you to track this stuff right around the world. You would be able to get, effectively, a tag in that plastic explosive to tell you exactly where and when it was manufactured, and you could then run that exploration throughout the course of its use. It would give us greater control and greater certainty. If the technology is available, let us look at being able to use it.

More broadly, our problems in maritime security, not only at our ports but on the high seas and as ships come into harbour, are fundamentally about the big stuff—ammonium nitrate and the potential for vessels that are not well enough controlled and regulated to come into our harbours where they could do a great deal of damage. I have spoken about that in relation to previous bills. With regard to transport security, I have spoken about Kingsford Smith airport with its myriad problems which are fundamentally historical; the embedded nature of the problematic way in which people do business, and hide criminality, within Kingsford Smith and other major airports; and the fact that getting those people out is not about identifying these sorts of things but, fundamentally, about getting a regime where you could put in a practised detective force. I think the New South Wales police force would be the best agency for this, to actually root out the difficulty and problem that we have with it. It is a massive job, but unless it is done we cannot be absolutely secure in terms of KSA.

The other great difficulty here, and one which could really be significant, is the issue of plastic explosives and their identification and use in attacks, particularly in our train networks. Sydney is highly vulnerable to terrorist attack on our train networks. We know how much damage was done in Madrid. We know how many people lost their lives there. We know how easy it was for them to bring Madrid to a standstill and for the shock waves of that to run around the world. If you look at Sydney’s geography—as the minister and I, coming from there, know very well—you see that Sydney is dependent on its railway lines running into the CBD. Those railway lines run west, they run south, they run north and they run east. The intersections between north and south in Sydney are very difficult. That is why we have used roads in particular to make those.

We have a fundamental problem. To bring down our train network, because of its very structure and the way it has developed historically, is not so difficult. This is an area that we really need to concentrate on and this is an area where the potential use of plastic explosives to create havoc on that train network is very significant. Why is that the case? It is pretty simple. It is the portability of them, that you could hide them relatively easily and that they could be the start point for using other sets of explosives to run off. We know from the London experience just how easy that is.

The last element is about these explosives being used in conjunction with others. Staying ahead of the game rather than being behind is extraordinarily important. We know from the recent changes in airline security that have had to be taken by the United States and the British governments that you can use very simple means: gels and other very simple things. You can put them together in a particular way and have an explosive that can do an enormous amount of damage, whether used in conjunction with plastic explosives or not. We have to be up to the game, fix this, put it through as fast as possible and implement it. Then we have to continue to take as many measures as we need to take to secure the public and our institutions against a very aggressive set of terrorists who understand the science and will put this into practice.

Philip Ruddock (Berowra, Liberal Party, Attorney-General) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank the members who have participated in this debate: the members for Brisbane, Blair, Melbourne Ports and, latterly, the member for Blaxland. I apologise that I have not been here to hear all of the comments but I do have some observations which I will make.

First, the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection is one of 13 international terrorism conventions and protocols which aim to strengthen the international legal framework to combat terrorism. Australia was one of the first countries to sign the new convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, which is yet to enter into force. The accession of the convention on the marking of plastic explosives, often referred to as the MARPLEX convention, will mean that we are a party to the remaining 12 international terrorism conventions currently in force and, I have to say, one of not too many countries that is party to as many conventions.

As one who plays a part in trying to get countries within this region to focus on the implementation of conventions and assist with the drafting of laws to ensure that they can do so, let me make it clear that we attach a great deal of importance to these matters. This particular convention arose from concerns about the use of plastic explosives in terrorist acts, particularly in the aviation environment. It aims to make plastic explosives even more detectable by requiring them to be marked and therefore inhibiting their improper and unlawful use. The Law and Justice Legislation Amendment (Marking of Plastic Explosives) Bill 2006 implements this marking requirement and imposes strict controls on the use, possession, manufacture, traffic in, import and export of plastic explosives which are not marked with a prescribed chemical marking agent. The unauthorised use of unmarked plastic explosives is punishable by 10 years imprisonment as an upper limit.

The bill provides for some important and reasonable exemptions to the requirement to mark plastic explosives. Existing Australian manufacturers of plastic explosives will be given 12 months to modify their processes to comply with the new obligations. Existing stocks of unmarked plastic explosives manufactured prior to the commencement of this bill may be used for up to a three-year period. The unmarked plastic explosives may be used for research purposes. In compliance with the convention, defence and police forces may use unmarked plastic explosives for up to 15 years from the commencement of the bill and there are exemptions to enable the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal Police to possess, import and traffic in unmarked plastic explosives in special operational circumstances where authorised. The bill was developed in consultation with the states’ and territories’ explosives industries. The passage of this bill will mean that we are one step closer to the accession to this important convention. The bill is consistent with the government’s ongoing commitment to countering global terrorism, particularly in the South-East Asia region.

In relation to the debate, I would like to make a number of salient points. First, there has been some criticism of the time that it has taken to accede to and implement this convention. That ought not to be of surprise, given the complex nature of it and that it did involve a number of government agencies that are able to use these materials and had to ensure that they were able to be compliant. That, inevitably, requires a good deal of discussion, negotiation and, ultimately, resourcing. The accession to this convention is something we have sought to deal with as quickly as possible. I was pleased that my colleague the member for Blair recognised that we were taking a balanced approach in relation to these measures. I think in my concluding remarks I have demonstrated that.

The member for Blaxland, who has now left the chamber, raised some issues in relation to other products. He may not be aware that I released a statement on this last week. We have already put in place arrangements to supervise the control, distribution and storage of ammonium nitrate. We are now moving to implement a wider range of possible measures and we have released a discussion paper. I noticed that he was a very thoughtful contributor, so he might like to look at that discussion paper and make some observations about the way forward. We want to do this in a way which involves all of those who are likely to be adversely affected as well as those who appreciate the importance of protecting the Australian community. The member for Werriwa might like to draw my remarks to his colleague’s attention. We also recognise that, in relation to some of the points he made of detail, the member for Blair is a thoughtful contributor, and we will look at the issues that he has raised about the marking of the components. I do not know whether that is technically possible, but it is an issue that we will give him a written reply on, as he has raised it.

But let me deal with the member for Melbourne Ports. I must say that I thought the Labor Party would be starting to shift ground on policy that is not terribly sensible. I am a bit surprised that the member for Melbourne Ports wants to be at the vanguard of advancing policy which has been, I think, very significantly discredited by the Labour Party in Britain and by the experience of the United States. He was running the line that I am in some way a part-time homeland security minister and that Labor’s policy was to have a full-time minister for homeland security.

I do not think he knows anything about part time and full time, but what I can say is that if you look at the position of the minister for home affairs in the United Kingdom, you see that they have a far wider range of activities in addition to homeland security—if you like to use that term—that they have to administer. I have been a minister for immigration and I can tell you that that involves a hell of a lot of work. But the minister for home affairs in the United Kingdom has to deal with security issues and immigration. So let me just make the point that, if you look around the world, you will find that there are a lot of interconnectivities in areas that often mean that these issues have to be dealt with by people who undertake other responsibilities.

The Attorney in Australia has always undertaken a supervisory role in relation to domestic security issues. We used to call it espionage. The issues are much the same: protecting the nation’s secrets. Those issues have not gone away. Are they suggesting that somebody else—somebody who does not fulfil the quasi-independent role that is expected of an Attorney-General—ought to do that? I think that would reduce the level of public confidence in the way these issues are dealt with at the present time.

Let me deal with this canard of a minister for homeland security giving you a better system. In the United States they wanted to deal with the problems of lack of interconnectivity of a lot of agencies that have to work together. We saw in relation to Hurricane Katrina that just creating another agency and giving it a name and saying it is an umbrella organisation does not necessarily work. I am not one who likes to criticise the United States—I think they recognised there were some lessons to be learnt from the way in which Katrina was dealt with—but Homeland Security has failed them dismally. What it has meant is that a lot of people are having to relearn their tasks.

The emphasis that we have put on dealing with security issues has been on ensuring that there is a high degree of interconnectivity. There is. That is the term that Dennis Richardson, the former head of ASIO, used to use to describe the way in which agencies in Australia worked. We have a situation where we are well practised. In other words, people know what their responsibilities are. In London, people were carrying out exercises on the day before the London bombings. Those exercises meant that people were not only well practised but knew each other and were able to work together. They came from different agencies. You do not need to have some overarching minister trying to draw everything together. You need to have people understanding what their roles are and practised in exercising those roles and in strategically thinking about how to deal with those sorts of emergencies if we face them.

Those who are continually pressing for some overarching homeland security department and a minister who has some overriding responsibilities ought to be able to substantiate where there are significant shortcomings in the way in which the security arrangements that we have put in place work in Australia. I have never heard it articulated. I have never heard any suggestions that there are shortcomings. I have heard no evidence. I think it is one of the ideas that they picked up from the United States—because they went down that route—that they ought to just quietly discard now that they have an opportunity to review the way in which they go about their quest for government.

Finally let me say—and this is for the member for Melbourne Ports—that, in my own experience, every time you change arrangements, change the way in which people report and establish new procedures and new protocols, that becomes the dominant objective: how do you reorganise yourself? It becomes inordinately time consuming. It becomes very technical trying to look at all of the requirements that you have to address. It takes your eye off the ball, and it means that the real effort you ought to be putting into protecting the community is lost while you are trying to reorganise yourself.

I am sorry that the member for Melbourne Ports was not here to hear my observations. I would hope that, rather than picking up what I think is rather outdated policy, he ought to focus on the real issues of how we can deal with risks that the Australian community face and how we are going to address shortcomings, not waste our time trying to reshuffle the deck and reorder and rethink the way in which we go about protecting the Australian community.

I commend this bill to the Main Committee. I am delighted that it is being supported by the opposition. It is an important measure to ensure that we are implementing our international obligations and, even more importantly, that we are in a better place to protect the Australian community.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

Ordered that the bill be reported to the House without amendment.