Mr Tony Burke (Watson, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Immigration, Integration and Citizenship) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Migration Amendment (Border Integrity) Bill 2006 proposes measures to enhance identity verification at Australia’s immigration clearance points and to streamline immigration processing. The purpose of the proposed amendment to the Migration Act 1958 is to enable certain persons with an eligible passport to choose an automated system or a clearance officer in immigration clearance and to identify who may use an automated system.

The bill also seeks to amend the Migration Act so that a special purpose visa may cease at a time specified by the minister, whereas currently the visa would only cease at midnight on the day of the ministerial declaration. The special purpose visa regime was designed to facilitate lawful travel and entry for low-risk groups of travellers. Persons eligible include crew members of non-military ships, air crew, foreign dignitaries and visiting members of overseas armed forces. The bill remedies the current situation where a declaration is made by the minister that a noncitizen should not remain in Australia, but action to detain that person for removal cannot occur until midnight on the day on which the declaration is made. Labor will be supporting the bill.

The bill allows for the expansion of the government’s voluntary SmartGate system—that is, facial recognition technology—to all Australians citizens and selected noncitizens, provided they hold an eligible e-passport. While Labor will be supporting the bill, and while we support measures to enhance security verification and the speed of passenger clearance at Australia’s immigration clearance points, we are not convinced that the SmartGate system as proposed will actually deliver on those aims. I will discuss this in more detail later.

The Australian Customs Service’s annual report of 2005-06 states that SmartGate is an automated passport-checking system which enables travellers with the appropriate eligible passports to move through passport control. Following a trial of the system, which was completed in June 2005, the version of SmartGate is to be progressively implemented throughout 2007. The system will only initially be available to holders of Australian e-passports, although it is planned to subsequently make it available to holders of eligible passports from other countries.

The use of SmartGate is dependent on having, as I said, an eligible passport which at first, in other words, is an e-passport. This bill refers to the fact that an eligible passport will be determined by the proposed new section 175A, and the use of these automated systems by travellers will rely on the e-passport. Launched on 25 October 2005, the biometrically-enabled e-passport has a microchip embedded in the centre page which contains the digitised facial image and personal details of the passport holder. The microchip can be read electronically by facial recognition technology. When launching the e-passport the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that, as the processing facilities are progressively introduced in Australia and at overseas airports, the new technology will strengthen border security and streamline the movement of passengers through airports. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade states on its website the advantages of the e-passport over the Australian passport, including that it provides greater protection against fraudulent misuse and tampering, that it reduces the risk of identity fraud—currently estimated to cost the Australian economy more than $1 billion each year—and also that it enhances the protection of Australia’s border through speedy and secure verification of incoming Australian passport holders.

The introduction of e-passports internationally will continue to assist in streamlining international travel. For example, the Australian e-passport complies with changes in the Visa Waiver Program. The Visa Waiver Program in the United States enables travellers from certain countries who travel to the United States for tourism or business purposes and who stay for 90 days or less to do so without a visa. The Australian e-passport also complies with the United States’s requirements for e-passports introduced in October 2006 and has received initial United States Department of Homeland Security certification.

The automated system will temporarily store the data electronically read from the embedded information stored on the microchip in the e-passport. This is only while it is used to process the relevant passenger. The information is then destroyed shortly after. The automated system will not collect—that is, permanently store—the relevant personal identifiers from these passports. This remains in keeping with the current policy intention, where passengers are required to present identification rather than have it collected. This creates a problem with the bill which is now being sought to be rectified through government amendments. The problem, where you set up the precautions that you will not actually collect personal identifiers, is that the signatures contained on passenger arrival cards are identified as being personal identifiers. Certainly it is not the intention that those passenger cards will be automatically destroyed in the same way that that computer information will be. With that in mind, the government has indicated it will be moving its own amendments to the bill, as certain amendments contained in the bill as it stands have that unintended consequence of actually preventing the collection of passenger cards from citizens and noncitizens arriving and departing Australia because they contain signatures. Signatures are defined, as I said, to be a personal identifier for the purposes of the Migration Act.

The amendments being moved by the government to this bill preserve the current policy intention by allowing the collection of a person’s signature, but not any other personal identifier. The amendments also clarify that clearance is not restricted to wholly one or the other of the automated system or the immigration clearance officer. This clarifies that a passenger can hand their passenger card to an officer and still be cleared through the automated system. In accordance with this, Labor will be supporting those amendments.

As I mentioned earlier, Labor supports the move towards the use of biometric technology for the purpose of identification. However, Labor does note that there has been some teething problems with SmartGate, the automated processing system to be used by the Australian government. The reliability of the technology, such as that used in the SmartGate system, has not been without criticism. On 5 September last year, the Australian Financial Review noted that industry insiders had identified:

... gaps in biometrics such as excessive error rates, a poor ability to find database matches and high sensitivity to varying conditions.

The article referred to a senior policy analyst at the White House Office of Science and Technology that has estimated that the accuracy rate for facial scanning is in fact only 90 per cent, whereas for fingerprints it is 99 per cent and for iris scanning it is 97 per cent. This 90 per cent accuracy for facial recognition carries the understandable problem that when you are checking facial recognition the expression somebody is holding on their face is going to be relevant to whether or not it is in fact recognised as matching the data that are being stored.

The reliability and effectiveness of the SmartGate system was directly questioned by Dr Roger Clarke, a visiting fellow in the Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology at the Australian National University, on ABC radio’s PM program back on 5 May last year. Dr Clarke stated that SmartGate will face difficulties because it is built on the assumption that a person’s face will always appear the same, when in reality that is rarely the case. He stated that this is particularly challenging when you are trying to do it in volume with large numbers of people passing through—and that is assuming that a person is not actively trying to confuse the machine.

In the 2005-06 annual report, Australian Customs maintained that, although there were problems initially, by the time SmartGate comes into full operation next year, all the creases will be ironed out. Hopefully that statement was not unduly optimistic. To that extent, the Howard government is asking us to take the Customs assurances of successful IT contract management on faith and on face value. The problem is that we have just had the release of an audit report into Customs’ last IT project, which was the Customs cargo management system. That project was approved without a financial management plan, costed on the basis of a stab in the dark, and delivered years late and approximately $200 million over budget. Labor has good reason to question the government’s ability to manage the implementation of systems technology in this area.

Risk profiling people coming into this country is critical for national security. We need to know who is coming into our country so we can do the background checks before they arrive. The same is true for sea and air cargo. Customs analyse sea and air cargo in Australia by computer to look at the cargo reports and check them against risk profiles. They have risk profiles for quarantine threats like fire ants and foot-and-mouth disease; there are health threats like anthrax, Ebola virus and bird flu; there are criminal threats like child pornography, cocaine, heroin, guns and ammunition; and there can be terrorism threats like nuclear material, precursor chemicals and bomb components.

I would imagine, therefore, that the Australian people would be more than a little horrified to learn that the Howard government had actually disabled the security profiling for 12 days. Unfortunately that is precisely what happened. We heard in Senate estimates last month that, for 12 days, the Howard government turned 3,200 separate risk profiles off—they flicked the switch—when the Customs computer crashed as a result of the minister ordering that a half-ready and inadequately tested IT system be turned on. When Customs went back and risk profiled the sea cargo reports after the event, an indeterminate number of air cargo reports and import declarations were never checked. Whether or not they were valid, we just do not know. Is it any wonder that the Australian National Audit Office found that:

6.31         The deactivation of over 4,000 risk profiles over a period of several days presented a considerable risk to Australia’s border security and Customs’ revenue collection responsibilities. These profiles covered areas such as counter terrorism, illicit drugs, revenue, prohibited items and compliance.

The rush to introduce technology to streamline processes such as this instance surely is a warning to the government about uncertain technology in other areas. The concern over the cargo risk profiling technology that left the security gates wide open for 12 days is that it was clearly implemented before it was ready. The government cannot tell us what might have got through because they do not include themselves. With a track record like that, it is very difficult for Labor to accept the government’s assurances that the same thing will not happen again.

As international travel increases and security becomes more demanding, streamlined processing, while also enhancing identity verification, is clearly something we ought to be pursuing. However we have to ensure that it is accurate, feasible and robust. The national director of border intelligence for the Australian Customs Service commented in May 2006 that the biometric technology is urgently needed to deal with the increasing number of people arriving at Australian airports. The director stated that facial recognition technology has high accuracy levels. Unfortunately what the director would not reveal at Senate estimates was exactly what the level was during the SmartGate trials. In fact the director added that the system has been set so that it is more likely to reject somebody who should have been accepted rather than the other way around. You can understand those parameters being set. You want to make sure that people who need to be rejected in fact are.

It was around this question of robustness that Senator Joseph Ludwig, then shadow minister for justice and customs, raised concerns that SmartGate may actually run the risk of causing undue delays to processing rather than alleviating congestion. SmartGate is intended to be an automated processing system to provide a voluntary alternative to manual processing at the border. The concern is that if this expensive technology is so sensitive to being confused and therefore more likely to direct people to manual processing than to automated processing then it does not actually appear to be that much of a ‘smart gate’ at all. In answers to questions on the implementation of SmartGate following the trial, an Australian Customs Service official stated during Senate estimates on 31 October last year:

The idea is, at this stage, that the first implementation will be at the end of February next year in Brisbane. As I said, it is a development implementation to develop the model fully. Then we intend to move to Sydney and Melbourne after that. But that will be a few months off. It will probably be in the latter part of the next calendar year.

So following the trial, the implementation of the system is, and I quote:

... a development implementation to develop the model fully.

So we have had the trial and the implementation will be ‘a development implementation to develop the model fully’.

The question is: why has the government chosen to proceed to legislation without having a fully developed model first? It is true that, despite concerns with the technology more generally, governments in countries such as Britain, the United States, Germany, Israel, Brazil and Singapore are rolling out biometric authentication systems in customer-facing departments such as customs, social services and health. Why, then, are we reinventing the wheel here? The government has to explain whether these models have been tested by Customs for effectiveness and efficiency.

The other main purpose of this bill is with regard to special purpose visas. The bill will enable the minister to specify a time when a special purpose visa will cease to be in effect. Currently, if the minister declares that it is undesirable for a person or persons to travel to, enter or remain in Australia, the visa does not cease until midnight on the day on which the declaration is made. Labor supports this amendment. The ability to cancel a special purpose visa immediately, however, is unfortunately overdue. Currently, foreign non-military maritime crew and their families are not required to make a formal application for a visa before coming to Australia. Special purpose visas are currently granted by operation of law. At present, maritime crew are granted the special purpose visas on arrival in Australia following checks against the Department of Immigration and Citizenship’s movement alert list. This process does not permit security checks to be conducted before the crews of these ships are allowed to enter Australia—an issue that Labor has been saying for some time needs to be addressed.

While the government introduced the Migration Amendment (Maritime Crew) Bill recently, which allows the government to introduce a checked visa for maritime crew, Labor questioned why it had taken almost 6½ years since 11 September 2001 for the government to introduce it. The government only recently adopted what has been a longstanding Labor party policy—to vet foreign maritime workers. During the debate on the maritime crew bill, I pointed out that Labor has consistently raised concern with foreign vessels, whose crews had not been security vetted, carrying thousands of tons of explosives around coastal Australia.

In 2005, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute published a damning report on the state of Australia’s security arrangements called Future unknown: the terrorist threat to Australian maritime security. That report identified the danger of foreign-flagged vessels carrying dangerous goods around the Australian coastline. This is a warning Labor has repeatedly made to the government. We have specifically warned about the dangers of foreign-crewed, foreign-flagged vessels for which there has been no security check carrying ammonium nitrate around Australia’s coastline.

Labor have also pointed out that Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiah have acquired the skills and opportunities to launch a maritime terrorist attack. These groups operate in South-East Asian waters, near to our borders and in waters in which the incidence of piracy is the highest in the world. On the latest available figures, there are two acts of piracy per week in the waters just to our north-north-west—exactly the area in which those terrorist organisations operate. The measures in the maritime crew bill were another example of the government adopting longstanding Labor policy in order to address a security related issue.

This government continually neglects to monitor and regulate necessary micro-national security issues. The government is spending considerable money on immigration and customs related IT systems. However, based on the IT systems contract management we have seen to date, it is simply not up to scratch. Simply spending money does not address a problem or an issue. It must be targeted, robust and effective.

While Labor supports the move to biometric authentication systems, we do have concerns with the government’s approach to go it alone internationally and to iron out identified problems with the SmartGate system during its introduction. While Labor supports the bill, as it will facilitate the ability for people with eligible passports to choose to use an automated processing system for immigration clearance to Australia, it remains wary of the system the government has chosen and of the government’s ability to administer that system. Labor will be monitoring the performance, cost and international compatibility of the SmartGate system closely. We support the bill and the government amendments to it.

Wilson Tuckey (O'Connor, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Migration Amendment (Border Integrity) Bill 2006 is important legislation. It adds another layer of protection for the Australian community. What is more, it sets out to provide convenience so as to ensure that the Australian people who have a good reputation can get back into Australia with a reduced amount of inconvenience. The member for Watson spent quite a lot of time talking about the administration of the new Customs software. It is universally recognised that that particular process left much to be desired. There were reasons for that. I would expect that we would not implement SmartGate, as it has been termed—and it is part of this legislation—on a national level, as the Customs arrangements were virtually obliged to be. We will probably have the opportunity to do so on an incremental basis. Furthermore, this is a choice that people will make. Many will retain their own passports and present to an immigration officer in the way in which they are accustomed. The phase in and the testing of this new software will thus be a lot easier.

I recently was in the company of a large number of English people who were travelling around Australia on a cruise vessel. As they left Singapore, Australian immigration agents boarded the vessel and did face-to-face checks on them as they were travelling towards Australia. One might think that people would be rather annoyed by that process. They were so happy to think that such a process existed and each and every one whom I happened to meet said, ‘I wish it was like this in our country.’ They wished there was someone checking the people who turn up in the United Kingdom from all over the place. It appears nobody knows they are there. As good citizens these people were pretty angry about that in their own country.

So there is worldwide support amongst the democracies for strong and properly administered border protection. I think there are times, when it comes to personal identification, when it is harder to corrupt a computer chip, which holds a lot of personal details and will be applicable in the SmartGate system, than it is to change a photograph on a passport and say you are still the same person but you look different, even though the photo looks like you.

So all of these things will improve border protection and at the same time improve the speed with which Australian citizens in particular can re-enter the country. As other nations may or may not pick up this particular technology, I guess we will see other people coming to Australia on the same arrangements. But we do go through border protection. I think our workers in Immigration and Customs do a great job. We experience that personally from time to time. This will make their task somewhat simpler.

The other amendment relates to some changes to the arrangements where special visas are granted to crew members of ships. The administration of these is an important factor when one considers the growth in the cruise tourist industry and the number of people who consequently work on those vessels. To the extent that they can get ashore they represent tourists the same as passengers. It is essential we have a sensible arrangement there. But there may be suspicions about an individual already in possession of one of these special visas that they might be deserting, which would be a common problem. Otherwise, there may be information available at the last minute but their special visa could not be cancelled until midnight. That is of course archaic and this new legislation makes it appropriate for the minister to declare the cancellation of that visa at any time, but they cannot cancel it retrospectively. In other words, they must only cancel it at a time prospective from the time of them signing the document. That is worth while.

I welcome the fact that the Australian Labor Party for a change are actually going to support a bit of border protection. I had a bit of discussion with their previous leader on this matter. I could not understand why he had voted against some other steps to improve our border protection. That became a matter of some public interest. But I am of the view that this time the House is combined on this. I think the member for Watson’s concerns are unwarranted. This is not the same requirement of administrative need as applied to Customs—more particularly, implementing it just before Christmas. I am sure that our immigration authorities will be able to make good use out of these new arrangements, I think SmartGate is a good idea and it will add to our border protection. I support the bill.

Duncan Kerr (Denison, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Migration Amendment (Border Integrity) Bill 2006 makes a number of positive amendments to the Migration Act which we as the Labor opposition support. In the main those amendments are non-controversial but they are important. One of the curiosities of this debate is that a number of the changes that the government said were urgent and ones of great moment have not come forward for over three years since the government introduced legislation that it now says was deficient in key areas. Thus far the only explanation we have heard in relation to that matter is that legislative drafting priorities were otherwise. It does seem an extraordinary situation that the government can come before this parliament claiming urgency in relation to the debate that is presently before us, point out that there are significant defects in its own legislation—which did have administrative difficulties and problems—and in some manner avoid the criticism of this House for having circumstances of that nature exposed. So, whilst the opposition does broadly support the legislation that is presently before it, it does so with some small sense of irony.

As a member of this House I also want to put on record a concern that I have personally about the way in which this particular matter has proceeded. When the underlying legislative changes were brought in enabling the collection of quite intrusive forms of information about those who would enter this country, we were given in this parliament the ‘cross my heart, spit and swear to die’ assurances that there would be no further extensions of these provisions. Now, three years later, we are told that the act was drafted in a way that was inconveniently narrow, that in fact it has created a great degree of difficulty for the administration of immigration and related areas of law enforcement and the terms in which this parliament passed the legislation were too narrow.

I do not mind that we address a deficiency once exposed, but I am particularly concerned about what one of my former colleagues, Senator Barney Cooney, used to call ‘legislative creep’. This is where government introduces a particular measure and gives to the parliament absolute binding, ‘cross your heart, spit and swear to die’ assurances that it will never re-extend it in any other area, that its reach will be narrowly prescribed. The House accepts the legislation on those assurances and then, as sure as shooting, it turns up a year or two later and discovers that the government proposes a much wider range of persons who can have access to that information. It would be far more honourable and honest if, in these debates, the government came forward with the real range of its objectives in the first place. I cannot believe that it was not within the minds of those who were proposing the legislation initially that it would need an extension of the kind that is now being proposed.

The situations in which this information is collected are when people are applying for an Australian visa, when they are going through immigration clearance, when a noncitizen is put into immigration detention or where a person is suspected of being an unlawful noncitizen. In those circumstances, personal identifiers are collected. ‘Personal identifiers’ is a euphemistic way of describing a whole range of information about what the person looks like, their biometric details and fingerprint details—all kinds of personal information. The 2004 amendments said that this was extraordinarily intrusive and, therefore, it would be prohibited from being accessed or disclosed, except where the act expressly permitted it. Indeed, we were told that any disclosure beyond that which was so narrowly prescribed would attract up to two years imprisonment. The bill before us widens the disclosure provisions significantly.

There are three new exemptions to the unlawful disclosure regime that was proposed three years ago. The first is where a person who accesses the information believes on reasonable grounds that the access or disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the life or health of that person or any other person. This is a perfectly sensible extension. It would apply, for example, where there has been a threat against an immigration official or an Australian embassy. The department might hold a photograph of the person or it might hold some other information—in fact, it would hold a significant amount of other information and it could disclose that.

The second provision is where the disclosure is reasonably necessary for the enforcement of a criminal law of the Commonwealth or of a state or territory. This amendment would fix the problem that the government says has emerged where the department cannot disclose signed incoming passenger cards to the AFP or to the Commonwealth DPP to assist, for example, with cracking down on drug smugglers. The provision is much wider than in relation to the smuggling of drugs. When this regime was put in place, there would have been some realisation that it was deliberately narrowed—only to immigration related matters—because of the concern that this collection under requirement of law was not to be used for general law enforcement purposes. Now we propose to permit it. I am told that this has been the subject of consultation with the Privacy Commissioner. I have no reason to dispute that; but, nonetheless, we have again taken a regime that was promised to the parliament to be restricted for the narrow purpose for which it was created and extended it across the whole range of Commonwealth law enforcement responsibilities.

The third new disclosure provision is where the disclosure is required by or under a law of the Commonwealth or of a state or territory. This can open up a wide range of permitted disclosures. The Commonwealth can continue to pass laws which authorise such disclosures. Interestingly, in relation to the provision about the disclosure required under the law of a state or territory, I understand that, in briefings to the shadow minister, the department said the phrase ‘required by or under a law of the Commonwealth or of a state or territory’ refers to such state or territory laws that validly bind the Commonwealth. This is why the word ‘required’ rather than ‘authorised’ is used. But, in a sense, that is a circular argument because only when the Commonwealth permits access to information of this kind can a state have the legislative capacity to demand it.

The definition, whilst providing that it relates to information required by or under a law of a state or territory, implicitly authorises states and territories to so require it. Having, by such means, implicitly authorised the states or territories, no doubt it will be used. So states and territories will also be able to access—by way of search warrants and various other means authorised under their legislation—information that this parliament was told originally would be used exclusively for immigration related matters. Here I am referring to the sorts of issues—the Alvarez type matters—where, colleagues were advised by the government, certainty of identity is known in order to prevent abuse of our borders by people who are within Australia illicitly or who are staying too long. This is with respect to the general implementation of the laws of not only the Commonwealth, in this instance, but also the territories and the states. I understand and accept this extension; however, as I have mentioned, I have some concerns about the manner in which it has been proceeded with. We have seen this sort of legislative creep in a whole range of areas.

Currently, this parliament has before it the prospect of legislation to introduce a national identity card. It is now being said that it would be limited to a whole range of narrow purposes and would not extend beyond those. But, having been a member of this House for some 20 years and having seen the manner in which those undertakings are routinely shredded, I do not have any faith in that statement whatsoever. When such measures are proposed, I think we have to look at how they will actually be implemented—not on the undertakings initially given, but on a reasonable prediction of the demands and expectations of the law enforcement community and those Commonwealth and state agencies that believe they have a legitimate interest in accessing that information. In this area we have already seen information that was promised to be restricted in the narrowest of terms now being made available in wide terms.

It is a lesson that those of us who have had membership in this House for a long period need to convey to newer members, to warn them that there is this experience, to warn them that assurances given in the course of one parliament do not necessarily adhere to the commitments of the government in the next parliament. Indeed, sometimes they do not adhere within the life of a single parliament. But, in this instance, they certainly did not last across the lives of two parliaments.

I understand why these measures are put in place, and I do not want to dwell exclusively on those particular measures. A number of other matters, particularly the e-visa scheme, have been put in place and there are convenient arrangements that apply to New Zealand which have immediate and strong support from the opposition. This is really a tidying up exercise. There are some odd provisions in the legislation. If you go to the regulations and look at the brief prepared for the parliament by the Parliamentary Library, you discover a very interesting regulation about special purpose visas which, essentially, are visas that you get automatically, without the need to apply. They extend to various classes of people who come in and out of the country, without the requirement of preclearance. But, if you look at the actual list, under regulation 2.40, ‘persons having a prescribed status for a special purpose visa’, you will see it lumps together a quite extraordinary range of people, including members of the royal family, who, in some way, are in the same grouping as members of the crew of ships being imported into Australia and airline positioning crew members and—

Gary Hardgrave (Moreton, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I’m an egalitarian.

Duncan Kerr (Denison, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The member for Moreton says he is an egalitarian. Well, bring on the republic, Comrade, and I will be with you, Son. An interesting provision is that members of the royal family are dealt with as having a prescribed status for a special purpose visa, notwithstanding the constitutionally anomalous position of our head of state.

I am content to support the remarks of the shadow minister. He has welcomed this legislation. I think nine-tenths of it deserves that welcome; I am prepared to let the other one-tenth pass into law without objection given that, from a law enforcement perspective, I do understand the rationale for it. But I do express great concern about the way in which this parliament is repeatedly abused by undertakings that are given to it—promises that new, intrusive forms of surveillance will be applied only in particular areas—and which are trashed so routinely, so quickly and with so little regard for any excuse. There is no explanation, no rationale, no reason why an event that is said to have caused considerable difficulty in the law enforcement environment was not dealt with quickly in the same parliament, with an apology for a failure of prescience to plan for that. We are just simply given the legislation and told that there is a crisis that we as parliamentarians need to respond to quickly. When we inquire a little, the only reason we are told that it was not brought forward earlier is that the government could not get priority to have the bill drafted in three years. It could not get a draftsman to have a look at the legislation in three years. That is not a priority, in my view.

What seems to be common to this and other instances which I have experienced as a member of this House is this pattern of abuse of the House and abuse of the chambers, where we are given undertakings and then they are breached without any reason being advanced for the breach and, given those previous undertakings, without even the slightest word of recognition of the seriousness of the step that has been taken.

As we increase the volume of our statute book, as we increase the degree to which those living in Australia are subject to surveillance, subject to the possibility of intrusive actions by law enforcement personnel, we forget those undertakings too readily. It is so easy to say, ‘We will never extend this in this area,’ and then come back a few years later and say, ‘This has caused a great problem.’ Often the members of the House who passed the legislation in the first place can be expected to have forgotten the commitments that were given by the previous government. So, piece by piece, thread by thread, we lose some of the understandings of the importance of individual entitlement that used to be taken as bedrock rights that we as citizens held in common. And piece by piece, thread by thread, we build a new maze of regulatory environments, regulatory obligations, a capacity for exchange of intrusive information across law enforcement agencies and departments of state. Then we cover all this with commitments that are given lip service to for freedom of information and privacy protection, which extend to areas where governments do not have any great interest but, in reality, which are flouted in areas where the citizen seeks to enforce their rights. So, in areas, for example, of freedom of information you can access your own personal information—on your Centrelink file, for example—but, if you try to get some information about government policy and the government objects to its provision, it is refused and it is made difficult and expensive.

If you look at other areas where privacy rights are an entitlement, you see that a number of quite stringent provisions are imposed on the private sector but that government exchange of information of this kind is facilitated. We do not have a significant debate about the terms of that facilitation, and we certainly do not have any acknowledgement that it is in breach of commitments that were given publicly to the community and to this House to explain why we are pressed into a circumstance in which we are told that there is now urgency, when the plain fact is that the government acted with no urgency.

The government did not immediately recognise that it had given an undertaking that was too extensive and did not come back to the House. That would have been the honourable thing to do. Instead, it says that it identified this problem three years ago but has had a problem finding the drafters to fix it. That is not a situation of any urgency, as I see it, and it certainly does not explain why we are told that this now creates a problem of such weight that we do not have an effective explanation for that delay. With those remarks, I will close my speech and invite the honourable member for Moreton, who is tapping his hand impatiently, waiting for his turn, to make an important contribution to the debate.

Gary Hardgrave (Moreton, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am impatient only to offer admiration for the honesty of the ambition of the learned gentleman from Denison! I would remind the House and the three or four people suffering over dinner, listening to the parliament tonight, that the awkwardness of reality defeats the ambition. I take up some parts of the theme of the closing comments of the learned gentleman and put the case that my grave concern is that too much executive power is in fact developed away from those accountable to this place. This parliament is the place where all authority of government conduct should be afforded. My grave concern is that over the last 20 or perhaps 30 years we have seen too much yielding—although to many fine people within the professional Public Service—to people from whom we then try to gain the information, as the member for Denison has rightly pointed out.

So I thank the honourable gentleman for reminding us of the ambition of proper accountability and, I dare say, consistency in our conduct in the development of public policy. But staying one step ahead of those who seem determined always to thwart all of our attempts to administer well for the law-abiding—the role of criminals and others who seek to pervert every ambition we have for good conduct in society—is a very real challenge in the world today. We are tonight again dealing with further amendments to our Migration Act and with the integrity of that act. We are tonight again further underscoring the importance of all of those passing through our migration system, even those on a temporary visit to Australia, doing so in such a way that all of us who live in this country are confident they are here for the right reasons, that they are good people and that they are indeed who they say they are.

I suspect that the two matters contained within the Migration Amendment (Border Integrity) Bill 2006, which seeks to strengthen Australia’s border integrity, could be summarised in a way that says they are about common sense—that is, to deal with the special purpose visa. Currently, when a decision is made regarding the revoking of the special purpose visa, it is current until midnight on the day on which that decision has taken effect. In other words, you end up with a circumstance where someone whose visa we may seek to revoke still has that visa under the law until some hours after that revocation takes place. That is a nonsense in itself, and this bill seeks to ensure that a timely circumstance is attached to any decision to revoke that visa. That is very important for those who may be in receipt of the special purpose visa.

The member for Denison outlined who some of those people might be. That circumstance might apply to crew members of non-military ships, aircraft crew, guests of the government and people who come here for participation in events such as the Commonwealth Games or other great international events, such as the swimming titles taking place in Melbourne at the moment. As it stands currently, anybody who may have been afforded a special purpose visa would, if it were to be taken from them, still have that visa until midnight on the day of that decision. In this timely and very exacting world in which we live, that is a nonsense that we are, through these measures, dealing with.

This bill will also amend the Migration Act to allow for choice. So we will have common sense and choice. We will be allowing for an automated border processing system, which people can opt to use, known as SmartGate. Citizens holding an e-passport or selected noncitizens arriving and departing from Australia will be able to clear migration processes by having their identity and their visa or Australian citizenship status verified by an automated computer system, the SmartGate system. They can, of course, still opt to front the Customs officials who do all the front-line processing for the Department of Immigration and Citizenship at airports and seaports all around this country. But they also—and this is particularly good for Australian citizens, I suspect—have the option of going down the SmartGate path. In that regard, the items before us are very important, as indeed are all of the matters this government brings to this place for discussion and for disclosure to the people of Australia.

As a representative of one of the most culturally diverse electorates in Australia—there are probably 20 or 30 that are more culturally diverse than mine but in the state of Queensland I am No. 1 in that distinction—I think this integrity aspect of our migration process is absolutely vital. There is no doubt about it in my mind. It is important to look back on some of the other measures that we have taken when it comes to establishing the integrity of those who have migrated to this country. This side has been involved in a nation-building exercise when it comes to migration, and those opposite have been very soft on these integrity issues. I will give some examples of that claim.

Back in the early nineties there was a genuine failure by the Labor Party in government to deal with these sorts of issues. At a time when law enforcement and border protection should have been boosted, the Hawke and Keating governments cut staff numbers in Customs by more than 1,000 between 1990-91 and 1994-95. This seriously undermined the ability of Customs officers, who are the people who do the processing on behalf of Immigration, to ensure the integrity of our borders. The Labor government’s bad economic management—the recession we had to have—saw the needs of our law enforcement agencies being unfulfilled, leaving Australia a soft target for transnational crime syndicates, organised crime and people smugglers. This has been a blight on Australia’s borders in years past, but because of the decisive approach that this government has taken to the nation-building exercise of migration and to the protection of the integrity of every person who passes through this country, people-smuggling operations have been thwarted by our very coordinated, forward-looking and flexible approach to border security.

Those opposite have had several dollars each way—I will update the two bob each way analogy. It has taken me a few years to come back and talk about this, because I have been a member of the dreaded executive, around on the blue carpet, for the last five or six years. I will never forget being confronted, at the time of the border protection bill’s introduction in August 2001, with Nazi slogans being uttered by people like the member for Grayndler, who said, ‘Sieg Heil’—and it is in the Hansard, and I invite people to see it. It is offensive terminology; he should have been thrown out that day. The Speaker of the day, Mr Andrews, apologised to me afterwards.

At the time I was in favour of that border protection integrity measure for one reason: because of the cultural diversity in my electorate I did not want any one of those faces from other places—the people new to Australia in particular, people who had come out of Africa, the Middle East and countries which could be typecast by others in society—to be under any doubt that their status was being enhanced by everything this government was doing. That is what our border integrity measures have always been about.

On one occasion, the then Leader of the Opposition, the member for Brand, said in the Hansard, on 29 August:

... this country and this parliament do not need a carping opposition; what they actually need is an opposition that understands the difficult circumstance in which the government finds itself ...

That referred to the arrival of the Tampa on the national agenda. But within the space of a few hours, the Left had locked him into a completely different position and Mr Beazley made a spectacular backflip and said that the opposition would not support the Border Protection Bill 2001. He completely confirmed in the minds of Australians that, with the flip-flop and uncertainty in the face of crisis, there could not be a consistent decision and it would be the sort of style he would bring if he were elected at the 2001 federal election. It was proof positive to the people of Australia that the government’s claims about his ability to make a tough decision when it had to be made were true.

I simply remind the House of these things because the Australian Labor Party, if given a chance at administering Australia, would not be able to make the decisions that need to be made. Their concept of a coastguard or ‘coastguide’, as I know the foreign minister always refers to it, would be a disaster. It would see Australian taxpayer resources meeting unauthorised arrivals in Australian waters and showing them the way to port, the way in. It would see an end to the very real and successful process of the so-called Pacific solution, which has been a demonstrable deterrent to people smugglers. This would be a green light for people smugglers to bring people to this country.

The measures we are dealing with tonight are very much about nailing down in an incremental sense another set of steps to enhance the standing of people who pass through our borders. It is about knowing that technology is not necessarily the friend of the law abiding—although it should be—but often the friend of the law breaker. It is about the need for government to keep one step ahead of people such as those organising people-smuggling. I know that the member for Kalgoorlie would be very aware of the monstrous north-west coastline of fantastic, productive lands with a great tidal power of possibilities that is also so open a flank for those who want to prey on our good nature and good fortune as a country, drive people ashore in unseaworthy boats and risk the lives of women and children on some promise of better times in this great land of milk and honey.

Tonight we are further enforcing and taking the opportunity to protect our borders, our national security. We are about building on our already strong record of border security. Major expansions in new technology used by Customs, the front line of the immigration process into Australia, and of course the Australian Federal Police, have meant that we are able to more efficiently process passengers. We are able to assist in the detection and prevention of terrorism and serious crime. We are able to map all of those who are coming into this country—and all of those who are going out—with the certainty that I think everyday Australians would demand of us.

We are able to take action to shield the people of this country from developing trends in criminal activity in areas such as identity fraud. When my electorate office at Moorooka was broken into a few years ago, one of the greatest concerns I had was that my old passports had been taken. Heaven knows if anybody would ever want to claim to be me—I wish they would pay a few of my bills—but I make the point that identity fraud is now so easy for those in the criminal world to prosecute against any one of us who are law-abiding citizens. If we are not careful, we may be innocent lambs taken to this identity fraud slaughter. SmartGate processing, involving further biometrics and allowing people to have a passport with those biometrics, ensures that we are able to guarantee the integrity of the system.

As much as I agree with the ambition of the member for Denison that we stop legislating and we say, ‘Enough is enough; what is true today will be true for the next five years,’ there can be absolutely no guarantee that we will not have to be back here again in six months time legislating in a way that further enhances integrity measures and that further underscores our ambition to provide certainty, security and dignity in the migration process. There can be absolutely no guarantees about that because the criminals are not cooperating. They are not ringing us up and saying, ‘Look, there’s a moratorium; we’ll be right for the next year or two.’ It does not work like that. As I said, I admire the ambition of the member for Denison, but the shock of reality must have surely set in by now.

We are also taking action to shield the people of Australia from developing criminal trends such as the manufacture of synthetic illicit drugs and money laundering. I was with the member for Denison on committee work six or seven years ago when I saw the superb work that is being done by Australian authorities regarding money laundering. The process of ensuring that people passing through our borders meet our expectations is absolutely important in that particular part of international criminal detection. If we are able to map the movements of people with the certainty that we want—and we will be able to enhance that through this legislation—then we are able to take away the proceeds of crime and map the movement of criminal activity by identifying those who are coming into and going out of this country.

We have now developed one of the toughest aviation security systems in the world to protect Australians and overseas travellers. I recently returned from a constituent visit to Taiwan—I have the largest constituency of Taiwanese-born people of anyone in this parliament—where I was talking with constituents. I found it interesting that, hopping on the China Airlines flight, they were talking about the security at Taipei airport but they said, ‘When you get to Australia, it is going to be even tighter again.’ Everything that is brought into this country is further screened and mapped so we know what materials are being brought into Australia.

This bill adds to that combined interdiction effort by the AFP, Customs and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship to ensure that Australians of all background and beliefs and of all experiences and lengths of time in this country—whether they have been here for a year or 10 generations—can be confident that everybody new who comes to this country is coming on the terms and conditions we outline. I am very pleased to see the government maintaining its determination to enhance our border integrity, because when it comes to migration we are involved in a nation-building exercise.

I note that the Minister for Small Business and Tourism is in the chamber. She is a great minister and is doing a great job. She would be very pleased to know that the number of arrivals and departures at Australian international airports is forecast to increase by up to 23 per cent by 2009. The measures in this bill we are debating tonight will ensure that people have a choice to either front the Customs officer working for Immigration or make use of the SmartGate e-passport concept. Either way, I am sure that the minister for tourism would want to make sure that not only everyone visiting Australia is doing so on the proper visa and that they leave before that visa is up but also their first experience in Australia—customs halls all around this country—is such a positive one that their reaction stays with them for their entire trip and that they tell all their friends. A lot more than the tens of millions of dollars already generated by international tourism to this country is coming our way.

I congratulate the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. I understand that the frustration of getting these things drafted in the time that suits the member for Denison is now a matter of public record. I hope that the member for Warringah, the Leader of the House, was listening to the debate and that he will ensure that further resources are given to the parliamentary draftspeople. They do a great job. As long as people in the executive can feed them the right information the first time, they will get it drafted and drafted well. I commend this bill to the House.

Warren Snowdon (Lingiari, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Northern Australia and Indigenous Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Firstly, let me acknowledge the contribution of the member for Moreton. He touched on a whole range of matters that I intend to come to myself: border protection, protecting our national security, the Pacific solution and the Tampa. He did not mention ‘children overboard’, although he might as well have—but I will come to those issues a little later.

I welcome the opportunity to speak on the Migration Amendment (Border Integrity) Bill 2006, which aims to improve Australia’s border integrity by implementing two measures. The first is in relation to special purpose visas, and it gives the minister the power to make a declaration that a person is undesirable and that he wishes to revoke the automatic visa. I noted the contribution of the member for Denison in relation to that discussion, where he referred to the category of people—including the members of the royal family, as I recall—and it is an extensive list.

Labor will be supporting these measures, the second of which is the rollout of SmartGate series 1, allowing anyone holding an eligible passport—that is, an e-passport—to use this facility, although I note that there have been some concerns expressed about the efficacy of the SmartGate system. I note that in his contribution the shadow spokesman talked about the question of the efficacy and reliability of the technology. He observed that an article in the Financial Review of 5 September noted that industry insiders have identified gaps in biometrics such as excessive error rates, a poor ability to find database matches and high sensitivity to various conditions. The article referred to the work of an analyst at the White House Office of Science and Technology who has estimated that the accuracy rate for facial scanning is 90 per cent. For fingerprints it is 99 per cent and for iris scanning it is 97 per cent.

Dr Roger Clarke, a visiting fellow of the Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology at the Australian National University, questioned the effectiveness of the SmartGate system on ABC radio, in its PM program on 5 May last year. Dr Clarke stated that he believed the SmartGate system would face difficulties because it is built on the assumption that a person’s face will always appear the same, when in reality that is rarely the case. He said:

The angle of a person’s head, the distance of the person’s head from the camera has got to be completely consistent with the angle from which the original photograph was taken that you’re trying to compare it to.

He observed:

... this is a very challenging thing to do, especially when you’re trying to do it in volume, with large numbers of people passing along. And that’s assuming that the person isn’t actively trying to confuse the machine.

He made what sounded like an amusing aside when responding to the interviewer, who said:

Even if they weren’t trying, things like smiling, laughing, what does that do?

Roger Clarke observed:

Well, it’s quite likely that it will confuse—

and he laughed—

the device.

Of course, we hope that is not the case, but we do observe that concerns have been expressed about the efficacy of what is being proposed.

The question is how we deal with people seeking asylum who may be coming to Australia or others who may breach our border security and what happens to them. I note that the title of this legislation refers to border integrity. The question was writ large in 2001 with ‘children overboard’ and Tampa, and what followed from that were decisions that were taken by this government which related specifically to my electorate. You would know, Mr Deputy Speaker, that my electorate, the seat of Lingiari, includes all of the Northern Territory except Darwin, all of its coastline and all of its waters, as well as Christmas and Cocos islands. That is important, because many of the decisions that have been taken by this government in the name of border protection have directly affected the communities of Christmas and Cocos islands. Both have been the site of reception facilities for illegal immigrants or people seeking to come to Australia who have been caught on the high seas in most instances, but not all. They have been transferred to Christmas and Cocos islands.

There used to be a temporary facility on Cocos Island which was used to house people who had been detained. It was an old quarantine station and it was not an unreasonable place to stay, I might say. I am sure people were reasonably comfortable. It was close to the beach and they were allowed to go fishing. It was not 12-foot wide, and there were no electrified fences. There were none of the sorts of security measures—razor wire et cetera—that currently exist in the new facilities. Indeed, on one particular occasion, the detainees wandered down the street in a protest. Of course, there was nowhere to go; they could not get off the island. It was a fairly moot point as to who they were protesting to, because I believe that most people on the island would probably have been fairly sympathetic to the cause.

It will be recalled that when people came onto Christmas Island—and the Tampa was the obvious case—they were housed in the gymnasium. Discussion with the community led to the building of a temporary facility which was opened in September 2001; it is still in existence. This building was used to provide accommodation for the expected surge of unauthorised boat arrivals. It was mothballed in late July 2005 and then reopened in November 2005 to hold seven Indonesian asylum seekers. These seven—four men, one woman and two infants—landed at Honeymoon Beach near Kalumburu, on the far north coast of Western Australia. The men had waded ashore to ask for directions. They were then picked up by HMAS Geraldton, delivered to Darwin and subsequently flown to Christmas Island.

What we have now is a new facility which is designed to house 800 people. It is a purpose-designed facility which will open, as I understand it, in the middle of this year, in June or July. It is unlikely to have anyone in it, which is a major cause of some concern and, I would have thought, of Australian taxpayers’ interest—although of course the community of Christmas Island welcomed the investment in the economy. But as a public policy initiative it raises some significant questions, given decisions which have been taken by this government in recent days.

In May 2006, the figure being reported for the construction of this new facility was $210 million. This was subsequently revised upwards to $267.7 million, and last month in Senate estimates it was made clear that the cost blow-out was now $396 million—a blow-out of 40 per cent of the original cost estimates. With all the other attendant infrastructure which was being built along with this facility and which was required in the community, it is clear now that the government’s investment is probably well over $400 million.

I recall the discussion which went on when the then minister for territories, Mr Tuckey, and the then minister for immigration, the current Attorney-General, visited Christmas Island—and I went with them—to talk to people about the development of this facility and all of the benefits that this was going to bring to the community. We know that there were significant benefits which came to some people eventually, over time. Some businesses had invested large amounts of money but, because of delays in the project, they were left out of pocket. Subsequently, though, although the major contractor was a Queensland based company, Baulderstone Hornibrook, and it employed staff who largely came from the mainland, there were a number of people who secured employment on the site and a number of small businesses which benefited directly as a result of this massive investment.

But it leaves open the question: what is it that the government proposes to do with this facility? In recent times, the 43 Papuan refugees who arrived on the north coast of Australia—from memory, in the Torres Strait—were then transferred over to Christmas Island. I met these people on Christmas Island at the interim facility. They were subsequently admitted as refugees to our country. But the government then took the decision, under pressure from the Indonesian government, that we would not accept this sort of occasion lightly in the future, and since then any asylum seekers who have made it to the mainland have been whisked off to Nauru, out of the view of the Australian people and outside the operation of Australian migration law. If they are not at Nauru then, of course, there is always Manus, which has been mothballed. We are told that the cost of maintaining the operation at Nauru is $24 million a year and the cost of maintaining Manus in a mothballed state is $3 million a year.

This facility on Christmas Island, I might say, is extremely sophisticated. It is the highest security detention centre ever built in Australia. In the words of Pamela Curr, of the Asylum Seekers Resource Centre, published in the Age on 25 November 2006:

There is no maximum-security prison (in Australia) that has electric fences, microwave probes, cameras with microphones in every room, electric doors and a direct link to the control room in Canberra ...

What does it sound like—Guantanamo? We are not sure what is going to happen if in fact this facility is ever used. What happens to families in this situation? Clearly you would hope that children and families would not be held in this detention facility, but that has not been made clear to us.

We know that the facility is 24 kilometres away from the major centre of the community. We know also that, according to the immigration department website, as of the ninth of this month there are 458 people being held in immigration detention centres: Villawood, Maribyrnong, Perth, Baxter, Christmas Island and the Northern IDC in Darwin. There were—there are no longer—in the Christmas Island facility 84 people, including 83 Sri Lankans. We know that these Sri Lankans have now been transported across to Nauru, although the government was reportedly having secret talks with officials in Jakarta to send these asylum seekers back home via Indonesia.

I certainly accept the need for us to secure our borders and to have strong border protection, but there is a very open question about the merits or otherwise of the Pacific solution—the idea that we can transfer people, at great cost to the Australian taxpayer, across to the small island of Nauru. There will inevitably be problems. How can you describe the lack of humanity in the case of Muhammad Faisal, who spent years in protection in Nauru? He fled Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2001 and was incarcerated in the facility in Nauru after being assessed as a security threat by ASIO. It was only earlier this year that he was released after ASIO reviewed its initial assessment. As the Sydney Morning Herald said:

... Australia has tried to act tough and has ended up just looking mean.

When we talk about how to deal with these issues into the future, there is an open question, and I know it is a question that is on the minds of the people on Christmas Island: what is the government’s intention in relation to that facility? If the government is intent on ensuring that no-one who comes to Australia’s shores is actually processed in Australia—apart from the cursory processing that took place on Christmas Island, such as identity checks, health checks et cetera—but is flown across the Pacific, at whose cost is that to be? And what, then, is the purpose of the facility on Christmas Island? How much will it cost to transfer the 83 Sri Lankans? A plane to transfer eight Burmese asylum seekers from Christmas Island to Nauru cost $225,000. For the 2005-06 financial year, the cost of charter flights to relocate asylum seekers was $4.9 million, almost $5 million.

If the government is not going to use the facility on Christmas Island for the purpose for which it was supposedly built, what will it be used for? And what will the cost be of maintaining this facility in a mothball situation over time? If it costs $3 million to maintain a mothball facility on Manus Island, what is it going to cost the Australian taxpayer to maintain the facility on Christmas Island? I am happy that people on Christmas Island will benefit from the employment which will be created, one would hope, from the maintenance of the facility—and there will be high maintenance. But, like me, the Christmas Island community want to know what the government’s intention is with this facility in the short term, the medium term and the long term. The government has a responsibility to tell us how it proposes to deal with it. One thing is for certain: the community of Christmas Island do not want their island to be seen as the Alcatraz of the Indian Ocean. They would like to see tourism as an option currently and into the future. The government is keen on border security, and I ask it to tell us what it is going to do with Christmas Island.

Alan Cadman (Mitchell, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The fact is that the Australian people trust the current government with immigration and border management. They do not trust the Australian Labor Party, and that is the fact of the matter. I think the attitudes of the Australian Labor Party have been demonstrated here tonight. They are not quite sure whether this is the right measure. They want to qualify it; they want to vary things in a way that would basically start to unpick the strong border regime that the current government has put in place.

The Australian people gladly welcome refugees and temporary residents of all types. We have a very open and welcoming community. We have generous-hearted people, and nowhere are they more generous hearted than in Tasmania, where they took stacks of refugees in, in difficult circumstances, and welcomed them. But that generosity is dependent upon being certain that it is being offered to people who are in genuine need. The goodwill of the Australian people can only be maintained, endorsed and encouraged if they are certain that those to whom they are offering support and assistance are in genuine need—that they have suffered from difficult circumstances and that they genuinely need help.

We are not talking about refugee programs or boat people tonight. What we are talking about is: how do we manage our increasing immigration and the traffic flow of travellers through Australia—basically on temporary visas? Of course, the immigration program itself has to have a high degree of integrity, and the processes undertaken to examine the background and circumstances of an intending permanent resident are very thorough. They go to police checks and Interpol checks to determine whether there are damaging factors known about a person who is applying for Australian permanent residency—whether someone has conducted themselves as a criminal or whether there are factors that would deny them permanent residency—so that those factors are known or can be ruled out.

We have to be diligent with people who are coming here temporarily. People coming to Australia on a temporary basis have to be identified. We have to keep out those who should not come, we have to keep ahead of the smugglers who would sneak people into Australia and we have to make sure that the gangs and criminal elements who want to abuse Australian hospitality do not take advantage of an open system. The period of the previous Labor government was the period during which the triads gained entry to Australia. That was because there was a slack system. It is nice to be nice to people, but you have to be sensible as well as generous. That is what this legislation, the Migration Amendment (Border Integrity) Bill 2006, is about. It is about being sensible.

Here are just a few statistics about the visitor visa applications for Australia: there were 2.7 million tourist visas with electronic travel authorities last year, there were 13,900 sponsored family visitors and there were about half a million tourists or visitors with non-electronic authority. So we are looking at well over three million people on tourist visas each year. Add to that about 180,000 business visitors and almost 200,000 business visitors with non-electronic travel authority, and you are looking at four million wanting temporary access to Australia. It is a large number of transactions to process, and it is a large number of whom we need to be certain, because at the other end of the scale we have to look at those who do not go home when they should. We do not want to run that risk with people who want to abuse Australian hospitality—who overstay for good or for bad reasons.

We need to look at the following countries. These are the countries from which overstayers are most likely to come. I am going to read these out, because the Australian people need to know. They are well known; they are published by the department of immigration. The highest proportion of those who do not return are from Samoa, followed by Poland, Tonga, Turkey, Kiribati, Romania, Cyprus, Kenya, Belgium and Cambodia. Those are people who tend not to go back when they come here as visitors. Those who are the best visitors, who are most likely to return to their country, are from these countries, and I will read the best performers first: top of the list is Kuwait, followed by Japan, Mexico, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, Argentina, Thailand and South Africa. Those countries have great records of returning. The other ones, which I read previously, have not got a good record.

So we have to identify those people who are at risk. One of the best ways of identifying whether people are fair dinkum or not is the way the Customs officer or the immigration officer looks at them as they come in through the front gate. We have all been through the airport. The passport is handed over; the officer looks at the passport, looks at that photograph and asks, ‘Is this who is in front of me?’ They scrutinise you, then read what is on the passport and verify that you can gain entry. So they check the veracity of the visa you are travelling on, the quality of the passport and then the personal identification.

This front gate assessment is just part of a whole system which includes the advanced passenger processing, which is the identification of the person when they apply to come to Australia, whether it be through an electronic travel authority or not. It is a way in which the passenger is assessed by the airline as being a suitable person to travel to Australia. So there is the prior notification. Then there is the universal visa for all noncitizens entering Australia, including those transiting Australia. That is another way. The issue of that visa and the person applying for the visa saying their age and name and identifying themselves to Australian authorities is another check. We are dealing tonight with the check that happens at the border coming in, where a person is scrutinised and their travel documents assessed, and where it is decided whether or not they should gain entry to Australia. It verifies as far as possible that all noncitizens arriving have valid visas.

That is the process. What we are looking at tonight is the way that can be implemented. The Australian Labor Party is not too keen on this sort of thing, but it is going to back this legislation. I am pleased it is, because what is added to a smart passport—an e-passport—is the biometric dimension, which means that instead of having an officer scrutinising you as you enter you are going to have a camera which, with the use of biometrics, is going to be able to pretty nearly identify whether the person presenting is the person whose photograph is on the passport and whose information is contained in a microchip within the passport. That is the simple system that we are adopting tonight. It is technically sophisticated; it is supposed to be one of the best and safest systems in the world.

But then again there is discussion about whether the biometrically enabled passport, as it is called, is able to provide all the measures and protections that we would require. This process has gone through a fair bit of testing. First it was tried with Qantas crews, who were volunteers. How good was it with them? It was very good indeed. Then it was tried in Melbourne with a whole bunch—a hundred-odd thousand people who volunteered—of frequent flyers. And it worked out very well with them too. So it has been adopted universally, and that is what we are legislating tonight. It is something that has been trialled and has been effective and that enhances the current system, adds to the process and allows us to process the more than four million people coming to Australia on a temporary basis every year.

So we are legislating for the use of the SmartGate, which is dependent on having an eligible passport, an electronic travel document. It is also dependent on that document containing the appropriate information. The microchip within the e-passport, embedded in the centre page, contains the digitised facial image and personal details of the passport holder. The microchip can be read electronically and will enable the implementation of cutting-edge facial recognition technology. That is the way it is going to work. So the facial recognition factors are there together with other details about the person seeking to gain entry.

It is said that the advantages of this type of passport are very significant. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on their website say that the e-passport:

• provides greater protection against fraudulent misuse and tampering

People do fiddle with their passports and try to change the photograph, the name, the date or things like that. One only has to talk to Customs officers to realise that this sort of thing goes on all the time. Some of it is very crude but some is very sophisticated. There is no doubt about it: the more sophisticated the crime and the more money involved in a criminal activity, the more likely there is to be fraudulent abuse of and tampering with passports. So this protects against this process. As a previous speaker, my friend Gary Hardgrave, the member for Moreton, said, this is about staying one step ahead of the criminals. It is a smart thing to do to be ahead of the criminals. That is why this is called SmartGate.

Foreign Affairs and Trade also say that this reduces the risk of identity fraud, where somebody is stealing somebody else’s identity, which is currently estimated to cost the Australian economy about $1 billion a year. I know that with particular ethnic groups it has been difficult for Australia to become accustomed to facial identification. I know that they have trouble identifying the differences between people of a European background. I will not get too specific, but I have seen biometrics in use and it is possible in fact through the use of biometrics to look at people who are related and pick out similarities between related people where a normal individual would not be able to see an immediately recognisable similarity between people—for example, choosing brothers and cousins, or uncles and nephews. Under this system, age differences vanish and differences of gender vanish and it is easy to form links between family groups when they are travelling. So fraud, which currently costs us about $1 billion a year, and identify theft are reasons why we should be introducing this measure.

This measure also enhances the protection of Australia’s borders through speedy and more secure verification of incoming passport holders, particularly those passport holders who hold Australian passports—whether they are bodgie passport holders, whether they are genuine passport holders or whether there has been some abuse of a passport system to allow them to gain access to an Australian passport. All of those three measures—protection against fraudulent use, protection against identity theft, and speedier and more secure verification—are tremendous advantages for moving the huge number of people who are coming through Australia each year. Australia is one of the most desired destinations in the world, and we must not forget that it is a precious thing we have and we need to protect it. We do not need people taking advantage of our generosity and our kindness, whether they be pseudo refugees, asylum seekers or others.

The Australian e-passport has also been tested in Los Angeles at the airport there. It is compliant with the US provisions. So we have a capacity to use biometrics on people as they arrive in Australia using an e-passport, and the Australian e-passport is a useful travel document and one that is valued around the world. It has been extensively tested and fits in in a harmonious fashion with the systems being used elsewhere in the world. This legislation has an application for special purpose visas. There is a narrow application for special purpose visas and special category visas. The use of biometric technology and the new Australian e-passport and the use of SmartGate are the crux of what has been happening and what I am speaking about tonight.

When the minister was introducing this legislation, he said:

The proposal to use automated systems in immigration clearance marks an important strengthening of Australia’s border control measures.

Mr Robb went on:

At present, the immigration clearance process at the border is performed manually by the primary line officers. However, extensive trialling of the automated border processing system presently in use at Sydney and Melbourne airports, the SmartGate system, has proven the viability of using facial recognition and new passport technology at the border.

So, when we come to look at the automated processing time, it is not possible to further decrease the amount of time of the current manual system without having some sort of impact on the integrity of the border processing function. So if we were to stick with a manual system and we wanted to go faster, we would diminish the security that we require. Our border agencies, which have taken up SmartGate, are happy with it. So we can maintain that level of integrity and also make sure that we can move passengers quickly. The aim of SmartGate is to enhance border security and improve passenger flow—and it will have that effect. The role of appearance at the gate has been questioned by some in authority. There have been questions about whether the system adopted by Customs is the most appropriate system for Australia to adopt. That debate has flowed backwards and forwards. I have heard both sides of that argument, and time will tell.

I only hope that Customs is not sticking to a particular system regardless of criticism because there is so much personal capital invested in the decision that has been made. I know that the biometric system is good. I trust that we in Australia will have the best type of biometric system available in the world and that it will produce the results that we expect it to produce.

The Australian Labor Party has made mistakes over time. Mr Beazley, for instance, was absolutely opposed to some of the border protection measures that we have adopted. I am pleased that the Australian Labor Party has chosen—in a grudging sort of way—to support this legislation. It will enhance immigration management. In particular, it will assist with the management of those four million temporary visas that are issued each year to people who come and visit Australia and who should leave again. That includes working holiday makers.

I have great pleasure in supporting this legislation. I want to compliment the government for the creative way in which a problem has been handled and for the way in which we have been able to work with other related nations to establish an international system in which their passports and our passports are interchangeable—the e-passport concept. The electronic travel authority is more in use. With safer security measures, the secure movement of people in a rapid manner—which is conducive to them—is advanced by this legislation.

Brendan O'Connor (Gorton, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Industrial Relations) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to comment on the Migration Amendment (Border Integrity) Bill 2006. I listened to the member opposite talk about the virtues of this proposed piece of legislation. There are indeed provisions that are acceptable and reasonable, however late they are and however long it has taken the government to put them before the parliament. The opposition sees some merit in these particular provisions, but we have questioned—quite rightly—not only the delay but some of the issues that go to the new technology that is being proposed. Particularly when we are talking about national security, it is very important that when we consider using technology to improve our security the technology is foolproof and watertight and will not allow any breaches to occur or any deliberate intrusions to occur by people who would like to obviate that security. The bill has been delayed and, while we understand that there have been some excuses to do with drafting, in the end, if we are going to lay the blame at the feet of somebody, it will ultimately have to be laid at the feet of the minister.

The two main provisions of the bill—namely the effort to redesign the special purpose visa regime in order to facilitate the lawful travel and entry of low-risk groups of travellers and the proposition to enhance identity verification at Australia’s immigration clearance points and to streamline processing—are matters that should be before this House and that should be debated. We want to have a secure and efficient process for entrance to and egress from this country. We should not have needless delays for visitors or people returning to this country. It is clear that there needs to be attention drawn to unnecessary delay. More importantly, we should have the best technology, complementing our specialised and experienced immigration security staff, strengthening the border. That can be done by various means.

The proposed act before us introduces biometric technology. The bill amends and introduces provisions to allow citizens and noncitizens to use an automated system in immigration clearance. Certain past legislative developments enable the operation of the current bill, which allows persons who are citizens or noncitizens to use an automated system when entering or leaving Australia. The purpose of the former act was to remove legal obstacles to the use of electronic transactions. It ensures that transactions are not invalid merely because they take place by means of an electronic form of communication. The act provides a framework to facilitate the use of electronic transactions, to promote business and community confidence in such transactions and to enable business and the community to use electronic communications in their dealings with government.

There has been some support for the introduction of this biometric technology. The use of the so-called SmartGate is dependent upon having an eligible passport—in other words, the e-passport. The bill refers to the fact that whether a passport is eligible will be determined by proposed new section 175A. The use of those automotive systems by travellers will rely on the e-passport. While we would argue that the consideration of this technology is not only sensible but ultimately necessary, there has been criticism of the SmartGate system in relation to the reliability of technology.

It is important to bring to the attention of the House that, according to certain media reports, industry experts have identified gaps in biometrics such as excessive error rates, a poor ability to find database matches and high sensitivity to varying conditions. Indeed, a senior policy analyst at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy has estimated that the accuracy rate for facial scanning is 90 per cent, for fingerprints it is 99 per cent and for iris scanning it is 97 per cent. So clearly there is a long way to go to perfect the system that would ensure a 100 per cent guarantee that the detection by technology of the person standing before that technology is indeed the person so described on the passport.

I saw only yesterday a program where a photographer was looking not for identical twins but for two people who look almost identical but are not genetically related. He scanned the world to find two people who are so similar as to give them a fright when one was introduced to the other. They are not related, they have never met each other, but they look almost identical, certainly facially. The program that I caught a glimpse of yesterday prompts the question: how confident are we that this system will be foolproof to people who are not the person as outlined on the new e-passport?

Some questions about the reliability and the effectiveness of the SmartGate technology are expected. Dr Roger Clarke, a visiting fellow in the faculty of engineering and information technology at the ANU, commented in a recent interview:

SmartGate is destined to fail because it is built on the assumption that a person’s face will appear the same, when in reality that is rarely the case.

Indeed, he says that it is quite likely that actions like laughing and smiling may confuse the device. I know that we are usually asked not to smile when we are having our photograph taken. For some, that is definitely an improvement. Whether it is an aesthetic improvement or not, the point the academic is making in this respect is that there are ways in which even technology may be confused in terms of whether the photo matches the person. I think that, again, requires close consideration so that we can ensure that the security of our immigration process is watertight.

That is not to say that Labor opposes the proposition. We have to make sure that we use the best technology available. But I would hope that, when this bill is enacted, the government would not think it was advisable for this technology to replace the basic skills, instincts and experience of people who have been staffing our borders and immigration outlets for many years. There is no doubt that it is more than just whether you detect someone digitally on an electronic passport. Clearly, it is more than that. It is therefore something that will complement the skills required of personnel who staff our airports and entry points into this country.

There has been, as I said, a number of concerns raised with respect to the technology. There have not only been concerns expressed by people and academics who are experts in the field. Murray Harrison, the Customs chief information officer, was concerned that the matter was still unsettled—that is, that the technology was still not certain. He declared last year:

SmartGate doesn’t enhance security. It helps flow and efficiency in the limited space available in airports.

Clearly, he does not view the technology as being up to scratch and has made it clear that there are still outstanding concerns.

SmartGate is a form of biometric technology, an automated border processing system that enables travellers with the appropriate eligible passport to move through the passport control. The use of SmartGate is dependent on having an eligible passport—in other words, as I said earlier, an e-passport. The passport has a microchip embedded in the centre page which contains the digitised facial image and personal details of the passport holder. That microchip can be read electronically and will enable the implementation of facial recognition technology.

The process was trialled for a year on Qantas air crew. Again, the results were, I have to say, extremely controversial. For the most part, the only information released about the detail of the trial was contained in the statements by the minister. Roger Clarke, as I referred to earlier, was concerned about that particular process. He went on to say, beyond what I have already quoted him as saying:

The SmartGate pilot is misconceived, it has been misrepresented, and it uses technology that has not been and cannot be effective. Any large-scale implementation of such a system, based on such flawed technology, would be an utter fiasco.

So there you have a visiting professor, who is an expert in the field of engineering and information technology, suggesting that, whilst there has been a trial in place, that trial was not sufficient to guarantee the security of the system. I think we must listen to these experts, who have no vested interest in concerning themselves about this particular matter except the concern about the system failing or otherwise. It does not mean that we abandon the process. What it does mean is that we must be vigilant in ensuring that any bugs in this system are found and any deficiencies are rectified.

There is no doubt that in recent times our tendency to rely on technological solutions to apparent problems is even more pronounced when we feel vulnerable. For whatever reason—and the reasons are quite obvious to some—we in this country and in other countries feel more vulnerable today than perhaps we did a decade ago. You would agree with that, Mr Acting Deputy Speaker. People do feel less certain. There have been acts of violence and acts of atrocity against people in countries that we are close to. Indeed, there have been acts of violence and atrocity against our own citizens in places not too far from our shores.

In such an environment of anxiety—and in the hope that we have found the silver bullet—we should not place too much confidence in technology that has been subject to criticism by people of repute. They are concerned that the technology has insufficient capacity. In the opinion of at least some experts, the pilot that was used to substantiate the view that the system would operate was clearly insufficient. It is very important that the government consider reviewing this area, that it not take the system for granted and assume that it is foolproof or that technology can prevent problems from occurring. It needs to realise that the technology should be improved upon, if it is possible to do so, and that it is a tool to be used to supplement our existing system so that we can provide security for the nation and also a more efficient way of processing people who enter this country.

The bill has been a long time coming, and that has been blamed upon a number of things, including drafting. We understand the reasons for the bill and accept the two main provisions—that is, the amendment provision that goes to special purpose visas and the more substantive provision in support of biometric technology. We caution the government not to rely too heavily on the notion that the technology is infallible; it is clearly not infallible. It may well be state-of-the-art technology but it has not been tried and tested.

I had the good fortune on Friday, as part of a public inquiry, to visit the tower at Canberra airport and to view the technology used by the air traffic controllers to regulate aeroplane traffic in and out of Canberra. The technology is dated—it was built 40 years ago—but it still works, I am happy to say. The tower needs to be rebuilt, and that is being proposed. We certainly accept that objective. The point I would like to make is that, if we are going to replace technology that has been used for many years with new technology, on the face of it, it should be an improvement. There should be a net improvement to the way in which air traffic controllers regulate flight in and out of Canberra as a result of the introduction of new technology. As someone said to me when I was visiting the airport tower: it has had 40 years to find its bugs; it has had 40 years to see what the problems are with that technology. While it needs to be changed, no doubt there will be more bugs in the new system than there are in the old system, which has been there since the 1960s.

By way of comparison, I make the point that there is always an argument for going to a more technologically advanced system, but if it has not been used widely or in a comprehensive way for any length of time then we should expect—although we certainly should not hope—the possibility of some breakdown of, or some deficiencies in, the system. No pilot, like the one being used by the Qantas aircrew staff, will remove the possibility of a new system having some failings.

I warn the government to keep a very close eye on the way in which this system will operate. I say to those who are overseeing the system, the experts in the field: do not rely too heavily on the technology being infallible; rather, be sceptical of it and challenge the system because it might have failings. This will ensure that not only will faults be detected but improvements will be made and, therefore, there will be better security in this country.

Louise Markus (Greenway, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today to speak in support of the Migration Amendment (Border Integrity) Bill 2006, which will amend the Migration Act 1958. The purpose of the bill is to strengthen Australia’s border integrity. The importance of ensuring that our borders are secure, and also the safety of Australians and visitors to this country, is on the minds of all of us. The bill does two things: firstly, it enables the introduction of automated border processing by using a system referred to as SmartGate; secondly, it amends the Migration Act to allow a declaration which ceases a special purpose visa to take effect at a time specified in the declaration.

I will first cover the introduction of SmartGate and e-passports. This will make clearance through immigration much more streamlined—currently around 5. 5 million visitors arrive each year through our borders—and will aid combating identity fraud. In this day and age, what is important to every person who is travelling is that their own identity is protected. By 2009, it is anticipated international arrivals and departures will increase by up to 23 per cent—that is, almost 6.8 million people who will enter and depart our borders. That amounts to a daily average of around 18,500 people who will require immigration processing. Of course, 18,500 people on a daily basis amounts to many queues and the need for many Immigration officers. Each of those people need to be correctly identified and obviously, legally, require authorisation to enter Australia.

The aim of the SmartGate system is to enable holders of prescribed e-passsports to have their identity verified by an automated system without the need for a clearance officer to be present. Prescribed e-passports will be available not only to Australian citizens but also to citizens from countries which also have the e-passport system in place, such as the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States as well as to selected New Zealand citizens, who will be able to have their special category visa granted automatically. Such eligible passports will contain embedded information stored on a microchip, which can then be accessed by the SmartGate system. I emphasise that this data is temporarily stored in the SmartGate system to process the relevant passenger information—such as the passenger’s name, their country of origin, their arrival or departure details—and then the information is destroyed. SmartGate does not store any personal information collected from the passport. This will certainly assure people that their privacy is protected.

This amending legislation will give eligible e-passport holders the opportunity to be cleared by an automated system, which will speed up the clearance time, rather than having to be cleared by an appointed officer. This automated system will of course reduce queues for not only international tourists but also tourists returning home to Australia and will make their return trip to Australia, or first experience of Australia, a lot more pleasant. And, from a security point of view, it will reduce the number of potentially fraudulent passports. So it will make it a lot easier for people who are re-entering or entering Australia whilst, at the same time, protect people’s identity and reduce the potential for fraud.

The microchip which forms part of the e-passport will contain information that is currently found on our passports such as a photograph, name, gender, date of birth, nationality, passport number and the expiry date. Anyone who holds an e-passport will be able to approach SmartGate, where their face will be checked using biometric technology, which will perform a face-to-passport check which will verify their identity. Once verified, the passenger will then move on to the next stage of immigration processing. The passport details scanned through the SmartGate system will have been forwarded to Customs, as well as to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship border systems, which verify the passport and visa details, and the person can continue with the process such as clearing Customs.

If for any reason a person cannot be immigration cleared or their special category visa cannot be granted, SmartGate will refer the person to a clearance officer for manual processing. This will be particularly critical in the early stages. I remind those opposite that this will be a voluntary alternative. If a person wishes, they can choose to go through the immigration process manually and have an immigration clearance officer process them as required.

The Howard government here offers choice whilst not jeopardising our border security, unlike the opposition which between 1990 and 1991, and 1994 and 1995, actually cut the number of staff employed by Customs by over a thousand and which undermined the vital work preformed by Customs to protect our borders. This decision and action by the opposition, the then Labor government, jeopardised our border security. By contrast, the Howard government is absolutely committed to prioritising the protection of our borders and the people of Australia.

The second part of the bill, which I support, amends those provisions relating to the special purpose visa and is provided for in section 33 of the Migration Act. This will allow for specified persons, or members of specified classes, to be taken to hold a temporary visa. The special purpose visa applies to people such as airline crew, the crew of non-military ships, guests of government and participants of events such as the Commonwealth Games. If it is believed a person should not travel to or remain in Australia and they are holding a special purpose visa, a declaration under section 33(9) of the Migration Act can be made and the visa can cease. This is often the case when a crew member from a foreign ship may be considered at risk of deserting a vessel in Australia or may have a character, national security or health concern.

Currently, provisions of the Migration Act mean that the special purpose visa remains in place until the end of the day when the declaration is made. This in effect means, for example, that if a person is classified as a desertion risk at 9 am, the special purpose visa will not necessarily cease and the person cannot be detained until after midnight. It is self-evident that this person may then be free to desert, and then it becomes extremely challenging to find and identify them. This is certainly unacceptable and undesirable. We want border integrity that will protect the people of Australia from people who wish to desert for whatever reason, where they may be a threat to our security and where people may be engaged in criminal activity or have the potential to traffic in drugs.

How can we prevent this from happening when, legally, we cannot detain the person until the next day? That is why this bill is important and I support it. The amendments will mean that the special purpose visa will cease at the time specified in the declaration and officials will be able to detain the person immediately. The Howard government, like all Australians, wants our borders protected. It is because of strong economic management that the Howard government is able to protect our borders and invest in this state-of-the-art technology. I commend the amendments put forward to the House in this legislation. I fully support these amendments, as they are in the best interests our national security, our border protection and everyone who lives here and who travels to Australia. Again, it is important to note that the Howard government’s priority is to protect our borders.

Barry Haase (Kalgoorlie, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise tonight, albeit for a shortened period of time, to support the Migration Amendment (Border Integrity) Bill 2006. Australia has the world’s most comprehensive entry system, basing its success on a multilayered approach. Our government takes the safety of this country and its citizens very seriously. We have funded major expansions in new technology used by Customs and the Australian Federal Police to increase border protection measures. Funding has also been put towards more efficient passenger processing and terrorism and serious crime detection and prevention.

We have taken action to shield the people of Australia from developing criminal trends such as identity fraud, the manufacture of synthetic illicit drugs and money laundering. We have developed one of the world’s toughest aviation security systems to protect Australians and overseas travellers. One example is the universal visa system for all noncitizens entering Australia, including transiting passengers. Another is the system of visa verification by airlines prior to a flight’s departure to Australia.

At this point, I think it is important to remind the House of the opposition’s track record on border security—it is nothing to be proud of. During their time in office, Labor’s bad economic management meant that the funding needs of our law enforcement agencies were unfulfilled, leaving Australia a soft target for transnational criminal syndicates and organised crime. At a time when federal law enforcement and border protection should have been boosted, Labor cut staff numbers in Customs by more than 1,000 personnel between 1990-91 and 1994-95.

This move seriously undermined the ability of Customs to do its vital work in protecting our borders. There were quarantine breaches, and exotic diseases came to Australia. The worst example of Labor’s border security policy—or lack of one—is from August 2001, when the Border Protection Bill 2001 was introduced. Initially, Labor supported it, saying:

... this country and this parliament do not need a carping opposition; what they actually need is an opposition that understands the difficult circumstances in which the government finds itself ...

Then, a few hours later, the former leader, Mr Beazley, announced the opposition would not support the Border Protection Bill.

I realise I am giving the House a history lesson, but border security must be treated as the important issue that it is. Protecting this country and its people from unauthorised arrivals and deterring would-be people smugglers for the sake of their victims are too important to play politics with. I am proud of the work that this government has done and will continue to do to keep Australia safe. I know it is important to the Australian people, because my constituents have voiced their views on numerous occasions about what we are doing to protect our borders, and they are extremely positive with their support.

The Australian government’s tough stance on border security is benefiting the federal electorate of Kalgoorlie in two specific ways. The first is the hard line we have taken on the issue of illegal fishing incursions off the north coast. This has been a significant problem to the communities along the northern coastline in my electorate, in addition to the financial impact on the commercial fishing industry. In last year’s budget $388.9 million was allocated to combat illegal foreign fishing in northern Australian waters. That new funding brought the Australian government’s total commitment to fighting illegal fishing to more than half a billion dollars.

I had been pushing for that funding, explaining to the minister and my colleagues how detrimental illegal fishing is to our northern waters and the communities that rely on fishing. The funding has been put towards improved detection and surveillance. Money has been used to upgrade the processing facility in Broome and for disposal of illegal boats, in addition to our policy of destruction of vessels at sea. Civilian charter vessels have been funded to tow apprehended illegal foreign fishing vessels to shore in the case of vessels unsuited to sinking at sea. Local Indigenous groups have been engaged to help monitor the coastline and any landings of illegal fishers. There is increased officer training and equipment money to address the risks associated with boarding foreign fishing vessels.

On top of the funding, the Australian government has been working with Indonesia to discourage illegal fishing at its source. Additional officers from Customs, the Australian Federal Police and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry have been working with their Indonesian counterparts to discourage the fishermen from setting out for Australian waters in the first place.

An expanded border protection command unit controls and coordinates all activities for civil maritime security. There were 40 per cent fewer sightings of illegal fisherman in 2006 compared to 2005, even though we funded an increase in surveillance flights. For the first two months of this year, sightings were down by 68 per cent compared to the first two months in 2006. Those figures are supported by those on the ground, by the two leading fishing groups. Firstly, Rob Lowden, chair of the Northern Shark Industry Association, wrote to the Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation, the Hon. Senator Abetz, on 16 November 2006 saying:

Our association would like to thank the Minister and the Howard Government for allocating the resources to tackle the Indonesian poaching problem in our northern waters. Our members have advised that they have not seen any Indonesian fishermen over the last two months. This is great news.

In an interview with the ABC on 26 February this year, the chairman of the Kimberley Professional Fishermen’s Association, Bob Masters, said that the government’s strategy appears to be working. He said:

I wouldn’t say it’s all sorted. I would say we’re definitely going in the right direction, it will be all sorted when we don’t have any incursions into our waters or any theft of our fish resources.

We will continue working on this problem until it is solved and we will continue to strengthen Australia’s borders to keep our country secure.

The second direct effect on the electorate of Kalgoorlie is the letting of the Port Hedland detention centre. The centre has been mothballed since 2004; it has been on standby in case of illegal arrivals and the need to accommodate them in a secure environment. Because we have been so successful in reducing the arrival of unauthorised boat people, with the Howard government’s strong and successful border policy, the centre is not required in the immediate future for detainees. I am very pleased to tell the House that it will now be let as temporary accommodation for workers in the Hedland area.

The reason for this is that the state Labor government in Western Australia has failed to meet its responsibility to provide low-cost housing for the people of the Pilbara. There is a severe shortage of available accommodation and rents are out of control, with prices rivalling those in Sydney. The centre can house up to 400 single people and will make a considerable difference to the accommodation crisis in the area.

I have spoken to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship about the issue over a long period, and in February he ordered an urgent review of the facility. That review has now been completed and the report concluded that there is no immediate need for the centre to remain available for illegal immigrants because we have being doing the job and presenting a tough barrier to those would-be people smugglers. I thank the minister for making this decision, as the housing situation in Hedland is desperate.

These are both excellent examples of how this government’s border security policy is working, but more can be done. The Migration Amendment (Border Integrity) Bill 2006 proposes to amend the Migration Act 1958 by adding two measures which will further strengthen Australia’s borders. The first is a declaration ceasing a special purpose visa and the second is the introduction of an automated border processing strategy. The special purpose visas allow for specified persons, or members of specified classes, to be taken to hold a temporary visa. For example, special purpose visas apply to crew members of non-military ships, airline crew, government guests and participants of events such as the Commonwealth Games.

The minister can cease a special purpose visa by making a declaration under section (33)(9) of the Migration Act that it is undesirable that the person, or a class of persons, travel to, or remain in, Australia. Most commonly, this power is used when a foreign sea crew member may be considered at risk of deserting a vessel in Australia or where there is a character, national security or health concern about the person.

Where such a declaration is made, the current provisions of the Migration Act state that the special purpose visa remains in effect until the end of that day on which the declaration is made. This is an anomaly in the visa regime; no other type of visa remains in effect until the end of the day on which it is ceased. As a consequence, the person cannot be lawfully detained until the end of that day, even if that person poses some threat to the Australian community. This is of particular concern where, for example, a master of a vessel has reported a crew desertion.

In such circumstances, Department of Immigration and Citizenship officers would usually cease that person’s special purpose visa and commence processes to locate the person. However, if the person is found on the day their special purpose visa is ceased, the officer cannot detain the person until midnight of that day—a ludicrous situation. The Australian Government Solicitor has advised that the common-law principles of natural justice should be applied in relation to declarations made to cease a special purpose visa.

The second amendment relates to the introduction of an automated border processing system. Immigration clearance is the process that regulates the entry of people into Australia. It ensures that those persons who enter have authority to do so, are who they claim to be and that they provide other information if required to do so.

There are new technologies available which will retain the quality of border control but automate systems to make the process quicker and easier. At present, the immigration clearance process at the border is performed manually. It is impossible to cut the manual process time any further without comprising the system’s integrity. Border agencies had to look at other alternatives, and the automated system called SmartGate is one of the strategies to be used in the medium to long term. SmartGate is the process by which the insertion of a chip within the passport document held by a passenger will allow the passenger to process themselves electronically, without the presence of an immigration officer. The detail contained within the chip will reveal all.

Debate interrupted.