Mr Tony Burke (Watson, Australian Labor Party, Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

by leave—On Thursday, 12 June 2008, I tabled the report of the equine influenza inquiry, conducted by the Hon. Ian Callinan AC, and released a detailed government response. Today I am providing the House with further details about the report, the government’s response and its implementation. The commissioner was appointed by the previous government in September last year to investigate the outbreak of equine influenza. He was asked to report on the circumstances contributing to the outbreak of the disease and the need for any strengthened biosecurity procedures for the quarantine management of imported horses. I thank Commissioner Callinan for his report and for the extensive work in undertaking this inquiry and reporting to me earlier than the due date. The inquiry was completed over seven months with 44 days of hearings, 260 witnesses, 80,000 documents and 41 formal submissions. In response, Commissioner Callinan submitted a comprehensive report of over 345 pages and made 38 recommendations. The government has agreed to every single one of these recommendations. The report contains substantial criticisms of the quarantine and biosecurity systems operating in relation to horse imports prior to the outbreak of equine influenza in August 2007. In his report, Commissioner Callinan said:

What I describe bespeaks an organisation that lacked clear lines of communication between those responsible for formulating procedures and work instructions and those responsible for implementing them.

The report also refers to ‘systemic failures’, ‘inadequacies and breakdowns’ and being ‘understaffed’. In examining these failures, the commissioner says that ‘inertia, inefficiency, lack of diligence, incompetence and distraction by unproductive bureaucratic processes all played a part’.

This report is a scathing assessment of Australia’s quarantine and biosecurity arrangements for horse imports prior to August 2007. These matters must be addressed as a matter of urgency—and they will be addressed. We must drive cultural change in our quarantine and biosecurity systems so that Australians can have confidence in them. My priority is to address each of the failures identified in the report and to restore public confidence in our quarantine and biosecurity systems.

While Commissioner Callinan was unable to make a precise finding as to how equine influenza escaped into the general horse population, he concluded that the virus ‘probably’ came into Australia on 8 August 2007 via horses from Japan. He has further found that the most likely explanation for the virus’s escape from infected horses at Eastern Creek is that it did so by means of a contaminated person or equipment leaving the quarantine station. He has also indicated that the contaminated person or equipment is most likely to have been associated with the care of the horses while in quarantine. The commissioner accepted that private vets, grooms, farriers and their employers must take some responsibility for the failure in quarantine. The commissioner says:

Their failure to decontaminate themselves and their equipment contributed to the probable means of the virus’s escape from Eastern Creek.

In opposition, Labor expressed grave concerns about Australia’s quarantine and biosecurity arrangements; these concerns were well founded. In response to these findings, the commissioner has made detailed recommendations in relation to biosecurity measures at Eastern Creek and a number of other inadequacies in import conditions, pre-export quarantine and post-arrival quarantine.

As a priority, those recommendations that can be implemented immediately are being implemented immediately. For example, a senior officer of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry has been designated as responsible for the importation of horses into Australia. An inspector-general of horse importation will be appointed following legislation establishing the position. In the meantime, an interim inspector will be appointed.

The government will also initiate improvements to a number of operational procedures for the clearance and quarantine of horses. It has been estimated that implementing the recommendations that require immediate attention will cost $1.3 million. To ensure early action, this funding will be provided by the government.

We are also committed to implementing those recommendations which call for further investigative work, including a review of current interim biosecurity policies for horses, followed by a formal import risk analysis. There will also be a reassessment of current import conditions for horses as applied by AQIS and a review of pre-export, airport and quarantine station facilities. In implementing all of these recommendations, the government is consulting with a range of industry sectors, including the racing, breeding and recreational sectors.

To ensure that the government’s response is implemented in full and without delay, the government has appointed Professor Peter Shergold AC, former Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to independently audit the implementation of the government’s response. He will provide regular external assessments to me over the next two years.

Another important part of our response to the inquiry is already well underway. On 19 February this year, I announced a comprehensive, independent review of Australia’s quarantine and biosecurity systems, which is being led by Mr Roger Beale AO. I have asked Mr Beale to have regard to the issues raised by the Callinan inquiry as part of his broader review, but action on Commissioner Callinan’s recommendations specific to horse imports will not be delayed.

The commissioner made no findings on legal liability; I expect that any such matters will be tested in the courts. There have been a number of reports regarding Mr Stephen Hunter and his decision to stand aside from his current role. I want to make clear to the parliament that this was his decision alone. It is worth noting, as Commissioner Callinan does, that he was appointed as Deputy Secretary and Executive Director of AQIS on 10 April 2007, only a few months prior to the outbreak of EI in August 2007. The secretary of my department, Dr Conall O’Connell, accepted his offer to stand aside. I thank Mr Hunter for this difficult decision to help drive cultural change.

Following my request, the Australian Public Service Commissioner has provided a report to the Special Minister of State, Senator John Faulkner, who forwarded it to me in a letter dated 22 June 2008. Ms Lynelle Briggs has provided me with recommendations with respect to the conduct of certain people named in the report, as well as some people who were not named but who held certain positions at relevant times. On 24 June 2008, I forwarded this report to the secretary of my department for his immediate attention. A new animal quarantine branch has been established, led by a senior executive now primarily responsible and accountable for the importation of horses into Australia.

This is also an opportunity to thank the thousands of hard-working, dedicated and valued public servants involved in quarantine and biosecurity right around this nation and the world. From our airports and our seaports to our many islands and remote locations—and the many public servants who work here in Canberra at my department’s headquarters—they perform an important function for all of us. Indeed, wherever there is an interface between Australia and the world, our quarantine and biosecurity officers are there.

These changes outlined today send a clear signal that the reform process has begun, and it will continue. I recognise that the outbreak of equine influenza has had serious economic and social effects. Commissioner Callinan’s report has exposed a critical need to restore public confidence in Australia’s quarantine and biosecurity arrangements. The Rudd government is committed to the task of restoring that public confidence and driving cultural change in Australia’s quarantine and biosecurity systems. There is much more to do, but I am pleased to report that this work has indeed begun.