Scott Morrison (Cook, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Immigration and Citizenship) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Law Enforcement Integrity Legislation Amendment Bill 2012. The purpose of the bill is to amend the Crimes Act 1914, the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002, the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, the Surveillance Devices Act 2004, the Customs Administration Act 1985 as well as the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006. I wish to note at this point that the overwhelming majority of Commonwealth law enforcement officers are honest, hardworking, good Australians who are dedicated to protecting our communities. However, it is a fact that criminals do target law enforcement officers due to the nature of their work, as they often have access to sensitive information.

Corrupt conduct can take many forms, including improper association, conflict of interest, abuse of power, fabrication or destruction of evidence, inappropriate disclosure of information, theft and fraud. Some crimes of corrupt behaviour involve committing a criminal offence. However, other kinds of corruption, while not criminal, may still undermine the integrity of the Commonwealth law enforcement agency an officer works for. The coalition firmly believes there should be zero tolerance for corruption in the public sector and we urge the government to take steps towards eradicating corruption, which undermines the integrity of our agencies and their ability to achieve their missions to protect our communities or our borders and as consistent with the high expectations that our community has in these agencies.

Integrity tests are operations designed to test whether a public official will respond to a simulated or controlled situation in a manner that is illegal or that would contravene an agency's standard of integrity. An example of integrity testing includes leaving valuable goods or money at a simulated crime scene to test whether an official officer steals the item. Often false information is put into a database to catch an officer suspected of unlawfully disclosing information. It is important to note that integrity testing is not entrapment or inducement. Entrapment is where an officer is induced to commit an offence they would not otherwise have committed, whereas the aim of integrity testing is to give an individual clear and equal opportunities to pass a test or fail a test. It has been reassured to the coalition that the tests will be carefully designed and will be carried out in a way which upholds this distinction.

The introduction of integrity testing at the Commonwealth level was recommended by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity on 21 November 2011. In evidence provided to the PJCACLEI inquiry, a number of issues associated with integrity testing were raised, including cost, impact on morale, legal issues such as inducement, and the effectiveness of integrity testing as an integrity measure.

The bill also makes significant changes to ACLEI's jurisdiction. Consequently, increased powers need to be thoroughly examined to ensure any privacy or use and disclosure information issues are addressed appropriately. The Australian Federal Police Association noted in their submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, who is conducting an inquiry into this bill, as follows:

It is commendable that the AFP executive is considering the implementation of an integrity testing regime at a time where there is no known widespread corruption in the organisation. This provides a stark contrast to the oft-cited example of widespread corruption in New York City during the 1980s and 1990s which led Mayor Rudolph Giuliani to commission the Mollen Report. The results of that report led to targeted testing being adopted, and soon thereafter it was consequently in every Australian state jurisdiction including the Northern Territory.

The coalition is off the firm view that for the most part our agencies are not plagued with widespread corruption; however, it is important to ensure that Australia never approaches anything like the levels of corruption seen in New York and other jurisdictions around the world. Eternal vigilance on these matters is what is necessary in our view.

I now turn to the amendments contained within the bill. The amendment contained in schedule 1will introduce targeted integrity testing for staff members of the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Crime Commission and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service suspected of corrupt conduct. It will increase the jurisdiction of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity to include CrimTrac, Austrack and other prescribed staff in the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. The purpose of schedule 2 is to enhance the powers of the CEO of Customs to deal with suspected corrupt conduct and bring those powers into line with powers currently available to the AFP Commissioner and the ACCC CEO.

I wish to expand upon the amendments in schedule 1, which is to introduce integrity testing for Customs. In their submission to the Senate committee, Customs said that, having regard to the significant consequences of Customs and Border Protections role at the border and controlling the import of prohibited items, including weapons and drugs, access to highly sensitive and classified information and working closely with other law enforcement agencies, the consequences of corruption or misconduct in connection with the service's law enforcement role are very serious.

It is a shame that this Labor government has not seen fit to couple this legislation with an increase in funding for Customs to help it perform these integral duties, such as a controlling the import of illicit goods. In the 2008-09 budget, Labor cut $58.1 million in funding for Customs cargo inspections. As a result, Customs has been placed under greater pressure and been asked to do more with less, putting Customs officers at risk of being vulnerable to being used by organised criminal syndicates. This year in March, Customs was unable to detect 220 guns which were smuggled into Sydney through the Sylvania Waters Post Office, which is in my electorate of Cook. New Wales Police Commissioner Andrew Scipione called this alleged smuggling operation perhaps the biggest illegal syndicate doing this type of illegal gun trafficking that Australia has seen. However, this Labor government refused to refer this incident to a specific inquiry into Customs or Australia Post, independent of these organisations. Labor refused to ask itself the hard questions about the effects its damaging budget cuts have had on our border and law enforcement agencies.

How can the Minister for Home Affairs continue to deny that the $58.1 million in funding that Labor stripped from air and sea cargo screening has not contributed to the problems which have been outlined in this place and many others when it comes to goods and other matters being smuggled across our border and into our communities. Air cargo inspections have dropped from 60 per cent under the Howard government to a dismal 8.3 per cent under this government. With these kinds of drastic cuts to cargo screening, illicit drugs and weapons are flowing through with ease onto our streets and into the hands of organised criminal syndicates. The only thing better than an old gun is a new gun.

Customs in their submission to the Senate committee also noted that this measure was formerly referred to as 'loss of confidence'. This terminology has been changed to better reflect the intent of the legislation and provide assurance to workers and the community as to how this power will be implemented. If Labor were serious about the integrity of our borders, they would stop the spin and look to reinstate the damaging funding cuts they have made to Customs and reinstate integrity to our borders. We take issues of corruption very seriously and support efforts to prevent corruption in Commonwealth law enforcement agencies. Corruption and abuse of power not only threatens Australia's national security but also compromises the trust that the community has in their role.

The coalition supports this bill in principle and supports measures to eradicate corruption in the public sector. Due to the nature of the wide-ranging amendments, the Senate committee is currently inquiring into this bill and is not due to report until 20 November 2012. The coalition reserves the right to move amendments in the Senate, pending the recommendations of the Senate committee when it hands down its report.

Luke Simpkins (Cowan, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I welcome the opportunity to make a contribution today on the Law Enforcement Integrity Legislation Amendment Bill 2012. This legislation is of particular interest to me due to my membership of the Parliamentary Joint Committee into the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, or ACLEI, and my background in the Australian Federal Police and also the military police. The purpose of this amendment legislation is to add three new aspects to the act. It introduces targeted integrity testing for staff members of the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Crime Commission and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service Officers suspected of corrupt conduct. It increases the jurisdiction of ACLEI to include CrimTrac, AUSTRAC and prescribed staff of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. Also, it enhances the powers of the CEO of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service to deal with suspected corrupt conduct and to bring those powers into line with the powers currently available to the AFP commissioner and the Australian Crime Commission's CEO.

I have great confidence in the professional standards of the AFP, the Crime Commission and Customs and the ability of ACLEI to control and to be appropriately involved in integrity testing on behalf of and together with those agencies. Given this, I do not think that we have a significant problem in this country but the reality is that where there is information about crime, drugs and government and defence contracts there will always be the opportunity for someone to make money by acquiring that information.

I will start with the integrity testing component of this legislation, which I note was recommended by the parliamentary committee on 21 November 2011. While the majority of Commonwealth law enforcement officers are trustworthy, honest people who take their role of protecting our community seriously, it is a reality that criminals will target law enforcement officers. That is largely due to their access to sensitive information. So there will always be someone who will try to reach out to officers of the Commonwealth to try to subvert them and get them to acquire information for them. Obviously, no-one joins the Public Service or a law enforcement agency such as the AFP with the intention to become wealthy or to seek out opportunities for corruption, but the trouble is there are times when frustration and other pressures might lead somebody to become vulnerable in their employment and it is then that they might be subject to being subverted by criminals.

Corruption can occur in many forms, including improper association, a conflict of interest, abuse of office or power, fabrication of or destruction of evidence, inappropriate disclosure of information, theft and fraud. While not all of these kinds of corruption are illegal, they still have the power to undermine the integrity of the Commonwealth law enforcement agencies and their employees. The definition of integrity testing, according to the Attorney General's Department, is this:

… integrity testing refers to the act of covertly placing an officer in a simulated situation designed to test whether they will respond in a manner that is illegal, unethical or otherwise in contravention of the required standard of integrity. The test must provide the subject with an equal opportunity to pass or fail the test. Depending on its severity, the consequences of failing integrity tests can include disciplinary action, termination of employment or criminal charges.

The joint committee's inquiry received a number of submissions and heard evidence directly from those involved or those who are or will be affected by integrity testing. During hearings, we heard about the classic or baseline integrity test which usually involves a scenario of a lost wallet being handed in to a particular officer and a check to see whether that officer then follows the correct procedures. That is without doubt an example of the baseline of integrity testing. However, throughout the inquiry process the committee truly embraced integrity testing as we moved through our examinations of the Commonwealth law enforcement environment. Employees in this area are exposed to information about criminal matters and a range of other things. Criminal organisations such as bikie gangs would see great value in trying to subvert an officer of the Crown within one of these agencies to try and acquire information from them. It is particularly in the area of information security that integrity testing is going to be required in the future. It is my belief that any person who has the opportunity to access information should, under the right circumstances, have their integrity tested.

The Joint Committee on the ACLEI was very fond of the notion of targeted integrity testing, which is when there is reason to look at a person's behaviour and to place in front of them opportunities to make that positive or negative decision. Targeted integrity testing is certainly what the committee was most keen on.

In evidence provided to the inquiry, a number of issues regarding integrity testing were raised, including the associated cost, the impact on morale, legal issues such as inducement, and the effectiveness of integrity testing as a measure of integrity. In reference to the cost, the introduction of integrity testing and enhanced power for the CEO of Customs to deal with corruption will have no financial impact, as the agencies will meet costs from within their existing budgets. It was proposed that ACLEI be provided with additional funding of $1.5 million over two years to support that expanded jurisdiction.

I reiterate that I have great confidence in the professional standards of the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Crime Commission, and Customs, and in the ability of ACLEI to control and be appropriately involved in integrity testing on behalf of and together with those agencies. I do not think that we have a significant problem in this country, but the reality is that where there is information about crimes, drugs, the government and defence contracts, where there is money to be made, there will always be someone who will try to seek that information and thereby gain financial reward. People will always try to reach out to officers of the Commonwealth to try to subvert them and get them to acquire the information for them. That is why we need to have this integrity measures in place—to make sure that action can be taken when there is suspicion of such actions. Similarly, the coalition firmly believe that there should be zero tolerance of corruption in the public sector and we urge the government to take steps towards eradicating such corruption, which undermines the integrity of our agencies in achieving their missions to protect our communities and our borders.

The coalition support this bill in principle; however, we reserve the right to move amendments in the Senate, pending the recommendations of the Senate committee when they hand down their report.

Chris Hayes (Fowler, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to support the Law Enforcement Integrity Legislation Amendment Bill 2012. As Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement and a member of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, I am very proud that the government has picked up these recommendations that were made unanimously by the committee, as referred to by the member for Cowan. One thing about this committee, at least as long I have been associated with it, is that it has always acted in very much a bipartisan fashion and its recommendations are carefully crafted, as is the case here with regard to strengthening anticorruption and integrity measures within its jurisdiction.

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement's jurisdiction initially covered the National Crime Authority, which became the Australian Crime Commission, and the Australian Federal Police. With the changing pattern of activity, the committee has been of a mind for some time that that should be widened to encompass other jurisdictions that equally have access to either sensitive or specific information about operations that could be affected by serious and organised crime. And that is what the bill does; it responds very positively to those recommendations and enacts them—maybe not in full but certainly enough to satisfy the committee that the government is acting to do something specific to give greater confidence in the integrity of our law enforcement agencies.

Part 1 of the bill enables targeted integrity testing. That is something that I know now exists in state and territory police jurisdictions but to date has been foreign to the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Crime Commission.

After having discussions with the various organisations representing police officers, including the Police Federation of Australia as well as the Australian Federal Police Association, their issue was not about targeted integrity testing; their issue was more associated with, if this was just going to be at random, it could be tantamount to entrapment, et cetera, and also it was a reflection on the level of confidence we had in the officers of those authorities. Each of the organisations representing police officers were in favour of targeted integrity testing because, as they indicated, the thing they value more than anything is the preservation of integrity within their profession

This legislation is not something that contravenes the application of employee rights; it is not something that is seen to be calling into question the integrity of specific officers, other than those who are suspected of acting in such a way that those actions could amount to a criminal charge attracting a sentence of I think it is more than 12 months. This is where the professional standards organisations of the law enforcement bodies already have good reasons to suspect criminal activity is at play, that this would enable senior officers of professional standards sections to go out and target and test the integrity of suspected officers. For those who represent the police profession, this is seen to be a good thing. It is seen to further support the preservation of integrity within law enforcement and also the integrity of all those officers who serve.

There was also a recommendation to expand the jurisdictions that could be subject to ACLEI oversight. Part 2 of the bill deals with that. The recommendation was to extend ACLEI oversight to AUSTRAC, which is the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre; to CrimTrac, which is doing vital criminal mapping as well as computer work which is being used by all states and territories at the moment; and also to Customs and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. These are certainly major changes, and with them obviously there is a change in the work of the Commissioner for Law Enforcement Integrity in respect of his staffing and also the ability to conduct investigations amongst those wider based agencies.

As I say, this measure will extend ACLEI's jurisdiction, which was previously limited only to the AFP, the ACC and Customs. It is designed to extend the reach of ACLEI to those areas where there is what would be regarded as a potential high level of risk by infiltration of organised crime groups and ensuring that ACLEI is in a position to make all possible endeavours to prevent, detect and investigate suspected instances of corruption.

Part 3 of the bill will also make amendments to the Crime Commission Act 2002, the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. Again, these are vital in terms of implementing the integrity testing regime. The variation of the ACC's act will enable them to now have targeted integrity testing within that organisation.

Earlier this year the government took steps to ensure that ACLEI's jurisdiction was extended to Customs and its staff, and this legislation will now extend that much more broadly.

From talking to officers of the AFP, they see this as extending the jurisdiction to all those who naturally fit in what would be considered a law enforcement role. All those organisations which will now, under this bill, be covered by ACLEI undertake, in their own way, law enforcement activity on behalf of the Commonwealth.

Further adjustments will be made to the Customs Act to allow various activities which are similar to what occurs in the AFP and the Australian Crime Commission—that is, to rules relating to drug and alcohol testing of staff. Further, if a police officer is suspected of a serious breach of integrity, clearly there is no point in having the person wait around—retaining access to vital and sensitive information which could corruptly be spirited off to other areas. So in each state and territory jurisdiction there is what is known as a commissioner's confidence arrangement. This arrangement was also extended to the Australian Crime Commission last year in light of certain activities which occurred there. The government considers it appropriate for the CEO of Customs, in ensuring the integrity of his organisation, to have a similar confidence provision. The bill does not do anything to circumvent the normal industrial rights available to a staff member aggrieved by the employer standing them down. But the arrangement ensures the integrity of the operations of these organisations by ensuring that the person can be denied access to sensitive information by the commissioner—or, in this case, the Customs CEO.

As the minister is here, I will conclude by saying, on behalf of the committee, that it is very gratifying the government has acted so swiftly to pick up our recommendations. It shows that this government is concerned to do everything possible to ensure the integrity of our law enforcement agencies.

Jason Clare (Blaxland, Australian Labor Party, Minister for Home Affairs ) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank all members for their contribution to this debate and for their support for this important legislation. As all members have said in their contributions, the overwhelming majority of law enforcement officers are good, honest, hard-working people—but it is a fact that, because of the nature of the work they do, they can be targeted by organised crime. Because this is a fact, we need to ensure that we have the right legislation and the right frameworks in place to identify corruption where it occurs and weed it out—and to prevent it in the first place. That is why I have brought this legislation before the parliament.

The bill contains important amendments to give our law enforcement agencies the power to prevent corruption and the tools and powers to weed it out. It contains three key measures. The first is the introduction of targeted integrity testing of Federal Police, officers of the Crime Commission and officers of the Customs and Border Protection Service who are suspected of corruption. Secondly, it doubles the number of law enforcement agencies covered by ACLEI. Thirdly, it strengthens the powers of the chief executive officer of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service to deal with suspected corruption.

This strengthening of the powers of the CEO of Customs includes three things. The first is the power to authorise drug and alcohol testing. The second is the power to issue orders, including mandatory reporting requirements where staff will be required to report suspected misconduct. The third is the power for the Customs CEO to make an order declaring that the termination of an employee was for serious misconduct. I will expand on that third point just for a moment, because I know there have been some concerns raised about the power and whether an appeal right should exist. This is a power which will not be exercised lightly and will be reserved for the most serious cases of misconduct, corrupt conduct or criminal activity. An advisory panel will be established to consider whether the criteria set out in this legislation for the making of a declaration of serious misconduct has been met.

The panel will then consider and advise the chief executive officer as to whether there is a reasonable basis to terminate employment, and that will include consideration of the following: (1) satisfying itself that the definition of 'serious misconduct' for the purposes of the declaration that has been made; and, (2), if it is having or is likely to have a damaging effect on either the professional self-respect or morale of staff or the reputation of the agency.

Customs and Border Protection Services is continuing to undertake consultation with unions and staff on the administration of this provision. A dismissed employee will be able to seek review of the decision in the Federal Court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. They will also be able to pursue other claims in connection with their employment or their dismissal, such as unlawful discrimination.

As I said in my second reading speech a few weeks ago, this is the first tranche of reforms that I will bring forward. They are the sorts of things that the former government should have done but did not. More work needs to be done to make our law enforcement agencies more corruption resistant, and I am working on those reforms now and will bring them forward when they are finalised. I commend this important legislation to the House.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

Ordered that the bill be reported to the House without amendment.