Andrew Hastie (Canning, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Defence) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

We in this House all know that we are living in a changing world, and with that change have come security challenges. We know that authoritarian powers are on the move, and the last two ASIO directors-general, Duncan Lewis and Mike Burgess, have both said that espionage and foreign interference are occurring in Australia at unprecedented levels. I think that last night ABC's Four Corners, which documented the intelligence activities undertaken by China's Ministry of Public Security, underscored that very point. So it's important that we make sure our legislative framework for our intelligence agencies is fit for purpose. We've got to make sure that our intelligence agencies, our intelligence officers and supporting personnel can do their jobs, on behalf of Australia, to protect us, maintain our security and defend our interests. That means we have to adapt our framework to make sure that it's fit for purpose as we see shifts in threats, technology and modes of statecraft.

That's why the Richardson review was commissioned in 2018, the same year that the former Turnbull government passed landmark, historic espionage and foreign interference legislation. The Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community, also known as the Richardson review, was the most significant review of Australia's intelligence legislation since the Hope royal commissions in 1974 and in 1983. The majority of the National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 3) Bill 2023 deals with the 12 recommendations of the Richardson review, all of which the former coalition government agreed to in 2020, so we support this on a bipartisan basis.

The bill includes additional elements that the current government has identified in consultation with national security agencies. The bill contains a number of provisions to amend the ASIO Act, the Intelligence Services Act, the TIA Act and the Archives Act to support and provide increased oversight of our intelligence agencies. These reforms address those 12 recommendations. Separate to the recommendations, the bill clarifies the operation of existing provisions in the ASIO Act and the Intelligence Services Act and updates the publication offence in the ASIO Act. Very generally—for the Australian public—the measures in this bill will support Australia's national security agencies by strengthening identity protections for employees, particularly against the backdrop of increased espionage and foreign interference in this country; increasing operational flexibility and sharing of information; clarifying some authorities to provide greater certainty for our intelligence agencies; and supporting quicker processing of security clearance suitability assessments. This is actually really important. Our whole national security enterprise, from Defence through to the national intelligence community, is undergoing greater recruitment efforts, and, as people are onboarded into Defence or our intelligence community, they need to have security clearance. So speeding that process up is vital for our national security, particularly when you add in AUKUS and the need for defence industry, which supports AUKUS, to have people who have the highest clearances. This bill will also promote increased oversight of national security agencies by introducing additional safeguards to provide oversight of ASIO's work on security assessments and vetting and by limiting who can exercise certain powers.

We on this side of the House, the coalition, will always support sensible changes to ensure that Australian men and women serving in our intelligence agencies can do their jobs effectively—that they can gather the intelligence, on behalf of us, to keep us safe. That's why they do what they do. We need to ensure that they are subject to appropriate oversight, and that's why we support these amendments. As such, we support the passage of the bill.

Peter Khalil (Wills, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The previous speaker, the member for Canning, is also a member of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, and I thank him and other colleagues for their work on that committee. We did a fair bit of work on this bill when it was referred to the committee, as part of our work in making recommendations to government to always try and improve national security legislation.

I want to say at the outset that this government's primary commitment is to keeping Australians safe and protecting Australians' way of life, and this legislation is part of that effort. It's part of the effort to ensure that we have all the necessary resources and frameworks in place for our intelligence agencies. Of course, many of the elements of this legislation, the National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 3) Bill 2023, flow from the intelligence comprehensive review. The key part of this bill is the enhancement of transparency, and the frameworks for transparency around our intelligence agencies and the work that they do, in what we call the NSLAB. We've done a lot of work in this space to ensure that our intelligence and security agencies have the tools and resources they need to do their job efficiently and effectively. That's been part of the work of the PJCIS in reviewing the bill. We've worked towards finding a bipartisan consensus within the committee to ensure that the bill is passed in the best possible way, which is in the national interest and will get the best possible result for our intelligence agencies. It is about a continual improvement of our national security laws to ensure that our agencies are well equipped to continue their work to keep Australians safe and, as I said, protect our way of life. The introduction of this bill is very much part of that framework.

Last year, the PJCIS released its report in relation to this bill, the NSLAB. As you have heard, Mr Deputy Speaker, the bill covers 12 recommendations of the 2019 Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community. This is actually the third in a series of bills that directly respond to the recommendations of that comprehensive review. As I said, its primary purpose is to ensure our intelligence agencies remain able to undertake their important functions efficiently, effectively and, of course, with the appropriate oversight. In many respects this bill consolidates the secrecy offences in the Intelligence Services Act and creates stronger protection of the identities of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, ASIS, and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, ASIO. That is a central element of the bill.

What I want to emphasise today are the amendments this act creates in relation to part IV of the ASIO Act, which relates to the agency's security assessment functions. These include improvements in the transparency and accountability of our intelligence agencies, a core objective of this bill. The comprehensive review that was released publicly in 2020 was the most significant independent review of Australia's collective intelligence legislation since the Hope royal commissions in 1974 and in 1983. That comprehensive review found that the legislative framework governing our intelligence agencies has been well maintained and largely fit for purpose but that targeted reforms are required to ensure our laws continue to keep pace with the ever-changing technological and security landscape. That has clearly been accelerated, particularly over the last decade and certainly over the last couple of years. The technological advances, the changes and the impacts and implications they have on our intelligence agencies and the work they do are profound, so it's critically important that we deliver these targeted reforms to keep pace with that increasingly complex environment—best described as our symmetric security landscape. That is critical to this bill because of the use of more and more complex technology in various attacks—cyberattacks, cybertargeting and throughout the cybersecurity space—but also more broadly in the way that adversaries tend to use technology in much more sophisticated ways to diminish our democratic institutions and our governance structures.

This bill continues that government reform agenda in response to the comprehensive review, with a very clear line of sight on these challenges. The Albanese Labor government take these reforms extremely seriously and we are intent on implementing them as efficiently as possible. So far, we as a government have enacted a series of targeted amendments to our national security laws to implement the recommendations of the comprehensive review. These include the National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 1) Act 2022, which implemented 12 recommendations, the National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 2) Act 2023, which implemented a further 10 recommendations, and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Modernisation) Act 2023, which implemented two recommendations. With this bill, we will be implementing another 12 outstanding recommendations of the comprehensive review. The bill supports Australia's national security agencies through the implementing of those recommendations with a couple of important elements: strengthening identity protections for those security agencies' employees; improving operational flexibility and the ability of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to communicate information; providing greater certainty as to who can provide authorisations for various activities; and supporting quicker processing of security clearance suitability assessments.

National security legislation inevitably—and, in most cases, importantly—grants security agencies very critical functions that can be quite powerful as they're wielded in the day-to-day operations and investigations that these agencies undertake. That is why it's so important that we are enhancing the transparency and accountability of ASIO's security assessments, because we believe that more checks and balances are actually a good thing. That transparency in the work of our agencies, and those checks and balances, are important elements in our responsibility as a government to ensure that the powers that are being used by those agencies are used in the best possible way.

We as a government are broadening the definition of a prescribed administrative action to include decisions relating to parole, firearms licences and security guard licences. That means any advice provided to a state or Commonwealth body relating to parole, firearms licences and security licences in relation to an individual will now be regarded as a formal security assessment made by ASIO. This, in turn, means that individuals now have expanded rights of review and notification in relation to any advice ASIO gives in relation to the topics I just mentioned. This can sound quite complex, but I want to make this point: the reform just shows and demonstrates how committed the Albanese Labor government is to taking a transparent, accountability based approach to our security arrangements. This is an approach which balances every individual's right of review and transparency with the collective security needs of Australians and of Australia.

We always take a consultative approach when doing this work. I noted earlier the good work of my colleagues on the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. When we were looking at it as a committee, we engaged in a consultative and consensus based way to seek to find answers and recommendations on the bill that could lead us to the best possible result for the national interest and for our national security. We did this in relation to many of the submissions to the PJCIS recommending making and supporting these changes in the bill.

We're also implementing new reporting requirements for ASIO in relation to any security assessments that the agency makes which are overly delayed. Currently, individuals undergoing security assessments by ASIO have no recourse other than complaining to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, the IGIS, if there's an unreasonable delay in receiving their assessment. Our amendments will now require ASIO to notify the IGIS if there is a delay of more than 12 months in finalising a security assessment. A written protocol will be established to specify when ASIO is considered to have started preparing an assessment, the time frame for notifying delayed assessments and the information to be included in notifications. The protocol will also outline steps for ASIO to take after notifying the IGIS about delays. Again, we as a government are proud of the work in furthering the accountability of our highly competent but powerful agencies and making sure that they can do their work most efficiently and effectively. Each of the agencies that would be impacted by these changes supports this change, emphasising the importance of notifying the IGIS about these delays.

Through this legislation, we're also giving ASIO increased powers to introduce new classifications of prescribed administrative action. We know that the security landscape is fast-moving and complex. We know it's moving at such a clip that it's often hard for regulatory and legislative frameworks to keep up the pace. We think that these changes will allow ASIO to become more agile in the way it conducts its security assessments. At the same time, the regulations would grant greater transparency and rights of review to those individuals affected by the assessments. We're trying to get that balance right. Given our robust parliamentary processes via many different parliamentary committees in the House and the Senate, and joint committees like the PJCIS, we think these powers of regulation balance the interests of ASIO to be an agile and strong security agency able to undertake the very important and critical work it does with giving this place, the parliament, sufficient checks and balances over its activities, all while enhancing the agency's accountability and making its processes more transparent for any of its decisions which affect individuals.

Security threats are becoming more and more asymmetric, as I noted earlier. They're becoming more and more complex. They're becoming more and more difficult to combat and to defend against. Last year alone, a cybersecurity incident was reported every six minutes. That's a remarkable statistic. Hostile cyberactivities are driving disinformation, which has destabilising effects on our social cohesion. This is not just at the Commonwealth level but at the state level, where such threats affect state infrastructure and social services. This includes cyberthreats to hospitals that are operated by states. Our healthcare system, our education system, our academia, our democratic institutions and our corporations and their systems and are all subject to significant targeting, cyberthreats and cyberattacks. Attempts to enhance that cybersecurity are critically important.

This bill is just one part of a much bigger piece of legislative work necessary to ensure that we give the tools and the resources particularly to our agencies to ensure that we can defend against these threats that are emanating not just from state actors but also from criminal syndicates and non-state actors. These cyberattacks no longer just compromise military capabilities; they have real whole-of-government and whole-of-population effects—implications for the entire population—so it's essential that state governments are also able to act based on urgent advice provided by ASIO, which is what this act does.

We are continuing to provide all the tools our agencies need to get on with the job. ASIO will now be able to make preliminary communications to state governments or other state based agencies. State based agencies can now act on security advice that is not necessarily a formal security assessment if the agency is satisfied that the action is necessary for security reasons, and that's a significant step. We need to break down those barriers between our different levels of government. We are all seeking to protect our democracy and our democratic institutions, whether they be at the state, local or federal level of government. That requires a much more agile approach, which I'm pleased to say is part of this bill.

Obviously the work we do in the PJCIS—and I note that my deputy chair is here—is critically important. We take it very seriously, because we have a critical and I think sacrosanct obligation to the people we represent across this great country to protect their way of life, to protect our way of life, to protect the democratic institutions, to protect our democracy and to defend against those who would seek to sow discord and division and disrupt those institutions and our society. In the work that we do we don't always agree, but that's part of the democratic process, and I know from all my colleagues on the committee that we always strive to reach consensus on what we think is the best possible result for the national interest and the national security of Australia. That is where, in good faith, everyone steps into those PJCIS meetings and the work that we do. I want to thank the deputy chair and my colleagues on the other side for their contributions.

I will reiterate that the changes that were made in this bill based on the advice provided to us by the comprehensive review are quite an important part of that process. Thank you, Deputy Speaker, for being able to articulate the important work that we've undertaken.

Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank the chair of the PJCIS for his warm and generous remarks about the bipartisan nature we try to strive for on the PJCIS, because he's right. On this I agree with him—that we really do try to leave our political guns at the door when we walk into those meeting rooms, because there is no greater responsibility that anybody has in this place, whether in opposition or in government, than to protect the Australian people and our homeland.

I've had the privilege of being the deputy chair of the PJCIS for two years, and in that time we've undertaken 22 inquiries. I believe we still have nine inquiries underway, although that seems a somewhat small list compared with what we've had in recent times. I chaired many committees when we were in government, and by far this committee has the highest-tempo work rate of any committee I have worked on. That is an indication of the nature of the fast pace at which our intelligence agencies continuously have to operate. That very fast pace means that the committee that oversees our intelligence agencies therefore also has to work at that pace.

In those two years that I've been on the intelligence and security committee I've come to appreciate more than ever the vital role that our intelligence agencies and our intelligence personnel play in protecting Australians and securing their future. On 25 April we as a nation rightly stop to recognise and commemorate our ADF veterans, more than 103,000 of whom paid the ultimate sacrifice. But rarely do we hear about our intelligence agencies and their personnel and the work they do both domestically and internationally to keep us safe. I think it behoves us all to stop, pause and reflect on the sacrifices our intelligence agencies make, as well as our DFAT staff.

I've had the privilege of visiting quite a number of our missions overseas. Let me tell you, they're not all like what you might see in Washington DC or in the movies. Some of the conditions in which our DFAT staff operate are very, very austere and, dare I say, very, very dangerous. We cannot thank those personnel—our foreign intelligence services and our domestic intelligence services—enough. I think it really is important that we don't just recognise our veterans who pull on our military uniforms, but we should be recognising them as well.

This National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 3) Bill 2023 goes some way to supporting our intelligence agencies and their personnel in response to some of the recommendations from the Comprehensive review of the legal framework of the national intelligence community report—which was an absolutely huge body of work that was done by Dennis Richardson. It aims to protect the identities of staff of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, the Australian Signals Directorate and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. It further strengthens Australia's security assessment framework. It addresses issues related to security vetting and security clearance related activities, particularly around the protection of intelligence information and documents, and it delineates clear authorisation processes for certain intelligence activities.

Our intelligence and law enforcement personnel are among the bravest and most patriotic Australians. They put themselves in harm's way to protect Australians and our interests. As I remarked earlier, they apply themselves to challenging and critical work, often in the most dangerous and high-tempo environments. They're linguists, they're translators, they're cryptographers, they're cybersecurity professionals, they'reoperatives, they're operational staff, they're analysts and they're accountants. They're ordinary men and women who love their country and want to safeguard it long into the future.

They are people like James Arnold, whose 34 years in the intelligence field saw him become a subject matter expert in counterterrorism intelligence; like Ellen Grace, Ailsa Hale and Coral Hinds—members of the 'Garage Girls'—who worked with the Australian Women's Army Service and the Central Bureau in Brisbane deciphering and communicating vital intelligence signals in support of Allied forces across the Pacific; and like Dr John Moss, whose three decades of service in financial and criminal intelligence has allowed Commonwealth law enforcement and intelligence agencies to prevent and disrupt the financing of terror, money laundering and serious crime. These five courageous and talented Australians are recent recipients of Australian Intelligence Medals and have been honoured for their distinguished service to the national intelligence community and to the security of our country.

The work of so many of our intelligence personnel goes unnoticed, unrecognised and unreported, and the fact is that the vast bulk of our intelligence agency personnel wouldn't have it any other way. Every day their work goes unreported is another day that Australians have been kept safe from the threats beyond our waters and within our borders. Every day that we enjoy our freedom, democracy and security is a testament to their hard work and their bravery.

When you walk along the beach of Buddina, you can thank our intelligence defence personnel and our first responders. When you swim at the Currimundi Lake, you can thank our intelligence and defence personnel and our first responders. When you bike through Beerwah, meander through Maleny and Montville, and play with the kids at the playground in Palm View, you can thank our intelligence and defence personnel and our first responders. We would not be the safe, strong and secure nation that we are without them. On behalf of the people of Fisher, I want to thank the men and women of the national intelligence community for their continued service to the Commonwealth of Australia. We can never say thank you enough.

This bill aims to improve employment arrangements and associated protections for current and former employees of ASIO, ASIO affiliates, ASIS and the Australian Signals Directorate. The bill will also consolidate several existing secrecy offences as they relate to ASIO, ASIS, the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation and the Defence Intelligence Organisation. Importantly, records which identify ASIO or ASIS agents, employees, affiliates and other operatives will be made exempt under the Archives Act.

It also aims to respond to the rapidly advancing digital and media landscape by modernising the publication offence under the ASIO Act which criminalises the publication of the identity of any current or former ASIO employee or affiliate. At present, the legislation explicitly identifies newspaper, print publications, radio broadcast and television as methods which are outlawed. This amendment will remove those listed publication methods to accommodate shifting digital media and social media platforms. This would make section 92 of the ASIO Act reflective of the changes made to section 41 of the Intelligence Services Act, consistent with the other publication offences related to intelligence offences. By imposing a blanket ban rather than designated methods of publication, the amendment avoids any potential gap arising in the law which could see digital publication or some future method of publication exempted from prosecution.

The legislation will also enable the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Defence to authorise ASIS, ASD and AGO, the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation, to undertake activities relating to an Australian person who is likely to be involved in activities that are likely to be a threat to security before the Attorney-General gives his or her agreement to the authorisation. The authorisation will not take effect until the Attorney-General's agreement has been obtained, however. This comes after recommendation 2 of the comprehensive review, which recommended that the sequencing of steps required in the Intelligence Services Act's ministerial authorisation process be adjusted to enable the responsible minister to authorise a certain intelligence activity. The aim is to streamline ministerial processes to respond to the security threats more quickly. Intelligence must be accountable and agile. A more efficient process, which still meets the requisite checks and balances, is crucial as Australia combats growing threats to our national security and sovereignty, as we saw on Four Corners just last night. The legislation will remove the ability for a junior minister to exercise a power under the ASIO Act or the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act, reflecting the standard practice in authorising intelligence activities.

The legislation also aims to support quicker processing of non-prejudicial security clearance suitability assessments by permitting the Director-General of Security to delegate their power or function to furnish non-prejudicial security clearance suitability assessments. This amendment would maintain that the Director-General of Security could delegate a power or function under section 82D(1) to an ASIO employee or affiliate serving at an executive level or in a more senior role, so long as the application was for a prejudicial security clearance suitability assessment.

The bill then allows the director-general to delegate the power or function for non-prejudicial security clearance suitability assessments to an ASIO employee or affiliate who isn't necessarily in an executive level 1 position. This should allow ASIO to expeditiously complete those non-prejudicial security clearance assessments which have contributed to the significant backlog and delays that we've seen over the last several years. In 2022-23 alone, ASIO finalised 35,055 personnel security assessment referrals. Requiring an executive level officer or someone more senior to approve all of those inquiries only makes that process more complex and time-consuming.

For accountability purposes, the legislation requires that ASIO notify the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security where certain security clearance decisions and security clearance suitability assessments are not made or furnished within 12 months. This is not just a matter of meeting KPIs; it's about ensuring that our workforce across defence, intelligence, security, government and various areas of public administration is not unnecessarily delayed.

All in all, this third tranche of measures in response to the comprehensive review aims to modernise and streamline Australia's national intelligence capabilities. The reality is, of course, that our country has not been in a more challenging and precarious position since the end of World War II. The geopolitical pressures are significant, and they are complex. The aggressive and deep rooted nature of foreign interference, influence and espionage is becoming increasingly apparent, and Australia's ability to respond with defence, security and technological capabilities is simply not where it needs to be.

To that end, I want to acknowledge the remarks of the chair when he talked about the importance of this bill and our whole national intelligence community legislative architecture working in concert with each other to protect and keep safe Australia and our homeland. This is where the government, when it recently announced the National Defence Strategy a couple of weeks ago, is missing the point. I want to send a big shout-out to Senator Jim Molan, who led the charge for a national security strategy, because a national defence strategy is only one aspect of what should be a national security strategy. It's all well and good to have a defence strategy. It's all well and good to have some of the best kit for our ADF personnel. But what we need in this country is an all-encompassing, whole-of-government and, in fact, whole-of-society approach to the security of this nation, and Jim Molan led the charge for that when he was a senator in this place. The late great Senator Molan was an exponent of the importance of a national security strategy, one that encompassed not just government of all three tiers but industry, our critical infrastructure. Every element—communications, defence industry, all elements of our community—needs to be brought together to operate as one under a national security strategy to keep our country safe, and I implore the government to investigate it and implement it.

Luke Gosling (Solomon, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

From the outset, I just want to acknowledge previous speakers—the member for Wills, the chair of the PJCIS; and also the member for Fisher, the deputy chair—for their hard work, as well as fellow members of that committee. I confirm my ongoing admiration for those that are on the front line of our security and intelligence, the members of the national intelligence community, and all others that are working diligently to keep Australia safe and free.

The Albanese government is committed to the continual improvement of our national security laws to ensure our agencies are best equipped to continue their work to do exactly that—to keep Australia safe and to protect our way of life. To ensure these laws are keeping pace with an evolving security landscape, our government is introducing the National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 3) Bill 2023. This bill is the latest in a series of targeted reforms to ensure intelligence agencies remain able to undertake their important work and undertake their functions efficiently, effectively and with appropriate oversight. This bill also addresses 12 of the recommendations of the 2019 Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the NIC, the national intelligence community. The bill supports Australia's national security agencies by: strengthening identity protections for their employees; improving operational flexibility and the ability of ASIO, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, to communicate information; providing greater certainty as to who can provide authorisations for various activities; and supporting quicker processing of security clearance suitability assessments.

The bill also promotes increased oversight, through supporting the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, IGIS, with the oversight of ASIO, by requiring ASIO to provide notifications to IGIS in certain circumstances relating to their security assessment and security clearance activities and making it clear that only the Attorney-General can exercise certain powers. The bill amends a number of pieces of legislation to address operational challenges facing the NIC, the National Intelligence Community, by refining the framework for ASIO security assessments; amending the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 to ensure the efficient and effective operation of ASIO security vetting and clearance related functions; enhancing protections for the identities of ASIO employees, affiliates and agents of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, ASIS, and the Australian Signals Directorate, ASD; and amending authorisation frameworks for certain intelligence activities.

The Australian government is committed to implementing the recommendations of the 2019 comprehensive review, led by Dennis Richardson AC, as quickly as possible, with the bill addressing 12 of these recommendations. The comprehensive review found that the legislative framework governing our intelligence agencies has been well maintained and is largely fit for purpose but that targeted reforms are required to ensure that our laws continue to keep pace with the ever-changing technological and security landscape of the times in which we live. The comprehensive review made a total of 203 recommendations. Given the total number of legislative measures arising out of the government response to that comprehensive review, implementation is being pursued progressively and seriously by our government.

I'm proud to be playing an ongoing role as a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and I take my hat off, again, to the chair and deputy chair in regard to the way in which they're pursuing that important work. Again, I say thank you to all those who are working so diligently, putting their lives on the line, and doing so with at times great sacrifice for their families, in order to keep us a safe and free people under the Southern Cross.

Sam Birrell (Nicholls, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 3) Bill 2023. As has been pointed out by previous speakers, every day and often in the dark of night there are people working to protect Australians. Their work is often secret, unseen and, by a large part of the community, unacknowledged. The first and most important responsibility of any government is to keep Australians safe, and I want to start this address by acknowledging those men and women in the intelligence services who serve the interests of our nation and the safety of all Australians. Your work is appreciated and you are appreciated.

As, I think, the member for Fisher was saying, on Anzac Day we think about those men and women in uniform and the decisive battles that have been won in the name of freedom in the past and the kit, as he put it. We can think of the Spitfire, the frigate, the submarine and all of those sorts of things and of some of the big battles that we talk about. Also, in the history of conflicts such as World War II, we can look back at some of the intelligence victories that weren't acknowledged at the time, because they couldn't be, but were decisive in turning the nature of that conflict towards righteousness and freedom. An example of that is Operation Mincemeat, which I recommend people read about. It's a fascinating story. There was also the cracking of the Enigma code. In recent times there's also been some incredible work by our intelligence services which has resulted in the protection of Australians and the saving of Australian lives, and I want to acknowledge that.

The National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 3) Bill 2023 contains a number of provisions to amend the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, the ASIO Act; the Intelligence Services Act 2001; the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979; and the Archives Act 1983. Those changes support our intelligence agencies by strengthening the protections around the identity of employees, improving the ability of ASIO to communicate information and providing additional protections for individuals by making the communication of certain information a prescribed administrative action. It increases the operational flexibility through updated approval processes for certain activities, and it clarifies the provisions relating to certain intelligence activities and can allow for quicker processing of non-prejudicial security clearance suitability assessments.

A lot of these changes come from the recommendations of the Richardson review. The Richardson review was a comprehensive review of the legal framework of our national intelligence community, commissioned by the former coalition government. Former Secretary of the Department of Defence Dennis Richardson AC released the unclassified version of his report in 2020. In its response, the coalition government agreed with the 12 recommendations that are addressed in this bill, but this bill, I acknowledge, goes further. It includes issues that were not addressed in the Richardson review, and these are clarifying amendments that support the review recommendations. On the face of it they are sensible measures that align with the broad intent of the bill. Any legislation relating to our intelligence services tries to balance the necessary transparency that we have in a democratic system of government with security operations that, by their very nature, are not always transparent. I think this bill does a good job, as previous speakers have said, of trying to ensure that balance.

I'd also like to thank the PJCIS for their work in making some recommendations in relation to this legislation. I think it's very heartening to see that, on an issue such as this, we come into this place and debate issues, as we need to—that's the nature of democracy. When it comes to the security of Australia and how we structure our intelligence arrangements, it is essential that the parties of government in particular work together in the common interest, and I think we saw that with the chair and deputy chair—the member for Wills and the member for Fisher—and the other members of that committee. I'd just emphasise that, whilst crossbench members can make positive contributions to the debate in this country, these critical activities need to be agreed on and worked on by parties of government, because those are the people who are going to be responsible for this at some point. I just make that point.

There are actors in the world who would do us harm. I think it's critically important that we work together as a parliament to make sure that we have arrangements, particularly in relation to intelligence gathering, counterterrorism and all the other important work that goes on within the intelligence communities and the intelligence agencies, that are supported by this place. If we support those who work in those industries, we are supporting our fellow Australian citizens to feel and be safe in a world that is increasingly not safe. On that note, I commend this bill to the House and, again, thank the PJCIS for their work.

Clare O'Neil (Hotham, Australian Labor Party, Minister for Home Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank the member for Nicholls and the other members who have participated in a really constructive debate about the legislation that's before the parliament this afternoon. The National Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 3) Bill 2023 is the latest tranche of legislative amendments implementing recommendations from the 2019 Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community. Additionally, the bill contains other targeted amendments identified as necessary by the intelligence community. The bill introduces amendments that will clarify and enhance the scope of the security assessment framework in part IV of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, strengthen protection for the identities and records containing identity information of certain intelligence personnel, clarify and enhance the authorisation processes for certain intelligence activities, and refine ASIO's functions regarding the security vetting and security clearance related activities.

I want to note that we're having a debate about this bill, which principally relates to the roles and responsibilities of and laws governing ASIO, in the context of what has been a really difficult time for national security in our country, with some recent events that have shocked the community. I want to briefly speak about the role that ASIO in particular has played in protecting the community so well over previous years. Probably not many Australians are aware of the work of this organisation, but ASIO and security organisations within the Commonwealth have assisted in thwarting 22 terrorist attacks that would otherwise have occurred in our country in the last decade. They do that because we've got a really mature system here, a system where state and federal authorities work really well together. The people who work in these amazing organisations are deep, thoughtful people who think a lot about the problems that they face and the manner in which they undertake their work.

Our organisations are excellent, in part because of their ability to change consistently according to the shape and the scope of the threat that they face. This is particularly relevant, because some of the attacks that we've seen over the last little period have actually been quite different to the type of terrorist incident that ASIO and other organisations were focused on, if we roll back, perhaps, for a decade. One of the things that has changed quite dramatically about the shape of our terrorist threat in this country is the way in which people are targeting terrorist attacks today. If we think back to the 9/11 tragedy and the extent of elaborate planning, financing and work that went into setting up that attack, we see something quite different today—for example, in a recent incident in Australia where a teenager used a knife at very short notice allegedly to attack someone violently. Something else that we see that's very challenging for our national security agencies is a much faster time of what they call 'from clash to bang'. What that means is the process that someone goes through from radicalisation, to thinking about violence and then to actually committing an act of violence is getting narrower and narrower. This, of course, creates really significant challenges for our law enforcement officials.

The third thing that I want to mention is the very obvious presentation of young people as part of the issue here. This is a very significant transformation in the way that this problem has presented itself to our country. When I talk to the ASIO staff about some of what they've seen over previous years, they talk about seeing a very significant uptick of young people in the alleged and potential terrorist cohort when we came out of COVID. They say to me that this is about young people who are being removed from their community, who are not doing things like going to school and playing sport but who are, instead, spending inordinate amounts of time on the internet and looking at materials that are a negative influence on those young people. I make this point because I know a lot of parents around the country are looking at this. It's not the only instance which is making parents really worried about the way in which young people in this country are being influenced, the way in which they are being raised and the way that we, as a parliament and as a community, can make sure there are strong, positive influences in the lives of young people around our country. This is something I talk to ASIO staff about a lot. These are security and intelligence professionals, but they will be the first to tell you that by the time a matter lands in the lap of ASIO it's already gone too far. We've got to think much more, as a community and as a parliament, about how we're going to make sure that we intervene as early as possible to make sure that we keep our community safe. There aren't many countries in the world where the intelligence organisations are respected to the degree that they are here in Australia. I want to use this opportunity to thank ASIO and to thank our other security and intelligence agencies, on behalf of the federal parliament.

Returning to the bill: the government accepts recommendation 1 made by the PJCIS. I note that reporting will remain consistent with ASIO's approach to releasing information about its activities through its annual report. This approach balances the need for transparency against the risk of compromising national security through the inclusion of classified appendices which are provided to the Minister for Home Affairs, the Leader of the Opposition, the PJCIS, the IGIS and the INSLM. These are acronyms which govern the protection of the community and the management of intelligence organisations.

The government also accepts recommendation 2, and will ensure that applicants are made aware of their right to make a complaint to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security in relevant documentation and advice about security assessments and security clearance processes.

The government accepts recommendation 3, and has amended the explanatory memorandum accordingly. The Australian Signals Directorate will also report to the committee on its development, implementation and use of cover arrangements.

The government notes recommendation 4, and will consider any recommendations made by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor's review of the secrecy offences in part 5.6 of the Criminal Code, when that review is completed.

Finally, the government welcomes recommendation 5, noting that it is a matter for the parliament. I thank the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills for the work they have done here. The publishing of ASIO identities has a very real prospect of resulting in harm to ASIO staff and affiliates.

Sharon Claydon (Newcastle, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The debate is interrupted in accordance withstanding order 43 and may be resumed at a later hour.