Christine Milne (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Hansard source

I rise today to note the report of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties entitled Agreement between the government of Australia and the government of the People’s Republic of China on the transfer of nuclear material and Agreement between the government of Australia and the government of the People’s Republic of China for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The report deals with the committee’s decision to clear the way for Australian uranium to be sold to China. Today I have heard the government spokesperson on this matter, Senator Trood, saying that the committee determined it was ‘in the best interests of Australia’. I would like to dispute the notion of ‘in the best interests of Australia’. It is clearly in the economic interests of certain uranium mining companies, it is clearly in the interests of China, but there is nothing that has been said that substantiates the notion that it is in the best interests of Australia, except if we have reached the point where economic rationalism is such that the only thing that constitutes ‘in the best interests of Australia’ is an economic return.

This report actually verifies all of the concerns that many people who have worked on nuclear non-proliferation issues for a long time have expressed. The report reached conclusions stating, ‘There needs to be increased funding for the IAEA so that it can do its job.’ That is an acknowledgement of what we have said: the IAEA is not resourced to oversee the inspection of where nuclear facilities will be and where nuclear materials will go to around the world.

Recommendation No. 3 says, ‘The Australian government should lobby the IAEA and the five declared nuclear weapon states to make the safeguarding of all conversion facilities mandatory.’ That is good; I agree with that. But the fact is that, currently, that inspection is not mandatory and it will not be mandatory. As if the Chinese government would take one iota of notice, even if the Australian government decided to raise the matter with the Chinese.

The committee recommends that we should get to a point where we should have a dialogue with the Chinese government about governance and transparency. That is good. Up until now, when has the Howard government raised human rights concerns, transparency and governance with the Chinese government? China does not adhere to most of the agreements it signs. You have only to look at its World Trade Organisation obligations to see that it does not do so.

I find it appalling that the committee, having noted that the IAEA is underfunded and that the inspection of uranium conversion facilities is not mandatory, having noted that Australian uranium, when it arrives in China, will be converted into facilities that are not under the safeguards regime and, having noted that governance and transparency issues are certainly of importance but, more importantly, pointing out that China is not transparent about what it does, it then goes ahead and says, ‘But we approve this uranium deal with China.’ Noting all the inadequacies that people have raised about the safeguards regime, that is what has occurred.

What is appalling is that the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office has not informed the committee as fully as it might have or in as timely a manner as it might have about the Chinese government’s record of nuclear proliferation. We now know that the US government has imposed sanctions on four Chinese firms for supplying Iran with missile related and dual-use nuclear components. We also know that the United States-China Economic and Security Review is seeking broader sanctions against Chinese firms and claims that China has contributed to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Here we have a United States committee actually looking at China’s appalling record of nuclear proliferation, pointing out that China has stolen design information on the United States’ most advanced thermonuclear weapons; that China was responsible for repeated thefts of the most sophisticated US nuclear weapons technology, and that this practice is likely to continue; that China has proliferated such military technology to a number of other countries, including regimes hostile to the US; and, that China’s actions posed a direct threat to the US, its friends and allies. Here we have the US coming to that conclusion and Australia saying, ‘Never mind, we still want the profits from our uranium sales, and we are prepared to overlook all of China’s bad behaviour when it comes to nuclear proliferation.’

In the UN Security Council, fingers are being wagged at Iran. Iran has asked that it be able to have nuclear energy and we have said, ‘No, you can’t have nuclear energy, because you can’t be trusted not to make it into a nuclear weapons program.’ Yet China put it on the record last year that it does not have enough uranium for both its nuclear energy and its weapons program. So, whether Australian uranium which ends up in a conversion facility in China, not inspected by the IAEA, goes directly to the weapons program or to the domestic program—allowing domestic uranium to be displaced to the weapons program—Australia will be fuelling the nuclear fuel cycle and it will be fuelling China’s weapons program. It will be doing so with the full knowledge that China’s governance is in a state of significant lack of transparency, that there are human rights abuses, as we have heard, and that China has a record of abusing the non-proliferation treaty.

I find this situation appalling. When I was overseas last month I picked up a copy of a newspaper from the British press which pointed out that four other Middle Eastern countries now want nuclear power, including Saudi Arabia. I ask you: who is going to believe that Saudi Arabia wants nuclear energy for electricity purposes? It has said quite clearly, ‘If Iran goes down the nuclear path, we want to go down that path too, because we are not going to have a nuclear weapons state, Iran, on our back door.’ So there is now a huge push for proliferation. The Australian government is going to be backing that by clearing the way for this uranium deal with China. It is not in our best interests; it is certainly not in our security interests. We have no credibility when it comes to talking globally about nuclear non-proliferation, because we are prepared to overlook all of the failings which are documented in this report in order to secure increased sales for BHP Billiton and the other companies interested in exporting uranium. That is what it comes down to. That is a morally bereft position for Australia to take.

Now we find that legislation is about to come into the house—the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill. What is that about? Nobody has been told about that. When we asked for it to be referred to a committee, we were told today that the committee will report on 31 January. All of Australia is on holiday over January. Who is going to know anything about the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill? The government has an obligation to tell us exactly what it is planning with that amendment bill.

I return to taking note of this report, saying that I am absolutely appalled that both the Liberal and Labor parties in Australia are prepared to see China access Australian uranium, with the record that China has of giving this technology to all kinds of states around the world, which jeopardises global security. So much for the promises about keeping Australia safe from terrorism. There is a huge risk here. We have seen the Khan network, we have seen North Korea explode a nuclear bomb and now we have Australia fuelling all of this, with a report in the US saying that China has helped proliferate to North Korea and to Iran.

I think it needs to be clearly on the record that both the Liberal and Labor parties in Australia see Australia’s interests defined as economic interests and that they are prepared to overlook our security interests. If they were serious about supporting non-proliferation and a safeguards agreement, they most certainly would not have approved these treaties until there was a bucket of money given to the IAEA and a bucket of money given to support a safeguards regime that might actually have some capacity to track uranium. As it currently stands, the equivalence regime simply means that all China has to do is demonstrate an equal volume of uranium going somewhere else and it is deemed to be Australian uranium not used in a nuclear weapons program.

It is not good enough. The loopholes are such that you can drive a truck through them. I think this will come back to bite the Australian government, just as Pig Iron Bob’s iron-ore came back in the Second World War.

Question agreed to.