Russell Trood (Queensland, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

On behalf of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, I present report No. 81, Treaties tabled on 8 August 2006 (2). I move:

That the Senate take note of the report.

I seek the opportunity to make a few remarks on the report. Report 81 contained the findings, binding treaty action and additional recommendations of the committee’s review of two treaty actions tabled in parliament on 8 August 2006 relating to China.

The Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Transfer of Nuclear Material creates a nuclear safeguards and physical protection regime for the supply of Australian uranium and its derivatives to China. The second agreement, the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, provides for cooperation on nuclear related matters, including the transfer of nuclear-related material, equipment and technology.

Together, the agreements have the same effect as the provisions contained in Australia’s other nuclear material safeguards agreements. They provide assurances that Australian uranium and its derivatives will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not diverted to nuclear weapons or other military purposes. These agreements form part of Australia’s obligations under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards system, which, of course, is aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The agreements allow Australia’s uranium industry to expand its export market while helping China to meet its future energy requirements. The agreements also strengthen the Australia-China relationship and foster continued dialogue with China on nuclear related issues.

The committee received evidence that China is expecting to quadruple its nuclear energy consumption by 2020 and is seeking to secure a long-term source of uranium to satisfy its expanding nuclear energy program. In addition, the Australian uranium industry was interested in exporting uranium to China but was denied access to this export market due to long-standing Australian government policy. This led Australian mining companies, together with Chinese government officials, to approach the Australian government in 2004 to request that the Australian government consider negotiating a bilateral safeguards agreement with China. The treaties reviewed in report 81 were the result of these negotiations.

The short-term impact of the Nuclear Material Transfer Agreement is expected to be an increase the volume of uranium exported from Australia by existing uranium producing companies, agents and agencies. In the medium to long term, the committee found that the impact of the agreements was likely to be an increase in uranium production leading to an expansion of Australia’s uranium industry. However, the committee found that whether Australia’s uranium industry can expand its production is based on commercial decisions by mining companies, and approvals by relevant state, territory, and federal governments.

The committee’s review of these treaty actions focused on whether the treaties are in Australia’s national interest. Accordingly, the committee has concentrated on the main issues arising from the treaties: the impact of the sale of uranium to China, and safeguarding the use of Australian uranium. Where appropriate, the committee has also provided information on issues arising from the indirect impact of the treaty actions, namely environmental and social issues.

The committee received evidence about a number of public concerns relating to the lack of transparency and inadequate governance structures within China as a declared nuclear weapon state. In addition, the weaknesses of the IAEA’s verification and safeguards system were also highlighted.

The committee also received evidence about the negative environmental impact of nuclear energy. Alternative renewable forms of energy production instead of nuclear energy were suggested, as was the use of thorium reactors.

The committee found the treaties reviewed to be in Australia’s national interest. Other recommendations made in report 81 include: the ratification of the treaties; increasing Australia’s monetary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office to improve the safeguards system; lobbying the International Atomic Energy Agency for mandatory safeguarding of conversion facilities in the five declared nuclear weapons states; and continuing dialogue with the Chinese government about governance and transparency issues.

I commend the report to the Senate.

Andrew Bartlett (Queensland, Australian Democrats) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

As a member of the treaties committee I would also like to speak to this report. I have a dissenting report contained in this which I will address in a moment. The treaties committee, as senators would know, is made up of people from both the Senate and the House of Representatives. There are 16 members all told. Apart from me, no other member of the committee dissented from the key recommendations. The key recommendations are that the treaties between the Australian and Chinese governments on the transfer of nuclear material and for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy go ahead. My opposition would not come as a great surprise. For nearly 30 years the Democrats as a party have strongly opposed all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. So exporting uranium and expanding the uranium industry—which would be a likely consequence of these treaties being adopted, as Senator Trood said—is something that we as a party do not support.

I also indicate that this is not just a party line type of view that I have put forward. There are genuine concerns that we have specifically about the sale of uranium to China. Some of them are actually acknowledged—I do not think they are adequately addressed, but at least they are acknowledged—by the majority report. One of the recommendations was that Australia call for an urgent review of the IAEA’s funding requirements, increase our voluntary contributions and encourage other governments to do likewise. Another recommendation was that Australia lobby the International Atomic Energy Agency and the five declared nuclear weapons states to make the safeguarding of all conversion facilities mandatory. Another recommendation was that we increase the funding allocated to the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office’s safeguards support and international outreach programs to ensure that effective safeguards are being applied in regard to the treaties.

All of those suggestions are positive recommendations that have been put forward. I think they also contain within them an inherent recognition that things are not as secure as we like to believe—that the safeguards that are in place are not as strong and not as fully enforced or enforceable as we would like to think. I must say that I was somewhat surprised during the hearings and in looking at some of the evidence provided to the inquiry that it was not as strong as I expected it to be. So whilst I would have an in-principle concern with expanding the uranium industry and expanding nuclear power generation and the potential consequences of all that, I did expect that the nuclear safeguards in place would be stronger than they seem to be from the evidence provided to the committee—and, I would suggest, from some of the commentary contained in the majority report. That to me is a serious concern in regard to not only the specifics of what might happen in China but also the broader problem of non-proliferation in general.

I acknowledge that Senator Trood has been a consistent advocate of expanding uranium production in Australia. He has a different view from the Democrats in regard to that. From memory, I think he has, nonetheless, also spoken about issues to do with the non-proliferation treaty and the progress or otherwise of that. I do think that, whatever we might think about the export of uranium to China, we need to take this opportunity to consider once again just where the world is at with nuclear non-proliferation treaties and the general proliferation of weaponry as a whole.

I am perplexed, I must say. It seems to me that, compared to even 10 years ago, the whole notion of disarmament and pushing for greater disarmament seems to have gone off the boil quite significantly. There seems to be far less global attention being paid to an issue that I think is just as important now as it was then—in fact I think it is more important now than it was then—that is, really moving towards non-proliferation.

It seems like the task of containing the number of nuclear weapons states, with the goal of eventually reducing them and ending up with zero nuclear weapons states, has been almost put to one side and is now seen as unachievable. I do not think we should put this to one side. I recognise that there are problems in how things have developed, not least with countries such as India, Pakistan and Israel, as well as states like Iran and North Korea and what they appear to be trying to do at the moment. There are clearly problems with the approach that the planet has tried to take to nuclear non-proliferation. We need to revisit that and take a look at it. I am not convinced that expanding China’s supply of uranium is going to be a positive contribution in that regard, but either way I think that all of us from all sides need to redouble our efforts on proliferation and look at what we can do on that.

I would also like to emphasise that, as I think senators across the board broadly acknowledge, there are problems with human rights in China. I am not one of those who suggest that we should prohibit all trade with China until they fix up their human rights record or anything absolutist like that. I do not think that would be helpful for anybody. But I do think that, when we are looking at expanding trade in an important and very sensitive commodity like uranium, we cannot just ignore what are without question very serious human rights questions and human rights issues with China. The committee does mention in one of its recommendations that Australia will continue its dialogue with the Chinese government about governance and transparency issues. I realise that does not necessarily go to the whole area of human rights. As evidence to the inquiry did indicate, there are issues with accountability and transparency in China. It is beyond dispute that it is a seriously undemocratic nation, and that always presents extra problems in regard to transparency, accountability and reliability.

I do not think we can sweep those concerns to one side just because there is a good trade opportunity here. There is no doubt that there are many great trade opportunities with China, a lot of money to be made and lots of export dollars. I do not dispute that, and I do not even dismiss it as irrelevant—of course, we need to ensure that we have a prosperous economy. But we cannot use that as a reason to push issues of transparency and accountability, let alone human rights, to one side. I have a concern that we are doing that.

I am somewhat surprised and disappointed that there was not wider opposition on the committee to the adoption of these treaties. It shows that strong momentum is building for expansion of uranium mining and exploitation in Australia. As that debate continues to develop in Australia, we find it is very hard to uncouple that proposal from debates about where nuclear waste goes and about nuclear power generation within Australia. It is hard to just have a bit of the debate and not the whole debate.

Certainly, I have a wider concern that, in what seems to be a growing momentum and push for using uranium and expanding the uranium industry and the nuclear cycle, there will be an attempt to create a sense of inevitability that this should also be considered and expanded in Australia. I do not want to go beyond the scope of this report, which is just about exporting uranium to China, but I would signal that sometimes it is hard to just stop a debate at a certain point. The sense of inevitability that, I think, permeated a lot of the inquiry and permeates this report is one we need to guard against. It is not inevitable; it is not essential that we go down the nuclear path or expand nuclear power generation as part of addressing climate change. I believe the facts stack up quite clearly to show that we can deal with climate change without going down that path. It can be part of it; I do not dispute that, but it does not need to be. That is the position that the Democrats take, and we obviously take it, doubly so, when it comes to any sort of nuclear power generation in Australia.

Christine Milne (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today to note the report of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties entitled Agreement between the government of Australia and the government of the People’s Republic of China on the transfer of nuclear material and Agreement between the government of Australia and the government of the People’s Republic of China for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The report deals with the committee’s decision to clear the way for Australian uranium to be sold to China. Today I have heard the government spokesperson on this matter, Senator Trood, saying that the committee determined it was ‘in the best interests of Australia’. I would like to dispute the notion of ‘in the best interests of Australia’. It is clearly in the economic interests of certain uranium mining companies, it is clearly in the interests of China, but there is nothing that has been said that substantiates the notion that it is in the best interests of Australia, except if we have reached the point where economic rationalism is such that the only thing that constitutes ‘in the best interests of Australia’ is an economic return.

This report actually verifies all of the concerns that many people who have worked on nuclear non-proliferation issues for a long time have expressed. The report reached conclusions stating, ‘There needs to be increased funding for the IAEA so that it can do its job.’ That is an acknowledgement of what we have said: the IAEA is not resourced to oversee the inspection of where nuclear facilities will be and where nuclear materials will go to around the world.

Recommendation No. 3 says, ‘The Australian government should lobby the IAEA and the five declared nuclear weapon states to make the safeguarding of all conversion facilities mandatory.’ That is good; I agree with that. But the fact is that, currently, that inspection is not mandatory and it will not be mandatory. As if the Chinese government would take one iota of notice, even if the Australian government decided to raise the matter with the Chinese.

The committee recommends that we should get to a point where we should have a dialogue with the Chinese government about governance and transparency. That is good. Up until now, when has the Howard government raised human rights concerns, transparency and governance with the Chinese government? China does not adhere to most of the agreements it signs. You have only to look at its World Trade Organisation obligations to see that it does not do so.

I find it appalling that the committee, having noted that the IAEA is underfunded and that the inspection of uranium conversion facilities is not mandatory, having noted that Australian uranium, when it arrives in China, will be converted into facilities that are not under the safeguards regime and, having noted that governance and transparency issues are certainly of importance but, more importantly, pointing out that China is not transparent about what it does, it then goes ahead and says, ‘But we approve this uranium deal with China.’ Noting all the inadequacies that people have raised about the safeguards regime, that is what has occurred.

What is appalling is that the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office has not informed the committee as fully as it might have or in as timely a manner as it might have about the Chinese government’s record of nuclear proliferation. We now know that the US government has imposed sanctions on four Chinese firms for supplying Iran with missile related and dual-use nuclear components. We also know that the United States-China Economic and Security Review is seeking broader sanctions against Chinese firms and claims that China has contributed to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Here we have a United States committee actually looking at China’s appalling record of nuclear proliferation, pointing out that China has stolen design information on the United States’ most advanced thermonuclear weapons; that China was responsible for repeated thefts of the most sophisticated US nuclear weapons technology, and that this practice is likely to continue; that China has proliferated such military technology to a number of other countries, including regimes hostile to the US; and, that China’s actions posed a direct threat to the US, its friends and allies. Here we have the US coming to that conclusion and Australia saying, ‘Never mind, we still want the profits from our uranium sales, and we are prepared to overlook all of China’s bad behaviour when it comes to nuclear proliferation.’

In the UN Security Council, fingers are being wagged at Iran. Iran has asked that it be able to have nuclear energy and we have said, ‘No, you can’t have nuclear energy, because you can’t be trusted not to make it into a nuclear weapons program.’ Yet China put it on the record last year that it does not have enough uranium for both its nuclear energy and its weapons program. So, whether Australian uranium which ends up in a conversion facility in China, not inspected by the IAEA, goes directly to the weapons program or to the domestic program—allowing domestic uranium to be displaced to the weapons program—Australia will be fuelling the nuclear fuel cycle and it will be fuelling China’s weapons program. It will be doing so with the full knowledge that China’s governance is in a state of significant lack of transparency, that there are human rights abuses, as we have heard, and that China has a record of abusing the non-proliferation treaty.

I find this situation appalling. When I was overseas last month I picked up a copy of a newspaper from the British press which pointed out that four other Middle Eastern countries now want nuclear power, including Saudi Arabia. I ask you: who is going to believe that Saudi Arabia wants nuclear energy for electricity purposes? It has said quite clearly, ‘If Iran goes down the nuclear path, we want to go down that path too, because we are not going to have a nuclear weapons state, Iran, on our back door.’ So there is now a huge push for proliferation. The Australian government is going to be backing that by clearing the way for this uranium deal with China. It is not in our best interests; it is certainly not in our security interests. We have no credibility when it comes to talking globally about nuclear non-proliferation, because we are prepared to overlook all of the failings which are documented in this report in order to secure increased sales for BHP Billiton and the other companies interested in exporting uranium. That is what it comes down to. That is a morally bereft position for Australia to take.

Now we find that legislation is about to come into the house—the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill. What is that about? Nobody has been told about that. When we asked for it to be referred to a committee, we were told today that the committee will report on 31 January. All of Australia is on holiday over January. Who is going to know anything about the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Bill? The government has an obligation to tell us exactly what it is planning with that amendment bill.

I return to taking note of this report, saying that I am absolutely appalled that both the Liberal and Labor parties in Australia are prepared to see China access Australian uranium, with the record that China has of giving this technology to all kinds of states around the world, which jeopardises global security. So much for the promises about keeping Australia safe from terrorism. There is a huge risk here. We have seen the Khan network, we have seen North Korea explode a nuclear bomb and now we have Australia fuelling all of this, with a report in the US saying that China has helped proliferate to North Korea and to Iran.

I think it needs to be clearly on the record that both the Liberal and Labor parties in Australia see Australia’s interests defined as economic interests and that they are prepared to overlook our security interests. If they were serious about supporting non-proliferation and a safeguards agreement, they most certainly would not have approved these treaties until there was a bucket of money given to the IAEA and a bucket of money given to support a safeguards regime that might actually have some capacity to track uranium. As it currently stands, the equivalence regime simply means that all China has to do is demonstrate an equal volume of uranium going somewhere else and it is deemed to be Australian uranium not used in a nuclear weapons program.

It is not good enough. The loopholes are such that you can drive a truck through them. I think this will come back to bite the Australian government, just as Pig Iron Bob’s iron-ore came back in the Second World War.

Question agreed to.