Marise Payne (NSW, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I note that Senator Allison made the observation that the most serious problem to be dealt with in this debate is the question of the potential increased proliferation of nuclear weapons. As anyone would acknowledge, the question of increased proliferation of nuclear weapons is not what anyone is seeking in this process—not the government nor any other participants in discussions like the 123 Agreement nor even, I should imagine, India. But what may be a very serious issue that has not been contemplated in the comments made thus far is, in what I think is a very short-sighted view of where we are in the world now, some acknowledgement of the changing place of India in the world and some acknowledgement of the reality of the shifting relationships and the development of India’s role. Part of that is dealing with its phenomenal growth, with its burgeoning economy, with its changing position strategically and with its energy needs, all of which need to be addressed in any contemplation of this particular discussion but which were not. Instead, we were treated to what some might say was a dissertation on why everything is bad and why there is nothing good in exploring enhanced relationships in any way in this process.

This afternoon I want to talk about Australia’s longstanding role in this particular area. We have a strong record of demonstrated achievement on nuclear nonproliferation and on the advocacy of practical nuclear disarmament measures. For example, the non-proliferation treaty was opened for signature in 1968 and came into force in 1973, and we signed up in 1970 and ratified in 1973.

In the last few years, from 2005 until just recently, we had the role as the chair coordinating international efforts to promote entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. We have also played a long-term leading role in efforts underway to secure negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, which would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The fact that that treaty, for one, is still in the works and still awaiting agreement by the Conference on Disarmament shows that these are not easy processes; these are complex processes of international engagement. They cannot be dealt with and dismissed easily, and so the processes underway between the United States and India and, similarly, between Australia and India are part of that complexity.

As a nation we also spent some time playing a very prominent role in the negotiation of the additional protocol on strengthened IAEA safeguards. We were in fact the first country to conclude an additional protocol in that process. With other countries from the G8 and other participants we are a founding partner in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. That group includes Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Britain, the United States, Russia, China, Turkey and Kazakhstan, amongst others. We continue to work towards universal application of the additional protocol, including an active program to assist countries in our region with their implementation of the additional protocol. That indicates to me that we take a serious and long-term interest in these issues and these processes, but at the same time we acknowledge that they are inherently complex; they are not simple.

A suggestion that pursuing the discussion of engagement with India on the sale of uranium should flow on to an opening up of the NNPT—with the number of signatories that it has and the sorts of processes that would be required there—is not looking at the reality of where we are in the modern world and of the role that India plays.

We have said publicly that we welcome the conclusion of the negotiations on the text of the US-India Bilateral Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which is known as the 123 Agreement. That is intended to establish a framework for full civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. That agreement was completed relatively recently, just last month in fact, and then approved by the Indian cabinet some days later. It is understood that the agreement will ensure that India is brought more fully into the nuclear non-proliferation mainstream, with separation of its civil and military nuclear facilities and with an expanded application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

One of the matters I mentioned in my initial remarks concerned the economic development of India, which is obviously vital for its viable future and for the sake of its people. That growth and development has in recent years helped in alleviating what has been very destructive poverty and in ensuring a better future for its citizens. India’s economic development also demands an enormous increase in energy to continue, and it is not possible to turn our backs on that and ignore it.

In the last decade we have seen significant structural reforms which have turned India into one of the world’s fastest growing emerging economies, with boosts to living standards and reductions in poverty in certain places—although, as some of us heard in a briefing this morning, there are still many people in the Indian community living on less than $US2 a day. That is with an average growth rate of more than seven per cent in the decade since 1996 and a reduction in poverty by about 10 percentage points. With that expansion, with that growth and with those endeavours India also needs new and clean forms of energy to pursue its economic development while it addresses significant environmental challenges, most of which are on the record in other discussions. The situation is that, in 2006, India was drawing just over 2½ per cent of its electricity from nuclear power, which is expected to reach over 25 per cent by 2050, in just over four decades.

We are viewing this agreement as a constructive approach and framework to provide India with the materials that it requires to make full use of civilian nuclear power. As part of this process, I understand that we have, from the Indian side, a pledge of a ‘no first strike’ policy and a pledge not to strike non-nuclear states. Before any move towards nonproliferation for India can be secured, the US-India initiative requires India and the IAEA to enter into new safeguards arrangements and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, of which Australia is a member, to agree by consensus to make an exception to its guidelines to enable international civil nuclear supply to India. Flowing from that, the 123 Agreement requires approval by the US congress. I understand that the foreign minister and other members of the government have indicated that there is a likelihood that Australia would support a US proposal to create an exception for India in the NSG, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, subject to those new safeguards arrangements being satisfactory from the perspective of nonproliferation. But I do not believe that the NSG members have yet been formally asked to take a decision on this issue.

We find ourselves, as a country with an enormous resource of uranium, in the context of changing relationships and new agreements between the United States and India, wondering where we go next. The reality is that we are required to take a very serious look at what steps we might wish to take.

There is a very strong relationship between Australia and India as economic partners. On security and strategic issues we are collaborating at a very high level. Our cooperation ranges across a number of areas, not just economics but also defence, counterterrorism, law enforcement, air services, technology and so on. The reality of the advance of the 123 Agreement is that Australians are in a position where we need to address what happens to our uranium. This is a matter of current policy debate in Australia and I think that is a very good thing, whether or not we go all the way down the road that Senator Allison suggests and have popular consultations, for want of a better turn of phrase, on a whole range of issues. That begs the question of what being a government actually means. Being a government usually means taking the hard decisions and governing, and that is not necessarily the approach the Democrats would enjoy or recommend. Hard decisions would be unfamiliar to them.

In relation to the question of state bans on uranium mining, the Commonwealth is not intending to rush around overriding those bans. We would rather see the state premiers in the relevant states drop what is fundamentally ideological opposition to uranium mining. That is a matter which I am sure my colleagues will take up further. (Time expired)