John Hogg (Queensland, Deputy-President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I inform the Senate that the President has received the following letter, dated 8 August 2007, from the Leader of the Australian Democrats:

Dear Mr President,

Pursuant to standing order 75, I give notice that today I propose to move:

That, in the opinion of the Senate, the following is a matter of urgency:

An imminent deal between the United States and India that will exempt India from restrictions on nuclear trade will pave the way for Australia to commit to a bilateral agreement with India on the export of uranium, recognising:

(a)

the dangers of undermining nuclear weapons safeguards by selling uranium to a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

(b)

the extent to which nuclear energy provides a solution to the problems associated with climate change;

(c)

the prospect of the Government taking control of uranium reserves from anti-mining states.

Is the proposal supported?

More than the number of senators required by the standing orders having risen in their places—

I understand that informal arrangements have been made to allocate specific times to each of the speakers in today’s debate. With the concurrence of the Senate, I shall ask the clerks to set the clock accordingly.

Lyn Allison (Victoria, Australian Democrats) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I move:

That, in the opinion of the Senate, the following is a matter of urgency: An imminent deal between the United States and India that will exempt India from restrictions on nuclear trade will pave the way for Australia to commit to a bilateral agreement with India on the export of uranium, recognising:

(a)

the dangers of undermining nuclear weapons safeguards by selling uranium to a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

(b)

the extent to which nuclear energy provides a solution to the problems associated with climate change;

(c)

the prospect of the Government taking control of uranium reserves from anti-mining states.

For this government, uranium mining is an ideological act of faith. Very early in its term of office, it declared that restraints on uranium mines should go. Roxby Downs would subsequently expand fourfold, and in situ mines like Beverley and Honeymoon would get the go-ahead. China would be encouraged to come to Australia and open up new uranium mines to be part of the great mining boom that is filling government coffers right now. And then, more recently, it has declared that Australia itself will go down the nuclear power path, leading the world in a resurgence of interest in nuclear power.

The nuclear power industry is on its last legs. No new reactors have been commissioned in the United States, for instance, in the last 25 years. They cannot deal with the depleted uranium that comes from the uranium enrichment process or the highly radioactive waste from their reactors around the country. Yucca Mountain Repository, which is being imposed on the state of Nevada, is already oversubscribed—and it has not even been agreed to, let alone constructed. No doubt, Mr Bush would love to unload his radioactive waste on another hapless but willing country like Australia, and no doubt this country would be willing, given half a chance.

The Howard government went ahead with the new reactor at Lucas Heights without having a repository to take the waste from either the old reactor or the new one. But the push to export uranium to India is what this current motion is all about. My question today is: is it worth the risk? The price of uranium has certainly increased, but it is not big dollars in the scheme of things. Estimates for the deal with China, for instance, are that, at most, it will be worth $300 million to Australia. Most countries will conclude that nuclear reactors are too expensive, and they will look for other options. China wants to expand its nuclear power from two per cent of total energy generation to six per cent by 2020, but it will be increasing its target for solar and wind energy from 12 per cent of total energy generation to 15 per cent by the same date.

But the most serious problem with the proposal to sell uranium to India is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. India is one of four countries outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that are known to have nuclear weapons. A United Nations report earlier this year said the international community is approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation. At least 40 countries have the technology now to build nuclear weapons at relatively short notice.

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty has already been weakened by the attitude of the United States—and, indeed, of Australia—which accuses the new weapons states of North Korea and, possibly, Iran of going against the treaty but not the existing nuclear weapons states with their 27,000 nuclear warheads. The last nuclear non-proliferation treaty review was a chest-beating exercise that went nowhere on disarmament, and Australia was happy to sit back and do whatever America asked. It will not get behind the middle-power initiatives, the nuclear-free zones or the new weapons convention proposals as far as I can see, and now we see why. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty is being undermined so that we can sell our uranium to India with impunity by providing some false guarantees about making sure our uranium does not get into bombs. We have to ask the question: why is India being given an exemption from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty? And the answer, I am afraid, is that it is expedient.

Another question that has been raised is about Pakistan. Pakistan is already asking: ‘Why not us? We’d like Australian uranium as well.’ The answer, typically, is because India has been good and has not passed on technology to non-weapon states. That is a good thing, but India is still outside the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and its acquisition of nuclear weapons is a demonstration that it can be done and the sanctions will be no more than a slap on the hand. Not long ago it was thought likely that the first nuclear weapon to be exploded since 1946 would be by one or other of these two warring countries—that is, India or Pakistan. The tensions are still there, and who is to say that this little act of generosity on the part of the Australian government to one of them, namely India, will not inflame them and lead to that most feared of outcomes? What are Australia’s responsibilities under other international agreements such as the United Nations resolution 1172 or the Rarotonga treaty? In May this year—just three months ago—Minister Macfarlane emphatically ruled out exporting uranium to India on the grounds that it would undermine the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. What has changed in the last three months? Why is it now okay when then it was not?

Nuclear power is not the answer to climate change: it is too expensive, it is too slow, it uses too much water and, finally, Australians do not want it. If the Prime Minister’s polling says otherwise, why not put it to the test? I challenge the Prime Minister to take his referendum, or his plebiscite, to the people on this issue at the upcoming election, particularly to those most likely to have a reactor in their suburb, on their bit of coast. Instead of running around and pretending to oppose council amalgamations and offering to give people a say in the matter, what about doing this for one of the most contentious issues of our time? What about asking people’s views on going to war without the consent of parliament as well? Or what about selling Telstra? Put that to the people as well. What about asking the people of Western Australia how they feel about their state government being overruled so that uranium can be mined there? Perhaps there is a limit to the Prime Minister’s recently discovered push for democracy. We certainly know that Indigenous people are not getting a say on how they are being treated in the child abuse intervention. The list of ways in which this government has denied democracy is far too long for this debate.

Whilst low in emissions at the generation of electricity stage, other aspects of the nuclear cycle are very heavy greenhouse gas emitters, and that is another reason for opposing nuclear power. Everything from mining to enrichment to facility construction to reprocessing to waste management to transport is incredibly greenhouse intensive. Dr Jim Peacock, the Australian Chief Scientist, said:

Expansion of nuclear fuel cycle activities need not be part of a response to climate change.

That is what scientists have said around the world, but for some unknown reason—or reason best known to this government—the Prime Minister still keeps saying that nuclear has to be part of the answer. Again, it is a case of the Prime Minister intervening in state responsibilities, and I ask the question: where is this likely to end? Does the Constitution allow the takeover of the mining of uranium in Western Australia? I doubt it. We are already exporting 30 per cent of the world’s uranium, and it seems unlikely that there is any pressing need for us to override any state responsibilities to open up new mines.

So there is a can of worms in the government’s proposal on its deal with India. There are real risks and serious dangers in further undermining the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The guarantees that have been talked about are hardly worth the paper that they are written on. We know that if India is supplied with Australian uranium there will be tensions in the region, particularly with Pakistan, and it is not at all clear what this will do in terms of relations in that part of the world.

To summarise, there are serious dangers in us supplying India with uranium. The nuclear power industry is not going to solve the world’s climate change problems. It is certainly not a solution for Australia, and we should not be going down that path. The prospect of the federal government takeover of uranium reserves from WA in order to facilitate more uranium there is an assault on democracy, a very silly approach in terms of Commonwealth-state relations and not something that would appear to be easy to do under our current Constitution.

Marise Payne (NSW, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I note that Senator Allison made the observation that the most serious problem to be dealt with in this debate is the question of the potential increased proliferation of nuclear weapons. As anyone would acknowledge, the question of increased proliferation of nuclear weapons is not what anyone is seeking in this process—not the government nor any other participants in discussions like the 123 Agreement nor even, I should imagine, India. But what may be a very serious issue that has not been contemplated in the comments made thus far is, in what I think is a very short-sighted view of where we are in the world now, some acknowledgement of the changing place of India in the world and some acknowledgement of the reality of the shifting relationships and the development of India’s role. Part of that is dealing with its phenomenal growth, with its burgeoning economy, with its changing position strategically and with its energy needs, all of which need to be addressed in any contemplation of this particular discussion but which were not. Instead, we were treated to what some might say was a dissertation on why everything is bad and why there is nothing good in exploring enhanced relationships in any way in this process.

This afternoon I want to talk about Australia’s longstanding role in this particular area. We have a strong record of demonstrated achievement on nuclear nonproliferation and on the advocacy of practical nuclear disarmament measures. For example, the non-proliferation treaty was opened for signature in 1968 and came into force in 1973, and we signed up in 1970 and ratified in 1973.

In the last few years, from 2005 until just recently, we had the role as the chair coordinating international efforts to promote entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. We have also played a long-term leading role in efforts underway to secure negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, which would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The fact that that treaty, for one, is still in the works and still awaiting agreement by the Conference on Disarmament shows that these are not easy processes; these are complex processes of international engagement. They cannot be dealt with and dismissed easily, and so the processes underway between the United States and India and, similarly, between Australia and India are part of that complexity.

As a nation we also spent some time playing a very prominent role in the negotiation of the additional protocol on strengthened IAEA safeguards. We were in fact the first country to conclude an additional protocol in that process. With other countries from the G8 and other participants we are a founding partner in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. That group includes Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Britain, the United States, Russia, China, Turkey and Kazakhstan, amongst others. We continue to work towards universal application of the additional protocol, including an active program to assist countries in our region with their implementation of the additional protocol. That indicates to me that we take a serious and long-term interest in these issues and these processes, but at the same time we acknowledge that they are inherently complex; they are not simple.

A suggestion that pursuing the discussion of engagement with India on the sale of uranium should flow on to an opening up of the NNPT—with the number of signatories that it has and the sorts of processes that would be required there—is not looking at the reality of where we are in the modern world and of the role that India plays.

We have said publicly that we welcome the conclusion of the negotiations on the text of the US-India Bilateral Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which is known as the 123 Agreement. That is intended to establish a framework for full civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. That agreement was completed relatively recently, just last month in fact, and then approved by the Indian cabinet some days later. It is understood that the agreement will ensure that India is brought more fully into the nuclear non-proliferation mainstream, with separation of its civil and military nuclear facilities and with an expanded application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

One of the matters I mentioned in my initial remarks concerned the economic development of India, which is obviously vital for its viable future and for the sake of its people. That growth and development has in recent years helped in alleviating what has been very destructive poverty and in ensuring a better future for its citizens. India’s economic development also demands an enormous increase in energy to continue, and it is not possible to turn our backs on that and ignore it.

In the last decade we have seen significant structural reforms which have turned India into one of the world’s fastest growing emerging economies, with boosts to living standards and reductions in poverty in certain places—although, as some of us heard in a briefing this morning, there are still many people in the Indian community living on less than $US2 a day. That is with an average growth rate of more than seven per cent in the decade since 1996 and a reduction in poverty by about 10 percentage points. With that expansion, with that growth and with those endeavours India also needs new and clean forms of energy to pursue its economic development while it addresses significant environmental challenges, most of which are on the record in other discussions. The situation is that, in 2006, India was drawing just over 2½ per cent of its electricity from nuclear power, which is expected to reach over 25 per cent by 2050, in just over four decades.

We are viewing this agreement as a constructive approach and framework to provide India with the materials that it requires to make full use of civilian nuclear power. As part of this process, I understand that we have, from the Indian side, a pledge of a ‘no first strike’ policy and a pledge not to strike non-nuclear states. Before any move towards nonproliferation for India can be secured, the US-India initiative requires India and the IAEA to enter into new safeguards arrangements and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, of which Australia is a member, to agree by consensus to make an exception to its guidelines to enable international civil nuclear supply to India. Flowing from that, the 123 Agreement requires approval by the US congress. I understand that the foreign minister and other members of the government have indicated that there is a likelihood that Australia would support a US proposal to create an exception for India in the NSG, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, subject to those new safeguards arrangements being satisfactory from the perspective of nonproliferation. But I do not believe that the NSG members have yet been formally asked to take a decision on this issue.

We find ourselves, as a country with an enormous resource of uranium, in the context of changing relationships and new agreements between the United States and India, wondering where we go next. The reality is that we are required to take a very serious look at what steps we might wish to take.

There is a very strong relationship between Australia and India as economic partners. On security and strategic issues we are collaborating at a very high level. Our cooperation ranges across a number of areas, not just economics but also defence, counterterrorism, law enforcement, air services, technology and so on. The reality of the advance of the 123 Agreement is that Australians are in a position where we need to address what happens to our uranium. This is a matter of current policy debate in Australia and I think that is a very good thing, whether or not we go all the way down the road that Senator Allison suggests and have popular consultations, for want of a better turn of phrase, on a whole range of issues. That begs the question of what being a government actually means. Being a government usually means taking the hard decisions and governing, and that is not necessarily the approach the Democrats would enjoy or recommend. Hard decisions would be unfamiliar to them.

In relation to the question of state bans on uranium mining, the Commonwealth is not intending to rush around overriding those bans. We would rather see the state premiers in the relevant states drop what is fundamentally ideological opposition to uranium mining. That is a matter which I am sure my colleagues will take up further. (Time expired)

Chris Evans (WA, Australian Labor Party, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Democrats urgency motion, moved by Senator Allison. I must say at the outset that I think it lacks a bit of clarity. I am inclined to vote for it, but I am not quite sure what it meant to say. It is an interesting discussion document. I think I will vote for it, because I basically agree with all the assertions, but it does not hang together very well. With all due respect to whoever drafted it, it needs a bit of drafting work. But we are not allowed to do that. Essentially, I support the sentiments and most of the claims made in the motion. On that basis, on balance, we are going to vote for it.

At the outset, it is important to note that the US-India uranium deal is not really imminent, as it still requires ratification by the US congress and the Indian parliament. Indeed, the US  congress will examine the 123 Agreement against safeguards and conditions laid out by congress in the Henry Hyde Act—the US legislation which paved the way for the deal to be signed. Before any supply of uranium can occur, the Nuclear Suppliers Group—of which Australia is an important member, as a major uranium supplier—will receive a submission from India to be granted exemptions under the NPT. For India to import uranium, the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group will need to be changed. Why? Because the present arrangement is that the Nuclear Suppliers Group will only support the export of uranium to nations which have signed the NPT. Britain, France and Russia are supporting India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the indications so far, although they have been a little all over the place on it, are that the Howard government may also support India in that forum. A Rudd Labor government would not do so. Labor’s national platform on uranium exports clearly states that Labor will allow the export of uranium only to those countries which, inter alia, are signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Therefore, Labor would not support the export of uranium to a nonsignatory as it would further undermine and weaken an already fragile non-proliferation regime and, in my view, equally undermine the Australian uranium industry.

Labor recognises that security weaknesses exist in monitoring the global use of uranium. The director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, has made it clear how much work is required to strengthen the nuclear safeguards regime. Labor have recognised this and acknowledged it with recent changes to our national platform, which now includes a strengthening of our policy on safeguards. Labor will actively pursue more effective international export control regimes, through the IAEA, and tighter controls on the transfer of nuclear technology. Our 2007 national platform commits Labor to reinvigorating diplomatic efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the responsible use of nuclear technology.

Labor does not believe India is responsible for the illicit trafficking or proliferation of nuclear technology. Indeed, we understand why India is frustrated by the current non-proliferation regime. But there can be no doubt that the NPT, although requiring reform, is the bedrock of the international nuclear safeguards regime and further undermining of the treaty would not be in our best interests. Instead of writing cabinet submissions seeking approval for the export of Australian uranium to India, Labor believes the foreign minister should be urging and leading the way to greater global nuclear safeguards cooperation.

The Howard government should join Labor in campaigning for wide-ranging reform of the NPT to encourage India to join. The Howard government’s exuberant promotion of nuclear power is cause for concern, particularly given its weakness on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation. For instance, in 2006, with two other nations, Australia voted against a United Nations resolution moved by Mexico. The resolution called for a conference specifically focused on nuclear dangers that would include non-nuclear non-proliferation treaty states. Also in 2006, Australia abstained from voting in support of a UN motion to reactivate the issue of nuclear disarmament and specifically ‘accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments’.

Australia has also voted against a UN motion calling for nuclear disarmament within a specified time frame, legally binding negative security assurances and an international conference on nuclear disarmament. Under the Howard government, Australia has also voted against a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, including calls for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Australia consistently abstains on the UN resolution that calls for multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention. In short, this is a mountain of evidence that the Howard government is not prepared to encourage strong, internationally agreed safeguards. Our concern is exacerbated by their extremely poor record in the area of nuclear nonproliferation.

I think that the second issue raised in Senator Allison’s motion, which is the extent to which nuclear energy provides a solution to the problems associated with climate change, is a useful issue to raise because there is going to be an increasingly vigorous debate in this country about whether Australia should pursue a nuclear energy industry.

The Howard government, for want of a climate change policy and for want of anything to offer with regard to tackling climate change, has seized upon nuclear energy as some sort of quick fix for the problem that climate change represents to Australia. In looking to pursue nuclear energy as its response, Labor believe the government is going down the wrong path. We do not support the development of a nuclear energy industry in Australia. We know that for some countries nuclear energy is seen as a viable energy option, but they do not enjoy the energy choices that Australians take for granted.

Labor is adamant that Australia does not need nuclear power or enrichment and that we should not become the world’s nuclear waste dump. Australia has established domestic power industries with strong skills bases, massive capital assets and considerable public support. The strength of these industries and the scale of their resource bases mean that nuclear power would struggle to compete economically.

The Prime Minister’s own nuclear review, led by Dr Ziggy Switkowski, found strong economic arguments against nuclear power in Australia. It noted that our access to low-cost coal and gas meant that nuclear energy would be up to 50 per cent more expensive than electricity from fossil fuels. Dr Switkowski’s report also noted that high up-front costs of regulatory approvals and construction are drivers of that unfavourable comparison.

The review also found that nuclear energy may only become economically viable in Australia if a carbon tax or emissions trading value of up to $40 per tonne is levied on CO₂ emissions. Even then, the review acknowledged that significant government support—taxpayer support—would be required to offset the cost of establishing a regulatory framework and developing the skills needed to build nuclear facilities in Australia.

On top of the up-front capital cost, and the unknown cost of government subsidies to get the industry started, the cost of decommissioning and waste disposal is also uncertain. In March 2007, the UK’s Nuclear Decommissioning Authority estimated that the total cost of decommissioning Britain’s 20 nuclear sites was £70 billion—up from an estimate of £56 billion the year before.

The decision to develop a domestic nuclear power industry would also mean Australia accepting the safety risks inherent in nuclear energy generation and taking on the problem of radioactive waste storage. Critically, any domestic nuclear power program would also face considerable challenges in gaining the necessary levels of public support. All senators would be aware of the difficulty faced over the last 15 years in establishing a disposal site for our existing radioactive waste. The difficulty in gaining public support for a nuclear power industry should not be underestimated.

The task for Australia in developing energy options to respond to climate change is not to develop a new nuclear industry but to put our vital fossil fuel industries on an environmentally sustainable footing and to build our renewable energy capacity. Australia’s coal and gas industries are vital not only for domestic power generation but also for our economy. Coal represents more than 10 per cent of our exports by value and provides around 30,000 jobs. Rather than developing a nuclear power industry, we need policy that focuses on developing clean coal technologies, which will clean up our fossil fuels and protect our economic interests. That is why Labor’s clean coal initiative is a key element of our response, and it has to go hand in hand with considerable efforts to boost our renewable energy capacity.

The Howard government has chosen a different course and seems committed to implementing the Prime Minister’s nuclear vision—although I think we are seeing some nervousness on the part of many on his backbench. The Prime Minister has already indicated that he believes that nuclear power is the cleanest and greenest form of electricity. In April, he announced a number of measures that his government was going to take to progress his vision of a nuclear powered future. Those included repealing Commonwealth legislation prohibiting nuclear activities, including provisions of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.

The government has already committed Australian taxpayers’ money to fund research for the Generation IV advanced nuclear reactor research program. We know that a director of Nuclear Fuel Australia, an Australian company proposing a domestic nuclear enrichment plant, has been in talks with the Minister for Industry, Tourism and Resources regarding the enrichment project. He has made it clear that he thinks his prospects of developing his proposals depend on the coalition winning the next election. He is certainly right about that.

John Howard has also recently got the backing of the Liberal Party Federal Council, which unanimously called for the establishment of nuclear reactors and high-level waste dumps in Australia. In addition, the Prime Minister has charged ministers and departments with preparing work plans which are expected to be presented to cabinet next month for implementation in 2008, should the government be returned. We know from Senate estimates hearings that these plans will include options to override state bans on nuclear power, which would eliminate the final protections Australians have against the imposition of a nuclear power plant in their region.

Clearly, at the coming federal election, Australians will have very real choices to make about Australia’s energy future. Labor’s future energy mix of clean coal and gas, geothermal, solar, wind and other renewable energies is in stark contrast to John Howard’s plan for 25 nuclear reactors dotted around our coastline.

The government’s indication that it is seeking advice on overriding state bans on nuclear power brings me to the final point raised in Senator Allison’s matter of urgency—the overriding of state controls on uranium mining within their borders. Industry minister Macfarlane has been campaigning for some time for state governments in Queensland and Western Australia to end their opposition to uranium mining. He was recently reported as saying that he was investigating suggestions that Commonwealth powers could be used to determine uranium mining policy in those states. Given the extraordinary extension of Commonwealth powers into other areas of state responsibilities in recent days, this should come as no surprise. The government is clearly looking to extend its powers in a whole range of areas, and it seems that uranium mining and nuclear energy may just be another of these.

The decision on whether or not to allow uranium mining within their borders is rightly a decision for state governments. That is Labor’s view. In modifying our position on uranium mining and export this year, federal Labor asserted the rights of the states to make decisions regarding land use and mining within their borders. Both the WA and Queensland governments were elected at their respective last state elections on the basis of a policy platform which included a continued commitment to refuse applications to mine uranium. For Premiers Beattie or Carpenter to submit to Minister Macfarlane’s pressure and allow uranium mining would be a reversal of commitments those premiers made to their electorates. For the federal government to override those restrictions would be a direct contravention of the policies Western Australians and Queenslanders voted for at the last election.

I have publicly expressed my personal view a number of times that the state restrictions will be removed. But their removal, in time, is a state matter. It is a state political issue and it should remain so. I respect the Labor premiers’ decision to stand by the policy platforms upon which they were elected.

In closing, I think this motion has raised a number of important issues about Australian and global security, about our energy future and the state of our federation. I thank Senator Allison for putting these issues on the Senate’s agenda. I think the Howard government’s pursuit of uranium sales to India fundamentally undermines the integrity of the NPT, and as such is contrary to Australia’s security interests.

Australia should focus on rebuilding the NPT, not undermining it further. We have real choices in Australia about our future energy mix. We reject the Howard government’s focus on going down a nuclear path. We have much better options. I think Australia should pursue the options of cleaner fossil fuels and renewable energies rather than endorse the government’s plans to turn Australia into a nuclear energy country.

Christine Milne (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today to support this urgency motion and to say emphatically that the Australian Greens are totally opposed to the sale of uranium to India because it is outside the non-proliferation treaty and for reasons which I will expand on in a moment, given that I have got only five minutes in which to speak. It is extraordinary to hear members of a government that constantly trade in fear suggest that the escalation of the nuclear fuel cycle can be managed in an extraordinarily safe way. The United Nations Security Council resolution 1172, passed on 6 June 1998, unanimously calls upon India and Pakistan to:

... immediately stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponisation or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The federal government decided to acquiesce to the Bush administration’s desire to ramp up India’s nuclear capacity. The Australian government went along with it. Up until then, Foreign Minister Downer had been one of the strongest advocates for saying that we should uphold the non-proliferation treaty. Once President Bush made his views clear to the Prime Minister, the Australian government shifted position.

Contrary to what Senator Payne put to the parliament, it is not true to say that the International Atomic Energy Agency will have coverage and oversight of all of India’s facilities. Many of the reactors, two of which are dedicated to making plutonium for nuclear weapons, and nine power reactors, including a plutonium breeder reactor that is currently under construction, will be outside international safeguards. Just to ramp up the tension in the region even more, Pakistan’s President Musharaff has declared that, ‘In view of the fact that the US-India agreement would enable India to produce a significant quantity of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence requirements will be met.’ So, by agreeing to this, by sending Australian uranium to India, you are ratcheting up the degree of tension between India and Pakistan and significantly shifting the balance that is already there. It is disgraceful. It is based purely on an agenda to facilitate the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership set up by President Bush and to which Prime Minister Howard kowtows.

I am interested to hear Labor say today that it upholds this, because just a few moments ago in the Senate Labor voted with the government against a motion which called on the government to reject any sale of Australian uranium to non non-proliferation treaty states, to encourage India to join the NPT, and to use its position in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to block the submission to give India an exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group rules, preventing the supply of uranium to non-NPT states. So it appears that Labor in government would be prepared to express their disapproval in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to register their dissent, but they would not block. That is the key difference.

That is where I would like clarification from the Labor Party. If they are going into government, people have a right to know exactly what they would do. We have the shadow minister, Mr McMullan, saying that they would not block. In the Senate, Senator Evans is saying that they would oppose. ‘Oppose’ is different from ‘block’ with consensus decision making, and the Australian people need to know very clearly whether Australia would have the courage of its convictions in the Nuclear Suppliers Group—which interestingly was set up because of India exploding its nuclear test and so on. That is why they set up the group. Now they are going to tear it apart again and change the rules to facilitate India to ratchet up tension in that part of the world. Given India’s record—which is not good, contrary to the Prime Minister’s assertion—in managing nuclear technology and knowledge, there is no guarantee that terrorists could not access this material from India just as easily as they can from other states which have a poor record in this regard. What we see here is a very serious issue. (Time expired)

Rod Kemp (Victoria, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Following Senator Milne reminds me why the Australian people will continue to reject the Greens. The Greens have a habit of extreme language, of opposing most developments in a modern economy. I was intrigued that Senator Milne accuses the government of fear tactics. The Greens trade on fear. Basically that is one of the leitmotivs of the Green movement—to trade on fear and to avoid wherever possible rational debate.

In the brief period that I have to debate this issue, let me go through matters which have been raised in relation to India. Senator Milne, why not put on the table exactly what Mr Downer said? Why try to invent comments from the government? Why try to make extreme comments? This is what Mr Downer, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has said in relation to a press question about any prospects of selling uranium to India:

If we were to sell uranium at all, we would only do that under strict conditions we would negotiate with India as we have with France, Britain, America, China and so on ...

Nothing like that, of course, emerged from Senator Milne’s statement. Mr Downer went on:

... a nuclear safeguards agreement so we could trace that uranium and that uranium would only be used in several nuclear power stations, not used for any military purpose.

He went on to say:

But we haven’t made any decision to do this yet, even to negotiate such an agreement, because first we would want the nuclear reactors that we would sell the uranium for, to come under the strict controls of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency and they would be able to send inspectors and inspect how the reactors operate and the like.

Let us get those facts on the table. In her remarks, Senator Payne added considerable details. In fact, there are various hoops that this proposal would still have to go through before any such matter could even be considered. For example, India and the IAEA must enter into new safeguard agreements, the Nuclear Suppliers Group must agree, by consensus, to make an exemption to the guidelines to enable international civil nuclear supply to India, and the so-called 123 Agreement that the US government has negotiated would have to be approved by the US congress. So there are many hoops to go through before such a matter could even be considered.

I was intrigued that the Labor Party sent Senator Evans in to debate this issue. It is a sensitive issue for the Labor Party and the Labor Party is hopelessly divided on this matter. Senator Evans, I think, as part of the leadership group, could be guaranteed to carefully tread the minefield as he went through it. Senator Webber is shaking her head. Of course, under the famous three mines policy of the Labor Party, which Senator Webber strongly supported, there was massive expansion of uranium mining in Australia, supported by a number of state premiers. Now, of course, the notorious, the useless, the pathetic three mines policy has been rejected by the Labor Party. But, in order to avoid upsetting some of their supporters, who are, as I said, hopelessly divided on uranium mining, they have said that, in relation to Western Australia and Queensland, it is a matter for the premiers. In the meantime, Labor Premier Rann is massively trying to expand uranium mining in that state. In listening carefully to the very moderate delivery of Senator Evans, I detected that the Hansard will show that. He said that the states do have a constitutional responsibility in the area, which is true, but he said he thought it would be better if the states of Queensland and Western Australia removed these restrictions and came on board. It was said very carefully and in a way to not highlight this issue. But what does this mean? In effect, it means Senator Evans was saying that Australia and the Labor Party wanted to expand the nuclear mining industry—that is the effect of what Senator Evans said.

Ruth Webber (WA, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Senator Webber interjecting—

Rod Kemp (Victoria, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Now Senator Webber is looking upset because she is very opposed to this. Oh, hello, Senator Webber is in favour of the expansion! This is very important, that Senator Webber is now in favour of the expansion of uranium mining in Australia which is very interesting for the record. Now, let me deal with the second part of the motion.

Penny Wong (SA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Corporate Governance and Responsibility) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Senator Wong interjecting—

Rod Kemp (Victoria, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Don’t get sensitive, Senator Wong, or I might start to speak about some of your issues. In relation to the second part of the motion, it is interesting to note that it is poorly worded and it was not precisely clear what the motion is. If we banned nuclear power plants around the world, emissions of carbon dioxide would be some 2.5 billion tonnes higher per year. The person who is drawing our attention to the important debate of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions wants to ban nuclear power. If you ban that, according to the figures I have, you would increase carbon dioxide emissions by some 2.5 billion tons per year. A remarkable policy and again it shows the unreality of much of this debate and the unreality of the Greens, and, I regret to say, the Democrats, on this. The Labor Party, of course, because of its hopeless divisions in this area which will paralyse it, finds it hard to debate this policy in any sensible and rational way.

Then, of course, the final part of the motion is the alleged prospect of the federal government taking control of uranium reserves from anti-mining states. I explained how carefully Senator Evans walked around this particular minefield for the Labor Party. We did come to the conclusion, when we listened carefully to Senator Evans, that the Labor Party was in favour of an expansion of this industry. It has expanded and we should not apologise. While Hawke and Keating were in office, uranium mining expanded greatly in Australia and we should not hide from that fact. My advice is that the Commonwealth government has no plans to override state bans on uranium mining, and I understand that the legal advice provided suggested that this would probably not be a viable option anyway. Of course, the most effective way for Australians to benefit from surging international demand for uranium mining is—(Time expired)

Ruth Webber (WA, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Unlike Senator Kemp, I will do my best not to misrepresent others in this debate. Senator Kemp is somewhat sadly mistaken, I think: Labor is not divided when it comes to the issue of selling uranium to India; we are at one. We had an interesting debate within our party about the future of uranium mining and we now have an agreed platform. We have an open and public process. We have a lively debate and we form a view, unlike those opposite who just do what their Prime Minister tells them to.

Senator Payne made an interesting contribution earlier, talking about the importance of Australia’s relationship with India. Indeed, it is of growing importance and a relationship that all of us in this place should probably spend more time contemplating. However, even more important are our responsibilities as a nation when it comes to being an exporter of uranium. Therefore I, like Senator Evans, have absolutely no problem with supporting, in particular, part (a) of Senator Allison’s motion and, indeed, the sentiments expressed in the rest of the motion.

If anyone is confused about the conditions under which uranium and nuclear power can be used, it is those opposite. You only have to look at the way they choose to treat two different nations: India and Iran. There is deep and significant confusion and division there.

Not only the shadow minister for foreign affairs, Mr McClelland, but also all of the media have pointed out the problems the federal government has with its contemplation of selling uranium to India. Mr McClelland has been on the record as saying that the federal government is pretty much into unrestrained promotion of nuclear power and that this is a cause of great concern, especially when it comes to the government’s poor record in the area of nuclear nonproliferation.

I notice that there are a whole lot of new strict conditions—not a strict condition that says you have to sign up to the NPT but a whole lot of other strict conditions that we may or may not be aware of. Instead of trying to work out a way of coming up with strict conditions under which to sell uranium to India, which the foreign minister has been trying to do, he should be joining us on this side in campaigning for wide-ranging reform and strengthening of the nonproliferation treaty. And then he should encourage India to join it.

It is important that we place on record here that the NPT allows the development of the nuclear energy industry, provided that countries do not build nuclear weapons. India, of course, has tested nuclear weapons, to our knowledge, in 1974 and 1998. India joins Pakistan, North Korea and Israel as the only four countries that have not signed the NPT.

So the government is going to contemplate selling uranium to India, and we are going to look at some nefarious ‘strict conditions’ that do not include signing up to the NPT. This is the same government that wanted to use the NPT to quite justifiably deal with the challenges that we were confronting with Iran. Well, you cannot opt in and opt out of an NPT. You cannot say that it is really important that Iran has to be a signatory and they have to obey it but that it is okay for us to sell uranium to India, which refused to sign it and which is on record as testing nuclear weapons. You cannot have it both ways—you either believe in the NPT and you want it enforced universally or you do not. You cannot play sneaky games with the United States about who is good and who is bad and opt in and opt out of the NPT. You cannot do that and be a responsible exporter of uranium.

What you also cannot do is go and seek legal advice—which the government did confirm at estimates hearings it was getting; I know because I was there with Senator Evans—about overriding the states when it comes to nuclear power and enforce nuclear power and uranium mining on them, yet, at the same time, override state governments and say they cannot have wind farms. Well, who cares about the environmental future of this nation and the energy sustainability of this nation? You cannot do that. You cannot have it both ways. Just as you cannot opt in and opt out of the NPT, you cannot pick and choose when you are going to override people— (Time expired)

Russell Trood (Queensland, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am very pleased to be able to participate in this debate this afternoon and, just by way of introduction, say that I share Senator Evans’s mystification as to the real intent of this motion. It seems to me that this is probably the only matter upon which he and I agree in relation to this debate. It is poorly drafted and it is not entirely clear as to its intent. But, insofar as one can divine that, it seems to be a good example of the Democrats hyperventilating on an issue of public importance but completely overstating the possible implications of the matter and, in that context, devaluing the sentiment contained within the motion. But, of course, the Senate is a very democratic place.

I confess that I had some concerns about the India-US nuclear deal when it was first announced. In fact, I think I am on the public record as expressing some reservations about it. The reason for those reservations was that it was not clear, when the agreement was announced, how restrictive it might be. It was not clear, when the agreement was announced, as to the extent to which there might be protections for the nonproliferation regime or to the extent to which there might be safeguards in relation to the materials and the technology that were to be transferred under the agreement. But we now know the answer to these questions.

The agreement was concluded on 20 July this year and is now available for public scrutiny, and I suspect that it would be a productive thing if all of those who had participated in the debates, but particularly those on the other side of the chamber, were to go to the agreement and look specifically at the provisions, because they are very illuminating. Let me take you to article 10 of the agreement. It reads very straightforwardly:

1. Safeguards will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, and with respect to all ... fissionable material used in or produced through the use of such ... materials and equipment ...

It goes on to say, at point 2 of article 10, that that nuclear material:

... shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA ...

And, importantly, it draws in the additional protocol, which of course adds a significant and important enhancement to the safeguards regime.

It is not just article 10 of the agreement that should be of interest to those who are concerned about this. Article 5, section 6, says:

... an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards ... India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.

Yet again, article 6 of the 123 agreement says:

India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards ... The Parties agree on the application of IAEA safeguards to all facilities concerned with the above activities ... Any special fissionable material that may be separated may only be utilized in national facilities under IAEA safeguards.

So at every turn this agreement, which is now available on the public record, asserts the importance, from the United States perspective, of having India participate in the non-proliferation regime. It continues to assert the importance of the regime as a means of protecting the global community, the international community, from further proliferation.

As my colleagues on this side of the chamber have said, there is a long way to go before this agreement might actually be implemented. The Nuclear Suppliers Group must of course agree to change; the 123 agreement itself must be approved by the Congress, and that may not be an easy thing to do—there is some reservation in the Congress already about the particular matter; and, of course, India itself, as the 123 agreement says, must negotiate an appropriate agreement with the IAEA. So we have a very long way to go before this particular agreement is put in place.

None of this makes certain that Australia itself will then go on to conclude an agreement to sell uranium to India. Let us assume the possibility that this course actually occurs; let us assume that Australia did take this possibility. I think we can say with some confidence that, at the very least, there would be comparable safeguards in place, as are contained in the 123 agreement concluded between the United States and India. That would reinforce Australia’s longstanding tradition of supporting the non-proliferation treaty regime.

Let me remind the Senate of the extent to which that is actually the case: the considerable work we have done in relation to nonproliferation over a long period of time—the failed negotiations in New York in 2005, for example; the continuous support we have had in trying to bring into force the nuclear test ban treaty; the work we have done in relation to negotiating the additional protocol which, as I said a moment ago, substantially enhances the overall safeguards regime—and let us not forget the work that Australia has done in relation to supporting the global initiative for combating nuclear terrorism. Australia has consistently, over a long period of time, since the mid-1970s when it began to sell uranium overseas, strongly supported the non-proliferation regime. There is no reason on earth to assume that that will not continue to be the Australian government’s policy should there be a decision, sometime in the future, to sell uranium to India. (Time expired)

Question negatived.