Russell Trood (Queensland, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I am very pleased to be able to participate in this debate this afternoon and, just by way of introduction, say that I share Senator Evans’s mystification as to the real intent of this motion. It seems to me that this is probably the only matter upon which he and I agree in relation to this debate. It is poorly drafted and it is not entirely clear as to its intent. But, insofar as one can divine that, it seems to be a good example of the Democrats hyperventilating on an issue of public importance but completely overstating the possible implications of the matter and, in that context, devaluing the sentiment contained within the motion. But, of course, the Senate is a very democratic place.

I confess that I had some concerns about the India-US nuclear deal when it was first announced. In fact, I think I am on the public record as expressing some reservations about it. The reason for those reservations was that it was not clear, when the agreement was announced, how restrictive it might be. It was not clear, when the agreement was announced, as to the extent to which there might be protections for the nonproliferation regime or to the extent to which there might be safeguards in relation to the materials and the technology that were to be transferred under the agreement. But we now know the answer to these questions.

The agreement was concluded on 20 July this year and is now available for public scrutiny, and I suspect that it would be a productive thing if all of those who had participated in the debates, but particularly those on the other side of the chamber, were to go to the agreement and look specifically at the provisions, because they are very illuminating. Let me take you to article 10 of the agreement. It reads very straightforwardly:

1. Safeguards will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, and with respect to all ... fissionable material used in or produced through the use of such ... materials and equipment ...

It goes on to say, at point 2 of article 10, that that nuclear material:

... shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA ...

And, importantly, it draws in the additional protocol, which of course adds a significant and important enhancement to the safeguards regime.

It is not just article 10 of the agreement that should be of interest to those who are concerned about this. Article 5, section 6, says:

... an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards ... India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.

Yet again, article 6 of the 123 agreement says:

India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards ... The Parties agree on the application of IAEA safeguards to all facilities concerned with the above activities ... Any special fissionable material that may be separated may only be utilized in national facilities under IAEA safeguards.

So at every turn this agreement, which is now available on the public record, asserts the importance, from the United States perspective, of having India participate in the non-proliferation regime. It continues to assert the importance of the regime as a means of protecting the global community, the international community, from further proliferation.

As my colleagues on this side of the chamber have said, there is a long way to go before this agreement might actually be implemented. The Nuclear Suppliers Group must of course agree to change; the 123 agreement itself must be approved by the Congress, and that may not be an easy thing to do—there is some reservation in the Congress already about the particular matter; and, of course, India itself, as the 123 agreement says, must negotiate an appropriate agreement with the IAEA. So we have a very long way to go before this particular agreement is put in place.

None of this makes certain that Australia itself will then go on to conclude an agreement to sell uranium to India. Let us assume the possibility that this course actually occurs; let us assume that Australia did take this possibility. I think we can say with some confidence that, at the very least, there would be comparable safeguards in place, as are contained in the 123 agreement concluded between the United States and India. That would reinforce Australia’s longstanding tradition of supporting the non-proliferation treaty regime.

Let me remind the Senate of the extent to which that is actually the case: the considerable work we have done in relation to nonproliferation over a long period of time—the failed negotiations in New York in 2005, for example; the continuous support we have had in trying to bring into force the nuclear test ban treaty; the work we have done in relation to negotiating the additional protocol which, as I said a moment ago, substantially enhances the overall safeguards regime—and let us not forget the work that Australia has done in relation to supporting the global initiative for combating nuclear terrorism. Australia has consistently, over a long period of time, since the mid-1970s when it began to sell uranium overseas, strongly supported the non-proliferation regime. There is no reason on earth to assume that that will not continue to be the Australian government’s policy should there be a decision, sometime in the future, to sell uranium to India. (Time expired)

Question negatived.