Senate debates

Wednesday, 18 March 2009

Fair Work Bill 2008

In Committee

6:09 pm

Photo of Eric AbetzEric Abetz (Tasmania, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Hansard source

The amendment that is before us is unfortunately part of the ongoing jihad that Senator Bob Brown is running against the Exclusive Brethren. I invite honourable senators to have a look at what we are actually talking about and go to the legislation itself. Before I do that, let me say this: you can quote a book but the quoting of a book does not clothe the assertions in fact. Indeed, as I understand the history of conscientious objection clauses in this country, they existed before I was born—I am not sure whether they existed before Senator Brown was born— in the Queensland parliament, in the New South Wales parliament and in the New Zealand parliament. In fact, in 1956 they were introduced by the then minister for employment, Harold Holt. His move was supported by the opposition and, as I recall it, a Mr Fraser—no, not the Malcolm Fraser—who was the member for the ACT complimented the government on the move.

Indeed, if you really want to get to the history of these matters, do not read just one book but consider speeches given at the Trades Hall of Victoria in 1979 on behalf of the Industrial Relations Society of Victoria. Two people addressed that forum in 1979. One of them was none other than the then Senator Gareth Evans, talking about conscientious objection clauses and how he in fact supported them. The other speaker was a Mr Keith Marshall, who held some position in the Industrial Relations Commission. In their speeches they go back a long way further than 1974 and this silly conspiracy theory that the member for Bennelong had somehow struck an agreement with the Exclusive Brethren.

There is all this literature from before 1974 dating way back to 1956. Last night, when we started on this I thought it was about 40 to 50 years ago. In fact I have now confirmed that that was a conservative estimate. It is over 50 years ago that conscientious objection clauses were considered appropriate and they have been part of the industrial landscape or framework on a bipartisan basis for over half a century.

Let us have a look at the actual clause that Senator Brown finds so offensive. Senator Brown’s amendment would remove any reference to conscientious objection in this legislation and it would remove clause 485, which allows for a conscientious objection certificate—but in very, very limited circumstances. It only applies if there are no more than 20 employees—and that is on a head count—performing work on the premises. That is the first qualification. The second is that none of the employees are members of an organisation, in other words, of a trade union. The third is that all the employees are employed by a person who holds a certificate that has been endorsed. So you cannot just say, ‘Look, I have a conscientious objection to a trade union coming in.’ This, by the way, is a right of entry to hold discussions in the workplace—that is all. To get the certificate you cannot just say that you happen to have a particular belief. At the moment I understand that you will have to go to the Industrial Relations Commission. Under this legislation you would have to go to Fair Work Australia and satisfy them. For Fair Work Australia to endorse a conscientious objection certificate, they would need to be satisfied: (a) that the person is a practising member of a religious society or order and (b) that the doctrines or beliefs of that society prevent membership of an organisation or body other than that society or order.

The Exclusive Brethren have—if I may say with respect to them—this bizarre view of the world, but it is their conscientiously held belief, and it holds that they are not allowed to become a member of a worldly organisation. I understand that Jehovah’s Witnesses have a similar belief. Right or wrong, that is their view and you would have to satisfy Fair Work Australia as to that. The circumstances in which it applies are: fewer than 20 employees; not a single union member on the floor; and, the employer has gone through the process of satisfying Fair Work Australia. So if there is an employee who has a grievance against an employer all they have to do is join a union. As soon as that employee is a member of the union the conscientious objection certificate does not provide exemption under this legislation. In circumstances where none of the workers are members of the union and the employer is, in this particular circumstance, in the very limited field of having only 20 employees, why would you seek to deny conscientious objection in these very strict and very tight circumstances?

Conscientious objection is a concession that a tolerant liberal-democratic society makes to those people within its community who have a diverse set of values that do not go to the extent of breaching the law. In the Commonwealth Electoral Act we have a similar clause and it is exercised by many different people—indeed, 60,000 people at the last election—who claim religious exemption from the requirement for a compulsory vote. Chances are that everybody in this chamber says that you have a duty to vote. We are all here because we passionately believe in the democratic system and we want everybody to be engaged in it. But we make a concession fairly and properly to those who for religious purposes do not believe in voting, and that is one of the great hallmarks of the liberal-democratic society that we live in—yes, there is a law, but there will be exemptions for certain categories. I say to Senator Brown that whether you like or dislike a particular organisation is completely irrelevant to the consideration of the fundamental principle.

I believe in the freedom of speech. My good friend Senator Marshall, across the chamber, and Senator Brown, up at the end, say things that I passionately disagree with, and I think they are wrong. But the principle of freedom of speech requires me to say, ‘Senator Marshall, Senator Brown and whoever else should have the right to be able to exercise freedom of speech.’ If I were passionately opposed to an organisation and I in fact wanted some payback on them for campaigning against me in the past, that might be fair cop in a political environment, but in a liberal-democratic society would you remove their right to conscientious objection? I say ‘no’ because the principle overrides those considerations.

I believe that conscientious objection is a fundamental and very well understood principle. That is why we find it in a number of areas such as the Commonwealth Electoral Act and, indeed, it has been in the industrial legislation for 50 years. But this particular clause is about as limited and restricted as you could get. Let me repeat: if you have one union member on the floor, the conscientious objection certificate will not be of any value or any benefit and the union will have a right of entry. This is stated in subdivision B under the title ‘Entry to hold discussions’. A union is given entry to hold discussions generally if there are persons who perform work on the premises, and the union is permitted to potentially look after their industrial interests, and they wish to participate. So, if the workers do not wish to participate, under clause 484 they do not have to, and that attacks the right of entry.

Why would a union, in general terms, want to hold discussions? It might be in relation to something at the workplace or recruitment or whatever. All they have got to do is talk to the person in private outside of working hours, or they could get just one person on the workforce to join the union and as soon as that happens the conscientious objection clause will no longer apply. So it is about as limited as you can get.

So I would say to the Labor government and other senators that, in previous times, allegations have been made against this particular organisation known as the Exclusive Brethren, and privilege report after privilege report after privilege report has come down in this chamber where those matters that Senator Bob Brown asserts are disputed. I do not even want to enter into the debate, whether Senator Brown is right or the privilege report statements are right. We are discussing a principle here: should there be such a thing as conscientious objection? And, if we come to the view that conscientious objection is a fundamental principle in our tolerant society, then the benefits of that will fall on whomever they may—in exactly the same way that the right to freedom of speech falls upon the most offensive person of the Left or the Right and those of us who see ourselves as somewhere between those two extremes.

It is the principle we are voting on this evening; it is the principle—not because we do not like a particular person and what he might say, when we consider freedom of speech, or because we do not like a particular organisation that may be the beneficiary of this particular clause. We are voting on a principle, not on an organisation. I hope that this chamber would never go down the track of saying we will jettison a fundamentally important principle and tradition that has been with us for over a half a century, that makes us one of the most tolerant societies in the world and that really does allow us to be the envy of the world, just because we have got a beef with a particular organisation that happens to be a beneficiary under this, might I add, very, very limited clause. We as an opposition will uphold the tradition.

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