Carol Brown (Tasmania, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The committee is considering Greens amendments (1), (3) and (4) on sheet 5730, moved by Senator Bob Brown. The question is that the amendments be agreed to.

Bob Brown (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The answer is yes, the amendments should be agreed to. I quote from the book Behind the Exclusive Brethren, by Michael Bachelard, produced by Scribe Publications in Melbourne and recently released. It says:

In Australia in the 1940s, this was a problem—

that is, the unions—

for Brethren firms. Union-preference clauses in state and Commonwealth legislation made membership of unions compulsory for most employees, particularly those working under an industrial award. Here was a law that was clearly, in Brethren minds, ‘contrary to the will of Christ’. So church elders began a campaign of lobbying, at the level of state governments, to exempt their businesses, on the ground of conscience, from union-preference clauses.

The lobbyists’ first success was in Queensland, in 1948—

and in New South Wales in 1951. It goes on:

In 1956, conscientious objection for the Brethren became part of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, after which it flowed to … all other states except Victoria.

I am moving quickly here, Chair. It continues:

The Brethren representations to governments, federal and state, continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and were almost exclusively made to discuss some aspect of industrial relations law. Ron Fawkes remembers visiting Malcolm Fraser in the 1970s—

Ron Fawkes being a member of the Exclusive Brethren. It goes on:

But in 1974 something happened that would change the Brethren’s relationship with politics forever: the election of a promising young Liberal MP, the local member in the seat of Bennelong, where many of the Brethren high-fliers lived. His name was John Howard.

It goes on to talk about that particular relationship. It says:

One of the issues on which Howard and the Brethren firmly agree is industrial relations policy. When it came to industrial relations, and other issues of ‘conscience’, the election of John Howard as prime minister in 1996 represented the best news the Brethren had ever had from the political sphere. By that time, thanks to the ascendancy of the new Right in Australian politics, a strong move had been afoot for over a decade to rid employers of the union ‘closed shop’.

It goes on then to describe the evolution of the current laws whereby in Work Choices the law was changed to not only facilitate the Brethren having the ability, if employers and employees agreed, not to have unions allowed into work places but also, since 2002, give Brethren employers the sole right to ban unions from looking at the workplaces of employees even if the employees requested that right. That is a situation that should not be allowed in any Australian workplace.

I did explain yesterday the difficulty there is with the imposition in the workplace of the mores—and some of them are quite strange to say the least—of the Brethren. I quote again from Mr Bachelard’s book:

But the provision does prevent employees from organising for any other reason—to advocate for a better lunchroom, or greater health and safety provisions, or to complain about ill-treatment or discrimination. In New Zealand, a Brethren-owned medical-supplies company banned their multicultural staff from speaking any language other than English, even in the lunchroom, and then used their exemption certificate to prevent a union coming in to hear the staff complaints.

‘They just hate the unions for some reason,’ said Fawkes. ‘I think it was just the mindset of the whole thing.’

We know that 33 workplaces are protected under what is an Exclusive Brethren clause, although it is not called that, in Australia. No other religious group, sect or philosophical organisation takes advantage of this so-called conscience clause. It is used primarily, indeed solely, by the Exclusive Brethren to disadvantage their workers in the workplace and, I reiterate, in particular, women. It ought not stand. We should have no restriction and no special clauses in workplace relations for a very secretive cult like the Exclusive Brethren. Hence, the Greens oppose clause 485 in the following terms:

(2)    Clause 485, page 394 (line 26) to page 395 (line 24), to be opposed.

Eric Abetz (Tasmania, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The amendment that is before us is unfortunately part of the ongoing jihad that Senator Bob Brown is running against the Exclusive Brethren. I invite honourable senators to have a look at what we are actually talking about and go to the legislation itself. Before I do that, let me say this: you can quote a book but the quoting of a book does not clothe the assertions in fact. Indeed, as I understand the history of conscientious objection clauses in this country, they existed before I was born—I am not sure whether they existed before Senator Brown was born— in the Queensland parliament, in the New South Wales parliament and in the New Zealand parliament. In fact, in 1956 they were introduced by the then minister for employment, Harold Holt. His move was supported by the opposition and, as I recall it, a Mr Fraser—no, not the Malcolm Fraser—who was the member for the ACT complimented the government on the move.

Indeed, if you really want to get to the history of these matters, do not read just one book but consider speeches given at the Trades Hall of Victoria in 1979 on behalf of the Industrial Relations Society of Victoria. Two people addressed that forum in 1979. One of them was none other than the then Senator Gareth Evans, talking about conscientious objection clauses and how he in fact supported them. The other speaker was a Mr Keith Marshall, who held some position in the Industrial Relations Commission. In their speeches they go back a long way further than 1974 and this silly conspiracy theory that the member for Bennelong had somehow struck an agreement with the Exclusive Brethren.

There is all this literature from before 1974 dating way back to 1956. Last night, when we started on this I thought it was about 40 to 50 years ago. In fact I have now confirmed that that was a conservative estimate. It is over 50 years ago that conscientious objection clauses were considered appropriate and they have been part of the industrial landscape or framework on a bipartisan basis for over half a century.

Let us have a look at the actual clause that Senator Brown finds so offensive. Senator Brown’s amendment would remove any reference to conscientious objection in this legislation and it would remove clause 485, which allows for a conscientious objection certificate—but in very, very limited circumstances. It only applies if there are no more than 20 employees—and that is on a head count—performing work on the premises. That is the first qualification. The second is that none of the employees are members of an organisation, in other words, of a trade union. The third is that all the employees are employed by a person who holds a certificate that has been endorsed. So you cannot just say, ‘Look, I have a conscientious objection to a trade union coming in.’ This, by the way, is a right of entry to hold discussions in the workplace—that is all. To get the certificate you cannot just say that you happen to have a particular belief. At the moment I understand that you will have to go to the Industrial Relations Commission. Under this legislation you would have to go to Fair Work Australia and satisfy them. For Fair Work Australia to endorse a conscientious objection certificate, they would need to be satisfied: (a) that the person is a practising member of a religious society or order and (b) that the doctrines or beliefs of that society prevent membership of an organisation or body other than that society or order.

The Exclusive Brethren have—if I may say with respect to them—this bizarre view of the world, but it is their conscientiously held belief, and it holds that they are not allowed to become a member of a worldly organisation. I understand that Jehovah’s Witnesses have a similar belief. Right or wrong, that is their view and you would have to satisfy Fair Work Australia as to that. The circumstances in which it applies are: fewer than 20 employees; not a single union member on the floor; and, the employer has gone through the process of satisfying Fair Work Australia. So if there is an employee who has a grievance against an employer all they have to do is join a union. As soon as that employee is a member of the union the conscientious objection certificate does not provide exemption under this legislation. In circumstances where none of the workers are members of the union and the employer is, in this particular circumstance, in the very limited field of having only 20 employees, why would you seek to deny conscientious objection in these very strict and very tight circumstances?

Conscientious objection is a concession that a tolerant liberal-democratic society makes to those people within its community who have a diverse set of values that do not go to the extent of breaching the law. In the Commonwealth Electoral Act we have a similar clause and it is exercised by many different people—indeed, 60,000 people at the last election—who claim religious exemption from the requirement for a compulsory vote. Chances are that everybody in this chamber says that you have a duty to vote. We are all here because we passionately believe in the democratic system and we want everybody to be engaged in it. But we make a concession fairly and properly to those who for religious purposes do not believe in voting, and that is one of the great hallmarks of the liberal-democratic society that we live in—yes, there is a law, but there will be exemptions for certain categories. I say to Senator Brown that whether you like or dislike a particular organisation is completely irrelevant to the consideration of the fundamental principle.

I believe in the freedom of speech. My good friend Senator Marshall, across the chamber, and Senator Brown, up at the end, say things that I passionately disagree with, and I think they are wrong. But the principle of freedom of speech requires me to say, ‘Senator Marshall, Senator Brown and whoever else should have the right to be able to exercise freedom of speech.’ If I were passionately opposed to an organisation and I in fact wanted some payback on them for campaigning against me in the past, that might be fair cop in a political environment, but in a liberal-democratic society would you remove their right to conscientious objection? I say ‘no’ because the principle overrides those considerations.

I believe that conscientious objection is a fundamental and very well understood principle. That is why we find it in a number of areas such as the Commonwealth Electoral Act and, indeed, it has been in the industrial legislation for 50 years. But this particular clause is about as limited and restricted as you could get. Let me repeat: if you have one union member on the floor, the conscientious objection certificate will not be of any value or any benefit and the union will have a right of entry. This is stated in subdivision B under the title ‘Entry to hold discussions’. A union is given entry to hold discussions generally if there are persons who perform work on the premises, and the union is permitted to potentially look after their industrial interests, and they wish to participate. So, if the workers do not wish to participate, under clause 484 they do not have to, and that attacks the right of entry.

Why would a union, in general terms, want to hold discussions? It might be in relation to something at the workplace or recruitment or whatever. All they have got to do is talk to the person in private outside of working hours, or they could get just one person on the workforce to join the union and as soon as that happens the conscientious objection clause will no longer apply. So it is about as limited as you can get.

So I would say to the Labor government and other senators that, in previous times, allegations have been made against this particular organisation known as the Exclusive Brethren, and privilege report after privilege report after privilege report has come down in this chamber where those matters that Senator Bob Brown asserts are disputed. I do not even want to enter into the debate, whether Senator Brown is right or the privilege report statements are right. We are discussing a principle here: should there be such a thing as conscientious objection? And, if we come to the view that conscientious objection is a fundamental principle in our tolerant society, then the benefits of that will fall on whomever they may—in exactly the same way that the right to freedom of speech falls upon the most offensive person of the Left or the Right and those of us who see ourselves as somewhere between those two extremes.

It is the principle we are voting on this evening; it is the principle—not because we do not like a particular person and what he might say, when we consider freedom of speech, or because we do not like a particular organisation that may be the beneficiary of this particular clause. We are voting on a principle, not on an organisation. I hope that this chamber would never go down the track of saying we will jettison a fundamentally important principle and tradition that has been with us for over a half a century, that makes us one of the most tolerant societies in the world and that really does allow us to be the envy of the world, just because we have got a beef with a particular organisation that happens to be a beneficiary under this, might I add, very, very limited clause. We as an opposition will uphold the tradition.

Bob Brown (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

What a ramble that was, one that failed to come up with any logical or coherent reason at all for opposing this amendment. Indeed, the heart of Senator Abetz’s argument was that he would uphold people’s right to free speech, and yet by objecting to this very amendment he is also saying that he also upholds the right of bosses in Brethren workplaces to ban free speech and gathering and unions’ right of entry to hold discussions in those workplaces. What Senator Abetz had to say is completely illogical.

At the heart of this lack of logic is the abuse of the term ‘conscience’. This is not a conscience clause that is protecting the Exclusive Brethren. It is the manipulation of the law through intense and relentless lobbying over the last half-century in several states—and the Exclusive Brethren lobbyists are here with us tonight—that has been able to impose this term ‘conscientious objection’ in a way it was never meant to be applied. I do not know about the references that Senator Abetz made, but I can ask him this: what is it that the Exclusive Brethren owners of workplaces, where 4,000 Australians are being discriminated against by the proposal in this legislation, think is an affront to conscience? Senator Abetz said himself that they object to the right of entry of union representatives to hold discussions. Where is the conscience in that matter? There is none. This is a concoction to prohibit unions from going into the 33 workplaces only in Australia that are controlled by this very secretive sect and prevent them from exposing to the light of day the conditions of those employees. You only have to talk to ex Exclusive Brethren folk—and I have to say they are wonderful people—

Eric Abetz (Tasmania, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

They are.

Bob Brown (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

They are indeed; Senator Abetz and I agree. The ex Exclusive Brethren are fantastic folk. But you only have to talk to them to realise how suborned the people who remain in the clamps of this sect are. Are they going to join a union? They would be excommunicated—and one has to have had a religious avocation at some time in life to know what that means. Of course, that is not going to happen.

I ask Senator Abetz: how would it be if we put into that conscience clause which says that you do not have to vote that you do have to attend a polling place? But you do not have to vote, according to our Electoral Act. What if it said, ‘But if you are going to exercise this you have to join a union first’? What a nonsense. Or you have to join a movement for democracy before you can uphold your use of a conscience clause?

A conscience clause is simply that; it is on a moral and ethical issue of a very high order which is going to cause a person to be greatly affronted when a law related to that issue is imposed on them. But this is not of that order. This is simply an excuse for Exclusive Brethren businesspeople to have special clauses to deny people in their workplaces the rights they should have. There is nothing at all about conscience in this matter; it is all to do with business. It is all to do with business, potentially at the expense of workers’ rights, and that is why I brought forward this amendment.

Eric Abetz (Tasmania, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I have spoken with a number of ex-Exclusive Brethren and to me they seem very jolly, decent people. I have also spoken to Exclusive Brethren. Similarly, they seem to me to be decent people. But the debate is not about whether we like somebody or not; the debate is about the principle. Before we get into the conspiracy theories of 1974 and the member for Bennelong being elected, how do we fit into that theory the fact that the New South Wales Labor Attorney-General introduced into the New South Wales industrial legislation identical clauses which we replicated when we came to government not with Work Choices but as early as 1996? It was not part of Work Choices—it predates that. At the time it was not commented on, not condemned and there was no statement to say that it was outrageous. This has come up now because of Senator Bob Brown’s personal beef with a particular organisation. What is very concerning is that the government has now agreed with Senator Brown to join in that jihad. It is not for Senator Brown or for me to ask: how can something be a conscience matter? This legislation does not want Senator Bob Brown or me to be the judge. We give it to an umpire—Fair Work Australia—to examine and determine whether or not the conscience is genuine. What could be fairer than that?

Bob Brown (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

That is not true!

Eric Abetz (Tasmania, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Senator Brown interjects. I refer him to the clause he wants to delete. Clause 485(3) says:

(3) FWA may endorse a conscientious objection certificate if FWA is satisfied—

so it must satisfy itself that the person who is to get this certificate—

… is a practising member of a religious society or order; and

(b) the doctrines or beliefs of that society … prevent membership of an organisation or body other than that society or order.

That is the test which has to be satisfied. For Senator Bob Brown to make the assertion that these people do not hold conscientious beliefs genuinely, that is for him to assert, but we have an independent body in this country which makes that determination. So Senator Bob Brown is saying that part of this great conspiracy will include Fair Work Australia in the future and that the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, which has, for the past 50 or more years provided such certificates, was part of this conspiracy as well. Unfortunately, that is where Senator Bob Brown’s dislike of a particular organisation has clouded his consideration of a fundamental principle and has, in effect, besmirched the Industrial Relations Commission—by saying that they have granted these certificates in the past in circumstances where the beliefs could not possibly be considered to be conscientious. That is a terrible slight on those good men and women in the Australian Industrial Relations Commission who give thought and consideration to these applications and then make a determination that a conscientious objection certificate should be provided to the particular person.

These certificates can only be applied for by the person who wants them. So you cannot have somebody else fronting up saying, ‘Joe Bloggs would like this and these are the reasons why.’ Joe Bloggs or Josephine herself would need to attend in person to make out the case—a very limited, very strict regime—so that when you read it you would think who on earth would want to apply for this certificate, unless you genuinely and conscientiously believed that which is being protected.

For a liberal-democratic society these sorts of conscientious objection clauses are one of its hallmarks. I also note with some interest that for those who so often try to make their career on the basis of preaching tolerance at all times, when the rubber hits the road they are often the most intolerant of those who have beliefs different from their own. I repeat: this is a principle issue; it is not whether you like an organisation or not. I dare say none of us in this chamber are members of the Exclusive Brethren for one good reason—none of us would agree with their views and beliefs. But just because we do not believe with somebody’s views and beliefs does not mean that we do not offer them, within our societal structure, the opportunity for conscientious objection. This is a fundamental principle and, as legislators, we have to be able to step back from our personal prejudices in certain circumstances and ask: what is the overarching principle? There is a very good and appropriate analogy, can I suggest to Senator Brown, with freedom of speech. Freedom of speech is a fundamental principle. People use it for good; people use it for bad. Nevertheless, it is a fundamental principle that we uphold very dearly, especially on this side of the chamber.

I repeat, we as a coalition, without wanting to enter into all the arguments for or against a particular organisation, are saying that we support a conscientious objection clause on principle. I remind senators that when the Fair Work Bill was considered by the Senate committee—on which there was Greens representation—this issue was not raised in the Greens minority report. The Australian Greens did not mention this as an issue. But they have snuck in an amendment, unfortunately with the support of the government. I simply say to them: it is not too late to abide by those fundamental principles that were held dear for many decades by Labor politicians in Queensland and New South Wales and Labour politicians in the federal parliament in New Zealand on the basis that there are some principles that are just worth adhering to, even if their consequences are such that some people that you may not necessarily be supportive of may benefit.

Joe Ludwig (Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Manager of Government Business in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I will put my position on the record. Do you mind, Senator Brown?

Bob Brown (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

No.

Joe Ludwig (Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Manager of Government Business in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you. I have tried a couple of times to get into the debate. The government has had a very careful look at this. The conscientious objection certificate provisions exempt union entry to certain premises for the purpose of holding discussions with employees where no more than 20 employees work on the premises, where none of the employees are members of the union and where the employer of all of the employees holds a conscientious objection certificate. The Greens have moved an amendment removing ‘conscientious objection certificate’ from this section. So it is not at large. I am at a point of not quite going to what the opposition are saying. Conscientious objection can continue to exist under industrial organisations legislation. The government will support this amendment moved by the Greens, removing the conscientious objection certificate from this bill in the area that it subsists in.

There does not appear to be any compelling reason why an employer’s religious doctrine or belief should prevent a union from being able to talk to individuals whom that employer employs. Whether or not those employees wish to talk to the union, of course, should be a matter for them. On this point I note that the bill maintains the current protections that unions may only talk to employees who want to take part in those discussions. I would also note the limited effect of the existing exemption. It only applies in relation to entry for discussion purposes in circumstances where the employer employs fewer than 20 employees and none of those employees are union members. In addition, a conscientious objection certificate can only be endorsed where the employer is a natural person. This is because only a natural person is capable of having a conscientious objection based on religious beliefs. It means, when you look at it, that even where the person who owns or runs the company has a conscientious objection they will be unable to have it endorsed if the business is incorporated. Given the hour, I just wanted to be succinct so that the chamber is aware, should we go to a vote this evening, of what the government’s position is on this.

Bob Brown (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I will raise just a couple of things. Firstly, I think the government is making a sensible decision here. The Prime Minister did refer to the Exclusive Brethren as an extreme cult—and not without warrant. This is a cult that within recent decades required members to drink whisky because the elect vessel did. It is a cult that requires that women not be in a position of authority over men under any circumstance. More notoriously, it is a cult that separates for life parents from children and children from grandparents and brothers and sisters. It breaks up families in the most cruel circumstances if they happen to leave the cult, because they are excommunicated. The literature on that is far and wide.

So much for freedom of speech and conscience. This clause, if it were allowed to stand, would simply give Exclusive Brethren bosses the right to deprive people in their workplaces of their freedom of speech, of their right to hold discussions. It would deprive them of their right to freedom of association. It would deprive them of their right to join a union. This has nothing to do with whether I like or do not like this organisation; it has everything to do with extending the right of 4,000 people in Exclusive Brethren workplaces to have an association, to have the unions brought in to hold discussions with them. That right—as we have heard from the government—should not be withdrawn by the employer. I might add, where is the conscience against being a member of another organisation? These employers have very prosperous businesses in Australia. They do not mind being part of the organisation of the Australian market, but when it comes to a union they draw the line. It is simply wrong. We should ensure that this excuse for depriving people in workplaces of their rights is not used by any religion—Christian or non-Christian—and it should not be extended to the Exclusive Brethren.

Eric Abetz (Tasmania, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I wonder if I could ask the minister this question. The minister has indicated to us that all we are doing is removing ‘conscientious objection’ in relation to the right of entry to hold discussions.

Joe Ludwig (Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Manager of Government Business in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The right of entry provisions.

Eric Abetz (Tasmania, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In what other circumstances would ‘conscientious objection’ be operable under this proposed legislation?

Joe Ludwig (Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Manager of Government Business in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I can go through the Workplace Relations Act 1996 in detail if you want me to. Those provisions have not been cavilled at in respect of the Fair Work Bill. At part 5 of the Act it provides:

180 Conscientious objection to membership of organisations

(1)  Where a natural person:

       (a)  on application made to a Registrar, satisfies the Registrar :

(i)  in the case of a person who is an employer or is otherwise eligible to join an organisation of employers—that the person’s conscientious beliefs do not allow the person to be a member of an association of the kind described in paragraph 18(1)(a); or

(ii)  in the case of a person who is an employee or is otherwise eligible to join an organisation of employees—that the person’s conscientious beliefs do not allow the person to be a member of an association of the kind described in paragraph 18(1)(b) or 18(1)(c); and

       (b)  pays the prescribed fee to the Registrar;

the Registrar must issue to the person a certificate to that effect in the prescribed form.

That is, the longstanding provision dealing with conscientious objection for a person not to join a union remains. What we are dealing with tonight does not cavil at this provision. Section 3 of that act says:

(3)  Subject to subsection (4), a certificate under subsection (1) remains in force for the period (not exceeding 12 months) …

So it is the usual provision where you pay the fee and you get the exemption from the registrar, and that operates for the period of 12 months or is otherwise renewed in a regular period of 12 months. It goes on from there. I will not go to any further matters unless the opposition want me to.

Eric Abetz (Tasmania, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I ask the minister whether that section will remain in the legislation in the transitional bill.

Joe Ludwig (Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Manager of Government Business in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Yes.

Eric Abetz (Tasmania, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

We will wait and see. I thought it was government policy not to require compulsory membership of any organisation these days, and in those circumstances why would you need to get a conscientious objection clause to joining an organisation if, as the government says, it now believes in voluntary membership? If there is no compulsion under awards or any other circumstances then clearly there is no requirement for a conscientious objection clause.

Joe Ludwig (Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Manager of Government Business in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The short way of putting it is to go back to the 1996 model. I understand that you have a longstanding agreement with conscientious provisions remaining. I think we are keeping them in terms of the 1996 provisions. What happened after 1996 was that they differed in their operation. They were also included in the right of entry provisions. So we are keeping the certificates for conscientious objection, as I indicated. So in relation to the argument you have put forward about its having been a longstanding issue and that it is a fundamental freedom—not withstanding that freedom of association probably overbears on this in any event—the small point I make is that we will maintain these provisions should someone wish to seek a certificate from the registrar if they conscientiously object to joining a union.

Eric Abetz (Tasmania, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Can you quickly confirm that there is no longer the requirement in the regime for anybody to be compelled to be a member of an industrial organisation? And if that is right, then clearly conscientious objection is not required as part of the regime, and therefore my point stands: if we knock out conscientious objection in relation to this, conscientious objection will appear in name only and not in practice.

Joe Ludwig (Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Manager of Government Business in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Do not take this as a facetious question: would you like us to remove that from the legislation?

Eric Abetz (Tasmania, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

No, you are removing conscientious objection.

Joe Ludwig (Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Manager of Government Business in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In any event, I did not want to start an argument with respect to that. The short answer is that we are maintaining it in the way that it was structured in the 1996 legislation where, yes, it had freedom of association provisions and it had, in addition to that, the ability to have a conscientious objection. So both of those provisions are there. If you see some difficulty with them I am not sure I could persuade the advisers to remove the conscientious objection provisions on the basis of the argument you put forward but I am willing to give it a go.

Question put:

That the amendments (Senator Bob Brown’s) be agreed to.

Alan Ferguson (SA, Deputy-President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The question now is that clause 485 stand as printed.

Question negatived.

Progress reported.