Dean Smith (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I thought I would use a few brief moments this morning to put on the record the government's position with regard to the private senator's bill, Human Services Amendment (Photographic Identification and Fraud Prevention) Bill 2019, brought to us by Pauline Hanson's One Nation senators in the Senate. Before doing so, I want to reiterate the government's very, very strong interest, concern and action in dealing with the issue of fraud throughout our public payments system in Australia.

As a starting point, it's worth reading directly from the Department of Human Services's website, which puts into very clear context the commitment and the framework that the government has in making sure that matters of fraud—the inappropriate payment of our welfare benefits to Australians who might seek to make illegitimate claims—is well recognised and is alive and very, very well known to government. Of course, government has a variety of remedies, which I'll come to in a moment.

The website makes it very, very clear. It says:

We—

the government on behalf of Australian taxpayers—

… administer in excess of $165 billion in payments each year. The community and government expect from us—

the Department of Human Services—

the highest standards of integrity, efficiency and effectiveness, including protecting their personal information.

The department says:

Our comprehensive Fraud Control Framework meets these expectations. It includes implementing activities, systems, policies and procedures to prevent fraud involving customers, service providers, employees and contractors.

Our Fraud Control Framework underpins our Fraud Control Plan. The plan is available to all our employees and contractors and outlines how we identify and manage fraud risks.

We conduct fraud risk assessments to identify internal and external fraud risks for all projects, policies and programs—

and, of course, payments—

We implement fraud controls and regularly test them to manage these fraud risks.

The department says:

We have advanced fraud detection methods to identify fraud committed by customers, service providers, employees and contractors. We investigate all suspected fraud and are continually improving our fraud control processes and systems.

The detail of that, of course, can be found regularly in the department's annual reports.

As part of our comprehensive fraud control framework, we have a robust fraud awareness strategy. It promotes an ethical departmental culture. We require our employees and contractors to:

That's not to undermine or diminish, effectively, the theme of what Senator Hanson and Senator Roberts are saying—that is, that governments must maintain complete vigilance when it comes to protecting Australian taxpayers from fraud and in this case with regard to Medicare payments. But, as we heard from Senator Brown and as I will briefly encapsulate, we believe that the remedies and practices that are currently in place do work and I think there's substantial evidence for that. But, I think it is important to put on the record and reiterate that this particular initiative, while it might appear appealing to some in the community, faces some very significant practical difficulties. Those difficulties, I think, reveal themselves when you examine this proposition more closely. They were revealed again in the Shergold report of 2017, which the government responded to in 2019.

At a high level, can I just reiterate the government does not support this bill for three of primary reasons. The first being the likely expense of rolling out the proposed new photo cards would be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. And, when you're looking at the cost of initiatives like this, it's important to measure that expected cost against the likely benefit. When you measure it against the likely benefit, you can't ignore the success that fraud control initiatives are already having in making sure that payments are going to the right people.

Secondly, the government's view is that there is a future potential to skip over photos to an even more secure form of ID such as biometrics, for example. I think this is a very important point: technology is moving at such an effective, efficient rate at the moment that, while you might think that photographs might be a suitable mechanism, it may well be that in future years, in the not-too-distant future, there might be other forms and mechanisms that can do a similar job but with much greater levels of efficiency, accuracy and preserving and protecting people's personal information.

Thirdly, the government's view, as I've alluded to already, is that various measures have already been rolled out to provide similar protections to what the inclusion of a photograph would achieve. So, while Senator Hanson and Senator Roberts have been correct, like coalition senators have been correct, in sensing the constant appetite and constant need for government and agencies of government to be on top of issues around fraud control, we're arguing that things are already being done. We're arguing that the government has a keen eye on these sorts of issues, but the remedy is not what is being proposed in this particular bill.

Before concluding, I think it is important to put on the record a number of key points with regard to this particular issue. There are currently over 25 million people registered on 14 million Medicare cards with many families sharing cards with children listed on their parents' cards. Inclusion of a photo on Medicare cards would require every individual to have a Medicare card of their own. In addition to that, the Department of Human Services currently takes all allegations of noncompliance seriously, and all reports relating to the potential noncompliance and inappropriate claiming are acted upon in accordance with compliance assessment procedures that are already in place that are constantly being updated. A number of compliance strategies are also in place to eliminate fraudulent activities, including data sharing with other departments and agencies. The Department of Human Services strongly defends the integrity of the healthcare system as it currently operates.

I want to reflect briefly on the Shergold review, Peter Shergold being the former and very competent and successful Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. In 2017, Professor Shergold led the Independent Review of Health Providers Access' to Medicare Card Numbers—the Shergold review, as I've referred to it—which included as part of its work an investigation of the issue of the current and potential use of Medicare cards as a proof of identity. The Shergold review recognised the need to appropriately balance access to health services for individuals, particularly vulnerable patients. And we heard Senator Brown talk about the impact that this would have on Indigenous people living in remote communities across Australia, and the need to balance access to health services for individuals with the security of an individual's information. The final report of the Shergold review states:

The Review Panel noted that while adding a photograph or other security feature such as a hologram might have a short term beneficial impact on the illegal reproduction of Medicare cards, such changes are not likely to have a lasting effect.

That's a very important point, when you balance that against the hundreds of millions of dollars that have been estimated that it would cost to initiate something that is proposed in this particular private senator's bill. The report continues:

A more practical and immediate measure is for organisations that accept Medicare cards as evidence of identity to utilise the DVS to confirm that the card and/or number being presented corresponds with a valid and current record held by the Department of Human Services.

The DVS is the Document Verification Service, which is already in operation.

The Shergold review conducted its activity in 2017. The government responded to that in 2018, and the government's response included four key points. The first was a significant public awareness campaign around the protection of Medicare card details, which was launched in March 2018 and is ongoing, using social media platforms, various front-of-house videos and information on DHS websites, and direct communication with peak sector bodies. The second is that the Department of Health has engaged directly with the sector through peak bodies and sought assurance that providers review their identity guidelines to ensure reasonable steps are taken to confirm the identity of a patient when they are being first treated. The third was that the DHS add additional questions to the phone inquiry line for providers seeking to confirm Medicare card details, and also reduce access to this service for providers so that it's used only in exceptional circumstances, such as when delivering services remotely. Finally, the department is also in the process of transitioning all providers to a more secure, digital authentication process for access to our online Medicare card verification services.

The sentiment of the bill—wanting to combat fraud in our very broad and extensive welfare payments system—is to be applauded. The measures contained in this particular bill don't, on close examination, deliver what is a very, very important issue—that is, that we maintain strong controls to ensure that the payments that Australian governments make on behalf of Australian taxpayers to other people to support a universal health system, like we do with Medicare, are properly resourced, and that we avoid instances of fraud. With that, I will conclude my remarks.