Pauline Hanson (Queensland, Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Human Services Amendment (Photographic Identification and Fraud Prevention) Bill 2019 is intended to achieve exactly what it says: to stop, by including photographic indication, a Medicare card from being used by someone other than the person to whom it is issued. Presently there is nothing to stop someone from sharing their Medicare card with anyone who hasn't been issued with a card or is not eligible for a card, in order to source medical services at a cost to the government. I say this because it was brought to my attention by someone who's cousin was visiting Australia and needed to go to the doctor. He borrowed his cousin's Medicare card, went to the doctor and was then put into hospital. He actually died. The owner of the card, an Australian citizen, had to notify the authorities that the person who had actually died was using his name. He was not fined. He was asked to pay the costs.

What I'm saying is that people travelling to Australia as tourists or illegals in the country can access their friends' and families' cards to use at the doctors', at the hospitals or for any medical service that requires a Medicare card and get the taxpayer to pick up the bill. As a result, health providers have no way of verifying that the name on the card is that of the person they are treating.

Eligibility for a Medicare card is available to Australian and New Zealand citizens as well as visitors from a range of countries with which Australia has reciprocal agreements. These countries include Belgium, Finland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Why on earth would we have reciprocal agreements with these countries?

The United Kingdom has a population of 65 million. We have a population of 25 million. People who are travelling out from England to Australia can access our health care at a huge cost to the taxpayer. I think this is a big problem—that people who go to our hospitals in the states are not paying for their care if there is a reciprocal agreement. Hence it is a burden on the taxpayers here in Australia.

We all know that when you travel today, if your travel arrangements are done on a credit card, most of the time the credit card covers that health insurance. We know that a lot of people take out their own personal health insurance, which should be the case. We should not have reciprocal agreements with other countries, especially when their population far exceeds that of Australia's. It's about time we started cleaning up our health act, because the cost to the taxpayers is exorbitant, and we can't give the people in this country the decent health care they need.

Anyone who has a permanent resident visa can also get a card if living in Australia. Even if they aren't, they continue to be eligible for Medicare for 12 months after leaving the country. I can't believe that even 12 months after leaving the country we give them Medicare. You may also get a Medicare card if you live in Australia and have applied for a permanent residency visa or permanent protection visa, provided that you are on a visa allowing you to work or you are the parent, spouse or child of an Australian citizen or permanent resident or a New Zealand citizen living here. It makes me ask the question. If we've got people coming into Australia who come in on a three-month visa and then pull the stunt that they want to stay in Australia, that they're a refugee, they go before the administrative tribunal and overturn the administrative decision that they have to leave the country, they are then put on a bridging visa and the decision could take two years to come down, at a cost of near nothing for them to take through the courts. Then they're allowed to work in Australia. Do they also get the Medicare card? Are they provided with health care? And prior to the decision being brought down that they must leave the country, they leave, because they've worked here, they've made the money, they've got everything provided for them, and then they leave because they've made the money they wanted to make.

We're being taken for mugs in this country—absolute mugs—and you don't do anything about it. The fact is that I see here in Canberra people sleeping out on the streets at night who can't get care or homes. I know of people who wait months if not years to have a necessary operation, and we can't provide that. We can't even open up hospital wards or beds because we haven't got the money or the services to provide to the Australian people.

There are additional ways of qualifying for the free or subsidised health benefits a Medicare card provides, depending on the type of visa you have been granted. As it stands, the use of Medicare cards is wide open to rorting, with nothing to stop a person who does not qualify for free or subsidised medical assistance from borrowing a card from a friend, as does happen. That's exactly what I've explained, and I'll go on further to say that it was told to me years ago that our health system, especially drugs—people coming out here and accessing our doctors to get script after script and then get the medications provided—is costing us to the tune of about $1 billion a year. This is a cost to the Australian taxpayer. And that's exactly what they do: they come out, visit our country, go from doctor to doctor. There's no identification on the card whatsoever. These people are doctor shopping. Then they get the scripts, get the scripts filled, take the medications back to their own countries and sell them on the black market. And of course if that card is tied to someone who's on a welfare payment, they don't pay the full price for a script. Usually it's only a couple of dollars, a few dollars. Again, we're being ripped off. I ask anyone here in this chamber, or anyone who's listening to this: when was the last time someone checked your ID card when you used your Medicare card? I can assure you it's never happened to me. But, then again, I'm more well-known than a lot of the other senators in this place.

But the whole fact is that you go somewhere and you're asked for identification. What identification? A card. In 2012 I went over to Thailand with A Current Affair and I did a program on cards. You can buy Medicare cards in the street. You can buy driver's licences in the street. And the problem is that, when we go to some place and they say, 'Show some identification,' and you pull out a card, usually that person behind the counter has no idea what they're looking for. They see the colour of the card; it looks exactly the same. It could be one of these cards that you can pick up over the internet or that you can buy on the streets of Thailand for $50. I've heard you can get them as cheap as $30. So what happens is that, over a period of the time, with these false driver's licences, false credit cards and false Medicare cards, you're building up your 100 points; when you finally do get the legitimate item you can start rorting the system.

Surely people can see how far behind the eight ball we are. We are backwards when it comes to identification. How many times in this chamber have we spoken about security? But we've never really addressed the concerns here to do with the Medicare card. Why is it not possible to have identification on Medicare cards—to have your photograph on it, like we do on our driver's licences, and to have a chip in it which gets swiped so we know that it is you and we have the information that we need? These are important matters that need to be discussed.

The 2018-19 budget for Medicare—or medical benefits, as it is labelled—is $24.1 billion, compared to an estimated total expenditure in 2017-18 of $23.3 billion. It is forecast to grow to $25.5 billion in 2019-20, $26.8 billion in 2020-21 and $28.2 billion in 2021-22. Medicare costs represent a significant part of the country's health budget, and this is growing as the population ages. Possession of a Medicare card has a financial value to whoever uses it, representing free or subsidised health care. Passports and driver's licences are protected, in part, from fraudulent use by having photographic identification of the person to whom they are issued. I see no reason why this should not also apply to Medicare cards.

I'd like to hear the response in this chamber from any senator who'll give me a legitimate reason why a photograph should not be on our Medicare card to protect against fraudulent activity? Is there any sound reason why it should not be on the card? Surely we have a duty of care to the taxpayers of this nation to ensure that their tax dollars are not being ripped off. Too often do I hear in this chamber that people are saying, 'We need the money.' I have charities and different organisations that are crying out for help and assistance. Just to have half a million dollars or a million dollars would go so far in helping their organisation. If we tackled this problem with the Medicare card, we could ensure that only Australian citizens or permanent residents—people who are truly entitled to use it—have the use of that card. If it is true that we have 65,000 or 70,000 people who are in this country illegally, what are they doing for their health services? Are they paying with cash, or are they using the cards of their family or friends to go to the doctor? Are they utilising our health services and our hospitals and taking up beds they are not entitled to?

It would be very easy for us to get on top of this and ensure there is photographic identification of every Australian, regardless of who they are. Even those people out there who care to wear a burqa should show their face on their Medicare card, and anyone who does not want to have a photograph taken, like for a drivers licence, pays full price; they don't get the benefits of it. If you want taxpayer funded services, whether it be Medicare or anything else, then prove who you are. If it's good enough for drivers licences and if it's good enough for passports, then it's good enough for Medicare. They must actually prove who they are.

I believe that this bill will stop fraudulent use and the consequent drain on the health budget. It will strengthen the integrity of the Medicare scheme—surely an outcome which everyone would welcome. I'm sure you understand that in many other countries around the world there is strain on health care. In the United States and Britain, there is huge strain on their health care. We have a responsibility to the people here to have the money going into the future to provide the decent health care that the Australian people should have, but that all comes at a cost.

The posturing that goes on in this place about stupid bills and other things that we spend so much of our time on is not dealing with the real issues that the people want us to deal with. It's all about getting things right. I hope the bloody-minded attitude stops. Make the changes that the people are demanding and crying out for. Stop the fraudulent activity that's happening in this country, and get photographic identification on our Medicare cards to stop those people who are abusing our system so that we have Medicare here in the long run.

Carol Brown (Tasmania, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Tourism) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Human Services Amendment (Photographic Identification and Fraud Prevention) Bill 2019. This bill seeks to amend the Human Services (Medicare) Act 1973 to include a requirement that photographic identification be present on Medicare cards. Senator Hanson states that this is to militate against fraudulent use of a Medicare card by someone other than the person to whom it is allocated. As a matter of principle, Labor will support considered and sensible measures that address Medicare fraud.

In considering this support, it is important to be clear about whether fraud is occurring presently; if it is, how that fraud is occurring; whether this bill will have the effect of addressing fraud, if, indeed, fraud is occurring; whether what is proposed in this bill is the most effective way of achieving the outcome of addressing Medicare fraud; the financial impact of the proposed changes; the impact on individuals, especially as it relates to their privacy; the impact on providers, especially medical practitioners, psychologists and others who bill to Medicare; and the government's capacity to implement any proposed changes. The impact on privacy is especially important, and I will go into this in more detail later. The red-tape impact of the proposed changes must also be considered. Finally, it is important to consider any unintended consequences of the bill.

There are a huge number of Medicare transactions every day. According to the Australian Medical Association, there are 45,000 provider interactions with Health Professional Online Services every day, and an estimated 27,000 HPOS confirmations of Medicare details; and, in the last year, 148.8 million GP services claimed against Medicare. The AMA said in 2017:

There is no evidence of a systemic problem and no evidence that patients' health information has been compromised.

From the outset, it should be noted that there are additional ways that a person's identity can be verified through the use of their Medicare card. In 2011 Medicare cards were added to the Attorney-General's Department's Document of Verification Service, DVS. To quote a government report from 2017:

The DVS is a secure, online system that enables user organisations to match information on a range of evidence of identity documents against the corresponding record of the document issuing agency. In addition to helping to strengthen the integrity of Medicare cards, the DVS provides a government-endorsed method for their verification, including for private sector organisations such as banks and telecommunications providers which have legislated customer identification requirements. The DVS operates 24 hours a day and can provide verification of identity documents within seconds.

Medicare cards are now the second most commonly verified document through the DVS: during 2016-17 around 4.6 million or 15 per cent of all DVS transactions were conducted using Medicare card data. More than half (55 per cent) of these checks were conducted by the private sector.

This detail is worth knowing, in the context of the significant changes proposed in this bill.

We also need to consider the practical consequences and, potentially, unintended consequences of what this bill proposes. One obvious implication that must be considered, in the context of the changes this bill proposes, is that for many families it is not just an individual but several members of a family on a Medicare card. The practical consideration of having current photos of children as they age or shifting to individual cards, to avoid having many photographs on the one Medicare card, is something that would need to be explored, in detail, if this proposal were to be given serious consideration. This alone would preclude this bill from being agreed to in its current form. As I said at the outset, Labor will support sensible measures to address Medicare fraud. But there are many actual and, potentially, unintentioned consequences, where this bill would affect that need, to be considered in proper detail.

Accordingly, in considering changes of this magnitude, a process ought to be established that allows all affected stakeholders to provide their input into the proposal and for the government to thoroughly examine all of these issues. We can, therefore, look to what has been considered in the past, when similar questions and proposals have been considered. There has been a significant body of work done quite recently into the proposal raised in this bill. In July 2017 the government commissioned the Independent Review of Health Providers' Access to Medicare Card Numbers. The purpose of this review was:

… to consider the balance between appropriate access to Medicare card numbers for health professionals and the security of patients’ Medicare card numbers.

It was in response to media reports that Australians' Medicare data had been breached and was available for sale on the dark web. The review was chaired by former Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet Professor Peter Shergold; the president of the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners, Dr Bastian Seidel; then president of the Australian Medical Association Dr Michael Gannon; and Dr Kean-Seng Lim, deputy chair of the Australian Medical Association Council of General Practice.

This review made 14 representations, informed by presentations and written submissions from professionals and community and consumer organisations. The recommendations covered the specifics in this bill, such as whether photographic ID or some other form of security, like a hologram, should be on a person's Medicare card. The review panel also considered whether a person should have to provide a secondary form of ID when they first attend a health service. There were a number of significant groups that were opposed to this proposal, which I will come to later.

Of particular relevance to the proposal raised in this bill is the review's observation that for some groups their Medicare card is their principal source of ID. The National Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisation submitted to the review:

Many of our Aboriginal patients use their Medicare card as their only form of identification – many do not have a Drivers' License or a Proof of Identity card. If this was no longer available for use as a form of identification, this would make access to essential welfare services extremely difficult for our patients.

To also quote the review panel directly in response to this, they say:

It is the Review Panel's view that any measure taken to prevent Medicare cards being used as a recognised form of secondary evidence of identity, as some submissions have suggested, has the potential to disadvantage certain vulnerable members of the community. It would also have significant impacts on a range of government and private sector organisations, and have a flow on effect on consumers, particularly in the telecommunications sector which has legislated customer identification requirements for pre-paid mobile phones. The education sector would also be significantly affected considering the Medicare card is used to support the issuance of a large number of Unique Student Identifiers.

To this point, the first recommendation of the review panel was 'that the Medicare card be retained as a form of secondary evidence for identity purposes'. The review panel also specifically considered whether having a photographic ID on a Medicare card might have the effect of reducing fraud.

The review panel responded to that proposal:

The Review Panel noted that while adding a photograph or other security feature such as a hologram might have a short term beneficial impact on the illegal reproduction of Medicare cards, such changes are not likely to have a lasting effect. A more practical and immediate measure is for organisations that accept Medicare cards as evidence of identity to utilise the DVS to confirm that the card and/or number being presented corresponds with a valid and current record held by the Department of Human Services.

As mentioned, the review also considered whether another source of ID in addition to a Medicare card should be presented when a person presents at a health facility for the first time. The Northern Territory Department of Health said of this proposal:

The NT does not support introducing additional identity requirements for this purpose as this has the potential to put added pressure on remote clinics and impact disproportionately on remote (particularly Aboriginal) people …

In short, it would be logistically challenging and impractical to require all patients to provide more than one type of identification aligning to their Medicare card. Further, any such requirement must not be able to be used as a reason to deny access to essential health care.

The Australian Medical Association said, 'It would place an additional administrative burden on practices and put in place an unnecessary barrier to care for patients.' The Australian Privacy Foundation said:

At the outset the Foundation emphasises the fundamental importance of trust as a basis of the delivery of health services to all Australians, including in instances where a recipient may not hold a card or other token of entitlement to services. Respect for that trust through a coherent, principled and effective privacy regime is not antithetical to good governance, efficiency and responsiveness to individual needs.

The National Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisation said:

It is critically important to remember health services, particularly in remote areas, that they continue to have access to clients Medicare numbers which:

…

• imposes no additional requirement for identifying people since many clients do not carry identification.

The review panel's finding on this point was as follows:

Existing requirements around patient identification for clinical safety purposes would be consistent with a requirement that health professionals should be confident of the identity of their patients for Medicare billing purposes, and this should not pose a barrier to care. This would provide assurance that patients are using their own identity to access healthcare, and that they are eligible to receive a Medicare benefit.

The committee did also recommend:

… as a condition of claiming Medicare benefits on behalf of patients, health professionals should be required to take reasonable steps to confirm the identity of patients when they are first treated.

The government formally responded to the review panel's report in February 2018. I note that it agreed, without qualification, to 13 of the review panel's 14 recommendations and agreed, in principle, to the other recommendation, pending further examination of implementation options. One of the main changes resulting from this is that health providers seek another source of identification in addition to a person's Medicare card when presenting at a health service. Of this change, the government, in response to the review panel's report, said:

This should not be onerous, and should not serve as a barrier to health care. By providing identification, consumers will be playing an essential role in supporting the ongoing integrity of the Medicare system. The Government will also empower consumers to protect their own Medicare card information by building public awareness and supporting consumers to access information about how their Medicare card number is used.

One final point worth noting is that this proposal is likely to have a very significant financial impact well into the hundreds of millions of dollars. This would need to be taken into consideration in formally considering any proposal. Labor believes that the case has not been made to support this bill. Labor encourages the government to look at this issue in more detail, particularly as technology changes, ever mindful of protecting Australians' privacy, reducing red-tape burden on health professionals and organisations and making sure that Medicare fraud is eliminated entirely.

Dean Smith (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thought I would use a few brief moments this morning to put on the record the government's position with regard to the private senator's bill, Human Services Amendment (Photographic Identification and Fraud Prevention) Bill 2019, brought to us by Pauline Hanson's One Nation senators in the Senate. Before doing so, I want to reiterate the government's very, very strong interest, concern and action in dealing with the issue of fraud throughout our public payments system in Australia.

As a starting point, it's worth reading directly from the Department of Human Services's website, which puts into very clear context the commitment and the framework that the government has in making sure that matters of fraud—the inappropriate payment of our welfare benefits to Australians who might seek to make illegitimate claims—is well recognised and is alive and very, very well known to government. Of course, government has a variety of remedies, which I'll come to in a moment.

The website makes it very, very clear. It says:

We—

the government on behalf of Australian taxpayers—

… administer in excess of $165 billion in payments each year. The community and government expect from us—

the Department of Human Services—

the highest standards of integrity, efficiency and effectiveness, including protecting their personal information.

The department says:

Our comprehensive Fraud Control Framework meets these expectations. It includes implementing activities, systems, policies and procedures to prevent fraud involving customers, service providers, employees and contractors.

Our Fraud Control Framework underpins our Fraud Control Plan. The plan is available to all our employees and contractors and outlines how we identify and manage fraud risks.

We conduct fraud risk assessments to identify internal and external fraud risks for all projects, policies and programs—

and, of course, payments—

We implement fraud controls and regularly test them to manage these fraud risks.

The department says:

We have advanced fraud detection methods to identify fraud committed by customers, service providers, employees and contractors. We investigate all suspected fraud and are continually improving our fraud control processes and systems.

The detail of that, of course, can be found regularly in the department's annual reports.

As part of our comprehensive fraud control framework, we have a robust fraud awareness strategy. It promotes an ethical departmental culture. We require our employees and contractors to:

That's not to undermine or diminish, effectively, the theme of what Senator Hanson and Senator Roberts are saying—that is, that governments must maintain complete vigilance when it comes to protecting Australian taxpayers from fraud and in this case with regard to Medicare payments. But, as we heard from Senator Brown and as I will briefly encapsulate, we believe that the remedies and practices that are currently in place do work and I think there's substantial evidence for that. But, I think it is important to put on the record and reiterate that this particular initiative, while it might appear appealing to some in the community, faces some very significant practical difficulties. Those difficulties, I think, reveal themselves when you examine this proposition more closely. They were revealed again in the Shergold report of 2017, which the government responded to in 2019.

At a high level, can I just reiterate the government does not support this bill for three of primary reasons. The first being the likely expense of rolling out the proposed new photo cards would be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. And, when you're looking at the cost of initiatives like this, it's important to measure that expected cost against the likely benefit. When you measure it against the likely benefit, you can't ignore the success that fraud control initiatives are already having in making sure that payments are going to the right people.

Secondly, the government's view is that there is a future potential to skip over photos to an even more secure form of ID such as biometrics, for example. I think this is a very important point: technology is moving at such an effective, efficient rate at the moment that, while you might think that photographs might be a suitable mechanism, it may well be that in future years, in the not-too-distant future, there might be other forms and mechanisms that can do a similar job but with much greater levels of efficiency, accuracy and preserving and protecting people's personal information.

Thirdly, the government's view, as I've alluded to already, is that various measures have already been rolled out to provide similar protections to what the inclusion of a photograph would achieve. So, while Senator Hanson and Senator Roberts have been correct, like coalition senators have been correct, in sensing the constant appetite and constant need for government and agencies of government to be on top of issues around fraud control, we're arguing that things are already being done. We're arguing that the government has a keen eye on these sorts of issues, but the remedy is not what is being proposed in this particular bill.

Before concluding, I think it is important to put on the record a number of key points with regard to this particular issue. There are currently over 25 million people registered on 14 million Medicare cards with many families sharing cards with children listed on their parents' cards. Inclusion of a photo on Medicare cards would require every individual to have a Medicare card of their own. In addition to that, the Department of Human Services currently takes all allegations of noncompliance seriously, and all reports relating to the potential noncompliance and inappropriate claiming are acted upon in accordance with compliance assessment procedures that are already in place that are constantly being updated. A number of compliance strategies are also in place to eliminate fraudulent activities, including data sharing with other departments and agencies. The Department of Human Services strongly defends the integrity of the healthcare system as it currently operates.

I want to reflect briefly on the Shergold review, Peter Shergold being the former and very competent and successful Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. In 2017, Professor Shergold led the Independent Review of Health Providers Access' to Medicare Card Numbers—the Shergold review, as I've referred to it—which included as part of its work an investigation of the issue of the current and potential use of Medicare cards as a proof of identity. The Shergold review recognised the need to appropriately balance access to health services for individuals, particularly vulnerable patients. And we heard Senator Brown talk about the impact that this would have on Indigenous people living in remote communities across Australia, and the need to balance access to health services for individuals with the security of an individual's information. The final report of the Shergold review states:

The Review Panel noted that while adding a photograph or other security feature such as a hologram might have a short term beneficial impact on the illegal reproduction of Medicare cards, such changes are not likely to have a lasting effect.

That's a very important point, when you balance that against the hundreds of millions of dollars that have been estimated that it would cost to initiate something that is proposed in this particular private senator's bill. The report continues:

A more practical and immediate measure is for organisations that accept Medicare cards as evidence of identity to utilise the DVS to confirm that the card and/or number being presented corresponds with a valid and current record held by the Department of Human Services.

The DVS is the Document Verification Service, which is already in operation.

The Shergold review conducted its activity in 2017. The government responded to that in 2018, and the government's response included four key points. The first was a significant public awareness campaign around the protection of Medicare card details, which was launched in March 2018 and is ongoing, using social media platforms, various front-of-house videos and information on DHS websites, and direct communication with peak sector bodies. The second is that the Department of Health has engaged directly with the sector through peak bodies and sought assurance that providers review their identity guidelines to ensure reasonable steps are taken to confirm the identity of a patient when they are being first treated. The third was that the DHS add additional questions to the phone inquiry line for providers seeking to confirm Medicare card details, and also reduce access to this service for providers so that it's used only in exceptional circumstances, such as when delivering services remotely. Finally, the department is also in the process of transitioning all providers to a more secure, digital authentication process for access to our online Medicare card verification services.

The sentiment of the bill—wanting to combat fraud in our very broad and extensive welfare payments system—is to be applauded. The measures contained in this particular bill don't, on close examination, deliver what is a very, very important issue—that is, that we maintain strong controls to ensure that the payments that Australian governments make on behalf of Australian taxpayers to other people to support a universal health system, like we do with Medicare, are properly resourced, and that we avoid instances of fraud. With that, I will conclude my remarks.

Malcolm Roberts (Queensland, Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

As a servant to the people of Queensland and Australia, I rise to discuss the core of this bill, the Human Services Amendment (Photographic Identification and Fraud Prevention) Bill 2019—that is, providing integrity. And that leads to accountability. Accountability in this parliament is so low, and people right around our country know that. Anybody who goes from this parliament as a representative of the people, and listens to the people, will find out that the people can cite instances where the accountability is low. Integrity is what it's all about.

As a One Nation senator for Queensland, I know that our supporters have a moral compass and a strong work ethic. So they're annoyed—because any lapse in accountability, any lapse in security or any lapse in integrity is paid for by the taxpayer, and the taxpayers are on the hook already for $160 billion worth of welfare. Now much of that welfare is necessary: age pensions, Department of Veterans' Affairs pensions and so on. Much of it is necessary, and we are a generous people. We Australians are known for our generosity. We will help mates. We will also help mates around the world who aren't Australians, and that is where the problem comes because of our generosity. We've all heard the saying 'generous to a fault'. We are generous to a fault because we turn a blind eye to the people who are ripping us off. Some of those people, as Senator Hanson mentioned, have come from overseas. They have been here five minutes and are plugging into a system to which they're not entitled.

Through this bill we're looking to provide for the security of taxpayers. That is important. If we don't provide for the security of taxpayers and accountability of government spending of taxpayer money—and that's where it comes from: increasingly burdened taxpayers—it will end up undermining the payment of benefits long term. We can pay welfare payments only while the taxpayers are able to fund it. Who pays for government failures? The people pay for government failures. One of our many roles here in parliament is to protect the people's money.

We have instances where people have found retribution from Centrelink because Centrelink has made mistakes. Every person, agency and entity makes mistakes. We're not debating that. Centrelink has come back savagely and torn into people. That shows that the system is not working. They don't have the data.

We also see people in this chamber wanting to increase Newstart. That's wonderful, and we support them on many aspects of that. We ourselves want to increase the payment of pensions to married couples—$150 per fortnight. It is one of our policies That has an impact on many other pensions. We are about maintaining generosity. We are about maintaining fairness—that is fundamental to Australian values and fundamental to One Nation—but we are also about accountability, responsibility and stopping the rorting.

As I said, the key word in this bill is 'integrity'. I see a lack of integrity around this parliament. I mentioned it when I was first in the Senate and I mentioned it again at the start of this parliament, the 46th Parliament. Taxpayers are on the hook here and taxpayers lack protection because there is a lack of accountability. Let's have a look at some of the basic economic management in this country. Let's look at the primacy of energy and see if we can find where the integrity is there. You will find there is a lack of integrity in economic management and a lack of integrity in the management of energy.

In this country we used to have competitive federalism as a foundation stone to our Constitution. That has been blown to the side and completely ignored. We now have centralisation, and with centralisation comes a lack of competition for managing this country's resources. We now find that we have centralised bureaucracy running what they call a market—but it's not a national energy market; it's a national energy racket. It has been so abused. The government itself has admitted that there is now rorting. There is gaming going on. This is just one example of a supposedly transparent scheme where the masses don't benefit directly. The gaming of the national energy market leads to multinationals and large Australian companies rorting the system and driving up the price of electricity. And who pays? The people who use electricity pay. It is now a necessity.

In addition to the national energy market we find that the bureaucracy is now gold plating the networks, so we have people making huge amounts of profit unreasonably, despite the protection that should be there. We have then things like the actual payment rates for retail providers of electricity. In some states they are guaranteed returns of around 26 per cent. Then we have things like the state government in Queensland actually owning the generators on behalf of the taxpayers but privatising them so, instead of it being a department that is accountable to the taxpayers at every election, we now have a corporation with a board of directors. We used to have a system in this country where the focus was on driving down the price of electricity and each state competed with other states to drive down the price of electricity while ensuring reliability. We now have an inherently unreliable system that is mismatched and mismanaged with a hodgepodge of renewables and intermittents coming in. What happens is that in Queensland and in other states, wherever there is a corporatised system—which is the case for the generators in our state—the emphasis of the directors is on maximising productivity. That's how they manage and that's how they're held accountable. So, when they maximise their profit, they drive a maximising of electricity prices—the complete opposite of the old competitive federalism where we drove down the price of electricity. We used to have an actual market between states and any—

Sue Lines (WA, Deputy-President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Resume your seat, Senator Roberts. Yes, Senator Sterle?

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

On a point of order: I'm trying to get my head around this speech by Senator Roberts and I can't find anywhere where he's relevant to the bill in front of us. Maybe he might be able to help me out?

Sue Lines (WA, Deputy-President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Senator Sterle. It is a broad-ranging debate. I think he is being relevant, but I will continue to listen closely. Thank you, Senator Roberts.

Malcolm Roberts (Queensland, Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

That's why I started on the concept of integrity because that is what goes to the heart of this bill: integrity of our payments, to protect taxpayers who are on the hook for everything the government spends now and in the future. We want to cut down the rorting of welfare. We've had Senator Brown talk about if, indeed, fraud is occurring. Hello! Go and talk to the people in the street. They will tell you fraud is occurring. They will give you examples of fraud occurring.

Coming back to energy: what we're seeing there is that the fraud and the lack of integrity is due to government policies under both Liberal and Labor Party governments over the last 30 to 40 years. I can give you specific examples, but, at the risk of upsetting the senators, I won't go into that any further.

Let's have a look at PFAS, which is hurting the people in Oakey, the people at Richmond, the people at Williamstown and the people of many defence installations and other airports around the country. We are supposed to be protecting our citizens with defence installations. Yet we find the defence installations, through the use and abuse of PFAS, are now hurting not only the lives but the livelihood of citizens, everyday Australians around this country. I've been listening to the residents of Oakey and how they're so upset, how they've been affected and how their health is suffering. They've been told not to eat produce grown in their own backyards in a western Queensland town, the rural town of Oakey—grown in a rich soil, but they've been told not to eat it. That affects the health of these people. The Defence department has been given recommendations from a joint committee that looked into this twice and they're ignoring those recommendations, fundamental recommendations about health.

Sue Lines (WA, Deputy-President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you. Senator Sterle?

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Once again, a point of order on relevance. I, for the life of me, cannot understand what Senator Roberts is talking about. We are discussing, or are arguing about, the photographic identification. He hasn't even gone to the purpose of the bill.

Sue Lines (WA, Deputy-President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I do agree. I was just checking my understanding with the Clerk because I've come into this debate while it's current. Senator Roberts, you do need to address the bill in question. I think in the last few minutes you were not doing that. You can have a broad-ranging discussion, but it does need to connect back to the bill.

Malcolm Roberts (Queensland, Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

As I said, the fundamental intent of our bill is to have a photographic card to ensure integrity. That is it. I am giving examples of how that lack of integrity is pervasive in our centralised form of governance.

Sue Lines (WA, Deputy-President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Senator Roberts, I remind you that it's not okay to make a statement about what the bill is about and then completely go off topic. You need to connect it up.

Malcolm Roberts (Queensland, Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

We wish to stop rorting. As Senator Hanson has stated herself, a number of people can give us examples of where people have rorted the system, used the same Medicare card repeatedly for many, many people. Having photographic identification would make sure that that would be minimised. Senator Smith himself, in criticising One Nation's proposal, acknowledged that perhaps they will be going even further into the future by looking at holograms and looking at biometric identification. That's very tight, indeed.

We are pleased to see that we are at least starting the debate to bring accountability back. That's because, as I keep saying, the people who pay for the undoubted fraud and the people who pay for the lack of integrity are the taxpayers. Our supporters, One Nation voters, have a moral compass and a very strong work ethic. I can give you examples of the lack of integrity, but I will just commend this bill to the parliament. I also seek leave to continue my remarks later.

Leave granted; debate adjourned.