Trish Crossin (NT, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The President has received the following letter, dated 11 October 2006, from Senator Milne:

Dear Mr President

Pursuant to standing order 75, I give notice that today I propose to move “That, in the opinion of the Senate, the following is a matter of urgency:

The need for the Australian government to take actions that strengthen and not undermine the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty following North Korea’s nuclear weapons test.

Yours sincerely

Christine Milne

Senator for the State of Tasmania

Is the proposal supported?

More than the number of senators required by the standing orders having risen in their places—

The Acting Deputy President:

I understand that informal arrangements have been made to allocate specific times to each of the speakers in today’s debate. With the concurrence of the Senate, I shall ask the clerks to set the clock accordingly.

Christine Milne (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I move:

That, in the opinion of the Senate, the following is a matter of urgency:The need for the Australian Government to take actions that strengthen and not undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty following North Korea’s nuclear weapons test.

With the news this week that North Korea has detonated a nuclear weapon and news since that time that North Korea is using the threat of the use of a weapon to try to force the United States to the negotiating table, on top of our awareness that Iran’s nuclear aspirations are destabilising global security, together with calls from the new head of al-Qaeda in Iraq for nuclear specialists from around the world to provide the materials for a terrorist bomb, I think it is fair to say that the world is on the cusp of a new era of accelerated nuclear proliferation. If ever there was a matter of urgency for the Senate to discuss, it is what response Australia should have to this particularly frightening new development in terms of global peace and nuclear proliferation.

We are aware that we have come a very long way from the time when former Prime Minister Keating established the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. It is a tragedy for Australia that the initiative taken by a Labor prime minister in 1995 was ended—that initiative ended with the election of the Howard government—and that effort to lead Australia to offer global leadership in nuclear non-proliferation has largely dissipated in the last decade, such that Australia, having had a leadership role, is now being seen as a deputy sheriff to the United States in a world that is becoming increasingly dangerous.

Following the explosion of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War, the world was shocked into the reality of what nuclear weapons could do. In 1953, US President Eisenhower made his famous ‘Atoms for peace’ speech based on his conviction at that time that the world was racing towards catastrophe. He said:

So my country’s purpose is to help us move out of the dark chamber of horrors into the light …

                 …         …           …

It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.

He proposed disarmament. By 1968 we had the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which essentially codified a bargain that the five existing nuclear weapon states—the United States, the USSR, China, France and Great Britain—were to negotiate in good faith to disarm and that the non-nuclear states were to be guaranteed assistance in developing civilian nuclear power in return for agreeing not to pursue their own weapons. By the mid-1970s, however, things were deteriorating. In 1974, India conducted a nuclear test, and it is obvious that the expertise and material for India to be able to do that were provided by the United States. By the early seventies it was very clear that the peaceful atom and the destructive atom could not be kept separate. The spirit and the spread of nuclear knowledge and technology for peaceful purposes was clearly spreading weapons—and it still does to this day.

Since then we have had news of the Khan network. For 30 years this Pakistani used his knowledge and networks from Pakistan to build a clandestine procurement network around the world. For many countries, the nuclear bomb represented security and prestige, and countries used the proliferation of nuclear technology for strategic priorities. The US gave it to the UK, France gave it to Israel, the Soviet Union gave it to China and China gave it to Pakistan—and now we are on the verge of the United States giving it to India, outside the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and with the support of Australia. What I think we should be looking at today is whether or not Australia will sell its uranium to India. (Time expired)

Marise Payne (NSW, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I appreciate the opportunity to take part in this discussion this afternoon and particularly to place on the Senate record Australia’s strong record of leadership in this area. I want to refer to a few different aspects of this discussion. I begin by saying that the country of which we are speaking, North Korea, has one of the most appalling human rights records in the world. The longstanding food crisis that North Korea has allowed to develop over years and years has resulted in chronic malnutrition amongst children in particular and amongst urban populations, particularly in the northern provinces. In a country where fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of movement continue to be denied and where access by independent monitors is severely restricted, it is of no surprise that this is the sort of behaviour that in this instance we end up with. There are well-documented reports of widespread political imprisonment, of appalling conditions in detention and of both torture and ill-treatment, and extrajudicial executions are regarded as an unfortunate matter of course in a country like North Korea. But the bottom line is that those who lose the most from the regime’s behaviour on this occasion are their own poor and starving millions—again and again and again.

In relation to the motion that Senator Milne has moved noting the need for the Australian government to take actions that strengthen and not undermine the nuclear non-proliferation treaty following this nuclear weapon’s test, I think it is important to state very early in the debate that the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery is a longstanding national security priority for Australia. Not just this government but successive Australian governments have recognised that if more states were to acquire nuclear weapons, even those that are far-removed from Australia, it would increase the risk of nuclear weapons being used, would destabilise both regional and international relations and would undermine global restraints on nuclear proliferation. More recently, we note that the emergence of a new form of global terrorism only adds urgency to the threat that terrorists might one day themselves carry out an act of nuclear or radiological terrorism.

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the NPT, which entered into force in 1970, was ratified by Australia in 1973. It is the centrepiece of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We have been one of the longest and strongest supporters of the NPT, recognising at a very early stage that its future would have a major impact on the future security environment both globally and in Australia’s own region. It is the most widely supported arms control treaty ever. Only India, Pakistan and Israel have never joined. North Korea in theory joined but claims to have withdrawn.

It has, though, come under challenge in recent years. Some states have clearly been able to pursue clandestine nuclear programs while still being a party to the NPT and subject to IAEA safeguards, and that indicates that there are weaknesses in the verification mechanisms to ensure that states are adhering to their NPT obligations. The announced withdrawal by North Korea from the NPT in 2003 brought to the fore the risk of states acquiring sensitive nuclear technology on the basis of being an NPT member and for ostensibly peaceful use and then subsequently withdrawing from the treaty to pursue nuclear weapons. The announcement on 9 October—in quite bizarre terms, it seems to me—that North Korea had conducted a nuclear test is indeed a grave threat to peace and security in the region and beyond and a further serious challenge to the NPT based nuclear non-proliferation regime.

As far as the NPT itself is concerned, the parties meet every five years to review the operation of the treaty. They met in May 2005. We have been a strong contributor at all of those review conferences and we have used them to pursue strengthened operation of the treaty. In fact, in 2005 at the review conference the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Downer, said—and I quote briefly from his remarks:

... no multilateral treaty has done as much to strengthen our collective and national security as the NPT in its 35 years.

But he warned:

... if the NPT is to continue serving our interests well, this Review Conference must tackle the serious challenges we now face.

Of course, that conference is on record as not reaching consensus on measures to strengthen the treaty, and Australia noted its disappointment in that regard, because we had worked very hard to find common ground at the conference. We worked with Japan, in particular, producing a joint paper on nuclear disarmament measures, and many members shared our strong support for entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and for the negotiation of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In that context of the discussion, we coordinated a small group of countries, the G10, which submitted proposals on nuclear safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy issues. But we also noted, having seen the disappointing result, that the future of the NPT did not hinge on the outcome of that review conference. It was disappointing that it did not produce a final document, but it was not fatal. Other review conferences have suffered from the same defect. Australia maintains its absolutely strong support for the NPT, marked by its participation in that review conference process.

I want to make some brief remarks about the IAEA safeguards and in particular note that the weaknesses in those safeguard systems, which were exposed by the 1991 discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program, are now being remedied by the IAEA’s strengthened safeguard system and, in particular, the adoption of the additional protocol to those safeguard agreements which extends and improves the IAEA’s inspection, information and access rights.

In 1997, we were the first country to conclude an additional protocol with the IAEA and in 2005 we announced our intention to make the additional protocol a condition for the supply of Australian uranium to non-nuclear weapons states. We worked very actively in that process. In relation to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, that treaty itself reinforces the nuclear non-proliferation regime by banning all nuclear explosions, and we strongly support the CTBT’s entry into force. While it did not overcome the final hurdle of being adopted in the conference on disarmament, in 1996, Australia led international action through the foreign minister in taking the treaty to the UN in New York, where an overwhelming majority of countries adopted it. In 2005 the foreign minister chaired a conference of CTBT parties in New York on ways to accelerate its entry into force, and he chaired a further meeting of those parties in September 2006. So we operate at a very high level in that regard and do take the sort of leadership that Senator Milne commented on in her earlier remarks.

We have also been active in supporting international efforts to strengthen controls on the spread of sensitive nuclear technology. At the NPT review conference to which I referred earlier, in May 2005, the minister called for the development of a new framework to limit the spread of sensitive nuclear technology while respecting rights to peaceful nuclear energy. We have a long record in this country of demonstrating strong support for the rights of NPT parties to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We note that these rights are not unqualified and do not automatically extend to proliferation-sensitive technologies. We are a very active participant in the international dialogue on sensitive nuclear technology issues and we follow those very closely, not only from the non-proliferation perspective but also in view of our role as a major uranium supplier.

In terms of the stronger physical security of nuclear and other radioactive materials and nuclear facilities, we know that physical security is essential to protecting against nuclear and radiological terrorism and we also know that the IAEA makes a crucial contribution in that area. We were one of the first countries to contribute to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, which was set up to support their 2002 action plan which was designed to upgrade worldwide protection against acts of terrorism that involved nuclear and other radioactive materials.

We are a very strong advocate of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which seeks to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear material and the acquisition of nuclear material by terrorists. We have been an active contributor in negotiations on amendments to the CPPNM to extend its application. We chaired the main committee on that at the July 2005 diplomatic conference. In 2003 we also chaired negotiations in the IAEA which developed the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. In 2004 we hosted a conference in this region, the ministerial-level Asia-Pacific Nuclear Safeguards and Security Conference. It is not true to say that Australia is not continuing to take a role in leadership in this area, and it would be disappointing to ignore all of those facts.

I note that part of the discussion which Senator Milne began before she concluded her earlier remarks—and I know she will continue later—was in relation to Australia’s sale of uranium and Australia’s uranium export policy. And that important element of Australia’s support for the non-proliferation regime is the policy which we run at the moment— (Time expired)

Chris Evans (WA, Australian Labor Party, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise on behalf of the Labor opposition to speak in support of the motion put by Senator Milne:

That, in the opinion of the Senate, the following is a matter of urgency:The need for the Australian government to take actions that strengthen and not undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty following North Korea’s nuclear weapons test.

This motion arises in response to an underground nuclear test carried out by North Korea on 9 October, following an indication six days earlier of its intention to carry out such a test. This test follows North Korea’s highly provocative testing of its long-range missiles in July this year, which led to a UN Security Council resolution condemning the missile tests and calling on member states to prevent the sale of arms and technology to North Korea. For some time now, the North Korean regime has used the threat of a potential nuclear arsenal to influence the international community.

I want to reiterate Labor’s unequivocal condemnation of this action by North Korea and its destabilising effect on the region. I note reports this morning that North Korea may have conducted a second underground test. We obviously have to wait for confirmation of those reports but if they prove to be correct it makes the situation even more disturbing. Monday’s nuclear test by the North Korean regime is highly provocative and threatens the delicate regional security balance in North Asia. It has serious implications for North Korea’s relations with its neighbours, for an escalation of regional tension and possibly for a regional arms build-up which could see other countries in North Asia look to develop a nuclear capability. Instability in North Asia and the broader Asian region presents a challenge to Australian national security—and, of course, to our international trade, as North Asia takes about 39 per cent of our total exports.

Labor calls for a very strong United Nations Security Council resolution imposing tougher sanctions on North Korea and enforceable under chapter 7 of the UN charter. We also offer our in-principle support for the draft proposal being circulated by the US, which would impose tougher sanctions on the regime. We do believe, however, that further sanctions should not impact on the humanitarian assistance to the people of North Korea. The humanitarian situation facing the North Korean population is of deep concern and it is disturbing that the regime would choose to pursue hostile military technologies while failing to provide for the most basic welfare of its people. It beggars belief that the regime would commit such extensive resources to weapons of mass destruction and military capability when so many of its citizens go hungry and have to rely on international humanitarian support.

In response to this week’s test, Labor has called upon the Howard government to build a diplomatic initiative, working with regional foreign ministers to develop consensus on the way forward. Labor strongly supports the non-proliferation treaty, strengthening safeguards against further horizontal proliferation and encouraging reductions in nuclear armaments. We believe that Australia should be at the forefront of international efforts towards these objectives.

For some time, Labor has been urging the government to launch a diplomatic initiative to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In July this year, Kim Beazley, the Leader of the Opposition, called for the development of a diplomatic caucus of countries committed to the principles of non-proliferation and pushing nonproliferation to the centre of international politics. Among the objectives of this group would be the strengthening of the non-proliferation treaty, new incentives encouraging countries to restrict their nuclear activities to peaceful purposes, ensuring that those countries were supported in maintaining their national security without nuclear arms, and pursuing the recommendations of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, established by Labor in government and never reconvened by the Howard government. I am mindful of the disdain that the Minister for Foreign Affairs showed for the Canberra commission when he called it ‘a stunt’. But, had it continued its work from its inception in 1995, it could have made a significant contribution to regional security and stability.

We now have a new opportunity emerging from this week’s events. That is why, as I have indicated, Labor has this week called for a meeting of regional foreign ministers. In recent months, Kevin Rudd, our shadow minister for foreign affairs, has spoken on a number of occasions about the need to reinvigorate the non-proliferation agenda. He has indicated Labor’s intention to re-establish the Canberra commission and to task it with developing new and innovative ways to confront the threat of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, particularly in our region.

There is a difference between Labor’s and the Howard government’s approach to national security, and it is no better illustrated than by our commitment to regional stability. Labor believes that Australia must focus our energy, resources and diplomatic efforts in our region. It is here that our efforts and resources can be best used to advance our national interests and wider interests. We have entered a new security era, and the Howard government is failing the Australian people by not adjusting to the new security challenges we all face. We need to concentrate in our region.

Last month Kevin Rudd spoke of the dangers of a breakdown of the non-proliferation regime, including a nuclear arms race in our region, and called for diplomatic action to strengthen the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. A cooperative multilateral approach, such as that encouraged by the non-proliferation treaty, can contribute to stability and to global and regional security. This week’s action by North Korea is clearly evident of the pressing need to reinvigorate non-proliferation efforts and make them a focus of our activities. That is why Labor provides its full support to Senator Milne’s motion.

The Howard government needs to be working in the international community to strengthen the non-proliferation treaty. As a non-nuclear state, the non-proliferation agenda is strongly in our national interests and if the government needs evidence of that we have seen it this week. Labor is deeply concerned that the government may actually be working against Australia’s national security interests by weakening the non-proliferation regime.

In recent months the Prime Minister has been pushing the idea of selling Australian uranium to India. Labor strongly opposes such a move. India is not a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty, and on that basis alone the Prime Minister should rule out the sale of Australian uranium to the Indian government. It is hard to see how any economic benefits of such a sale would compensate for the potential undermining of the integrity of the non-proliferation treaty. Sales to India would put us outside the treaty regime, they would undermine our commitment to that instrument, and they would undermine Australia’s ability to work towards non-proliferation and arms control, more generally.

A further breakdown in the non-proliferation regime could further contribute to the development of a nuclear arms race in the Asian region and would present a considerable challenge to Australian security policy. Our national interest is in strengthening the treaty regime and contributing to stability and cooperation in the region, including in South Asia. I understand that Senator Trood spoke in the coalition party room yesterday and raised those concerns. I know of his considerable expertise in this area, and I hope that he has an influence on government policy.

Labor believes that sales of uranium to India would send the wrong message to both North Korea and Iran. I note also that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has indicated that the government has no current plans to supply uranium to India. While that provides some reassurance, given the Prime Minister’s public comments it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could clarify whether that is in fact the government position. He needs to rule out uranium sales to India or to any other country that remains outside the non-proliferation treaty and to actively work to build and strengthen that regime.

Beyond that, the Prime Minister and the government need to get strongly behind the non-proliferation treaty and efforts in this area. Labor has indicated a number of ways in which Australia can do this, and I have alluded to a few of those today. The promotion and support of the non-proliferation agenda, particularly in the Asian region, is in our national interest—a point so vividly highlighted by this week’s events.

Let it be clear: Labor absolutely condemns the North Korean actions. We call upon the government to make nonproliferation a priority. It is an area where the Howard government needs to show far greater commitment and to be more active. I hope that the government heeds the message of this motion. I hope that the motion is carried by the Senate and that it helps to build community support for nonproliferation and for enhancing the non-proliferation treaty and its impact so that we can add to a pressing need to preserve regional stability. I urge senators to support the motion.

Lyn Allison (Victoria, Australian Democrats) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Democrats also strongly support Senator Milne’s urgency motion. We join the rest of the world in condemning North Korea’s nuclear test, but we urge caution; knee-jerk threats of military action will just inflame the situation.

Australia and nuclear weapons states must also take responsibility for this new crisis, having failed to disarm the 27,000 or so nuclear weapons still in existence and having failed to dissuade India, Pakistan and Israel from taking them up. The complete lack of progress at the New York review of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty last year and the failure to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty have sent powerful messages to rogue states that different rules apply to those in the nuclear club and those that are not. Despite the devastation that nuclear weapons and their testing have caused, we still do not have an enforceable ban on nuclear testing; disarmament has stalled; and there are almost as many nuclear weapons around now as there were when the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was first signed.

The global council of the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, of which I am a member, yesterday issued this statement:

As parliamentarians from across the political spectrum, and from countries around the world, we share a concern about the announcement by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea on October 8 that they have tested a nuclear weapon for the first time.

This act increases tensions in North East Asia and is in violation of obligations of North Korea and all other countries to end nuclear testing and work for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

There have been over 2000 nuclear weapons test explosions conducted by China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, each one contaminating the environment, threatening the peace and stimulating the nuclear arms race. There is no need for any more testing by any country.

We welcome the negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the overwhelming support it has already received. We call on those few States that have not yet ratified the treaty—particularly those with nuclear capabilities including North Korea, China, India, Israel, Pakistan and the United States—to do so.

We also call on North Korea to rejoin the Six Party talks, with China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States, for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and to explore the possibility for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in North East Asia. We call on all six parties to refrain from any further provocative actions that could derail these talks, including any threats to use force against any of the parties.

We are encouraged by the international monitoring system developed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation, which has the technical capacity to detect nuclear tests anywhere in the world. And we look forward to the treaty’s entry into force in order to make available its compliance mechanisms in the case of a treaty violation.

This morning I circulated this to all members of parliament, inviting them to endorse the statement, which will be used to encourage a diplomatic solution and an end to nuclear testing. This is an opportunity for Australian parliamentarians to reinforce their commitment to nonproliferation and to encourage progress on disarmament.

North Korea’s test shows that there is a link between the civil and military uses of nuclear technology. It is a clear sign that we need to take action. The federal government could do that. It could stop exporting uranium to countries that have not ratified the comprehensive test ban treaty. It could use its uranium as leverage to encourage nuclear weapons states to disarm, instead of setting yellowcake as a royalty cash cow. It should halt its current flirtation with uranium enrichment. It is not viable, there is no lack of capacity world wide and it is likely to add to the current provocation of rogue states like North Korea. I urge that cool heads prevail.

David Johnston (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I want to deal with Senator Milne’s matter of urgency by expressing deep concern that, following the alleged nuclear test by North Korea, at 4 pm on Tuesday 10 October, the Australian Greens leader Bob Brown and nuclear spokesperson Ms Christine Milne met the ambassador of North Korea, Chon Jae Hong. In a press release dated 11 October, following that meeting, it is expressed that Senator Brown asked the ambassador to explain his government’s actions. In response, the ambassador said:

... North Korea felt vulnerable to a pre-emptive nuclear strike and took its action in response to:

The Bush administration’s abandonment of the arrangement between the Clinton administration and North Korea;

President Bush’s declaring North Korea ‘evil’ and calling for regime change; and

There being 1000 American nuclear weapons deployed in the region coupled with the potential for a pre-emptive strike.

This press release is most curious. It is unclear as to the extent and level of rejection of the North Korean state’s nuclear testing and, indeed, rejection of the regime.

Christine Milne (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Read the first sentence!

David Johnston (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I must have struck a nerve because senators from the Australian Greens appear to be quite upset. I will read what the press release says:

Senator Brown told the ambassador that the Greens utterly condemn yesterday’s nuclear test and that North Korea’s action has made the region and the world a more dangerous place.

Nowhere in the document is the North Korean government, the North Korean state, the Marxist system under which North Korea operates condemned by the Australian Greens. In fact, when I read from the web the Green Left Weekly, citing a book by Mr Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another country, it appears that the Green Left Weekly, which, I take it, has some broad political affiliation with the Australian Greens, apologises for the North Korean regime. Let me deal with what it says, in citing Mr Cumings book:

North Korea does not exist alone, in a vacuum ... It cannot be understood apart from a terrible fratricidal war that has never ended, the guerrilla struggle against Japanese imperialism in the 1930s, its initial emergence as a state in 1945, its fraught relationship with the South, its brittle and defensive reaction to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and its interminable daily struggle with the United States of America.

It is clear that in terms of left-wing green politics in Australia there is a strong apologist approach to the North Korean regime. What I want Senator Milne or Senator Brown to do is tell the Senate and the Australian people that they utterly reject the North Korean regime, that they utterly reject the Marxist fundamentals and principles upon which North Korea is based. I want them to stand up and say that.

Bob Brown (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Acting Deputy President, I rise on a point of order. We do reject the North Korean regime and that in Beijing.

Ross Lightfoot (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

What is your point of order, Senator Brown?

Bob Brown (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I challenge the member opposite to reject Beijing.

The Acting Deputy President:

Senator Brown, if you do not have a point of order, I ask you to resume your seat.

David Johnston (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Mr Acting Deputy President.

Bob Brown (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

What about Beijing?

The Acting Deputy President:

Senator Brown!

Bob Brown (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

He’s grovelling to Beijing.

The Acting Deputy President:

Senator Brown!

Bob Brown (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

What an apologist for Beijing you are.

The Acting Deputy President:

Senator Brown!

Bob Brown (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Where’s yours?

The Acting Deputy President:

Senator Brown, that’s four times that I have had to speak to you. I ask you to remain silent while Senator Johnston makes his contribution.

David Johnston (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I want to hear the Leader of the Australian Greens say that not only are they opposed to the detonation of a nuclear device but also they are opposed to the North Korean regime.

Bob Brown (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Where’s your statement?

The Acting Deputy President:

Order! Senator Brown, I have had to speak to you on six occasions in a very short period. You know the rules of this Senate chamber. I ask you to remain silent while Senator Johnston finishes his contribution.

Stephen Conroy (Victoria, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Acting Deputy President, I raise a point of order. On that matter, I think you are entirely correct to draw Senator Brown’s attention to the standing orders but it would help if Senator Johnston addressed his remarks through the chair.

The Acting Deputy President:

That is more advice to the chair, which I appreciate, Senator Conroy, rather than a point of order.

Stephen Conroy (Victoria, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I just want to assist with the running of the chamber.

The Acting Deputy President:

Thank you, Senator Conroy. I appreciate your advice.

David Johnston (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The point is that I simply want a clear and unequivocal statement with respect to the North Korean regime: that the people are in poverty, that this is one of the poorest nations in the world with one of the largest standing armies in the world and it is allegedly detonating a nuclear weapon. I want to hear Senator Bob Brown say that he rejects all of that, not just the fact that there has been a detonation but that he rejects the Marxist principles that underlie this regime. If he does make that statement, that will be good for us because we will know where he stands, because his press releases to this point have been equivocal and they leave open the strong hint that he is an apologist for that regime.

Stephen Conroy (Victoria, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Senator Conroy interjecting—

The Acting Deputy President:

Senator Conroy, shouting down the chamber is unruly and you should desist!

David Johnston (WA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Senator Milne argues that there is an undeniably strong correlation between nuclear weapons and nuclear power. If a country has nuclear power, then it will have nuclear weapons. This is what Senator Milne seeks to promote in the nature of some sort of rationale in opposition to Australia’s export of uranium.

Eight states in the world have nuclear weapons: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India and Pakistan, and probably Israel. There are 35 countries in the world which have a nuclear power generating capability. There is a substantial, logical and rational distinction to be drawn on those numbers alone. Of course, Senator Milne will not accept the fundamental logic of the fact that there are 35 countries around the world which are seeking to safely, properly, diligently and economically advance the best interests of the power and energy needs of their people through the use of nuclear power but do not use nuclear weapons.

I want Senator Milne to understand and to explain to us why there are 35 as opposed to eight and why the correlation simply does not hang together as she would have us and the Australian people believe. I know that part of the Greens policy is founded upon a fear that uranium is bad. It is bad enough that the Labor Party has good uranium and bad uranium: some of the mines that are good have good uranium; mines that should come on stream obviously have bad uranium. But the Greens want to tell us that all uranium is bad.

This is an absolutely ridiculous argument. Australia has a very long and proud record of standing up for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. On the other hand, the Greens have a very dubious and greatly contrasting history with respect to their support of outrageously despotic regimes. (Time expired)

John Hogg (Queensland, Deputy-President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise following the contribution from Senator Johnston to bring a different perspective back into this debate. I think it is important to bring a bit of perspective into the debate. I share the grave concern that Senator Evans and others have expressed here this afternoon about what has taken place in North Korea this week. Let me also say that this is not the first time, indeed in recent times, that we have had to express concern about nuclear tests in our region, and our region is quite expansive. The last significant occasion that this happened was back in 1998, when India and Pakistan both indulged themselves in exploding nuclear devices.

George Campbell (NSW, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

What about Mururoa?

John Hogg (Queensland, Deputy-President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am talking about India and Pakistan for a particular reason. As a result of those particular forays by those two neighbours in our region, we ended up with an inquiry by the then Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee into the issue of what was happening in the region in terms of nonproliferation and other things associated with the nuclear race.

Chapter 8 of that committee report is entitled ‘The way ahead’. I think that is a most important thing. The committee spoke of the way ahead, and the first thing it addressed was: ‘The genie is out of the bottle’. The fact is that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty has not worked as it should have. It has suffered backward steps; there is no argument about that. At the start of chapter 8, ‘The way ahead’, the report focused on the fact that the Cold War had ended and that there had been ‘a move towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction’. That is the only way that the path that North Korea is going down now can be described: the path of weapons of mass destruction. The report gave a fairly reasoned analysis of what was taking place in this path of nuclear nonproliferation and recognised that nonproliferation was fairly stagnant. Paragraph 8.73 of the report particularly notes:

Australia has been in the forefront of international moves aimed at global disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, arguing that it is in our own interests for all such weapons to be eliminated. A lot of time, effort and expense has been devoted to fulfilling this goal.

However, the report then notes:

Yet, intellectual studies in academia on these issues have been made more difficult because of the closure of the Peace Research Centre at the Australian National University through departmental funding cuts. The Committee believes this is a short-sighted view given the importance attached to elimination of weapons of mass destruction by the Government in the interests of Australia’s security.

What a surprise that is! The committee then came up with a recommendation:

... consideration should be given to the establishment of a Peace Research Centre to rebuild Australia’s academic expertise in regional security, peace and disarmament.

That came as no surprise, arising out of what the committee had just witnessed—that is, the explosions that had taken place at that time. Whether that would have stopped what happened in North Korea the other day I doubt very much. The committee went on in its report to note also the work that had been done by the Canberra commission. It was even conceded by people from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade at that time that there was merit in the Canberra commission report. At page 144, an official says: ‘The Canberra commission report has certainly nourished ongoing debate on the way forward on nuclear disarmament.’ And yet, when faced with the challenge of having the UN adopt the Canberra commission report, this government squibbed it. That was most unfortunate. It was seen as being a reasonable and logical way to proceed—a way which, whilst not necessarily averting what happened in North Korea the other day, was nonetheless a mechanism by which the issue could be addressed on an international basis.

Senator Evans alluded to the fact that Labor has called for the Australian government to launch a diplomatic initiative and to host a meeting of regional and foreign ministers to build consensus on the way forward. I think that is important because again we are looking at the way forward—not at what has happened before, because you cannot undo that. The way forward in nonproliferation is difficult indeed. It is not an easy task. It is a matter of one step forward and maybe two steps back sometimes. Sometimes it is two steps forward and one step back. But, given the uncertainty, given the interests that prevail in the area of security, one would think that it is essential that we would seek the highest and utmost cooperation with the neighbours who share a common responsibility with us for having a peaceful and worthwhile world in which to live.

In her speech this afternoon, Senator Payne outlined a number of government initiatives. Whilst some of those were indeed commendable, they did not go far enough. They did not take us to the area of engaging our region to confront this most horrendous fate that hangs over our heads: nuclear warfare. One would hope that we have a sophisticated society in which this can be countered by rational thought, rational debate and rational discussion rather than confrontation—and rather than going down the path that the government have chosen to go down, as they did in Iraq, to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. It is therefore an important part of this whole debate that it does not get lost—as has the report of the Senate committee, which was a unanimous report in the aftermath of what happened in India and Pakistan—and that the reports of this place do not get lost. The suggestions in there are not partisan suggestions in many instances; they are completely across political parties. They are designed to give the thoughts of the people who work, speak and operate in this place, regardless of whether they are government senators or opposition senators, to the government of the day.

It seems to me that when you have knee-jerk reactions by governments to an ongoing problem then those knee-jerk reactions will fail. The non-proliferation area is an area where an ongoing, long-term, dedicated negotiation is required, in a spirit of good faith and involving all our neighbours. If we do not have them in the can then we are fragmented in our opposition and we will achieve very little indeed. If there is a failure on the part of the government, that is the failure. Whilst governments have the rhetoric of opposition to what has happened in North Korea and whilst they will point to some of the initiatives that they have undertaken in this area—and I commend them for those—that is not sufficient. It is not enough because we are still faced, eight years on from what happened in Pakistan and India, with the problems in Korea today. (Time expired)

Russell Trood (Queensland, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

This is a welcome opportunity to participate in this debate, because the events on the Korean peninsula over the last few days are a matter of grave importance to the Senate and to our region. Although we bring different perspectives to this debate, I think there is some common ground. The obvious common ground is that this nuclear test by the North Korean regime represents a grave threat to peace, security and stability—potentially, anyway—in the East Asia region. Some of the previous speakers have referred to the possibility of an arms race occurring as a consequence, and that would indeed be a grave threat to stability in the region.

But there is a wider implication, of course, and that implication relates to the consequences of this test for the international non-proliferation regime, about which much has been said. In my view, in the light of these dangers, it is important that there is a strong and firm international response to these events in North Korea over the last couple of days. It is important that this takes place because it is fundamentally important that we discourage a wider break-out from the non-proliferation regime. It is important that we send messages to other countries in the international system, such as Iran, which might be inclined towards going down the proliferation route.

It is true, as Senator Milne has said, that the non-proliferation regime is under some threat. North Korea is an example. Iran is an example. The difficulties we are having at the moment in securing the ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty is another example of the dangers to the regime. Senator Milne had a rather doomsday assessment of the situation and the plight in which we find ourselves in 2006, and I think it is important to get some clear perspective on this.

Part of that perspective requires us to recognise that since 1968, since the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was signed, many more countries have given up nuclear weapons than have taken them up; there are fewer nuclear weapons in the world and the United States and Russia have cooperated in relation to disarmament and arms control. One of the important consequences of that cooperation is that there has been a significant reduction in the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Libya, of course, has given up any aspirations to be a nuclear weapons state. Whatever one might think of the situation in Iraq, one of the important consequences of the intervention there is that Iraq no longer represents a threat to the international community.

We have the US-led proliferation security initiative. And we ought not to forget the United Nations Security Council decision—I think it was in April 2004—passing resolution 1540, which actually improved the security of weapons and materials. In a sense, that created a criminalised regime in relation to that kind of activity. So over the last 30-odd years there have been some significant developments which have reinforced the non-proliferation regime.

Far from being complacent about this, far from treating it with disparate concern, I think the reality is that for 30-odd years Australia has been a consistent, strong, vigilant, determined and committed member of the international community determined to try to support and reinforce the nature of this regime. Far from taking the actions that Senator Milne and some of those from the Labor Party have suggested in this debate, Australia has been absolutely diligent for this period of time in trying to reinforce the nature of the regime.

It is worth while recalling the extent to which we have been diligent. In doing that, I think it is useful to recall that the non-proliferation treaty is just the centrepiece of this international architecture. Hanging off this non-proliferation treaty is a whole series of other conventions and arrangements, all of which tend to reinforce the non-proliferation regime so that we end up with a regime, not just a treaty. When you look at the totality of all of those conventions and arrangements, you find that it is a very comprehensive regime.

Australia is at the centre of almost all of these particular arrangements—the non-proliferation treaty itself; the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; the efforts to try to secure ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty; the efforts to try to secure a fissile material cut-off treaty; the work on the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies; Australia being an advocate of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials; Australia’s support for nuclear weapons free zones; and resolution 1540, which I mentioned just a few moments ago. Australia’s own very comprehensive and detailed uranium export policy, which requires that states with which we deal in relation to uranium sign on to the additional protocol, is an important part of the regime.

The export controls are an important part of the regime and add a new dimension to this overall regime. The export controls and the financial controls run in various kinds of ways into a succession of committees of which Australia is absolutely at the centre—the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement. We should not forget the Australia Group, which Australia itself founded and in which we have been active since 1985, when that initiative was first put before the international community. So at every juncture Australia has been trying to reinforce the regime and do more than perhaps other states have tried to do. (Time expired)

Christine Milne (Tasmania, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank senators for their contributions to the debate. I particularly note that three coalition senators have spoken in this debate and not one of them has rejected the sale of uranium to India. That is of great concern to me because, as Senator Trood has just said, Australia has had a strong record in upholding nuclear nonproliferation and in trying to support the treaty. What we now have is a critical situation. We are at a crossroads in this country with regard to nuclear nonproliferation, and it is because of the Howard government’s relationship with President Bush.

India is not a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The treaty states very clearly that we should not be supplying nuclear materials to a state party that is not a signatory to the convention. Australia has upheld that position time and time again until recently. Foreign Minister Downer has been strong in saying that that would continue to be the case, in spite of the fact that Australia is prepared to sell uranium to China, which is the other Communist regime in Asia which is not condemned by Senator Johnston. However, the fact of the matter is that the Greens oppose the export of uranium to both India and China. The Australian government will be undermining the nuclear non-proliferation treaty if it moves to sell uranium to India. And what has the Prime Minister had to say? He has been shifting position. He said:

We are examining all the implications of the Indian request—

that is, for Australian uranium—

and the desire of India to be part of the nuclear system to get access to uranium for peaceful purposes, but it would require a change of policy.

He went on to say:

But as time goes by if India were to meet safeguard obligations some Australians would see it as anomalous that we would sell uranium to China but not to India.

On and on it has gone, and there is report after report in the Australian press that the Australian Prime Minister is shifting ground to endorse and support the sale of uranium to India. And why would that be so? It would be so because President Bush went to India earlier this year and struck a US-India technology deal. That deal has not been approved through the American political process yet—and may not be so if the mid-term elections change things in the US. The point is that the United States has gone outside the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It is undermining the treaty. The Nuclear Suppliers Group will have to deal with this issue if it goes through the US parliamentary process, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group operates on a process of consensus. Australia could block the US-India deal in the Nuclear Suppliers Group if it chose to. If it were serious about the nuclear non-proliferation treaty it would do so.

Yesterday in Vienna there was a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It was reported that the US-India deal would be discussed informally, but it will not be considered as a formal proposition until, of course, it is endorsed through the US process. But, if it were to be considered, what would Australia’s position be? Australia would either support the US-India technology deal and began exporting uranium to India as well or do as Senator Trood has said and continue to take a leadership role globally in supporting the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. We are at this crossroad right now, and that is why this is a critical matter. That is why I have moved that Australia should take every action to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, not to undermine it. That treaty, for all its failings—and I admit that it has been fraying in recent years, and what we have to do is strengthen it—is what we have under international law to stop proliferation.

Where we have been going in the last few years is for the US to undermine international law, and if you undermine international law, as Philippe Sands says, you have a lawless world. Australia must uphold the provisions of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and I am alarmed that not one of the three government senators today assured this chamber that Australia will not undermine the nuclear non-proliferation treaty by selling uranium to India. They made no comment about Australia’s support for the US-India deal under that treaty. (Time expired)

Question put:

That the motion (That the motion (Senator Milne’s) be agreed to.) be agreed to.