Jacinta Collins (Victoria, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Cabinet Secretary) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

On Monday, the Leader of the Opposition addressed the House of Representatives on Labor's approach to the national security challenges presently facing Australia. As Bill Shorten said, Labor believes that our security agencies and national institutions should have the powers and resources they need to keep Australians safe from the threat of terrorism. But we also believe in safeguarding fundamental democratic freedoms. We must ensure that, in legislating to protect national security, the parliament does not damage the very qualities and liberties that we are seeking to defend from terrorist threat.

Labor has a strong record on national security. While in office we undertook a range of measures to strengthen national security, including strengthening intelligence relationships with our major allies; proscribing terrorist organisations; ensuring that our security agencies were resourced to prevent terrorist actions on Australian soil before they occurred; and building a new state-of-the-art operations centre for the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation, ASIO, here in Canberra. In opposition, too, Labor is working constructively with the government on matters of national security.

The National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014, now put forward by the coalition, is closely based on proposals put forward by the previous Labor government and which were the subject of a Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, PJCIS, inquiry and report commissioned by the previous Labor government. In particular, the bill intends to give effect to parts of chapter 4 of the Report of the inquiry into potential reforms of Australia's national security legislation, produced by the joint committee and tabled on 24 June 2013—shortly before the federal election. Some of the committee's recommendations, such as a regime for special intelligence operations, were also supported by Bret Walker SC, the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. The proposals and inquiry that led to this bill were initiated by the previous Labor government because we recognised that our national security framework needs to keep pace with changing threats and changing technologies and that laws that dated back as far as the 1970s need to be reviewed to ensure that they are appropriate to the current national security environment.

However, the origin of the current bill does not mean that the Labor opposition has given a blank cheque to the government for whatever changes it wishes to make to our national security laws. As Labor has consistently argued, while we support the appropriate extension of the powers of our intelligence agencies to meet Australia's security needs, it is critically important that these powers be appropriately balanced against the rights and democratic values that our nation holds dear, and that suitable checks and balances are in place to ensure that these powers are always used correctly. In this respect, it is important to note that, in recommending reforms to ensure that our national security agencies have appropriate powers to effectively gather intelligence, the joint committee also sounded a note of caution in its June 2013 report, stating that 'these intrusive powers must always be balanced by appropriate safeguards for the privacy of individuals and the community recognising that Australia is a democratic nation which values personal freedom and places limits on the power of the state.'

In addition to recommending a raft of significant changes to our national security framework, chapter 4 of the joint committee report also includes a recommendation that the government release draft legislation to the Australian public and key national security stakeholders. In accordance with this recommendation, Labor insisted that the bill be referred back to the joint committee for consideration and that the public and key stakeholders be consulted on the changes to our national security laws being proposed by the government. It is clear that this scrutiny has been valuable in allowing considered public debate and in ensuring that the bill is not only effective in furthering national security but also includes appropriate oversight and safeguards. A number of significant concerns about the government's bill were raised through the public consultation process. There has been particular concern about the definition of 'computer' for the purpose of certain warrants, about offence provisions relating to the proposed special intelligence operations regime, and about ensuring that Australia's complete opposition to the use of torture is made very clear.

In response to these and other concerns, the joint committee recommended over a dozen important improvements to the bill. For example, the committee recommended the following changes to the bill proposed by the government. They recommended reporting requirements for ASIO in any instance of use of force against a person, and close oversight by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security—recommendations 6, 7 and 8. They recommended the Attorney-General's approval of any special intelligence operation, including variation of a special intelligence operation or its extension beyond six months—recommendation 9. They recommended enhanced oversight of the special intelligence operation scheme by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security—recommendation 10. The recommended exemptions under proposed section 35P to allow disclosure of information about a special intelligence operation scheme in particular circumstances—recommendation 11—and improved clarity about potential prosecution—recommendations 12 and 13. The committee has also sought to enhance reporting requirements and obtain greater clarity in provisions relating to ASIO affiliates, secondment arrangements, computer access warrants and disclosure of information to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.

We welcome these recommendations. The suite of improvements and safeguards recommended by the joint committee is ample evidence of the importance and value of the debate and scrutiny that Labor has insisted upon in the development of this bill. It is now up to the government to refine its proposed legislation in light of the joint committee's valuable work. Labor thanks the government for accepting the committee's 17 recommendations to improve scrutiny and oversight of that legislation. As we scrutinise this bill, we will ensure that the amendments to the bill moved by the government—hopefully this afternoon—

Scott Ludlam (WA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

We haven't seen them.

Jacinta Collins (Victoria, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Cabinet Secretary) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

As I said, Senator: hopefully this afternoon. Indeed, Senator Brandis was in the chamber earlier. I hope he was giving such effect. As we scrutinise this bill, we will ensure that the amendments to the bill, to be moved by the government, fully implement the joint committee's recommendations. We will also ensure that the government honours its commitment to implement those recommendations which do not require legislation. Let me cover those. Firstly, a larger budget for the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, which is recommendation 15; conducting a review of the Attorney-General's guidelines issued under section 8A of the ASIO Act, including examining ASIO's management and destruction of information obtained on persons who are not relevant or are no longer relevant to security matters, which is recommendation 4; and consider issuing ministerial directions to ASIO under section 8 of the ASIO Act requiring ASIO to report to the Attorney-General on instances of non-routine access to third-party computers or premises, which is recommendation 5. Crucially, we insist that the government immediately implement the joint committee recommendation to appoint a new Independent National Security Legislation Monitor.

Labor welcomed Senator Brandis's announcement on 16 July this year that the government had backed down on its plan to abolish the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. Tony Abbott announced the abolition of the monitor as part of his 'repeal day, wrongly labelling this safeguard of the rights of the Australians as 'red tape'. Mr Abbott also claimed the monitor's review role had ended, instead of recognising the important ongoing role the monitor holds. Labor had fought against the abolition of this important position, and it is clear that the government's bill to abolish his office would almost certainly have failed to pass the Senate. The bipartisan joint committee support for the position of the monitor is vindication of Labor's consistent support for proper oversight mechanisms.

The position of monitor has now been vacant since April, at a time of substantial change to our national security laws and circumstances. Labor calls on the government to appoint an appropriately credentialed and experienced monitor immediately. Our ongoing debate about the reform of national security legislation must be informed and needs to be informed by the expert contribution of a new monitor.

Separately from the joint committee recommendations, Labor also welcomes Senator Brandis's acceptance that the government must amend the bill to clarify that the special intelligence operations scheme will never authorise our security organisations to engage in torture. Australia has a proud history of opposition to torture, as does Labor. The Hawke government signed and ratified the convention against torture in 1985 and 1989. Under the Labor government in May 2009, Australia signed the optional protocol to the convention against torture. We must never allow for any doubt about Australia's steadfast position on this issue. Labor will insist that the government put forward amendments to this bill which make that position beyond doubt. The Australian community, and indeed the international community, should expect nothing less from the parliament and from the government of Australia.

In conclusion, I will return to what Bill Shorten said in the other place on Monday. Keeping our people safe is above politics. The security of our nation runs deeper than any of our differences. Labor takes its responsibility as a loyal opposition very seriously as the parliament deals with legislation relating to our national security. We will assist the government to appropriately resource and empower our security agencies, but we will not give the government a blank cheque. As Bill Shorten said on Monday, we must ensure that in legislating to protect national security the parliament does not damage the very qualities and liberties that we are seeking to defend from terrorist threat. The improvements which are now being made to this bill are testament to the importance of Labor's work in this regard. As the parliament debates this bill, and also future national security bills foreshadowed by the government, we will continue to insist on proper debate, on proper scrutiny and on making sure that Australia strikes the proper balance in its national security arrangements.

Scott Ludlam (WA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014 marks the beginning of what we understand will be months of parliamentary debate on national security legislation—today, an expansion of ASIO's intrusion and surveillance powers; perhaps next sitting, the question of Australians travelling to the civil war in Syria and the continuing war of terror in Iraq; then perhaps national mandatory data retention laws entrenching the infrastructure of passive surveillance over everyone in the country; and then after that we will see. One thing we know we will not be voting on in here is the Prime Minister's split-second decision to deploy the ADF back into war in Iraq, even though that open-ended commitment profoundly shapes the context in which this debate takes place.

I want to begin, as I suspect everyone in this debate will begin, with unconditional and unequivocal condemnation of the medieval barbarity of this entity that calls itself Islamic State. One of the founding principles of the Australian Greens is non-violence, and we condemn without reservation this organisation that has raised the bar on violence in an already violent part of the world.

I understand that, because of this government's cynical and unpopular standing in the Australian community, questions have been raised as to the motives and the timing behind the government's sudden array of national security measures. But for me these questions are secondary. No government—coalition, Labor or Greens—wants to suffer an act of terrorism against the Australian community on its watch. No-one, no matter what their politics, wants to look back in the aftermath of a violent attack in a familiar place and realise that there were things we should have done to better protect our community. Until shown otherwise, I want to assume that it is this imperative that principally motivates the government. What I will strongly question is whether the government understands just how counter-productive some of its initiatives are. I understand that some of these initiatives seem to make tactical sense in the very short term, but before I get into debate on the specifics of the bill, I want to look at the steps we have taken to get here today.

In the aftermath of the indiscriminate attacks on 9-11, Australia pledged its support to a global war on terror. At the tip of the spear, we joined military invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 that sought to obliterate al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime and depose the dictator Saddam Hussein. Our ground stations at places like Pine Gap have supported targeted drone assassinations of suspected terrorist figures, and everyone in their immediate vicinity, in any country in which the US chooses to conduct them. Across the Five Eyes alliance of intelligence agencies, Australia has supported the development of high-resolution real-time surveillance of the entire population, militarising the entire internet in the process. Every few years the powers of police and intelligence agencies are expanded and widened to fight this war on terror; and every time we surrender some of our hard-fought freedoms, we are told to accept in good faith that these expanded powers are needed to keep us safe. Detention without charge. Sedition laws. Hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent as we fight this war on terror with kill teams, laser guided bombs and drone strikes. Fire has been met with fire. As a result hundreds of thousands of innocent people have been killed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan and places far from here. Hundreds of thousands of men, women and children. These are people with names and family histories and stories that most of us will never hear. Every one of these casualties of the war on terror is a human tragedy every bit as real as the tragedy that befell the Sari Club or downtown Manhattan more than a decade ago.

So what do we have to show for our series of tactical decisions to fight violence with violence and to militarise civilian communications channels? The terror networks we tried to smash have morphed and grown and spread to the point where we are now in a more precarious state than before. The death of Osama Bin Laden at the hands of US special forces three years ago appears to have had no discernible impact on the spread or capability of extremist networks. A fundamentalist army built on oil money and stolen American weapons now occupies a huge swathe of Iraq and Syria and has an expanding online audience. As we join yet another military coalition in the Middle East, Australian government representatives themselves now believe the threat is higher than ever before.

So on a day such as today, with the latest legislative upgrades to the war on terror on the table before us, we need to evaluate whether the arc of our response to terrorism in the last decade and a half is in fact making everyone less safe. Rather than speaking of 'national security', which has come to imply militarisation abroad and a stepwise erosion of precious freedoms here at home while the state steadily increases its powers of surveillance and coercion, perhaps it is time to start speaking of 'community safety'. Human security. Community resilience. De-radicalisation. It is why the Australian Greens will not be writing blank cheques to the surveillance state. It does not make us safer.

In times of heightened security civil liberties such as privacy or freedom of speech are more vital than ever. That is why the Greens believe—and I join my comments with those made by Senator Collins—we need a fully funded independent national security monitor. This was a cross-party initiative, introduced at the time of the Rudd government, that was supported and amended by the Australian Greens. I well remember the day that Senator Brandis—and it might have been the last time it happened—supported Australian Greens amendments to make the monitor more independent of the Prime Minister's office. It was one of those occasions—and I argued that it had been long delayed—when the parliament did its job, and at last we would have an office that would assess whether the counter-terrorism legislation and national security legislation that exists on the statute books in this country was necessary, proportionate and actually keeping us safe. In subsequent years the work of that monitor was almost completely ignored by both the government and the opposition of the day. If you take the time to read those reports, you will discover that many of the powers that sit on the statute books are considered dangerous or obsolete. That is why I think we are simply not learning from history.

I strongly condemn the decision of the government, as part of its arbitrary attack on the budget, to knock over the National Security Legislation Monitor—as Senator Collins said, as part of red tape removal. What on earth were you thinking? I understand that we have an agreement—probably a handshake agreement—that that monitor's office should resume. The office is unoccupied. Nobody is there at the moment. Senator Brandis is a full member—and, I understand, a diligent member—of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. He signed off on a report last year that said this very bill that we are debating today should, firstly, be put into the field as an exposure draft, which it was not; and, secondly, that the National Security Legislation Monitor should be given the opportunity to assess it. But that office is currently vacant and unoccupied.

I am sure that we will hear coalition speakers during this debate—I hope we will—talk of the need to balance privacy and civil rights against the needs of security. I believe it is a false construct and a false balance that is described. However, I presume you will, at least, make a rhetorical flourish in that direction. A very important part of that balance is having an operating National Security Legislation Monitor whose work is listened to and incorporated into the debate.

It is obviously not to deny the important role that our police and security agencies play in disrupting these networks, but I call the Senate's attention to an interview by Glenn Greenwald—who published many of the revelations of Edward Snowden, documents that exposed huge illegalities at the heart of the surveillance state in the United States—where he said, 'If these powers were being used solely in pursuit of terror networks and organised crime networks, we wouldn't be having this conversation. We wouldn't need to be having this conversation.' We will get to a debate on data retention, if the government is so bold as to bring a bill forward, so I will not dwell on it here today. They are applied so indiscriminately; they are utterly indiscriminate. It is the opposite of targeted and proportional.

I also want to point out—I am not sure whether Senator Collins is aware of this or not—that the amendments that the government has allegedly drafted in response to the parliamentary joint committee's report, which was tabled last week, have not yet been circulated to this chamber and that all senators—government, opposition and crossbench—are now debating a bill that we have not read. We have not been given the courtesy of even seeing the government's amendments to this bill. If this bill were trivial, that would be bad manners. But, on a bill as important as this, I say you are treating us with contempt. You are treating your own backbenchers with contempt or anybody who might come in here with a will to do, with due diligence, the job that we were sent here to do, whatever our political affiliations, with contempt by asking us to come in here and debate a bill that we have not read. That is treating us with contempt.

I should put on the record that we rang the Attorney-General's office an hour or so ago to find out whether he was going to do the chamber the courtesy of tabling the amendments at least before the debate began. We were told they had been tabled half an hour or so ago. Obviously, that has not occurred.

There are two main issues that I will raise and speak of in more detail when we get to the committee stage. I have got very strong concerns about the whole regime of special intelligence operations that throw an additional blanket over the operations of an agency that already, by definition and under its act, operates under conditions of great obscurity. I understand why that is the case, but any proposal that comes in here to make even more opaque the operations of these agencies and to do things such as propose almost complete immunity to breaking the law, which is where I think Senator Leyonhjelm's concerns around terrorism originated, and wide scope for misbehaviour make it impossible for this parliament to know whether or not these powers are being abused. It is already ready very difficult to tell and we tend to find out in the aftermath, as in the case of Dr Haneef, Mr Ulhaque or in any of the other instances where, in retrospect, when you look back you realise that ASIO's powers had in fact been abused—because these were just people—and recognise that they operate, very tightly circumscribed by an act of parliament. Nonetheless, the work of oversight committees or groups like the legislation monitor is essential in a democracy. These powers and these oversights are there for a reason.

I have strong concerns, but the issues upon which I have circulated amendments effectively fall into two areas. Firstly—and this was something that the joint committee picked up and I believe the government has chosen to ignore its advice—the definition of 'a computer' for which an access warrant will apply is considered to include 'computers attached on a network'. And as many, many submitters put to the committee and have put to the government directly, this effectively means that with a single warrant you could be authorising intrusion onto computers in a network in an unbounded way.

Senator Fifield, I know you are here in a representative capacity and this is not your bill but, just to put you on notice that, when we get to the committee stage I will be seeking detailed information—unless of course the government consents to the Australian Greens amendment, which is always a possibility—

Barry O'Sullivan (Queensland, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Don't hold your breath!

Scott Ludlam (WA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I know not to get my hopes up, but you come in here at least in an optimistic frame of mind. I would like to know how the government proposes that these clauses that it has inserted will be interpreted. A very wide range of submitters, from the Pirate Party, Electronic Frontiers Australia, all the way up to the Law Council have said it is vastly open ended to allow a single warrant for a computer system and to then arbitrarily extend it. Does that mean a premise, an entire building, a university campus, a small town? The internet is a network of networks and I believe the Australian law, particularly on surveillance powers, should recognise that fact.

The second issue which, again, has exercised the minds of nearly everyone who made a submission in the brief time that the PJCIS was given to evaluate this bill, concerns the idea that national security reporting becomes criminalised, sharing material on Facebook becomes criminalised, explicitly in black-letter law in this bill and I am appalled that the Attorney-General, who falls over himself in interviews to say he would be the last one to arbitrarily sign off on the coercive powers of the state—I believe he considers himself a true Liberal in the original sense of the word—would allow the criminalisation of reporting of this material.

So we have serious concerns and, again, Senator Fifield, for your benefit, when we come to the committee stage I would be very interested to know how the Australian government can justify clauses that criminalise reporting or authorised disclosure of some of these matters. We have seen from experience overseas, principally in the United States, that national security whistleblowing and the protection of public interest whistleblowing—and I am not talking about espionage—is an essential component of keeping some of these agencies honest.

I want to conclude with some thoughts, again, on community safety as opposed to the government's frame of national security, which always seems to imply increasing militarisation and coercive powers of the state. If we are serious about keeping people safe—about deradicalisation and prevention rather than cleaning up horrific messes after they have occurred—understanding that is partly the mandate of the policing and intelligence agencies is, by definition, pre-emptive. If you are cleaning up after a mess, I understand that is considered a failure and it is not something that anybody wants to see on their watch, whatever their politics.

The other way, apart from raising and increasing coercive surveillance powers, of preventing these attacks in the first place—apart from taking a long, hard look at well over a decade of Australian foreign policy—is to keep our own house in order. Anybody who watched Q&A last night would have seen the presentation by Dr Anne Aly. She spoke briefly of the People Against Violent Extremism organisation she is a part of, and some of the community and family deradicalisation work she has been engaged in. She does this on the proverbial smell of an oily rag; it is not a great proportion of the resources—of the tens and ultimately hundreds of millions of dollars—that are being hurled by this government toward national security objectives, which I understand. What about community safety? What about prevention where it really matters?

These initiatives were discussed at a symposium in Perth in 2013 on countering violent extremism. The Australian government does not have to look very far because some of it was funded by the former government and some of the funding—a trickle—still remains. We have had, at a pilot scale, excellent initiatives built on work done in Germany and other parts of the world, because Australia is obviously not alone in confronting these issues. Just to give you one metric: $13.4 million is dedicated to preventing young Australians from being caught up in these violent networks which operate almost as violent crime networks. That is 0.5 per cent, roughly, of the government's counter-terrorism package.

This has an important place in community safety. Deradicalisation and prevention in the first place—which I understand everybody in here is interested in—need resourcing. I know it is not as dramatic, and it might not get you on the front page of the Daily Telegraph tomorrow, but it is an essential part of preventing the further spread of violence. Cutting $11 million from the Building Multicultural Communities Program is really dumb. Cutting the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor is unforgivable. They are cutting humanitarian foreign aid and our humanitarian refugee intake. They zeroed, earlier this year, our foreign aid contribution to Iraq, which we helped demolish. These are decisions that come back to bite us. These are things that matter. People notice.

Barry O'Sullivan (Queensland, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

That is not accurate!

Scott Ludlam (WA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Senator, you are free to contradict me when you get time to jump to your feet. If we still make any humanitarian foreign aid contribution to Iraq, I would be very keen to see it in the budget papers, because it has gone from quite a substantial commitment in the aftermath of the war to approximately zero.

Colleagues, the Australian Greens will not be supporting this bill. I look forward to getting some information from the government, when they come to the committee stage, as to exactly how it proposes to justify to a somewhat sceptical chamber the radical expansion of ASIO's surveillance powers which has come to seem almost like an annual event.

David Fawcett (SA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to make a few brief remarks about the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014. I am doing so both in my capacity as a member of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and also as chair of the government's legal affairs policy committee, which has carriage of these matters.

Firstly, I reject outright the imputation that was just raised about the motivations of the government—that somehow the whole move towards this legislation and these measures is an attempt to divert attention away from other issues. It is an outrageous claim, particularly given—

Scott Ludlam (WA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I said the opposite of that!

David Fawcett (SA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I will take that interjection, Senator Ludlam. The claims were made both last night in the program, as has been referred to, as well as by many other people. The claims or orders that have come from ISIL in the last 24 hours highlight the fact there is a real risk the government needs to respond to, to make sure its intelligence agencies have an appropriate legislative basis for their actions to protect Australia.

I also reject outright the claim that somehow it is our foreign policy that has made us victims or targets of terror. To look at things such as the Bali bombings, which targeted Australia: those occurred before Australia became involved, in a military sense, in the Middle East. It is a statement by these organisations that they reject the very nature of our way of life—our plural, liberal, secular democracy as a form of government. They reject the individual's rights—the right to freedom of conscience and to hold one's own beliefs—as opposed to a centrally directed approach. They reject that outright. That is why we are a target, and that is why we need to take appropriate measures to support the security of our nation.

This bill does not present an annual increase of powers, as Senator Ludlam has just claimed. In fact, it is a package of targeted reforms to modernise and improve the legislative framework that governs the activities of the Australian intelligence community. It principally amends two pieces of legislation, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 and the Intelligence Services Act of 2001. One of the important things to remember is that this is not just something the government has cooked up. It has come about predominantly because of the report last year of the Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, as well as a number of recommendations from other agencies; but predominantly from that report. It has been a process, and part of the reason the process has occurred is the recognition of the fact that the two acts we are talking about are quite dated in a number of areas—some at the sharp end in terms of being operational and some at the administrative end, in terms of things like employment practices and how we go about employing people. So there is a range of measures encapsulated in this, which are just going to the process of due diligence by a government, with strong bipartisan support—and I want to put on the record here my respect for and gratitude to Mr Anthony Byrne from the other place, who is the deputy chair of the committee, from the opposition, who worked in a very constructive manner with the government to process the review of this piece of legislation. I will not talk too much more about that report because I will be tabling that on behalf of the committee and will be speaking to that subsequently.

The important point from a national security perspective, though, is that we have layers of security to protect our community, but the most important layer, the most effective layer, is intelligence. With effective intelligence, all the other layers become far more effective. Without intelligence, the other layers become quite reactive. It is a bit like the walls that were built in history to try and protect countries from other attacking forces; the attackers would find ways around them. Intelligence is one of our most important aspects of defence, and if our agencies are to remain effective then they have to be supported by legislation that allows them to respond rapidly to emerging security threats, both domestic and global.

To this end, the bill contains measures that address some of the practical limitations in the current legislation. As I said, they have been identified by the parliamentary joint committee. I know Senator Ludlam has talked about us debating a bill when we are not sure what is there. Well, we have seen the bill. The Attorney-General has issued a media release saying that the government will accept the 17 recommendations of the parliamentary joint committee, and he has also indicated in that release that they will be tabled and, during the committee stage, just like amendments from other political parties, dealt with in the committee stage. The government will be tabling those so that we can deal with and debate them and people like Senator Ludlam can ask questions in the appropriate process, which is the committee stage of the Senate.

I will just briefly outline the key areas that this bill goes to. As I said, it is looking at modernising the number of statutory employment issues. Some of these have not actually been updated for over 30 years, and they need to be updated. It is modernising and streamlining the warrant based intelligence collection powers for ASIO. One of the things that we have seen, in this most recent wave of atrocities committed, around the world and here in Australia is the use of social media. When some of this legislation was written, people still conceived of a computer as a great big box in one room, as opposed to smartphones, social media and the other networks we now have that are commonly used by people who are committing crimes. So, clearly, the legislative basis that underpins the work of ASIO and other agencies needs to recognise the developments in technology so that they can take appropriate actions to respond to developing threats.

There are a number of safeguards that are put in place, and a lot of the work that was done by the parliamentary joint committee in reviewing this bill was to look at how we could increase the safeguards—particularly IGIS, the independent body that was set up to do oversight. The comment was made before that the parliament has no idea of how some of these measures or some of these powers are being used. Well, that is not correct, because IGIS is set up as an independent body with deep probing powers to monitor what goes on within our intelligence services.

Part of the reason it is important to get this debate right is that we have to balance both the public interest and transparency, with not only the effectiveness of the agency but also the safety of the agents concerned. This particularly goes to the issue of SIOs—the intelligence operations that are essentially undercover operations. What is one person's whistleblowing motive—they might see something they think is inappropriate—put out in the public space not only potentially makes the operation ineffective but also very literally puts at risk the lives of people who are serving their nation and seeking to keep our community safe. So the committee looked to see how we can make sure that we make very explicit in this legislation the fact that IGIS exists, and that people who go to IGIS with legitimate concerns are exempted from the parts of the legislation that make disclosure about an SIO illegal. That is one of the ways that the committee is looking to make sure that we find that balance between saying, 'There is a public interest in being able to hold an organisation to account, and IGIS is there to do that,' but, at the same time, 'What one person sees as legitimate whistleblowing can literally be a death sentence for somebody who is serving their nation.' So we need to get that balance right, and I believe that the committee's report on the legislation and the government's acceptance of those recommendations will achieve that.

In conclusion, as I said, I will be talking about the committee's report in some more detail when I table that in the Senate later this week, but I do strongly support both the intent of the government in the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill and, again, I welcome the bipartisan support of the opposition in this matter.

Joe Ludwig (Queensland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to also contribute to the debate on the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014. I also indicate that the opposition will be supporting the government's amendments as well as the substantive legislation. There can be little question that one of the primary functions of the executive government is to protect the citizenry of this country. That is beyond doubt. This extends to matters of economics and society, and to the harmony of the community. It also means the physical security, defence and protection of the nation-state. This primary function of executive government, however, is not a function in isolation. The protection of the nation and of the citizens of the nation also means the protection of our values and our Australian way of life. These are the values of a transparent and accountable government and also an informed parliament with executive oversight and, at times, restraint. The parliament, rightfully, has and should always continue to have a critical role over the powers extended to the executive and the use of those powers.

In finding that balance between personal freedoms and the responsibility of government to protect is a balancing act each parliament must face anew. The pace of change and the evolving nature of the threats posed to the country and to the security of the nation mean that these issues cannot be set aside and not dealt with. They must adapt and respond to the issues of the day as well as the views of the community. There will never be a perfect balance between the individual and the state. This is especially true of any policy, but particularly so when it comes to the security of this nation. As the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security has noted:

… intrusive powers must always be balanced by appropriate safeguards for the privacy of individuals and the community recognising that Australia is a democratic nation which values personal freedom and places limits on the powers of the state.

The legislation before the chamber today is a mark of our democracy. That we can apply accountability and scrutiny to the powers of our intelligence agencies and to the executive government is a very good thing indeed.

These bills have not been drafted in a rush. I should also note that, despite their timing, it is wrong to consider that they are a direct response to the security issues that we presently face. Even if these updated powers must be used as part of that security threat, they are a broader set of changes to our intelligence framework and are long overdue. Some of the measures in this refresh relate to provisions as old as the 1970s. Some of the advisers may not recall the 1970s, but most of us in here would. The technologies, means and methods of the risks and threats to our national security have clearly changed since that era.

The bills we are currently debating come at the end of a long and proper legislative and expert driven policy process to continue the modernising of our intelligence agencies and their instruments. Labor initiated the review of these laws back in 2012, where they were considered by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. Chapter 4 of that June 2013 committee report made 24 separate recommendations, which are largely represented in this amendment bill. The government has obviously gone through its own internal processes and has presented these bills to the Senate. Some may argue that it took Senator Brandis quite a while to bring them forward. Nonetheless, they are and have been considered by the Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.

In the 2013 review committee report, the Attorney-General's Department noted that the security environment in which Australia's intelligence agencies operate is 'continually evolving and becoming increasingly diversified'. It is always difficult to make sense of the soft language security and intelligence officers use, but it is fundamental that there has been a significant shift over the last 10 to 15 years of our security environment and the way we respond to that is crucial. That is the fundamental issue that modern intelligence agencies need to confront—how we respond to those changing and evolving issues not only as they change but also diversify from what they once were.

The challenge for parliament is to assess and, where needed, amend the responses developed by the executive government in response to that evolving environment so that they match both the security environment and the standards of the community. The Australian Labor Party has insisted throughout this legislative process that any amendments be scrutinised and open to public submission and to public hearing. That has occurred with this legislation and has allowed proper debate to be continued in this chamber.

The amendments in this legislation update the employment framework of Australian Security Intelligence Organisation workers and clarify the relationship between ASIO and the private sector. Further, the bill strengthens the ability of ASIO and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service to cooperate in more streamlined chains of approval.

Security agencies have not been operating in a vacuum. Over the last decade, we have seen the evolving nature of the Australian Federal Police. They have significantly moved and changed to meet the criminal elements, from 2001 and all the way through. They have come before parliament and sought, through the executive, improved powers to manage the criminal threats to our society. During that process, we have had many a debate on how you balance the freedoms and the requirements of strong measures for the Australian Federal Police to deal with criminal elements. Those debates have ranged long and wide in the Senate. With that expansion, improvement and ability of the AFP to deal with criminal threats, we have not seen the intelligence community move with them. That has not occurred for a whole raft of reasons. It is now clear that this bill will allow the security and intelligence organisations to also move and be contemporaneously relevant with the Australian Federal Police.

We will not see the headline issues of the amendments today. They go to the point that these are modernising bills that have long been in process, starting with Labor referring them to the Senate committee in 2012. It was recognised that while the various powers of the Australian Federal Police are evolving and changing to address the threats of criminal elements in our society, the powers and scrutiny of the intelligence community have not been evolving, to the same degree, with the evolving nature of the threats.

In 2012, Labor recognised the need for this change. These particular amendments that have been put forward today are not sudden or hasty responses to immediate security challenges—and this should be welcomed. The fact is that these have been scrutinised, brought forward, examined and passed through to us since as early as 2012. I am sure Professor George Williams would not mind me quoting him. He has noted:

Many laws are in poor shape after being rushed through prior parliaments, while others need updating because of new technology.

Whilst I might be taking him out of context, having known Professor Williams for many years I am sure he would not mind me adding that quote to this debate because I think he would recognise that there has been public scrutiny of these laws and that they have not been rushed through parliament. They have come through a proper process with proper consideration.

Whilst we reserve judgement on bills still unseen, in the process conducted on the current amendments bill it reflects the process that Labor has called for. Labor takes seriously the responsibility to support modernisation of our national security and the importance of appropriate scrutiny of these laws.

I want to make plain the point that Labor will take a different position to government on matters of national security where they do not align with our values or our beliefs. The responsible oversight of national security is such a belief. This is why, when in government, Labor created the position of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. It was a bad decision of this government to seek to repeal that position. It was wrong, and it was under the guise of removing red tape. I think everybody saw through that poor slip by the government. It was irresponsible, and Labor disagreed on that point. Labor opposed that decision, but I understand that even Senator Brandis is capable of eating humble pie. He has—

Senator O'Sullivan interjecting—

I know you laugh. I know you find it difficult to accept that proposition, but it does appear that in this instance he has. In this instance, Senator Collins and Mr Mark Dreyfus have called for this position. It needs to be properly funded and filled with experienced and credentialed individuals and have the support of this place. If the government is going to be serious about national security, it needs to be serious about national security oversight as well; not just a token gesture, but a real monitor in addition to the checks and balances in this chamber.

I think Senator Collins went to this very issue earlier today, but it is worth saying it again. On Monday, the Leader of the Opposition addressed the House of Representatives on Labor's approach to the national security challenges presently facing Australia. As Mr Shorten said:

Labor believes that our security agencies and national institutions should have the powers and resources they need to keep Australians safe from the threat of terrorism.

I think that is an axiomatic statement. I think everybody in this chamber would want that to occur. He went on to say:

We also believe in safeguarding fundamental democratic freedoms. We must ensure that in legislating to protect our national security that parliament is careful not to damage the very qualities and liberties that we are seeking to defend from terrorist threat.

We do need to be vigilant. That is why, through the joint committee, various parliamentary committees and this Senate we have the opportunity of scrutinising the legislation. In committee stage, we also have the opportunity of examining the amendments to ensure they reflect that right balance that we speak about.

At this time, it is worth reflecting on the deep Labor principles. At the time the bill was introduced in the Senate on 16 July 2014, Labor gave in-principle support to most of the amendments proposed. However, Labor insisted that the bills be referred to the committee for public consultation to ensure that they are properly scrutinised and reflect the proper balance that I speak about. But Labor has always recognised the importance of our nation's security. While in office, we undertook a range of measures to strengthen national security. This is an ongoing process, an ongoing story for Labor. That is why we support this bill. It continues to be part of the story of Labor—about how we support striking the right balance between personal freedoms and our national security.

In government we strengthened intelligence relationships with our major allies. We proscribed terrorist organisations and ensured that our security agencies were resourced to prevent terrorist actions on Australian soil before they occurred. We built a new state-of-the-art operations centre for the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation in Canberra and, even now in opposition, Labor is working constructively with the government on matters of national security.

That does not mean we give the government a blank cheque. What it does mean is that we ensure the government responds appropriately to the need to see that our security agencies have the appropriately resourced powers to maintain the security of the nation. As Labor has consistently argued, while we support the appropriate extension of the powers of our intelligence agencies to meet Australia's security needs, it is critically important that these powers be appropriately balanced against the rights and democratic values that our nation holds dear and that it contains those suitable checks and balances in place to ensure that these powers are always used correctly. That includes a well-resourced Digest and a well-resourced Monitor. It includes proper oversight of ASIO and a proper oversight of our intelligence organisations, more specifically.

In looking at all this and doing its job, the committee examined many of these issues. I want to single out one or two before my time finishes. For example, changes that we sought and that the committee recommended, concerned the Attorney-General's approval of any special intelligence operation including variation to an SIO or its extension beyond six months—recommendation 9. This is about ensuring that there is proper oversight, in this instance, by the Inspector-General of Intelligence. The enhanced oversight of the SIO scheme by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security is recommendation 10. These are about making sure that the national security legislation is both supported here and in the community and responds appropriately to community concerns, but that it also addresses what I have described as the 'catch-up' by ASIO to a modern security environment where it has appropriate powers to deal with evolving security threats.

Penny Wright (SA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak today on an extremely significant piece of legislation, the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014. Indeed, this legislation has been characterised as the most significant change to security laws in Australia since the far-reaching antiterrorism laws introduced by Prime Minister John Howard in 2005.

Let me say clearly and right at the outset, the Australian Greens understand the need for intelligence agencies to have appropriate powers to protect Australia's national security interests. We also understand of course the serious nature of current threats to national security. After all, we are part of this society we are wanting to protect. We live in the community. My kids and my friends and my neighbours live in our community. We share an interest with all other Australians in living safely and securely.

But we also share an interest with our fellow Australians and, indeed, the good fortune, to live in a democracy with a legal system that has developed over centuries to uphold individual liberties and comply with the rule of law. As the Prime Minister said yesterday, regrettably, for some time to come the delicate balance between freedom and security may have to shift. It is in that balance and that shift that lies our task as a responsible representative body and as legislators to consider what the implications of that statement will be and how it will be manifested in legislation that comes before this chamber. That is why this legislation and the legislation that is coming down the track is significant and that is why it is vital that there are those of us in this parliament who are willing to look carefully at the substance of what is being proposed. We must explore all its possible consequences, intended and otherwise, to ensure that the rights of Australians—the rights of all of us—are not being unduly compromised or eroded.

Among other measures, this bill seeks to expand the power of intelligence agencies. If that is to occur, the Australian Greens believe that those expansions must be necessary. There must be compelling evidence to justify enhanced security powers and the expansions must be coupled with appropriate safeguards.

I have serious concerns about some of the proposals in this bill which would significantly expand the power of intelligence agencies without the necessary safeguards and that, as a result of this legislation, the privacy and other rights of average Australians will be compromised. As stated in the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, the PJCIS:

There is a need, in the intelligence context, to maintain a strong accountability framework so as to ensure that corruption and abuses of power do not occur (or are at least can be detected and minimised).

Their submission goes on to note that the legislation in its current form lacks accountability by:

… establishing vague and unduly broad criteria for the issue of a warrant, internalising the process for authorising intelligence-gathering activities and cloaking these activities in even greater secrecy than that which they have historically enjoyed.

As well as concerns about accountability, the Australia Greens have concerns that many of the measures that we are being asked to vote on today have not been subject to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. Unlike other legislation, this bill has not been considered by the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, a committee in which all senators are able to participate. Instead it was referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, the very committee which had originally come up with the recommendations for reform to national security legislation on which it is based. If passed, this bill will implement the majority of the recommendations in chapter 4 of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security 2013 report of the inquiry into potential reforms of Australia's national security legislation. So we have a parliamentary committee scrutinising a bill which was largely written by itself.

Our concerns do not finish there. It is a parliamentary committee from which the Australian Greens and all other crossbenchers have been actively excluded. What justification can there be for the exclusion of representatives of a significant proportion of the Australian public from considering the implications and effects of laws that will change Australian people's rights in unprecedented ways? Then there is the short consultation period, again noting that this is legislation which will change the rights of security agencies and individuals in Australia in unprecedented ways. Various organisations and individuals making submissions have commented on their inability to consider that legislation in detail due to the short time frame provided for public consultation.

Similarly, there is concern about the speed with which this legislation has been introduced to parliament and the fact that we have not yet seen some of the significant amendments. We are being assured that they will meet the concerns that have been raised and, yet, we have not seen them yet. It also means that the parliamentary watchdog on human rights, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, has not been able to assess the human rights implications of this legislation as yet. In my view, it is likely that many of the provisions of this bill will be found to be incompatible with various human rights in Australia. It is likely that the committee will actually make the same finding at the end of its process. But it is also likely that the government and the opposition will have dispensed with this and will pass the bill before it has even been canvassed by the human rights committee, making a mockery of the process that is designed to give appropriate consideration to human rights in the law-making of our national parliament.

Given the complexity and consequences of this legislation, it is impossible to fully articulate all of the Australian Greens' concerns in a short speech. However, I concur with many of the concerns made in submissions by the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, the Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance, the Law Council of Australia and other credible bodies, who have invested a great deal of time and expertise in analysing this legislation.

I will go to three of the most controversial measures being proposed in this National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014. First, there is the proposed special intelligence operations, or SIO, scheme, which would provide for criminal and civil immunity, provided that certain conditions are met, for ASIO officers and affiliates who are involved in criminal activity during the course of an undercover operation. It should be noted that the safeguards and accountability requirements for the special intelligence operations scheme are less stringent than that recommended by the PJCIS. There has also been plausible speculation that this scheme could open the door to impunity for actions that amount to torture. Obviously, such ambiguity is totally unacceptable. The Attorney-General has said that he will be moving amendments to rectify this concern, but we have not seen the amendments yet, so how do we know what they will say? Clearly, given the scandal and shocking situation that arose in the United States in relation to the question around torture in Guantanamo Bay, that is something that the Australian Greens and the Australian public would never canvass in Australia.

A more general concern from some submitters to the PJCIS noted that the government should provide concrete evidence as to why an SIO scheme—a special intelligence operations scheme—is required in the first place. The Attorney-General's second reading speech canvassed the idea that corresponding protections to those available to the Australian Federal Police should be extended to participants in covert intelligence operations. This logic was refuted by Gilbert + Tobin in their submission, which said that ASIO should not automatically receive the same powers as the AFP as it is not analogous. It is not a law enforcement agency and it is not accountable through the criminal trial process in the way that a law enforcement agency is.

Secondly, as we have already heard from my colleague Senator Ludlam, the Australian Greens are also highly concerned about the proposed new offences and increased penalties for existing offences relating to the unauthorised disclosure of a special intelligence operation. This provision has been met with criticism by the Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance, among others, who are concerned it could chill national security reporting. The penalty for existing offences will be increased from two years to 10 years imprisonment. We also have concerns about parts of the proposals regarding ASIO's warrant powers, including the ability of ASIO to access an innocent third party's computer or an entire computer network, or to disrupt such systems to target a suspect—again, as has been discussed by my colleague Senator Ludlam.

The Australian Greens echo the calls of experts in this space to urgently engage the next appointed Independent National Security Legislation Monitor to review existing legislation in light of the amendments proposed in this bill. This independent scrutiny is critical and should be abided by. The advice should be heeded, unlike the sorry history that we have seen with both governments in ignoring previous reports of this monitor—when the position was actually filled. We should not make amendments of this nature lightly. Our national security legislation should receive proper public and parliamentary scrutiny and should strike a real balance between freedom and security.

I would like to revisit the issue of proposed offences for unauthorised disclosure of information about special intelligence operations, with reference to the potential implications for journalists and freedom of speech more broadly. I believe this has dangerous implications for freedom of speech and the transparency and accountability of government that we have a right to expect in a democracy. Schedule 6 of the bill will create two new offence provisions and update existing offences for the unauthorised communication of intelligence information.

As outlined in a submission to the PJCIS by the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, a person may be imprisoned for a maximum of five years for disclosing any information relating to a SIO, a special intelligence operation. This is an exceptionally broad offence that will apply to any person, not just an ASIO employee or contractor. There is no requirement that the person is aware that a SIO has been authorised—and this knowledge would actually be very unlikely given the secrecy around a SIO authorisation. There is also no requirement that there be evidence of adverse consequences or even possible consequences arising from a disclosure.

The Australian Greens share the concerns of the MEAA and other organisations that have raised the possibility that a journalist may face up to five years imprisonment for publishing information that relates even vaguely and inadvertently to a SIO. This could have a chilling effect on national security reporting, with journalists understandably wary about reporting on issues that are well within the public interest. Under this offence it is enough that the person is aware of a substantial risk that the disclosed information is connected in even a minor way with a SIO. It is a very low standard indeed.

In relation to the second and more aggravated offence for unauthorised disclosure of information about a SIO, the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law summarise that the offence occurs when a person intends or the disclosure will endanger the health or safety of any person or prejudice conduct of a special intelligence operation; however, a number of submissions to the PJCIS say that the penalty for this offence is excessive, provides limited excuses and in particular is missing any defence in the public interest. As I often say, accurate information is the currency of democracy. The Australian Greens do not support the chilling of national security reporting through introducing broad offences with serious penalties as well as increasing penalties for existing offences. It is the crucial role of the media to scrutinise government and its agencies.

As reported in The Australian back in July, Senator Brandis has insisted that the new offences are not aimed at journalists or placing restrictions on freedom of speech. However, it was noted in that editorial that the legislation makes no exemptions that could open the way for its misuse by a government or bureaucracy intent on secrecy to avoid embarrassment. Indeed, under the first offence I mentioned—the inadvertent offence, where a person inadvertently discloses information about a SIO—the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law used the example of a teacher who uses an article written by a journalist that mentions an ongoing terrorism investigation relating to a SIO as a teaching aid, for example, in a legal studies class. As suggested in their submission, the teacher may be caught by this offence. That is how broad it is.

As mentioned earlier, the Australian Greens are concerned about the lack of independent scrutiny for this significant legislation. The bill is extremely complex and it is only the first of three national security bills foreshadowed by the government this year. It was recommended in the 2013 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security report that amendments implementing the committee's recommended changes to Australian intelligence community legislation be released as an exposure draft for public consultation, as well as being subject to parliamentary committee scrutiny and targeted consultation with the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security. This has not happened.

We can and we must remain vigilant against acts of terror in Australia but we must also remain vigilant about protecting the rights and freedoms of Australians. As Human Rights Watch Australia Director Elaine Pearson wrote in The Guardian yesterday:

… parliament shouldn’t rush to adopt laws that infringe on basic rights and that risk criminalising the legitimate actions of whistle-blowers, journalists and human rights activists.

These changes must not be made lightly. They must not be made in a rushed way. Every possible scenario must be considered. Every possible gap or unintended consequence deserves our utmost attention.

This legislation engages a number of human rights, as outlined in the statement of compatibility with human rights that accompanies the bill. A number of submitters to the inquiry voiced concerns about the human rights implications of the bill. There is the unacceptable erosion of freedom of communication and freedom of the press, as suggested in a joint submission from numerous media organisations; there are the undue restrictions on freedom of political communications, as expressed by the Pirate Party in their submission; and there is the undermining of the right to freedom of expression and the right to protection from arbitrary and unlawful interferences with privacy, as outlined in the submission made by the councils for civil liberties. The Human Rights Commission in their submission also raised a number of human rights concerns which the commission suggest require further consideration prior to the enactment of the bill.

This bill represents the most significant change in security law in almost a decade. We must responsibly and carefully analyse and scrutinise this legislation to ensure it does not disproportionately restrict the rights and freedoms of Australia. We can be vigilant against acts of terror without undermining the very freedoms we seek to protect. We must be steadfast in protecting the fourth estate. Accurate information is the currency of democracy, and journalists must not be prevented from publishing information that may be embarrassing for the government of the day. Journalists must be empowered to tell uncomfortable truths. For this reason and many others the Senate must subject this bill and any further national security legislation to the highest level of scrutiny. For this reason I will not be supporting this bill.

Concetta Fierravanti-Wells (NSW, Liberal Party, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Social Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014, being the first tranche of the government's proposed reforms to national security legislation. This bill will modernise and enhance the legislative framework that governs the Australian intelligence framework. It does so by focusing on the powers of intelligence agencies and the way they have available to them to obtain and gather intelligence for the purposes of protecting our national security. The bill implements the government's response to chapter 4 of the bipartisan report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security in its inquiry into potential reforms to national security legislation that was tabled on 24 June 2013.

By addressing the practical limitations identified by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, this bill will ensure that our intelligence agencies retain their capabilities to protect Australia's national security in the contemporary security environment. In particular, the bill focuses on recommendations in chapter 4 of that report, of which the government has accepted most in full or in part. As indicated, the bill would modernise and enhance the legislative framework governing the Australian intelligence community. In particular, the bill will ensure that intelligence collection and related powers keep pace with technological developments, particularly the use of online communications by persons of security concern. To this end, the bill will also assist in managing the risks presented by Australians who are participating in foreign conflicts or who are supporting participants in foreign conflicts, and this of course includes terrorist organisations.

Intelligence is at the forefront of our national security capability and it is vitally important that this remain the case given the global challenges we face. The reforms to the intelligence specific secrecy offences will strengthen Australia's capability to manage the risk of unauthorised disclosures of classified information by trusted insiders who have access to such information in the course of their official duties. This bill is a significant contribution towards ensuring that future capability of Australia's intelligence agencies are secured. In broader terms, this bill is just the first step in the government's commitment to maintaining and improving Australia's already strong national security laws where this is necessary.

As has been indicated, other legislation will shortly be brought in which will complement a suite of available laws. The government is undertaking a comprehensive review of these laws, which will involve responding to recent reviews and proactively addressing any gaps that may be required to be filled to ensure that our agencies can respond effectively to emerging security threats. Let us not forget that four planned terrorist attacks on Australian soil have been disrupted since the enactment of Australia's counterterrorism legislation in 2002. In addition, 23 people have been convicted under Australian law of terrorism related offences. Most of these prosecutions have made significant use of vital intelligence information. I take this opportunity to point out that in these prosecutions reliance was also placed on information from the public and that without that information from the public, including from various communities, those prosecutions would not have been possible.

It is imperative that the statutory framework governing the operations of Australia's intelligence agencies does keep pace with the contemporary and evolving security environment in which we live. If our agencies are to maintain their effectiveness, they need to be supported with legislation that allows them to respond rapidly to emerging security threats, both on the domestic front and on the global front. Amongst these activities in the international sphere of security concern is transnational terrorism. This includes the involvement of terrorist organisations in civil conflicts or insurgencies, such as what we are witnessing in Syria and Iraq. As we know, around 60 Australians are participating in the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq; a total of 150 Australians, both onshore and offshore, are involved in the conflict, and this ranges from engagement in fighting to providing support such as facilitation or funding. And we know that a considerable number have also been precluded from travelling to these areas.

Again, I particularly mention the work that has been done by people, particularly in the Muslim community. Imams, families and community leaders have been involved in important counselling work with young disaffected people and stopping those young people from travelling abroad. This is the most significant risk to Australia's domestic security that we have faced in many, many years. There is a real risk that such participants will become further radicalised. They may return to Australia with an increased capability and a capacity to pursue violent acts in our community. The threat of a terrorist attack on Australian soil is a very real one, it has not diminished. Indeed, the threat of home-grown terrorism is an enduring one in today's global environment.

We have seen rapid developments in information and communications technology, particularly in the online space, and this has led to increased use of activities that do raise security concerns. Terrorist groups and individuals are becoming much more sophisticated in their use of such technology in organising themselves and in evading detection. And that is why it is vitally important that our security and our intelligence forces are one step ahead. Espionage also remains a security threat, and we have seen a number of high-profile cases which are a stark reminder to us of the risks presented by so-called trusted insiders in this respect. It is important that our intelligence agencies are equipped with powers that enable them to function at their best and to function most effectively in this environment.

I am pleased to support our efforts to secure Australia's position in relation to these issues. Our government will do whatever is possible to keep its people safe, but I want to stress that our security measures are directed towards terrorism and those who would do us harm. Can I stress that these measures are not about religion and they are not about any sector of our Australian community. This legislation provides the framework, in effect the hardware, but it is also vitally important that we have the most effective software.

Debate interrupted.