Jacinta Collins (Victoria, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Cabinet Secretary) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

This bill is the second national security bill brought forward by the government in this parliament; the first, the National Security Legislation Amendment (No 1) Bill, was passed through the parliament on 1 October. Labor insisted on a full review of that bill by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security; and we supported the bill, subject to the government implementing each of the committee's recommendations. This bill is of a very different nature to the first bill. Labor's shadow Attorney-General, Mark Dreyfus, said of that bill in his second reading speech in the other place:

Many of the measures in the bill are largely uncontroversial, though worthy, adjustments to intelligence legislation, including updating ASIO's employment framework, improving ASIO's ability to work and share information with other organisations, enabling ASIS to better cooperate with ASIO, improving ASIS's protective security capability while operating in dangerous environments and renaming our defence agencies to better reflect their roles. Though it is perhaps impossible to separate this legislation from current events in public debate, we should be clear that these are reforms intended to endure well after current threats have faded. We should debate their content on that basis.

The Foreign Fighters bill contains a very different set of amendments. The first bill updated and adjusted the architecture of our national security organisations in a broad way so that they will be better able to meet present and future demands. The Foreign Fighters bill, by contrast, directly addresses the threats to Australian security which have arisen out of present circumstances in Iraq and Syria. Where the first bill focused on the structure of our national security institutions in the long view, this bill focuses on the discrete powers most relevant to addressing the immediate threat of foreign fighters.

Labor offered the government its constructive bipartisan support for the first bill and we have offered constructive bipartisan support for this bill. As the Leader of the Opposition, Bill Shorten, has said on many occasions, Labor believes that our security agencies and national institutions should have the powers and resources they need to keep Australians safe from the threat of terrorism and we will support the government in providing those powers and resources. However, our bipartisan assistance to the government on matters of national security is never a blank cheque and we have also sought serious changes to this bill. Labor foreshadowed during debate on the first bill that subsequent bills 'may merit a different approach', and this has proven to be the case with regard to the Foreign Fighters bill. We have sought much broader changes to the Foreign Fighters bill than we sought to the first bill—arising as it did out of a lengthy bipartisan process begun by a Labor government.

Labor has fought hard over the past weeks to improve this bill by making sure it actually assists our agencies in addressing the foreign threat and by insisting on necessary safeguards for the fundamental democratic freedoms which characterise our society and our way of life in Australia. We pursued these improvements in the intelligence committee, where Labor members and senators closely scrutinised the bill and tested the case for each new measure. In cooperation with the government members of the committee we achieved 36 substantive recommendations. We pursued these improvements in negotiations with the government in which we have achieved agreement on not just the full implementation of the intelligence committee's recommendations but also yet further amendments to the bill. Now, not satisfied with the government's position on two outstanding matters in this bill, Labor will pursue improvements to this bill through further amendments that we will move in the Senate.

To give context to the improvements to this bill that have been achieved by Labor, it is useful to consider the scope of the bill and the original form in which the bill was first introduced into the Senate. The bill was introduced into the parliament on 24 September. It contains a broad range of measures designed to address the foreign fighter threat and amends more than 20 Commonwealth acts. Much of the bill implements recommendations of the March 2013 COAG review and the second, third and fourth reports of the former Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Bret Walker SC. These measures include: a new power for interim suspension of passports; merging the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act into the Criminal Code, and harmonisation with code antiterror provisions; changes to the law of evidence to facilitate the use of overseas evidence in prosecutions of foreign fighters; a new evidence-tampering offence; lowering the legal threshold for arrest without warrant for terrorism offences; new power to seize bogus travel documents; providing for information sharing between AUSTRAC and AGD to help combat terrorism financing; and the introduction of delayed notification search warrants for terrorism offences.

The bill also includes other proposals which have attracted more controversy: a new offence for advocacy of terrorism, and the introduction of 'advocacy of terrorism' as a ground for prescription of a terrorist organisation; a new offence for entering or remaining in an area declared by the Minister for Foreign Affairs; and an expansion of power to collect biometric information on Australian citizens at airports. Further, in its original form, the bill provided for the extension by 10 years without review of the sunset clauses for legislation empowering the AFP control orders due to expire in December 2015, the ASIO questioning and detention powers due to expire in July 2016 and the AFP preventative detention orders due to expire in December 2015.

Let us look at the committee recommendations. The bill was referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, where it was thoroughly scrutinised and debated. The committee sought public submissions and held several public hearings. Labor members worked tirelessly with their government counterparts to apply the level of scrutiny and oversight Australians expect their representatives to bring to bear on legislation of such consequence. The process culminated in the intelligence committee's production of a substantial report making 36 recommendations, many of them calling for significant changes or clarifications. For completeness, and to illustrate to the Senate and to the Australian people the breadth and depth of the changes to this bill that have been achieved, I will set out those recommendations of the committee which call for amendment to the bill. I note that in each and every case Labor has insisted that the intelligence committee's recommendations be accepted and necessary amendments brought forward by the government.

In relation to sunset provisions, in its original form, the bill provided—extraordinarily, as I said—for the extension by 10 years, and without review, of the sunset clauses for legislation empowering control orders, ASIO questioning and detention powers, and preventative detention orders. Incredibly, in fact, there were reports in the press that the government initially wanted to remove any sunsetting arrangements for these powers, and confirm them as a permanent part of our law. Control orders, preventative detention orders, and the ASIO powers are each extraordinary and unprecedented powers introduced in the mid-2000s in response to the September 11 attacks and the Bali and London bombings. Their extraordinary nature is reflected in the fact that the Howard government saw fit to subject those powers to review and have them lapse after 10 years of operation if no legislation was passed to extend them. I note that the then Labor opposition sought amendments limiting this sunset period to five years—amendments which, unfortunately, at the time were unsuccessful.

The intelligence committee, after robust debate, concluded that these powers should sunset two years after the next federal election. It is right and proper that the next parliament be obliged to grapple with these powers again, and to decide on its own account whether their continuation is justified. Labor was not satisfied that the case had been made for such a lengthy extension. It is not acceptable that these extraordinary powers could operate for two decades without being properly reviewed by the parliament. As I said, this bill is aimed at a present threat; Labor will resource our agencies appropriately to deal with that threat, but we will not abandon scrutiny of agency powers properly considered special or emergency measures.

Moving onto the reviews, importantly, Labor has ensured that these sunset provisions are accompanied by mandatory reviews ahead of time. As was noted in evidence given to the committee, the whole purpose of sunsetting provisions is undermined if appropriate reviews are not conducted. The intelligence committee recommended that its review of the preventative detention order, control order, and ASIO powers be mandated by statute. What is more, it recommended amendment of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act to mandate reviews of the powers by that body also. It is worth remembering that it was only due to pressure from Labor that this body was retained. Earlier in the year, the Abbott government described this critical oversight office as 'red tape' and sought to repeal it. We vocally opposed that short-sighted cut, and the bipartisan support the committee expressed for the position in its report on the first bill was vindicated by Labor's consistent support for proper oversight mechanisms.

Speaking on the first bill, I pointed out that the position of monitor had been vacant since April. At a time of substantial change to our national security laws, that office is still vacant. This is simply unacceptable. Labor calls on the government to appoint an appropriate, credentialled and experienced monitor immediately. This is critical. By insisting on dramatically shortened sunset periods and on statutory reviews, both by the monitor and by the intelligence committee, Labor has ensured that, no matter the attitude of the Australian government in the next parliamentary term, there will be a sober and considered review of these powers ahead of their scheduled sunset.

We move onto foreign evidence. Labor has improved key human rights protections in the bill's provisions for the use of overseas evidence in terrorism prosecutions in Australian courts. As we did in regard to the first bill, we have demanded amendments to clarify that torture can never be accepted in any way under our law. As originally presented to the parliament, this bill excluded foreign evidence obtained as a result of torture only where that torture was carried out by public officials. There is no reason why the exclusion should be constrained in this way, especially when we are particularly concerned with regions which may have no readily recognisable state authorities.

The committee recommended the exclusion be expanded to cover torture by anyone. It also recommended the expansion of the definition of evidence obtained under duress to cover situations where evidence is obtained from a person by dint of threats to their person, their family, their associates or their property. In its original form, the bill had only covered circumstances where a person or their family was threatened. Though we strongly support making foreign evidence easier to use, as it is a critical part of enabling successful prosecutions under foreign incursions offences, Labor also wants appropriate safeguards for the accused. The committee recommended that judges be obliged to warn juries about the potential unreliability of foreign evidence; this is an important way of making sure that trials are fair.

On biometric collection, the Foreign Fighters Bill includes provisions for the expanded collection of biometric data on Australian travellers. While the legislation expressly provides only for the collection of photographs, the bill as originally drafted allowed the government to expand this to other forms of biometric data, such as fingerprints or iris scans, by mere regulation and without seeking parliamentary approval.

Labor voiced its objection to this during the committee process. It is not acceptable that such an expansion of power with serious consequences for the privacy of ordinary citizens could be achieved without new legislation. Indeed, it is worrying that this aspect of the bill only became apparent during the Intelligence Committee's scrutiny. It is a vindication of that scrutiny process that did occur. We welcome the committee's recommendation to remove the ability of the government to prescribe further biometric collection by regulation. We also welcome the recommendation that the privacy commissioner oversee both the biometric database that is provided for in this bill and any future legislative proposals to expand it to other forms of data.

On foreign incursions, the bill makes a number of changes to Australia's existing foreign incursions legislation which were recommended by the National Security Legislation Monitor. Appropriately, the bill will roll the Foreign Incursions and Recruitment Act into the Criminal Code and update its provisions to specifically deal with the foreign fighter threat. We welcome those changes along with the improved ability to use foreign evidence and we hope that these improved provisions will allow for successful prosecutions of Australians who engage in lawless conduct in conflict zones abroad.

However, the bill as originally presented was drafted in a confused way. It did not simply implement the monitor's recommendation that the definition of 'engaging in hostile activities' overseas be updated to include terrorist activity as currently defined under Australian law. Rather, it included a new concept: 'subverting society'. As was pointed out in evidence to the committee, this expanded the operation of the foreign incursions provisions well beyond what the foreign incursions provisions were meant to address. It could have seen those provisions address private disputes or petty criminal activity.

Labor welcomes the committee's further recommendation that the definition of 'engage in hostile activity' be amended so that it only captures conduct which would be a serious offence under Australian law. The strange legislative language of 'subverting society' was likely to mislead or confuse the public as to what was intended. As the former monitor Bret Walker pointed out during the Intelligence Committee process, there is no need for this sort of florid language in Commonwealth statutes, which should be drafted in clear and calm terms. A loaded legislative term like 'subverting society' would cause completely unnecessary community agitation when the substance of the provision is aimed simply at terrorist conduct. Labor welcomes both the substantive changes which faithfully implements the monitor's recommendation and the removal of this poor drafting technique. We are pleased to see the government agree to produce a more tightly constrained provision that is drafted in clear language.

On enhanced oversight, across all parts of the bill Labor has sought improved oversight and accountability mechanisms. We believe that our security agencies can only continue to do their important work if Australia's political leaders are willing and able to reassure the community—and I refer here to every part of our diverse, multicultural community—that our security agencies are not only appropriate empowered but also appropriately accountable. Of key importance is that the committee recommended that it have the power to oversee not just the Australian Intelligence Community agencies but also the AFP in its counter-terrorist capacity. Labor supports this, as it is right and appropriate for the Intelligence Committee to be able to hold all agencies involved in counter-terrorism activities to public account. This is especially so given the extension in this bill of AFP powers, including to preventative detention orders and control orders.

With respect to the more controversial parts of the bill, particularly the declared areas and advocating terrorism, I will cover those issues during my contribution to the committee stage and in moving the amendments that have been circulated. In conclusion, I will say that Labor has approached this legislation as a responsible opposition should. We have offered the government our bipartisan support for measures to ensure our national security and that is constructive, bipartisan support. Labor did not, and never would, offer the government a blank cheque on this or any piece of legislation. We have worked hard to improve this bill. We want to make sure that it operates as intended, actually serves to protect our security and is subject to limits and accountability appropriate to the sort of free society that Australia is and must remain.

Our committee members have worked hard in pursuit of these ends in the intelligence committee process. We have worked hard in pursuit of these ends in negotiating with the government. And when our concerns have not been satisfactorily resolved, we have moved amendments in this place, which we urge the government to consider and to adopt.

Labor is proud of its record on national security and we are happy to assist the government in getting this bill right. We thank the government for its willingness to accept so many of the changes that we have asked for, and we hope that in that same spirit of constructive bipartisanship they might accept the two further changes we seek in the Senate today. (Time expired)

Penny Wright (SA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak with a heavy heart about this bill, the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014. This is a significant and complex piece of legislation which, if enacted, will have long-term impacts on how ordinary Australians go about their lives. These impacts will include whether and where people travel; the circumstances in which people can be detained and questioned by ASIO, Customs officials or the police; and what kind of public commentary on controversial issues is allowed to occur in Australia. The reality is that once this legislation is enacted—once it is on the books—it is very likely, on the basis of the lessons of history, that it will be very hard to shift.

I want to make one thing clear in this speech, and it is this: this legislation does not target only those with a criminal or terrorist intent. Nor does it carefully pinpoint gaps in the existing counter-terrorism legal framework and then fill them in neatly. This is a bill that will affect many everyday Australians and how they go about their lives. It contains widely drafted, sweeping reforms and makes changes to over 20 existing acts. It introduces a range of new, very serious criminal offences. It extends the scope of many other existing criminal offences, and it significantly expands the range and scope of powers available to law enforcement and intelligence-gathering agencies.

Interestingly enough, I received a tweet when I was talking about the need for the scrutiny of legislation. Someone tweeted to me, 'Why do you Greens want to protect terrorists?' I think that is one of the fundamental issues that we need to come to terms with in debating this legislation, because it is not the guilty I am interested in protecting here, it is the innocent. It is actually the Australians going about their lives who will be affected by this wide-ranging, unprecedented change to our laws. Tomorrow these laws may affect me or my child or my neighbour, or someone listening to this speech or reading my remarks.

In response to some of the commentary that I have been putting out in relation to this national security legislation I received a letter from an Australian working abroad, who thanked me for the Greens' work in opposing this legislation, in particular the 'declared zones' offence. This person said:

While some people are having theoretical debates about what such provisions might mean, it is all too real for people like me. I am an Australian living and working in the Middle East, many of my friends are aid workers and journalists, and this bill will have serious repercussions for us. If this bill becomes law in its current form, on our return to Australia, we will all be criminals; unless and until we can prove we are not.

While in the Middle East I have worked with and volunteered for INGOs .... One has to ask how exactly restricting or criminalising the movements of people like me will make Australia a safer place?

I urge people who might be listening to this, or reading these remarks, to remember that every time, in Australia, we lose rights and freedoms that are precious—every time we allow fear to divide us and hurt people who are innocent—terrorism is actually winning. The Australian Greens have consistently said that there must be proper parliamentary scrutiny of this legislation, including a robust inquiry which offers legal experts and relevant stakeholders a genuine opportunity to come to terms with this complex legislation, to analyse it and to provide comment on the bill.

In the face of fear about terrorism the first failure of this government, in carrying out its duty to protect the population of Australia, is in not providing an adequate opportunity for this parliament and the Australian community to even begin to understand some of the most significant counter-terrorism changes in our lifetimes. This has not happened. This is a failure to uphold and protect some of the most dearly held tenets of the democracy that we cherish—in a sense, that we are fighting for here. This is irresponsible and antidemocratic. Already, by playing the national security trump card, by rushing these laws through parliament in the space of two days in the Senate, with inadequate time to consider them and before they have been properly scrutinised by the very committee of this parliament established to safeguard our human rights—the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights—it is possible to say that this government is already allowing terrorism to win, or to start to win.

The government is pursuing these changes without adequate consideration of the broad range of existing offence provisions and powers that are currently available to such agencies to protect the Australian community against threats to national security, and    without a careful analysis of whether each individual reform proposed is a necessary and proportionate response to genuine and legitimate national security concerns.

As it is for every other senator in this place, keeping the Australian community safe from harm is my unwavering priority. Of course it is. I live in the community. My family is in this community. My children are here and so are my neighbours and my friends. But I will not pretend that the only way we can keep our community safe is to undermine the rights and processes that make us a vibrant parliamentary democracy.

I will not agree to amending laws on the run, without allowing the parliament or the community to really understand what they will mean for ordinary Australians. I will not agree that doing that is the best way to guard Australia against national security risks.    The Australian Greens support careful lawmaking, particularly when people's lives, rights and liberties are at stake. This means ensuring that the agencies we rely upon to protect us from harm have the tools they need to investigate crime and gather intelligence. But it also means looking at what laws we already have in place, whether they are working properly or need to be improved, and when they should be limited to the most exceptional circumstances.

In short, it means listening to those with experience and expertise. Sadly, the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 has been introduced in flagrant disregard of these principles. As a result, this bill risks being at least an ineffective reaction to the national security threat which is faced by Australia, duplicating existing laws, and at worst it risks being a disproportionate intrusion on the rights and liberties of Australians.

Let's look at the lack of scrutiny first. I was really interested to hear Senator Collins' comments. It will be interesting to see how Labor votes this afternoon when there is an hour's motion to gag debate on this bill. If that motion is successful, this Senate will have fewer than eight hours to consider the most significant counter-terrorism laws in my lifetime. The unwarranted haste with which this bill is being pushed through parliament has meant government agencies and Australia's foremost legal experts have not had enough time to provide a comprehensive analysis of the full bill. The communities who were apparently consulted in relation to the draft bill remain deeply concerned with its content and continue to feel sidelined and ignored. Even the government's own expert—the position established for the specific purpose of monitoring our national security laws—the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, the INSLM, has remained vacant since April, leaving Australia without the source of independent expert advice it needs most.

The Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, of which I am a member, forewent its capacity to inquire into the bill, although the Senate referred it to that committee. The unrepresentative Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, comprised only of the club, coalition and Labor politicians, with no input from crossbenchers or Independents or the Australian Greens, has had too little time to identify and address the potential implications of these changes on the lives of ordinary Australians.

As a lawyer, I remain deeply concerned about the devil yet to be revealed in the detail of this bill. The Australian Greens have a number of concerns about this bill, many of which I will not have time to address during the time allocated. However, I will start with the no-go zone offence. The Australian Greens will seek to abolish the so-called no-go zone provision in this bill which will make it a criminal offence, punishable by 10 years imprisonment, for a person to travel to a declared area. In an extraordinary departure from the type of traditional rule-of-law principles the Attorney-General in this place claims to hold dear, the offence does not include a fault element; it does not include a mental intention element; it does not require the person to be travelling with any kind of criminal or wrongful intent. It effectively allows the executive arm of our government to draw red circles on the world map and put anyone who goes there at risk of criminal prosecution.

There is a narrow list of exemptions for 'legitimate purposes', but this will not protect the many Australians who travel abroad every year. A person who has travelled to a declared zone will be subject to a criminal charge and can only effectively defend themselves if they can bring evidence to show that they were in the area solely for one of the listed legitimate purposes. Legally, to start with, that will be extremely hard to do. As the law stands, visiting friends will not suffice. Travelling to give legal advice or for a religious pilgrimage or ceremony is not covered. And, while visiting a family member will be considered a legitimate purpose, being invited to a wedding in another town while you are there and attending would breach the requirement for the purpose to be a sole reason for the travel.

This law will have a chilling effect on the freedom of movement of every Australian with relatives or friends in areas that are experiencing, or may in the future experience, violence or conflict. Would anyone here with young children take the risk of visiting a sick mother or father in a declared area if they knew they would have to face a criminal court to prove the legitimate reasons for their travel on their return? It is also worth noting that travelling for business purposes is currently not listed as a legitimate purpose in the bill. This offence has the serious potential to isolate and divide family members, dislocate migrant communities and stifle business transactions with developing nations. The risk is that this will further entrench feelings of isolation and alienation in the very communities we rely upon most in building a safer, more cohesive Australian society. And all this when this offence is considered by legal experts to be completely unnecessary.

Australia's criminal laws already well and truly cover circumstances where a person leaves Australia to participate in hostile or terrorist activities overseas, as well as circumstances where a person encourages or urges another person to engage in such activities or a person who financially or otherwise supports terrorist or criminal organisations.

Let's turn to control orders and preventative detention orders. The second area for concern is indeed the extension of sunset clauses—the built-in expiration provisions for various existing powers: control orders, preventative detention orders, ASIO's questioning and detention warrant powers, and certain stop, search and seizure powers relating to terrorism offences available to the police under the Crimes Act. Despite the fact that we are told that this legislation is so urgent that we must consider it within a period of hours in the Senate and get it through the parliament with unwarranted haste, these powers are not due to expire until December 2015 and July 2016. But this bill seeks to extend them further. These powers are exceptional. They allow authorities to operate outside the traditional criminal justice process, because they restrict the liberty of people not charged with, or even suspected of, engaging in a criminal offence.

A number of independent bodies, including the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and the 2012 COAG review of counter-terrorism measures, have carefully reviewed these existing powers. Both the INSLM and the COAG reviews recommended that the preventative detention order regime be repealed, describing it as being 'at odds with our normal approach to even the most reprehensible crimes', and said that it may be thought to be 'unacceptable in a liberal democracy'—but maybe that is not what we are living in anymore. The INSLM also stated that 'control orders in their present form are not effective, not appropriate and not necessary'. Inexplicably, this bill ignores expert evidence in relation to these provisions and precludes the opportunity for further review of these powers by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, which is required to review the operation, effectiveness and implications of ASIO's questioning and detention warrant powers by January 2016.

As well as extending the time frame for these powers, this bill extends their reach by making it easier, for example, for the police to obtain and enforce control orders. I cannot say strongly enough: we must not normalise powers that will allow ASIO or the police to detain someone without charge; limit whom they can speak to, where they can go and whether and where they can work; and impact on the lives of their families. We must remember that we are not only talking about Prime Minister Abbott's 'baddies' here; it could very well be a 'goodie'—a person getting on with their everyday life in Australia—who gets caught up in this. If a mistake is made, a suspicion is wrong and someone happens to be in the wrong place at the wrong time—and we have historical examples of that in Australia—lives can be destroyed, people can be crushed and our democracy is poorer.

Let me turn to biometric material. This bill contains biometric data provisions that usher in an unprecedented change to the data collected about travellers at Australian airports. I will be moving amendments to remove these sections. No-one has had the time to carefully consider what this change might mean and what impact it will have on the privacy rights of all Australians leaving on international departures, including those who pose no risk to Australia's national security. As presently drafted, these changes could result in giving the green light for the collection and inter-agency sharing of biometric material, which currently includes photographs and face recognition, but could potentially include iris scanning and fingerprints. We just do not know precisely what forms of biometric material will or can be collected, used and shared under these changes and under what circumstances and with whom this material can be shared. Due to lack of time, many experts were unable to provide comprehensive submissions on the impacts of these changes. For these reasons, the Australian Greens will move that the reforms proposed in schedules 5 and 6, relating to the expanded use of biometric material for passenger processing at Australia's border, be removed from the bill.

I will also introduce amendments in relation to the new offence of advocating terrorism. Many experts have suggested this offence duplicates and unnecessarily expands existing offences while using broadly defined terms that may have unintended consequences. This offence risks capturing legitimate commentary on issues like Australia's foreign policy or political satire whilst at the same time driving those with nefarious intentions underground, making it harder to monitor and investigate real terrorism offences such as supporting a terrorist organisation. To remain one of the world's strongest democracies, we must remain free to strongly criticise the actions of our government, particularly on those matters directly relevant to our nation's place in the world, such as whether we should engage in combat activities overseas or whether Australia should publicly condemn or praise a certain political or violent struggle. Not everyone thinks carefully about their public contributions on matters that invoke passionate responses. It is chilling to think of those among us, from our teenage sons and daughters to favourite online bloggers, who, because of impetuous or thoughtless action with no real malice involved, could be at risk of very serious punishment under an offence like this, which does not specifically define the limits of criminal liability.

We also have significant concerns about new powers for the suspension of travel documents and visa cancellations. These clauses give the minister very broad powers with limited oversight and narrow appeal rights. The Australian Human Rights Commission, among others, has pointed out that the cancellation of family and sponsored visas risks violating a range of human rights.

We have other concerns about the expansion of powers of customs officials to detain people without charge, the delayed notification search warrants and provisions governing the use of foreign evidence in Australian criminal proceedings—and we will be speaking further about those in our committee stage amendments.

The issues raised in this speech merely skim the surface of the Australian Greens' grave concerns with this bill. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights has not yet even finished its consideration of this bill and is still waiting for responses from the Attorney-General to deal with deficiencies in the mandated statement of compatibility provided with the bill. But it is fair to say that Australia has a proud history of protections and freedoms that it has inherited from hard-fought reforms in British democracy. When the government seeks to take away freedoms including freedom of movement, freedom of expression, right to freedom and freedom from arbitrary detention, it is essential that the legislation is subject to rigorous scrutiny. (Time expired)

David Fawcett (SA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to make a short contribution in the five minutes I have available to the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014. As a member of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, I can assure Senator Wright and other senators in this place that there has, in fact, been robust and deep scrutiny of this bill. The committee listened to a wide range of witnesses and, importantly, also to the evidence provided by the security agencies, who work tirelessly on behalf of the people of Australia to ensure our security and also to ensure that we meet our security obligations to the broader global community.

To put it into context, on 24 September this year the United Nations Security Council met and passed a unanimous resolution. The resolution requires all 193 UN member states to prosecute and penalise people who travel or attempt to travel abroad for terrorism training or to help finance such efforts; to deny entry to anyone they have reasonable grounds to believe could be supporting or participating in terror related activities; and to share airline passenger information records and other personal details with international databases to help track and prevent the movement of suspected foreign fighters. It is only the sixth time in 70 years that the Security Council has met with heads of nations. It met in those times to address the most urgent threats to peace and security. We see here that whilst there are urgent threats—and we are seeing those play out both on the global stage, particularly with the events in northern Iraq and Syria, and in Australia, as we have seen just recently in Melbourne, as well as in Canada and the United States—there are emerging and changing threats from people who support the ideology of Daesh or the Islamic state.

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security scrutinised these bills and made 36 recommendations. As Senator Collins pointed out before, it was a bipartisan effort whereby members from both the government and the opposition looked at the bill and made suggestions as to how to improve it so that we could capture the operational effect that the agencies need to ensure the safety of Australians but at the same time increase the balance to make sure that essential freedoms are preserved and that there are checks, such as sunset clauses, so that these do not without due cause become a permanent feature of our legislation.

I would like to quickly address some of the key points that have raised concern. One is the issue of advocacy. One of the problems in the past has been that people who had been seeking to inculcate in young, impressionable minds the mindset that this is something that is not only permissible but required by their ideology had been very smart and very clever to walk a fine line to avoid the current law which would capture them. We are seeing that we have a generation of people who have been inculcated to a point where the process from that inculcation to action—to that radicalisation—is very short. And it is quite important that we have the ability to circumvent and to prevent those enabling conditions such that we do not have this body of young people—or, in some cases, older people—who have been radicalised to the point where they can decide to act and very quickly move forward.

We have seen a number of cases in which the so-called hate preachers have walked that fine line, they have inculcated into minds the willingness to act, and this legislation is a way of preventing that. Importantly, they commit an offence if they 'intentionally counsel, promote, encourage or urge the doing of a terrorist act or the commission of a terrorism offence' and the person is reckless as to whether another person will engage in a terrorist act or commit a terrorist offence. There are a number of things in there, particularly the 'reckless' element, that are important and that provide protections from a free-speech perspective. Importantly also, there is a safeguard in that there is an existing defence for acts that are done in good faith, such as political communication or publishing a report or commentary about a matter of public interest.

The sunset clauses, as we talked about, are important measures, and we have reduced the time frames on those to make sure they do not become a continuing feature of our law. But the arrest thresholds are an important part, as we have seen, with increasingly the change from large groups with complex plans seeking to have mass casualty events. We have had very good records in Australia of our existing laws enabling our security forces to have things like Operation Pendennis, in which we defeated the threat against the MCG in Melbourne. Now we are seeing people operating as small groups or individuals very quickly, with no great planning required in terms of their equipment. It is important to change the threshold to enable our security officers to act in a timely manner so that they can apprehend people and prevent those occurrences. So the threshold is being changed to require that an officer of the law has reasonable grounds to suspect, rather than the threshold of reasonable grounds for belief. This is not arbitrary. Some factual basis for the submission must be shown. It is also important to recognise that this is not a new concept in Australia, with many states and territories already having an arrest threshold that is based on suspicion.

On the issue of biometric measures, we have seen a case in which somebody left Australia, with manual checking at an airport, and went and joined terrorist fighters overseas. We already use biometric measures for people coming into Australia. Many would be familiar with eGate. This legislation provides the ability to use that same technology outbound. It meets the obligations that we have signed up to through the United Nations. It means that we can use existing technology, existing privacy safeguards, on outgoing as well as incoming passengers to prevent the kind of occurrence we saw in Australia before.

I will make one final comment, on declared areas. This is not an offence of strict liability. The DPP still has discretion as to when to actually bring a case against an individual. So, if there is a range of background factors and other information that is in the brief and the DPP cannot for whatever reason use another law, this measure provides an opportunity to bring a case against an individual who has travelled to a declared area. But for a declared area—somewhere like Mosul—witnesses were questioning, during the public hearings on this, why somebody would not be free for example to go and do language training. As I put to those witnesses, in the case of an area like Mosul, where every reasonable person has either fled or has been executed through decapitation or crucifixion, what reasonable person would seek to travel there to do education training? It just does not make sense. And because this is not a strict liability offence, all the people who were talked about in terms of journalism and foreign aid workers would not automatically be captured when they came back, because whole regions are unlikely to be declared areas. In fact, specifically, countries are not going to be able to be declared areas. So this offence is not the dire restriction on freedom of movement that has been claimed. Because it is not strict liability, the DPP has a discretion to include it as part of a brief of evidence.

My time is about to expire, but I commend this bill to the house. It has had good scrutiny by the process that has been set up by this parliament, which has worked well for many years through the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, and I commend it to the Senate.

David Leyonhjelm (NSW, Liberal Democratic Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak against the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014. I do so because I do not believe that the bill is urgent or even necessary and also because it contains measures that, like the previous national security legislation, erode our rights and freedoms. It is somehow fitting that this chamber is close to empty because it reminds us of Edmund Burke's observation that bad things happen when good people do nothing.

Last week, the government snapped to attention in response to video threats made by a 17-year-old jihadist from Bankstown. I then attracted some attention when I used some mildly unparliamentary language to describe him. I stand by that description. And, for that and other reasons, I do not believe there is any reason to give security agencies additional powers to prevent those like him from causing harm.

We have heard constant claims that we are now operating in a changed security environment where Australia is under threat. Because Daesh is enjoying success in Iraq and Syria, and a sympathiser has perpetrated an atrocity in Canada, the argument goes, we should all be hiding under the doona and giving ASIO and the AFP additional powers to protect us. I say that is not so. This bill has nothing to do with defeating Daesh in Syria or Iraq, and it will not keep us safer here in Australia.

The Attorney-General says that the number of Australians presently involved in the conflict in Syria and Iraq is unparalleled. According to his figures, 160 Australians are currently supporting or fighting with extremist groups. And yet 66 Australians fought in the Spanish Civil War. As a percentage of the Australian population in 1936, more Australians thought helping communists or fascists was a good thing than are currently supporting jihadists. Young men with a thirst for action and too much time on their hands have long joined gangs and become entangled with organised crime. These days—at least for a few—it seems violent religion provides an alternative outlet.

Then there is the basic reality that the government already has substantial powers on the books to deal with any terrorist threat. Apart from the fact—as Bret Walker SC often points out—that violence and conspiracy to commit violence have always been crimes, Australia's security agencies have extensive surveillance capacities. They can, for example, obtain data preservation orders that ensure metadata is retained and an individual's activities on the internet can be examined. They can obtain warrants to intercept phone calls. People can be held and compelled to answer questions. Preventive detention orders and control orders, without any crime having been committed, stop people leaving their homes if it is suspected that they might commit a crime in the future. Passports can be cancelled. Some of these powers are so over the top they are already incompatible with a liberal democracy. No case has been made for the need to add to them. In Australia, lightning kills five to 10 people each year; this does not mean our security agencies should have the right to enter our houses to check on us or imprison those who would walk around during storms.

People have pointed out that Daesh makes sophisticated use of social media and videos deliberately aimed at the young. 'Wouldn't it be better,' I have been asked, 'if watching those videos were made illegal? Wouldn't it be good if we could legislate Hizb ut-Tahrir out of existence?' I have formed the view that the new offence of advocating terrorism, which can be committed by both individuals and organisations, is present in this bill purely to get at Hizb ut-Tahrir and any others like it. It does this in two ways. First, it defines advocacy so as to include the promotion of terrorism. This is broad enough to take in a general statement endorsing revolutionary violence with no particular audience in mind. Second, the offence is drafted in such a way that it requires only that the individual or organisation be reckless as to whether the words in question will cause another person to engage in terrorism. At common law, incitement has always required the element of intent, whereas promotion goes beyond the requirement—also present in incitement—that words ought to act directly on their intended audience.

Last week, I looked at Hizb ut-Tahrir Australia's website. Of course, ASIO probably already know what we do on our parliamentary computers, but I am letting senators know because it was actually an enlightening experience. Hizb ut-Tahrir, like Daesh, supports a global Islamic caliphate. It seeks the imposition of sharia, including the hudud ordinances. These take in nasties such as stoning people to death for apostasy and adultery. It is difficult to avoid the imputation that, given a choice, Hizb ut-Tahrir would prefer Daesh to the Commonwealth of Australia. The issue, of course, is that making Hizb ut-Tahrir illegal will not stop Daesh's videos being made or distributed or watched. In fact, they are likely to acquire a sort of weird cachet from their very illegality. Lots of youngsters, when adults in authority tell them not to do something, immediately go out and do the opposite. This phenomenon is not confined to Muslims. What proscription and listing as a terrorist organisation will achieve when it comes to Hizb ut-Tahrir is to drive the organisation underground.

I like the fact that I can read Hizb ut-Tahrir's website. I like the fact that one of their obnoxious spokesmen turned up on Lateline and revealed to all and sundry just how uncomfortable he is around independent, educated women. I also like the fact that their public presence exposes them to ongoing scrutiny and forces them to speak, not fight. Sunlight is indeed the best disinfectant. It may be possible to legislate bodies like Hizb ut-Tahrir out of existence but not the sentiments it represents.

Thanks to the alleged urgency and necessity of this bill, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security was forced to come up with something approaching a review in a fortnight. Labor, of course, is being its usual supine self on national security—although, to be fair, the recommendations made by the committee are all sound. There is only one problem: they are like putting a bandaid on cancer. Yes, it would be nice to have words like 'encourage', 'promote' and 'advocate' defined with clarity—or at all. It would also be good if the foreign minister could not simply declare entire countries off limits. I agree that the idea of 'subverting society' needs work. But it clearly has not occurred to the Attorney-General that some countries and societies actually make good candidates for subverting: Zimbabwe, for example, or North Korea. I am happy to say that I support the overthrow of Kim Jong-un and Robert Mugabe, and I would not mind if there was a bit of advocating terrorism to achieve that. What does that make me? Even better are the proposals to reel in the lengthy sunset clauses for PDOs and control orders. Instead of 2025 or 2026, they will stay on the books for a mere two years after the next federal election—about four years, then, give or take. Mind you, that is still a long time for bad law to hang around.

Then there is the recommendation, when it comes to unauthorised disclosure of delayed notification search warrants, to take the public interest into account. However, as with the previous national security legislation, this safeguard will only go into the explanatory memorandum, not the bill itself. I may have slept through some of my lectures in law school but I remember enough to know that a court only takes the explanatory memorandum into account when the words of the statute are unclear. And the words in this bill are perfectly clear.

These kinds of laws will effectively turn our security agencies into various versions of secret police. Last week, News Corp's Lachlan Murdoch criticised the attack on freedom of speech that sailed through this place with the support of both major parties in relation to special intelligence operations—laws that could see journalists jailed up to 10 years if they disclose information about them. This bill seeks to prevent so-called 'delayed notification warrants' from being disclosed. We are talking about a warrant. One assumes that Lachlan Murdoch will one day be at News Corp's helm. The way things are going, there will be nothing for his journalists to report aside from the colour of Kim Kardashian's knickers.

Even with the acceptance of all the recommendations of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, we are still left with a bill that enables the foreign minister to declare large swathes of territory no-go areas, allows the AFP to conduct searches without telling anyone about them for up to 12 months, places further constraints on the ability of Australians to speak freely, engages in extraterritorial overreach, and tells journalists they must go to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security if they come across misconduct rather than reporting to the wider public in the normal way.

Mr Abbott tells us that the 'delicate balance' between freedom and security will have to shift 'for some time to come' in light of the heightened terror risk. What he fails to realise in enacting laws like this one and the national security legislation is that he is curtailing the very liberties that distinguish free countries like Australia. Australia has the rule of law, procedural fairness, the presumption of innocence, free speech and a free media. It is simply not acceptable to give those good things away, surrendering freedom for safety, in response to windy threats from the 'ginger jihadi' of Bankstown. We can do better than that. Giving away freedom for security is like giving your possessions to a thief so you will not be robbed. At the risk of repeating a worn phrase, it would be tempting to call Mr Abbott and Mr Shorten the girly men of personal freedom, but I do not know of any girls who would be intimidated by threats from a spotty youth on YouTube.

Young men with limited skills and an aggressive cast of mind have always been attracted to violence and have often committed crimes That those crimes are now sometimes committed in the name of Islam does not make them different from crimes committed in the name of communism or fascism, or even just testosterone. There is nothing unprecedented, urgent or super risky about any of this. The internet has changed many things about the modern world, often for the better, but communists and fascists alike were able to convince Australians to fight in Spain in 1936 without it.

When I came to write this speech, there were lots of words and phrases I could have used at the outset to describe the foreign fighters bill. I could have called it Orwellian in its desire to put the Australian people under surveillance. When discussing Hizb ut-Tahrir, I could have pointed out that the best response to speech is more speech. I could also have suggested that the government was in the process of tearing up the Magna Carta and depositing the bits in Lake Burley Griffin. I did not use that language at the outset precisely because it has become stereotyped. However, that does not make it any less true. Look at what you are doing to Australia's democratic heritage; and then, in the name of all that is decent, do better.

Sean Edwards (SA, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I also rise to talk this afternoon on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014. I do not have the advantage of having the sunlight shining on me, as Senator Leyonhjelm did throughout his speech, which was indeed pleasant to look at and certainly was a perfect photo opportunity. Senator Leyonhjelm, I will be at some variance with your views in my contribution today, perhaps particularly on the acts of terrorism on dictatorial people in other countries. We share a similar view on many things, as you well know, but today I think we might diverge.

The first responsibility of government is to the security of its citizens. To deliver on this, the Commonwealth relies on a team of thousands: the military, the state and federal police, and the government agencies and organisations whose people we never see—those amongst us who run towards the bomb blast when everybody else is running away. We owe Australians all reasonable protections, and we owe these people all reasonable tools to keep the odds in our favour.

The national security space requires flexibility and adaptability from all those involved, including from legislators. This bill in effect represents the law adapting in response to the ways in which our enemies have adapted in their fight against us. Outlawing the advocacy of terrorism at home is a sensible and necessary measure in a battle where the key recruiting mechanism has been the rhetorical flourishes of charismatic jihad salesmen. We are banning the jihad salesmen.

Restricting travel to declared regions is both an investment in our own security and an act of a responsible global citizen. It is an investment in our security because those who travel to fight may bring their war home with them and it is an act of a responsible neighbour because we would otherwise be exporting our national security liabilities to other countries. Removing the passports of those with ill will may be enough to stop them from reaching their intended battlefields, but is it enough to ensure they do not take up the battle here instead?

The cancellation of welfare payments for individuals of security concern hardly needs a supporting argument. It will remove the possibility of taxpayers' money being used to fund the very terrorism the same taxpayers' money is being used to combat. That is certainly a sound principle but it is also of great practical importance, because terrorism on the scale of that committed by Islamic State is not cheap. They need money; they need lots of it; and that money has to come from somewhere. Let it not come from here.

The government has cancelled a number of passports to date in order to halt those aspiring to join the terrorism tourism trail. That is the right course of action for Australia's security interests and it is the action of a responsible global citizen. But what happens next? What about the individual who is committed to terror and who is stopped from reaching the battlefield by effective border security but whose aspiration to fight may be far from extinguished? At the very least this leaves our security people with a considerable burden, but a far worse outcome would be one akin to what happened in Ottawa last week. It is reported Michael Zehaf-Bibeau's passport application was declined by Canadian police, who believed he intended to travel abroad to fight, before he attacked the National War Memorial and the parliament of Canada instead. The need for the provisions within this bill is evident.

It is also evident that we should start debating whether we must be much more prepared to imprison those amongst us who want to fight our armed forces overseas, those amongst us with the self-declared intention of overthrowing government and imposing an Islamic caliphate, but who simply cannot reach the battlefield to participate in that fight? What if they seek to conduct the fight here? The evidentiary burden for a passport cancellation is appropriately different to the threshold for arrest and imprisonment, but the risk of jihadists participating in the fight at home is very real. So I suggest that, in addition to the very appropriate provisions of this bill, the time has come for us to debate the appropriateness of being much more inclined to jail the enemy amongst us. I know that this bill has been through the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security that Senator Fawcett chairs and that he made a contribution earlier. This process has been scrutinised by both sides of government and the minority parties in this house. I commend the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 to the house on those grounds.

(Quorum formed)

John Faulkner (NSW, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am delighted that there are so many senators in the chamber to listen to my contribution on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014, which of course contains a broad range of measures designed to enhance the capability of Australia's law enforcement, intelligence and broader protection agencies to protect the Australian community from the threat posed by returning foreign fighters and individuals in Australia supporting foreign conflicts.

This bill was introduced into the Senate on 24 September. It was referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, both of which reported on the 17th of this month. Even with the short and, I believe, inadequate time available to it, I must say that the PJCIS has worked very hard to examine and scrutinise the bill, and it has done so effectively and closely. The committee made 36 recommendations—many of them calling for quite substantial changes or clarifications. I understand that the government has now agreed to all the recommendations made by the PJCIS. As a result, the federal parliamentary Labor Party determined at its meeting this morning that it will support this bill—but it will, however, propose a number of amendments in the committee stage.

With more and more legislative changes boosting the powers of security agencies, the requirement for effective external oversight is now critical to maintaining an essential level of trust in the community about agency operations. Today I want to use the opportunity of this speech in the second reading debate on the bill to speak about this issue and to state very clearly the importance of this issue of oversight of our intelligence and security agencies. I believe that the time is right for a comprehensive review of the oversight of Australian intelligence agencies as further security measures are brought into the parliament for consideration.

I think that there are a number of steps that not only are worthy of debate, both inside and outside this chamber, but also could be readily adopted to enhance our current system. Last Friday, in fact, I posted a paper on my website, which was also posted by the Lowy Institute and published by the Australian Financial Review. That paper recommended eight measures to improve the oversight and scrutiny of our intelligence and security agencies. I do commend these proposals to the Senate and, as I said, I intend to take the opportunity of this second reading debate to outline some of these proposals to the Senate.

It is the parliament to which the intelligence agencies are accountable, and it is the parliament's responsibility to oversight their priorities and effectiveness. The Australian parliament has no better or more authoritative forum than the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Joint Security, the PJCIS, to do this job. The PJCIS is established under part 4 of the Intelligence Services Act—the ISA. Schedule 1 of the act contains detailed provisions about the committee's operations and appointment processes. But the provision of the ISA regarding a prescribed balance of PJCIS members between the Houses has, I think, been an unnecessary impediment to ensuring that the best-qualified eligible parliamentarians serve on this committee. I believe this should change to ensure that the PJCIS has the capacity to draw on those parliamentarians with the greatest expertise and experience in this area.

I also want to talk about the role of the Australian Federal Police, which now of course is absolutely central in Australia's counter-terrorism framework. In its report on this legislation the PJCIS, in recommendation 14, proposed that the committee's functions be extended to encompass the counter-terrorism activities of the Australian Federal Police, including, but not necessarily limited to, anything involving classified material. I have been arguing the merits of this proposition for a number of years, and I am pleased that the committee has again proposed that the government move in this direction—as it did in its report in 2010 on the review, administration and expenditure of intelligence agencies.

To ensure comprehensive and consistent oversight arrangements, it is critical that the AFP's counterterrorism elements be added to the list of organisations reviewable by the PJCIS and to achieve this section 29(1) of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 should be amended accordingly. Also, currently the Intelligence Services Act stipulates the functions of the committee as review of the administration and expenditure of agencies, including their annual financial statements and in addition, of course, any other matter referred by a minister or resolved by either house of the parliament. I argue that the powers and the access of the PJCIS should be enhanced to include access to more classified information and material, including reports and the classified annual reviews of intelligence agencies so that it can do its job more effectively. Of course, in considering the provision of such additional material, the critical issue arises of where to draw the line. It is clear that some types of information are so sensitive that they should not be provided to the PJCIS, even if the committee were given a broader remit.

I have outlined in my paper some examples of such sensitive information such as revealing the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source; current or planned operations but not necessarily past operations; revealing the identities of agency staff past and present, unless that requirement was waived by the agency head; technical details of nonhuman intelligence sources including cryptology; data or information provided by another country, unless that other country consents; current vulnerabilities of ICT systems, installations or infrastructures relating to national security; and, technical capabilities which are subject to protection beyond the top-secret level.

The PJCIS in that report of 2007 proposed that a small working group drawn from relevant departments, agencies and the committee be set up to recommend the types of material which the PJCIS could access, material which should remain off limits and amendments to the ISA enabling any proposed changes for consideration by government. I think this proposal has real merit and I hope to see it implemented.

In addition, currently the PJCIS can only request a matter be referred to it by a responsible minister. In the United States and the United Kingdom, the equivalent parliamentary committees set their own agenda and work programs. It is time for the PJCIS in Australia to be given the power to generate its own inquiries if it believes, following consultation with relevant agencies, that such action is necessary and appropriate. Also, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, who provides detailed scrutiny of the legality and propriety of intelligence agencies' operations, must have her office adequately resourced. The government and the parliament must ensure that the resources and level of staffing provided to the IGIS continue to meet the growing demands and responsibilities placed on them by the expansion of the Australian intelligence community and its powers.

It is critical that the government and the PJCIS regularly review or audit these resources, including the level of staffing and their expertise, within the office of the IGIS. There has been an enhancement recently. That is a good thing but I would argue that the IGIS's annual report should be required to provide a detailed assessment of the adequacy of resources provided to that office and the consequences of any shortfalls if they occur. The government and the PJCIS should provide a response to any such annual assessment. In addition to that, there should be more formalised liaison between the PJCIS and other oversight bodies, of course including the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security but also the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. For example, each IGIS formal inquiry report should be provided to the PJCIS no more than three months after it is presented to the Prime Minister or relevant ministers. It would also be good practice for the committee to receive regular briefings from the IGIS and the security monitor and, where appropriate, from the National Security Adviser, who is based in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

In addition to these proposals, I believe there should be strong support for mandatory sunset clauses for controversial legislation. In recent years, in some instances the parliament has used sunset clauses when intelligence agencies have been granted unprecedented powers. These unprecedented powers include AFP detention orders, AFP control orders and ASIO questioning and detention powers. The lifespan of too many such sunset clauses has been far too long and it is simply not possible to predict the nature and extent of terrorist threats over such a long period.

Stephen Parry (President) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Order! It being 2 pm, the debate is interrupted.