Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Aviation and Transport Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

On 4 December 2003 the Howard government announced its intention to create the position of the Inspector of Transport Security. It is a sign of the Howard government’s mismanagement and incompetence that it took more than two years after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 for it to even accept the need for a senior inspector of our transport systems. Having an independent expert running a ruler over our aviation, land and maritime security operations is an invaluable audit of our preparedness to prevent or disrupt potential terrorist attacks targeting Australia or Australians. Since 9-11 it has become clear that terrorist organisations continue to see mass transport systems as attractive targets. In spite of the repeated statements from various Howard government ministers seeking to score political points out of the current security situation, they did precious little about fulfilling this important role.

It was not until 23 November 2004 that former AFP Commissioner Mick Palmer was appointed as the Inspector of Transport Security. That was nearly a full year after the announcement that the position would be created. It took a full three years after 9-11 for the Liberals to get someone to work on this important task. As with so many other areas of policy, the Liberal government has been more interested in the political spin than in taking the sensible, practical measures necessary to make travel as safe as possible in a new climate of threat. But even here, with this appointment, the Howard government is playing a game of smoke and mirrors. The government has engaged the inspector on average for only one day a week. We have had a part-time Inspector of Transport Security at the same time as terrorist attacks on mass transport systems have increased.

On 7 July 2005 terrorist attacks on rail and bus systems in London killed 56 people, including one Australian, and hundreds more were injured in that appalling attack. Two weeks later, on 21 July 2005, four terrorists attempted bomb attacks that disrupted part of London’s public transport system. Stations were closed and evacuated. The intention of the terrorists was to cause large-scale loss of life, but luckily only the detonators of the bombs exploded. On that occasion, innocent travellers were lucky. In March 2004 we saw terrorists successfully attacking a commuter train in Madrid. More recently, in July this year, we have seen terrorist bomb attacks kill innocent people on a train in Mumbai in India. On 11 August—almost three months ago now—the United Kingdom went to its highest threat level after authorities arrested 24 suspects in a plot to blow up as many as 10 passenger jets leaving Britain for the United States.

Meanwhile, here at home, we have seen repeated breaches of security in the Australian transport industry. All the while, the Howard government has been asleep at the wheel. In Western Australia there was the incident in March last year when three drunken men decided for a bit of a lark that they would jump the fence at Perth International Airport. They walked across the tarmac and, in fact, boarded an empty Qantas passenger plane. Thankfully, they were there for a drunken lark; they could easily have been there for far more sinister purposes. You might think that if security were to be top-class in one place in Australia it would be at Australia’s busiest airport in Sydney; yet, sadly, we know that is not the case. Earlier this year I raised in this parliament a number of breaches of security at Sydney airport. There was the incident in July this year where vehicles tailgated through a security gate. The gate was allowed up to enable one vehicle with a security pass to pass through. Two other vehicles quickly followed through without authority. On that occasion, it was again a case of good luck rather than good management. The two vehicles involved in breaching security were in the midst of an act of road rage. Again, contemplate what might have been the case had that been a planned attack, if it had been terrorists who wanted to get into Australia’s largest airport.

One of the great pities of that incident, as with a number of others, is that the exact problem was drawn to the attention of the government by the UK expert Sir John Wheeler, who delivered a report to the government in the second half of last year identifying a range of problems. He specifically mentioned the problem of vehicles tailgating through security checkpoints at airports. Twelve months after he pointed out that specific problem, we saw examples of it at our largest airport. Then there was that rather famous timber chock that was loosely securing a door on the public side of the airport. The only thing stopping the public walking into the secure area of the airport was a piece of timber in the track of a sliding door. You could lift up the piece of timber and the sliding door would open, allowing you entry into the secure side of the airport. When presented with this in the chamber, the minister sought to deny it, in spite of the photographs we were able to produce of the door and the bit of timber.

And who can forget the camel suit at Sydney airport? In April 2005 a baggage handler managed to get a camel suit out of one of the checked bags. That is the sort of thing we could all have a laugh about in certain circumstances but, of course, this was a secure item in a secure area of one the most important transport hubs in the nation. If a person could easily get to that baggage and take items out, they could just as easily put something in. We know that a number of people who were working at Sydney airport were subsequently removed. Not all of them were removed for reasons associated with the camel suit, but some were removed for security reasons.

But it is not just at our airports that Australia has had these problems; we have seen disasters waiting to happen at our waterfronts and in our ocean lanes. This government has handed out voyage permits for foreign crewed ships, foreign flag of convenience vessels, as if—and I have described them in the past—they were tickets in a chook raffle at a Friday night pub draw. No review has been conducted by this government of the background of the ships or of the crew. The truth is that these ships are flagged in places like Panama, where there is no way of properly identifying the ownership and background of the vessels, and the government makes no real effort to get a security clearance on the individuals who crew the ships, yet those ships carry dangerous chemicals around our ports. On many occasions in this parliament I have raised the example in September of last year of one of those vessels, the Pancaldo, travelling around the Australian coastline on a voyage permit, carrying 3,500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate. Ammonium nitrate is the explosive of choice that terrorists have used around the world for some years. Its use has been regulated by agreement with COAG, but the Commonwealth allows its widespread use by flag of convenience vessels with crews who have never undergone security clearances here in Australia, unlike Australian crewed vessels, where maritime security identity cards provide thorough background checks on all Australian seafarers.

Then, of course, there is land transport, with rail stock and commuter transport. We do not have to travel far around Australia to find rail stock with graffiti on it. That graffiti is often viewed by some—those who created it—as a work of art. They spend some time graffitiing the train to have what they regard as their work of art on display. They are in what should be secure areas for 30 minutes, one hour or two hours doing their graffiti, their so-called artwork. The truth is that terrorists need only a few seconds to deposit a bomb.

Then there is the problem we have in our regional airports, from which, as we speak today, there are flights into major centres like Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane, where passengers hop on the flights without ever having any check done on what they are carrying onto the flight. There is no inspection of either them or their carry-on baggage. They could take weapons on; they could take bombs on; they could take a hand grenade on. Frankly, no-one would know because no checks are performed on them. Again, it is a serious flaw in our transport security network, which was identified by Sir John Wheeler more than a year ago and is still being neglected by the Howard government.

Just two weeks ago Sydney airport had to be partly evacuated precisely because of that problem. A flight arrived from Wagga Wagga and people who had hopped on the flight had never been scanned and had never had their luggage checked; they could have been carrying weapons or explosives. They wandered off into the wrong area of the airport and, all of a sudden, they were in a secure part of the airport without ever having been checked. When the authorities realised there was a problem, they had to evacuate part of Sydney airport and put everybody back through the security points.

These are the problems that have been occurring on a regular basis, but I have mentioned only a couple of them because of time constraints. In the five years since 11 September 2001, when the world was put on notice that public transport systems were a target for terrorists, this government has been asleep at the wheel. It has taken years—in fact, until tonight, it has taken five years—to put in place an Inspector of Transport Security and provide that person with the legislative basis for their work. Even after his appointment, the inspector had no legal powers to do anything. Labor has been calling for legislation to underpin this important job for years. Finally, last year, on 23 May, the government announced its intention to underpin the inspector’s role with legislation. We applaud that. Labor has consistently argued that the Inspector of Transport Security have legislation authorising the important tasks that need to be performed by the person fulfilling that role. Some 17 months later we finally have a bill in this parliament—that is, five years after 9-11 the Howard government has managed to complete, or nearly complete, the process of establishing the Inspector of Transport Security. I have recently described that progress as akin to a snail on sleeping pills.

Who would seriously contemplate this as a response to the threat of terrorism, a response to the 9-11 disaster, a response to the Madrid train bombing, a response to the London bombings? Who would credibly accept that in the face of those threats a reasonable response of a diligent government is to wait five years before actually getting a senior Inspector of Transport Security on the job with a piece of legislation to say what he can and cannot do? Finally, on 18 October this year—just a couple of weeks ago—the government tabled this bill in the House of Representatives after what can only be described as a disgraceful and unacceptable delay in the face of a dangerous list of terror attacks overseas and flaws in our own system.

Labor supports the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006. However, there are flaws in it that need to be rectified, as well as improvements that need to be made to enhance the inspector’s role and the independence of the inspector. I want to quickly refer to just a couple of provisions in the bill and then address those areas where further improvements are required. Clause 80 requires the inspector to minimise disruption to transport. That is a sensible provision—Labor wants commuters to be safe and on time.

Clause 81 correctly obliges the inspector to act consistently with Australia’s international obligations, and that is a sensible provision, of course, that we support. From time to time it may be appropriate for states and territories to confer powers and functions on the inspector, and clause 83 of the bill allows that temporary passing of powers from the states to the inspector to occur.

The bill also ensures the interests of the states and territories are protected. The consent of the relevant state or territory minister is required before the Inspector of Transport Security can conduct an investigation into a matter that falls within their jurisdiction. I have no reason whatsoever to doubt that all of the states and territories would work cooperatively with the Commonwealth and the Inspector of Transport Security, especially in the event of an incident or a terrorist attack.

But there are five particular areas of this bill that we think require improvement and amendment, and during the consideration in detail I will be moving amendments to give effect to these matters. This bill claims to provide a framework for independent inquiry and recommendations in relation to transport security and offshore security matters. Under the bill, though, the inspector has no power whatsoever to independently initiate an inquiry of his or her own volition.

The Minister for Transport and Regional Services, Mark Vaile, has made some statements about this bill but, like so much of what the government tell you, the devil is in the detail. The minister for transport has said:

The strengths of the legislative framework to support the role of the Inspector of Transport Security include: the independence of the inspector ...

I am not quite sure what definition of ‘independence’ the minister had in mind but it is certainly not the simple English view of independence. The truth is that the inspector has no power whatsoever for an own-motion investigation into a federal matter. He can only investigate what the minister wants investigated, not what needs to be investigated. Indeed, the bill determines that the inspector is not allowed to look at anything until the minister authorises it. Subsequently, the minister can withdraw that authorisation before a report is produced. That is hardly a common-sense definition of an independent inspector. This is somebody well and truly under the yoke of the minister of the day. You might as well make the person a ministerial staffer and put them in the minister’s office. They can only do what the minister wants when the minister wants. That is not what we need if we are going to properly protect the Australian travelling public.

The government have tried, also, to slip in a clause to remain lazy on security. Clause 25(3) of the bill says that the inspector may be appointed on a part-time basis. It does not require him to be appointed part time but we know that that is the government’s form. On average, the inspector has only been asked to work one day a week. Protecting Australians on our transport system is a full-time task. We will move an amendment to stop the government providing Australians with part-time security.

A properly operating Inspector of Transport Security will play a key role in security and counterterrorism matters. By its very nature that will involve access to classified and sensitive material, some of which cannot be made public. However, that does not mean that you cannot have transparency or accountability. As with other senior positions, like the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security—and also positions such as the director of ASIO—appropriate involvement of the Leader of the Opposition of the day provides public confidence that necessary secrecy is not a cloak for hiding poor performance or improper activities.

We should bring this bill into line with the principles enunciated in the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986. Before a recommendation is made to the Governor-General for the appointment of a person as the Inspector of Transport Security, the relevant minister should consult with the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives. That is a provision similar to section 6 of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986. Similarly, the relevant minister should give a copy of a report furnished under subclause (1) to the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives but, in accordance with the similar provisions that apply to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, there would also in the act be a duty on the Leader of the Opposition to treat as secret any part of the report that is not tabled in a house of the parliament.

That brings me to questions associated with public access to reports. Clause 64(1) of the bill states:

The Minister may table a copy of a final report, or part of a final report, in the Parliament, if the Minister thinks that it is, on balance, in the public interest to do so.

In other words, the bill proposes an Inspector of Transport Security who is not allowed to look at anything unless the minister says he can. And the bill then says that, having investigated a matter and reported to the minister, the minister can decide at his absolute discretion whether or not he tells anybody what the Inspector of Transport Security found. So if it is a bit embarrassing for the minister or the government day it will not be a hard task to put it in the top drawer and never have it seen again.

That is not how the nation is going to secure our transport networks against the threat that it now confronts. The word ‘may’ should be changed to ‘shall’ to make it a compulsory requirement to table some report for public consumption. As is customary in matters of this kind, the report tabled may, in fact, be an edited version of a classified document. Sir John Wheeler’s report on aviation security is a clear example. Indeed, I know a few people who wondered why our own Inspector of Transport Security could not have undertaken that review. In any event, it illustrates the process which Labor believes should be followed in this case. I will be moving amendments to give effect to those changes when the bill is considered in detail.

We are also debating the Inspector of Transport Security (Consequential Provisions) Bill 2006 associated with the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006. That consequential provisions bill is important in that it encourages the voluntary disclosure of information under the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006. The object of the bill is to provide an exemption from a request under the Freedom of Information Act for information gathered by the Inspector of Transport Security in the course of the inquiry. It is important to encourage people to provide the inspector with intelligence on security and safety matters. A lot of that inside information is often personal. It can save lives by identifying vulnerabilities quickly and accurately. However, it is important that information be kept confidential. In reading through the international standards and recommended practices to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, a rationale for controlling freedom of information disclosure in aviation matters is articulated. These views are relevant to controlling access to data on black box recorders and I believe they are appropriate and relevant in dealing with the other matters that the Inspector of Transport Security would be obliged to investigate.

This fact was recognised by the 35th assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organisation which noted that existing national laws and regulations in many states may not adequately address the manner in which safety information is protected from inappropriate use. The sole purpose of protecting this information from inappropriate use is to ensure its continued availability so that proper and timely preventative action can be taken and aviation safety improved. The bill protects the information generated or gathered by the inspector in the course of an inquiry from being released under an FOI claim and supports the other confidentiality provisions in the main bill. The inspector’s inquiries will be conducted on a no-blame basis and that is clearly an appropriate thing. Information generated or gathered in the course of inquiries cannot be used as evidence in civil or criminal proceedings except in very limited circumstances set out in the main bill.

Clause 67(3) of the bill permits the minister to issue a certificate indicating that disclosure of the information in a civil proceeding or coronial inquiry is not likely to interfere with an inquiry under this bill. For the information to be disclosed to a court or coroner, clause 67(5) must also be satisfied. These are all sensible provisions to enable the release of information where it is not in any way going to impede either the inquiry or subsequent inquiries and access to information that is going to, in other events, save lives. Clause 67(4) permits disclosure of information in a criminal proceeding where the minister has issued a certificate stating that the disclosure is not likely to interfere with an inquiry. The minister may only issue a certificate if the criminal proceeding is for a serious offence and the disclosure is necessary to establish a chain of evidence.

Clause 67(5), to which I referred earlier, permits a court or coroner to order disclosure when the court or coroner considers the adverse impact of disclosing the information is outweighed by the public interest in the administration of justice. Labor has no objections to these provisions. Clause 67(6) permits a court or coroner to place conditions on the publication or communication of protected information that is to be disclosed or ordered under the subclause, including any information that may be obtained from such information. These are important protections.

We all know the important use of black box data—the information of what is said in cockpits—and its vital role in enabling post-incident investigations. Ultimately, the purpose of that is to prevent accidents from happening again. It is important to ensure that access to the full information is maintained and these provisions, I think, go a long way to applying that standard to the role of the Inspector of Transport Security; we think they are appropriate. The procedure reinforces the policy intention that, except in extraordinary circumstances, information collected for the purposes of an inquiry conducted by the inspector should only be used for that purpose. Labor endorses this provision. It is consistent with Australia’s international obligations with respect to the collection and use of information arising from safety incidents involving transport.

That takes me back to the general purpose of the bill and the Howard government’s performance on this matter. There has been a very unsatisfactory five-year delay in putting in place what is potentially a very important role in improving the security of Australians, whether they are travelling by air, on land or at sea. These are difficult times for many countries in the world to grapple with. There is a new threat that affects people in their normal daily lives in a way that we are not used to. When we turn on our televisions and see what happened on September 11 in America, or when we see what happened in July of last year in London, it affects all of us profoundly and sits in the back of our minds when we travel as well. It is important that when people travel they have the full confidence that all reasonable measures that can be taken have been.

I have cited in my speech a raft of examples where security within Australian airports and on maritime matters has been well below what any competent performance would deliver. The government have not been diligent in addressing these matters. They have been quick to get the political spin out there; they simply have not been quick to do the sensible, practical things that are needed. I hope that the Inspector of Transport Security is given the independence the minister spoke about—and that will only happen if our amendments are adopted. And I hope he fulfils that role of ensuring not just that there is an investigation post incident but that his vast experience and the powers that this bill confers are used to take preventative measures so that all of us in Australia, when we travel, do so knowing that all the things that can be done to make that travel safe have indeed been done. I move:

That all words after ‘That’ be omitted with a view to substituting the following words: “whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House:

(1)

notes the failure of the Howard Government to appoint a person as Inspector of Transport Security until one year after the announcement of the position;

(2)

notes that the Howard Government finally committed to underpin this important job with appropriate laws in May of 2005 but has only now introduced legislation into the House for that purpose;

(3)

condemns the slowness with which the Howard government dealt with the important role of Inspector of Transport Security;

(4)

condemns the Howard government’s dismissive use of the Inspector of Transport Security who has been engaged on an average of just one day a week in spite of repeated failures in security in the Australian transport sector at the same time as terrorists have targeted aviation and rail transport over years; and

(5)

condemns the Howard Government for its failure to engage the Inspector of Transport Security in a full time capacity”.

Bruce Scott (Maranoa, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Is the amendment seconded?

John Murphy (Lowe, Australian Labor Party, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Opposition) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I second the amendment.

Wilson Tuckey (O'Connor, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I have read what one might term the pious amendment proposed by the member for Brisbane. I have listened to his speech and I understand he may have some amendments in the consideration in detail stage. I wonder when he has ever talked, for instance, to his Labor colleagues in New South Wales, who of course legislated to prevent adequate video surveillance in Sydney airport’s baggage area, particularly in the Qantas international area. After all, what was the area of concern? The area of concern was that some trade unionist who was rifling through someone’s bag might get caught. That was the dominant requirement of the New South Wales government. They will shortly have an election, and one wonders whether we are going to debate that issue. But when you want to lecture this government you should have some explanation of the activities of your own colleagues who occupy government in our states with a very significant responsibility for the activities of transport and its security—after all, I still think they employ their local police forces. Some doubt what their benefit might be.

It was interesting to hear the member for Brisbane make the point that some people got into the wrong part of Sydney airport, having come in from Wagga Wagga. He said that, when the authorities recognised this problem, they did something about it. So that is an issue. The system worked. We will never gain perfection in the management of the thousands of people who participate in air travel every day but, on this occasion, belatedly, the authorities recognised what had happened. They inconvenienced a lot of people by sending them outside and making them come through again, but they addressed the problem.

What has become so significant in this place—and the member for Brisbane is a participant in this—is that the opposition constantly puts political opportunity above the safety of the people. The Labor Party recently got a large colour photocopier at the expense of the taxpayer—and they abused the privileges of this House yesterday; I note the Speaker is eventually going to make some response to those sorts of activities—and the member for Brisbane came into this place with photographs purporting to be some door that was not locked. Why, on the first occasion he was informed about that, did he not take it to the minister and see that the door was locked? Because, in the time he waited to come in here and perform his little political exercise, all the things he has told this House about could have happened.

We get it day after day: people standing up with the hard luck story—usually false—about some individual who is being mistreated under recent laws brought to this House by the government. But if there is a true and real problem and someone is being exploited in the workforce why not go and get it fixed? Mr Deputy Speaker, you, the two senior members of parliament sitting at the table and I are required every day to represent the problems and the rights of our constituents—and we do it. And we do not ask them how they voted at the last election. But the policy that seems to be so apparent on the opposition’s side of the House is: ‘Oh well, you know, if the poor lady hasn’t been able to get to the hospital for a month and she has pain and suffering, it is better that I take advantage of it in this place.’

Roger Price (Chifley, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Deputy Speaker, I rise on a point of order. With due respect, this is an important national security bill. I encourage a wide-ranging debate, but clearly the member for O’Connor is not being relevant to the bill. I am interested in his contribution, but it should be on the bill.

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Can I say to the member for Chifley that I think the debate has been, from the member for Brisbane, quite wide ranging. I call the member for O’Connor.

Wilson Tuckey (O'Connor, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am more than willing to comply with that requirement. But I would point out to the Opposition Whip that I am referring to activities conducted by the previous speaker, the member for Brisbane, and referred to in his speech. Let us look closely at some of the things that the member for Brisbane also said in his presentation to the parliament. He complained that the inspector would be subject to ministerial directive. This is the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006. Might I say at this point that the member for Brisbane talked about the fact that the inspector might not be employed full time—in other words, five days a week—to turn up on Monday morning and say, ‘Hey, where’s the failure in the system that I’ve gotta look at this morning?’ It might not be there. Or are we to give him a big staff, with uniforms, to dredge through the various transport sectors looking for some trouble? No.

The intention is that the inspector and his advisers, with their wide-ranging experience, will look at transport security issues and advise the minister where the government is failing in its responsibility to the people. That is his job. He is not a cloak and dagger man. The legislation makes it very clear that every aspect of his inquiries must not impinge on other activities, if there is a breach of other laws—and, of course, the member for Brisbane even made passing reference to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. I am not sure that safety stops at the door of terrorism—I do not think it does—but we have to look at common-sense outcomes. We have debated that in other legislation today.

The English adviser who was brought out to advise the government and to analyse the efforts of the government made it very clear that you need to have a response to various levels of risk. One of the airports in my electorate has full surveillance. It is the airport for the tiniest town in the world but, because of a fly-in fly-out procedure for a major mining construction process, it is being serviced by jet aircraft. It is an about twice the size of a garage but it has the most sophisticated X-ray equipment et cetera. Why? Because there are jet aircraft. At two other airports with much more significant traffic movements we do not have those processes. There is not much evidence that anybody is likely to commandeer the aircraft; it would run out of fuel very promptly. When you get to Perth Airport, you go into the arrivals section and either go home or go back through security to join another flight.

That is an adequate response in those circumstances. I guess that somebody could get on one of those aircraft with the intention of destroying it, but the evidence is that that is most unlikely. Consequently, I have looked really closely at some of the other comments that have been made by the member for Brisbane. He also said that, in all these matters, the information the inspector might accumulate has to be announced in this parliament, and he went so far as to say that the Leader of the Opposition might be consulted. Were there to be a change in the representation in this House, from one side to the other, there is a fair chance that that would be managed in a proper fashion. But, as I have observed the activities of the opposition over the last 10 years, I cannot remember a time when common sense and the interests of the community have prevailed over political opportunity. So why would you tell the present Leader of the Opposition, when, day after day, he demonstrates that the only thing he wants out of this is political advantage? I have seen this in another area. When people approached him to seek his assistance for their financial future, the advice that came out of his office was: ‘If you haven’t got some dirt on the government, I can’t help you.’ What are we talking about here? We are talking about public security. We are talking about a process.

Roger Price (Chifley, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Mr Deputy Speaker, I rise on a point of order. If the honourable member for O’Connor wants to reflect on the motives and actions of the Leader of the Opposition, he needs to move a substantive motion. I would ask that he either move a motion or withdraw the comment.

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The member for O’Connor will withdraw the comment.

Wilson Tuckey (O'Connor, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I withdraw. But I am only commenting on what the member for Brisbane presented to this parliament. He wants it to be a compulsory requirement that all the things that the inspector is supposed to consult upon and inquire into be made publicly available. In those circumstances, how many people are going to give him the evidence he needs? He is there to advise the minister to conduct inquiries and to do the things that are necessary to upgrade the government’s performance in this area. We have all sorts of cops out there who will deal with the day-to-day issues. Of course, the reason that the taxpayer does not have to keep this man around from nine to five is that he will be called upon to advise the government when the need arises—and let us hope that the need never arises. Let us hope that the authorities at the various points of transport perform adequately in ensuring that the laws that have already passed this parliament are complied with, and let us hope that we are fortunate enough not to suffer a terrorism event—and, unfortunately, that cannot be guaranteed.

On other aspects of the bill, I have to express concerns about the government’s policies. I represent a large rural electorate where people deliver fertiliser to their properties in road trains, yet with two or three shovels of fertiliser and the appropriate alteration—pour some diesel on it and find a detonator or, preferably, a short stick of gelignite or dynamite—you have a bomb. Just how far can government ask people to go in the normal activities of their business to secure that product? It is a really serious problem and I wish I had an answer. But my plea is that there will be a bit of common sense relative to the risk assessment of those goods. I have read papers which have suggested that, if you are driving your own truck with 20 or 30 tonnes of this stuff and you stop for a cup of tea at one of the roadhouses, you are supposed to have it inside the truck. I hope they have designed the roadhouse that way.

The reality is that we have got to be a little careful, and I think what the member for Brisbane is asking for today is a direct contradiction of those remarks. He is taking the opportunity, from the privilege of opposition, to tell the government to go beyond a reasonable level of requirement, because he is on about every regional airport—and we know there are hundreds, if not thousands, of them. Instead of taking the advice of the British security agent who said, ‘You must risk-assess these various regional airports,’ he is saying, ‘No, we want total control everywhere.’ But I am not aware that he ever asked Premier Carr, I think it might have been, to allow surveillance in the luggage areas of Qantas. It was not that it was not allowed; the fact of life was that it was prohibited. I think that has now been resolved.

This is good legislation. It provides principally for the independence of this inspector. I am not saying that he is not independent because he operates at the direction of the minister of the day. The minister will be confronted from time to time by correspondence or by the media for whatever purposes and will have drawn to his attention matters that are of interest, and I expect that the minister will give a directive that the inspector look at it. He does his inquiries on, quite properly, a no-blame basis—and I thank the member for Brisbane for his support of that provision. There is protection of information collected as part of an inquiry. Notwithstanding the fact that I thought the member for Brisbane endorsed that proposal, I thought he got a bit wobbly about it, because in another breath he wanted to have the Leader of the Opposition and someone else know about it—and a secret once repeated is no longer a secret. There is recognition that the work of investigating agencies should not be interfered with by inquiries undertaken by the inspector.

In those four provisions we get a clear description of what this particular job is all about. We have the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, we have state departments for road transport and we have all sorts of other agencies with specified tasks relating to the conduct of that area of transport. This is an overriding position that looks specifically at security. The minister might give the inspector a directive one day, saying, ‘Look, what about so-and-so? Do you think legislation and other activities are adequate in that regard?’ and the person currently occupying the post has a wealth of experience—and, I might add, courage—to look at those issues. We asked him to do another inquiry and I am not sure we came out of that smelling of roses. He was very hard on us, and obviously he has demonstrated his integrity in that regard. I would expect that, be it he or someone else in the future, they will value the integrity of the post and deliver accordingly. But this is not a position for day-to-day surveillance of other aspects of transport, and I think the legislation has properly covered these matters. That it has taken another year is one of the criticisms that we have received, and the opposition says it:

... condemns the Howard government’s dismissive use of the Inspector of Transport Security who has been engaged on an average of just one day a week in spite of repeated failures in security in the Australian transport sector at the same time as terrorists have targeted aviation and rail transport over years, and

What is that supposed to mean when in fact the best that the opposition have been able to bring to this House is a photograph of some door that, from their point of view, was supposed to be locked?

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

We’ve got more than that.

Wilson Tuckey (O'Connor, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The interjection that I have just received is interesting. Well, I tell you what: if there is such a door and the member who said that has not provided that information to the appropriate authorities, he is delinquent in his responsibilities as a member of parliament. This was why the Chief Government Whip complained a little while ago, after I pointed out the abuse of this place on the grounds of bringing up issues where the individual member has made no attempt to present the problems of the individual or the issue to the appropriate minister. Bring them up later if you like and, more particularly, if they have failed after they have been notified. But time and time again in this place we know very well that the people who stand up and tell us about Mary Jones or Jack Smith have not made any formal representations on their behalf—for the simple reason half the time that either they do not exist or in fact the information provided is not true. (Time expired)

Ms Anna Burke (Chisholm, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I want to thank the member for O’Connor for his contribution to the debate on the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006, although I am not sure that he ever actually got around to speaking on the bill. He is the only member of the government to speak on it, so he at least gets brownie points for having done that. What a sad indictment of the government: we have a very important bill before the House today, one for which we have been waiting a very long time, and we have got one contribution from the member for O’Connor, who I think spent about five minutes of his entire speech actually on the bill, and as for the rest of it I am not quite sure where he was at.

I want to correct him on a couple of points. He criticised the Transport Workers Union members at Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport for saying that they were concerned about being watched while they were rifling through bags. I have had the absolute pleasure of meeting with some of those baggage handlers at Sydney airport and you could not meet a more reputable bunch of guys anywhere. They are out there asserting the integrity of their profession and looking after the security of the passengers flying on our aeroplanes. They are the ones who are on the front line. You need to remember that every time there is a terrorist attack it is, without fail, transport workers who are killed in that attack. On the airlines, on the trains, on the buses—it is always the transport workers who are at the front line and who are risking their lives.

These people at Sydney airport, down in the baggage-handling area, are the ones who, nine times out of 10, are bringing the issues to the attention of management. We were recently told about an incident where a very suspicious package arrived at the end of the queue. The guys were told to put it on. They looked at it and said, ‘There is something very odd with this package. There are wires coming out of it. Perhaps something should be done.’ Nobody knew what was to be done. They themselves ended up calling the bomb squad to come down. How inappropriate! They all felt incredibly frustrated that there was no chain of command, that there was no instance of how they could progress this issue. They are the ones out there putting themselves at risk in part of their job. They recognise that and understand it. So should this parliament and so should the members getting up to speak on the bill.

While I welcome the bill, I also endorse wholeheartedly the amendment moved by the member for Brisbane. This bill is too little and way too late. The government has patted itself on the back because we have not had an incident. That is more down to good luck than down to good management. Finally we have a framework in which the Inspector of Transport Security can operate, but he is still only going to operate part time, if and when he is released from the other duties he is performing. It is now five years since the September 11 bombings, four years since the first Bali blast, two years since the Madrid bombing, one year since the second Bali bombing and one year since the London bombing, and finally we are putting in place legislation to govern how the Inspector of Transport Security will operate in this country. We have seen by the pattern of these bombs that they are predominantly targeted at transport areas.

The Labor Party recognised last year that one of the areas this government has been failing in is transport and maritime security, and we established our own task force. I have had the pleasure of chairing the task force and I have been to some very interesting places around the country and visited some very interesting things which a girl from Melbourne would usually never get to see. I got to go to Karratha’s port, one of the most important ports in this country and one of the most essential to our economy. It was fascinating being up there. The day we arrived, the boom gate had been constructed. They were actually tarmacking the road as we were driving over it because the gate had not been put there. But I do want to commend all the port authorities. These people are doing a sterling job. We were highly impressed by all the port authorities we met and we were highly impressed by the port authority security committees.

Having also been to Sydney airport and seen the baggage handling, I now know that airports do not cater for passengers but cater for bags. Bags are far more important at airports, I have discovered, having been in the bowels of Sydney airport and seen the check bag screening going on. That is for international; domestic will come online next year. There is a huge process in the bowels of the airport which these bags go through—again, highly professional individuals running a very good system. Probably the only criticism I have of the airport is that it does not now mirror the port security committees system that is in place. I would recommend that there be a rethink about security committees at airports that incorporate all the people at the airport, most particularly the unions. Union representatives sit on the port security committees, and that has been found to be very beneficial.

Finally we have legislation which outlines how the inspector will conduct independent inquiries and recommendations in relation to transport security and offshore security matters, upon the Minister for Transport and Regional Services authorising an inquiry. The flaw in this legislation is that the Inspector of Transport Security cannot actually go out and say, ‘I think I need to conduct an inquiry into this.’ It must be authorised by the minister. When the position was created in 2003—let me repeat: 2003—the government said:

The government will provide $1.6 million over four years to support the establishment within the Department of Transport and Regional Services of an Inspector of Transport Security. The inspector will investigate major incidents and systematic transport security weaknesses to ensure security vulnerabilities are identified and addressed.

The position has been up and running now for three years without enabling legislation for that to take place, and that is a sad indictment of the government. The Minister for Transport and Regional Services at the time, John Anderson, said on 23 May 2005:

Mr Palmer has temporarily stood aside to conduct an inquiry into the Cornelia Rau case, and it is expected he will resume his duties in the near future.

Seven months he took to do that inquiry. A very detailed inquiry it was and very important work, but he already had a very important job to do. The minister went on to say:

There have been no matters which have arisen that would have required Mr Palmer to be recalled or to have someone else appointed to the role on a temporary basis.

Again—more good luck than good management. What if there had been an incident? Surely we have seen, from what has recently occurred in London, that you want to stop these incidents before they happen. Today in the Main Committee we are having a migration debate triggered by fear of the Islamic religion. In stopping people from taking out citizenship, we need to remember that in the latest London incidents they were home-grown terrorists; they were people who were born and bred in London. Where is somebody conducting security—looking at our transport security system overall—ensuring that we have the intelligence and the systems in place so that we do not have a London bombing? I do not know that we have anybody. That is one of the biggest flaws with this legislation.

The minister promised in 2003 that there would be enabling legislation put into place. It is now 2006 and we finally have the legislation, but it is still only a part-time position. It has taken three years to get there. On 23 May 2005 the then transport minister, John Anderson, promised that Mr Palmer’s position, Inspector of Transport Security, would have legislation to underpin it and define its powers. Today we are seeing that being delivered. So we have gone on and on and on. The government has previously said that Mr Palmer will be recalled to his position if something goes wrong in transport security—not good enough. But when appropriating funds for the position the government informed the parliament that the role of the inspector included the investigation of systematic transport security weaknesses ‘to ensure security vulnerabilities are identified and addressed’. How can you do that if you are only going to recall someone if there is an incident?

It is clear that Mr Palmer cannot do the core job of identifying systematic weaknesses in the system to prevent security incidents occurring on train, tram and bus systems. On the one-year anniversary of the London bombing, it is worrying that the government has not installed a person in this position who has this as their sole focus. Finally, we have seen the legislation promised to give the inspector real teeth, but, as indicated by the amendments, we think that somehow the legislation has failed to give the minister the real teeth.

In the last two or three years, in Sydney airport alone, we have had the following incidents. There was the camel incident. There was the suspicious device on an international flight into Sydney. On that flight, the baggage handlers had taken the bags off before anyone told them that there was a suspicious device on the plane. Two cars tailgated a van through the security gates at the airport without proper security checks. They got to what is known as the sterile area. Passengers from a regional unscreened flight from Wagga Wagga entered a secure area. The entire area involved in the breach had to be evacuated. Everyone had to be re-screened. As I mentioned before, a device spotted by baggage handlers resulted in ground staff calling the bomb squad themselves. A passenger with suspected bird flu was removed from the plane. It subsequently turned out that there was probably another issue, but again the procedures for how to deal with that incident were not fully understood by the staff on the ground. If we had a full-time inspector, surely he would have been dealing with these incidents and they would not keep repeating.

The member for O’Connor kept mentioning the English gentleman who came out and did the report. The Wheeler report said that the area of regional airports was a gaping hole in security. If we had a full-time inspector—we have a part-time one who is eminently qualified—he could have conducted the inquiry and we could now be acting on those recommendations. But Wheeler was brought over. I had the pleasure of meeting him. He is a highly intelligent and very articulate man who knows his subject. But we have had this report and still some of the vital issues have not been acted on. If we had a full-time inspector we could be looking at the actual issues and strategic responses could be put in. As Wheeler said in his report:

… in the current environment, consideration should be given to more comprehensive security control over regional flight passengers when arriving at major airports such as Sydney because of the risk to larger aircraft and facilities when passengers disembark at the apron.

That is from the Wheeler review. As part of the task force that I have been chairing, we had the pleasure of going to quite a few regional airports. When you go into the regional airports down at Burnie and Devonport, there is a big sign that tells you ‘Don’t bring in fruit’. But you could probably bring in or take out anything else because nobody screens you. When you leave the terminal at Burnie you are not screened, but you get screened when you come into Melbourne. After you have been on the plane that has landed on the tarmac at Melbourne, they then put your bag through. It seems quite bizarre, but that is how it operates. These are airports that have large passenger movements.

But what about ports? Is anybody looking at ports? Yes, we have had the MSI card introduced, and Labor supported that. As I said, port security authorities and committees are up and running. I want to put onto the record my thanks to the following individuals who allowed the Labor task force to visit and hear firsthand how things are operating: Captain Vic Justice, the harbourmaster and port security officer at the port of Dampier, and members of the Port Dampier security committee; Mr Warren Fish, Woodside Dampier port operations; Mr Gary Webb, chief executive officer, and Mr Colin Norman, general manager operations, of the Newcastle Port Corporation; Mr Murray Fox, general manager environment and planning, Mr Peter Shepherd, manager port security, and Mr David Taylor, manager risk and dangerous goods, Sydney Ports Corporation; and Rod Gilmour and Ron Elliott at the Sydney Airport Corporation. They all took a great deal of time. There was also Rob Mason at RailCorp in Sydney, who took a great deal of time going over many of the operational procedures at these interfaces and these coalfaces. I want to say thank you very much for doing that.

When we were in Newcastle, we were highly impressed by the port authority and what they are doing on the ground in a day-to-day environment. The port of Newcastle is very interesting because it has the largest ammonium nitrate facility there. Orica has set up there. They actually produce on the site. From that site they use coastal shipping and rail to move ammonium nitrate around Australia and overseas. When we were there I was effusive in my praise for what the port authority was doing. However, I did draw to attention the fact that the Howard government, by virtue of lack of legislation, is exposing the port—and indeed the town of Newcastle—to a risk. This ammonium nitrate is not shipped on Australian vessels under Australian flags with Australian seafarers. No. It is shipped on flag of convenience vessels with foreign seafarers. We are not 100 per cent sure who the seafarers are and we cannot tell the authority or the ownership of the ship. There is a great danger there that the Howard government, with this legislation and with a part-time inspector, is not dealing with. The government is not really dealing with the nature of dangerous goods.

Just recently we had an incident where 400 kilograms of ammonium nitrate were taken off a freight train—just outside Newcastle, funnily enough, where all the ammonium nitrate is. Four hundred kilograms were taken. The freight train was in the yard. People managed to jemmy the container open and take out one of the ammonium nitrate bags. In Newcastle we got to see these ammonium nitrate bags. They are very big. It was a very small amount of ammonium nitrate that was used in the Oklahoma bombing and that caused so much devastation there. I think 162 lives were lost. Here we have an issue of very grave concern. We need someone full time to look at it and deal with it.

Then there was the incident down in Geelong: ‘Drunk sailor almost blew up our port’. Dealing with the Pos Auckland highlights the issue brilliantly. Who has actually reviewed this incident? Who has actually gone down there and done an analysis of what went on the day that this ship was under threat from the drunken sailor—the poor individual who had spent 11 months on the ship without shore leave and who then went on a drunken rampage and threatened to blow up the ship? Who has actually investigated what went on that day and reported back what should have taken place? Who has looked at the fact that the Geelong city council was not advised of the risk? Who looked at the fact that Displan was not put into action? Even if there was not a risk, who was actually assessing the risk on the day to make that assessment? Who was in contact with the master of the ship who raised the security level from the standard, security level 1, to the highest, security level 3—which resulted in a SWAT team turning up at the port to take away the poor sailor in question? Let me read from the Geelong Advertiser:

A DRUNK Filipino sailor on board a ship docked in Geelong threatened to blow up the vessel, which was packed with more than 30,000 tonnes of volatile fertiliser, the Maritime Union said yesterday.

The sailor attacked two crewmates on Wednesday morning before locking himself in the engine room, where he opened fuel valves and shoved raids into electrical equipment.

The emergency forced the captain of the vessel to issue a high-level security alert never before used in Australia, the union said.

The ship was docked near the Shell refinery, in the heart of an industrial area where millions of litres of flammable and dangerous substances are stored.

What they did not say is that the port is right in the middle of a residential area, right nearby a whole lot of people. On examination, there is probably a whole lot of stuff that was or was not happening out there, but who was actually reviewing it? Who was making those calls? Who has assessed the situation afterwards to ensure that we have the appropriate things in place? According to the following report from the Geelong Advertiser:

After 11 months’ continuous toil aboard the bulker, POS Auckland, tied up at Lascelles Wharf, drunken Filipino seafarer Allan Yordan, 45, snapped and attacked two of his colleagues with a knife and a hammer. He then locked himself in the engine room and made some wild threats that he could never have carried out before police coaxed him out and arrested him.

This might be, as the story says, the ‘end of a sad story’, but there were a whole range of incidents that were happening then that nobody knew the real risk assessment of at the time. It is all right in hindsight to say now, ‘Well, it didn’t happen and it couldn’t happen,’ but who actually knew? At the time, nobody knew that. At the time, there was a serious risk and threat happening on that wharf, and nobody was dealing with it. Nobody was there to actually ring to ask: ‘How do we deal with this situation?’ The poor individual has now been sentenced to six months in jail, but have we had an assessment? Have we had a review? It is, again, more good luck than good management that an incident has not happened.

As I said, a 400-kilogram bag of ammonium nitrate was recently taken from a train. I had the pleasure of visiting Sydney’s Central Station and was very impressed with the operations there; they are highly technologically advanced. But, again, there is no federal government coordination in respect of rail. There is nobody overseeing what is happening on the rail system. Again, it is more good luck than good management. The individual states are looking at it and taking action. At the Sydney RailCorp they have devised a device so that they can get security workers in and out in a timely manner if they are carrying breathing apparatuses. A breathing apparatus has about 20 minutes worth of oxygen. If you are actually walking with that, it uses up a lot of that oxygen. Based on what they learnt from the London experience, they have devised a little trolley to get in and out—but it is something they have done off their own bat. Surely we should be doing this in a coordinated fashion, sharing information and having a system across the board—something that a full-time inspector of transport would be doing and running.

I have not got time to go into road security but, again, there does not seem to be any harmonised approach. A recent COAG meeting said that all state ministers would harmonise the approach to the carrying of dangerous goods, but it is not happening. Companies like Orica are taking it into their own hands, but they are meeting with quite a deal of resistance when they have to deal with various jurisdictions. There was an agreement that it would be harmonised but there is nobody overseeing the process. Whilst this bill will finally go some way to actually implementing what the transport security officer is to do, it fails to ensure that he is there doing it full time for the security of our nation. (Time expired)

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In supporting the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006, the opposition also supports amendments moved by our very thorough member for Brisbane, the shadow minister for homeland security. We obviously do not oppose the passage of this bill, since it is better than nothing, but we have some serious criticisms to make of this government’s handling of this matter, and we will insist that our amendments are put to the vote.

Since I last spoke in this House on the issue of transport security, we have acquired a new Minister for Transport and Regional Services. The honourable member for Wide Bay—the minister who gave us the wide-open gate at Mascot airport, the minister who gave us flights from Wagga Wagga to Sydney without baggage inspections, the minister who gave us ships sitting in Gladstone Harbour packed with enough ammonium nitrate to blow the whole place sky high—has moved on to new disasters. In his place we have the honourable member for Lyne, the Deputy Prime Minister. This is the minister—or, rather, one of several ministers—who gave us the ‘wheat for weapons’ scandal in which $300 million was paid by an Australian company run by National Party mate Trevor Flugge to a bogus Jordanian trucking company which handed it over to Saddam Hussein’s bloodstained regime. This is the minister who apparently never noticed one of the greatest scandals in Australian parliamentary history—despite all of the cables his office got, which, of course, he never read or we are led to believe he never read. I will be very interested in the report of the royal commission and Mr Cole.

I may be accused of cynicism, but I do not feel very confident that this minister will be more effective in protecting the security of Australian ships, ports and airports than his predecessor was. Despite the fact that there are many good people in the National Party, I think the National Party’s record in this portfolio, under successive ministers, has been a disgrace. The majority party in this government should have considered grabbing this portfolio in the last round of reshuffles if they take the area of transport security seriously. It really is time that the Prime Minister showed some leadership in this area. It is time he removed responsibility for the security of our ports and airports from the Department of Transport and Regional Services and its succession of less than brilliant National Party ministers.

This is not a transport issue; it is a national security issue, and it belongs with a full-time minister for national security, a minister for homeland security. All we have at present is the Office of Transport Security in the Department of Transport and Regional Services. No doubt the people in that office are capable and dedicated—no-one is critical of them as individuals. The failure here is a failure of leadership and policy from successive ministers for transport and regional services and ultimately from the government and the Prime Minister.

This bill is a belated response to the new security environment created by the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. Those attacks took place more than five years ago. It took this government until December 2003, more than two years later, to create the Office of the Inspector of Transport Security. It took two years just to make an in-principle decision—and not a very difficult one at that. By contrast, let me point out that President Bush, despite his many critics in many areas, announced the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security in the White House, directly answerable to him, on 20 September 2001, nine days after the attacks. This was followed by the creation of an independent Department of Homeland Security.

The decision to create this position of Inspector of Transport Security was taken in December 2003, nearly three years ago. Now we finally have a bill creating the position of Inspector of Transport Security and setting the terms on which the person will operate. I am very glad—and I think all Australians will be glad—that al-Qaeda has not managed to undertake a major operation within Australia. But I do not think that is due to any preparations that the government has made in this particular area; it may be due to the efficient work of the Australian Federal Police and our security agencies. Transport security is a matter we should have been sharper on and acted earlier on.

I have to ask: what is it about this bill that is so difficult, so complex, that it took two years to bring it before us? Does the government really think this is a matter which it can dawdle over for two years? This bill finally creates a statutory position of Inspector of Transport Security, more than five years after 9-11. Many people will be surprised to hear that. After all, Mick Palmer has been travelling around the country under the title of Inspector of Transport Security since November 2004. Most people assumed that we already had an Inspector of Transport Security.

Brendan O'Connor (Gorton, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

He had the business cards.

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

As the very capable member for Gorton said, ‘He had the business cards,’ and he is a good man. But, if the public assumed that he was on the job full time, they were wrong. In fact, Mr Palmer has only been acting in the position, on a temporary appointment, in the Department of Transport and Regional Services. He has no permanent role and no independence. And of course he has been distracted by other things, such as trying to sort out the mess in the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs under this government. He had a minor investigation—the Cornelia Rau affair—that took nine months of his time, and the disgraceful treatment of mentally disturbed people in our correctional facilities. That might have distracted him a little from the very grave matters of transport security that one would have thought the government would be fully seized of post September 11.

So now are we going to get what we really need: a full-time Inspector of Transport Security, with full statutory powers to go where he wants, investigate what he wants, report on what he wants and make recommendations independently of the supervision of the minister? No, we are not. This bill provides for only a part-time inspector and restricts his ability to conduct investigations. The inspector will only be able to inspect what the minister asks or allows him to inspect.

This is not good enough. Australia needs a full-time Inspector of Transport Security, just as it needs a full-time minister for homeland security. It needs an inspector with full statutory independence, able to act on his own initiative, with full powers of inspection and investigation. No minister is going to say, ‘Please investigate the fact that I left a security gate open at Mascot airport and report on what an incompetent dill I am.’ No minister will allow the inspector to investigate his own failures.

We have here a Potemkin village bill—a facade of national security, behind which we see the same old National Party slackness, cronyism and incompetence. I do not think the National Party really want rigorous security measures at regional airports, because they fear they will get blamed for the inevitable queues and delays that rigorous security entails—things that those of us in metropolitan areas have had to get used to.

I remind the National Party and the more serious people in the government that the whole incident of 9-11 began in Portland, Maine. The whole idea of the hijackers was to get to the secure side of airport security at Logan airport. How did they do it? Very simply, they boarded at a feeder regional airport that did not have the kind of security that exists at Logan, LAX or O’Hare airports or any of the big airports in the United States. They got into Logan and were able to hijack all of the aircraft from Boston, with the terrible results that occurred.

Yet we still have all kinds of incidents here in Australia—some of them were pointed out very capably by the former member for Braddon, Sid Sidebottom—such as the lack of ability to check things at regional airports like Burnie. The whole point of what occurred on 9-11 should be starkly clear, particularly to people in the National Party. In the end, do they want to be blamed for a similar incident happening here—it would be a disaster for Australia—because of their failure to introduce proper screening at regional airports?

I think the current Minister for Transport and Regional Services would prefer to have unexamined baggage on flights from Wagga Wagga rather than risk upsetting his constituents. But the member for Chisholm recited a litany of potentially security threatening events we have had—the camel incident, the tailgating of cars through security points, the bomb squad being called and local unionists having to deal with a matter for which they had no instructions. A few weeks ago on a Sunday night I was at Salamanca Place in Hobart walking with my daughter to dinner. Right down the end there was a big gate with barbed wire at the top with big letters that said: ‘Maritime Security—This gate must be closed at any time the port is not being used.’ Both gates were wide open. Both Laura and I walked through. She is 15. She was very annoyed with me that I did not have a camera in my phone to take a picture of this obvious violation of security.

The other deplorable aspect of the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006 that I want to examine is the fact that there is no bipartisan accountability. When the Director-General of ASIO makes a report, the Leader of the Opposition is briefed on the report on a confidential basis. Moreover, to the credit of this parliament, we now have a parliamentary intelligence committee whose members are also briefed on security matters. My friend the member for Holt, who is the soul of discretion, is the deputy chair of that committee. Many is the time that members on this side are not even aware that he is on that committee and what he is doing, he is so discreet. There is no possibility and no suspicion that the security services these days are being used for partisan purposes, as there were in the days of the Cold War. That is a good thing. We have very capable people in all of the security agencies and it is precisely because we have that trust of them in the parliament that I think they are able to act with such efficiency.

There is no such provision in this bill. The Inspector of Transport Security will report to the minister in secrecy. The opposition, like everyone else, will be kept in the dark. I accept of course that the Inspector of Transport Security will be reporting on sensitive matters about which confidentiality is necessary. But that occurs with ASIO, ASIS and the other agencies and they manage to do it. Obviously, they appear before responsible people; they report on the opposition side to the Leader of the Opposition and sometimes the shadow foreign affairs spokesman. These people, whatever political party is in government, are bound to take their duties very seriously. But a provision for the Leader of the Opposition to have access to the reports of the Inspector of Transport Security on a confidential basis seems to me to be a very reasonable safeguard against any suspicion of cover-ups. I would have thought the government would welcome that, but apparently not.

These concerns that I have mentioned are reflected in the amendment moved by the honourable member for Brisbane. The amendment notes:

... the failure of the Howard government to appoint a person as Inspector of Transport Security until one year after the announcement of the position;

... the slowness with which the Howard government dealt with the important role of Inspector of Transport Security,

... the Howard government’s dismissive use of the Inspector of Transport Security who has been engaged on an average of just one day a week in spite of repeated failures in security in the Australian transport sector ...

And finally:

... the Howard government’s failure to engage the Inspector of Transport Security in a full time capacity.

I commend the amendment to the House. I also support the bill, as does the opposition.

Brendan O'Connor (Gorton, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to support the amendment moved by the member for Brisbane because the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006 is deficient without the amendment being accepted by the government. I would also like to associate myself with the comments made by the member for Melbourne Ports, who is indeed the secretary of Labor’s national security caucus committee and who is very interested in these particular matters and spends a great deal of time considering them.

I wish I could say the same for the Minister for Transport and Regional Services or for the government, because it seems that there has been a great delay in this matter coming before us today and it is similar to a bill that was before us this morning, which dealt with matters that also went to our national security. As you might recall, Mr Deputy Speaker Causley, the Australian Citizenship Bill was important for our national security because there were provisions in it that extended the length of time a person would have to wait until becoming an Australian citizen. There was the provision of a 10-point plan arising from meetings of COAG where federal, state and territory governments considered a response to the bombings in London. That matter had been determined 12 months ago but we were debating it only today, because the bill had been delayed for that long.

Indeed the announcement to provide some authority for the inspector’s position in the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006 was announced in May last year. The actual appointment of the inspector was announced in 2003. Five years after the tragedy that occurred in New York and in other parts of that nation as a result of a terrorist attack, we are still trying to work out what particular inspectorial regime we want to oversee our national security. That is a travesty and it is a failure of this government.

I also want to comment upon the remarks of the member for Chisholm. The Labor Party did establish a task force to examine breaches of our national security and to examine where there were weaknesses. The report that that task force released about three or four months ago went to some of the problems that this government should be attending to. The member for Chisholm reiterated the concerns of that committee and referred to the particular experts that the committee spoke with as well as mentioning the remote areas that she found herself in when examining the particular concerns of security breaches in our ports.

If you listened to the debate that has occurred this evening, you would have to say that the government seems to have very little regard for this chamber, the bill, national security or indeed all three matters. Not one government member has spoken on this bill. The member for O’Connor rose during the debate and spoke for 20 minutes—he just did not speak on the bill. It does worry me when I do not see one government member wanting to explain why there is a delay, wanting to explain why there is not a full-time inspector, wanting to explain, for example, why this inspector cannot of his own motion ensure there is a particular inquiry which at the moment can only be undertaken pursuant to the powers of the minister. These are the sorts of matters that you would think government members would want to explain to the people of Australia via this chamber. But again we see a disregard for national security, a disregard for this place and ultimately a disregard for the concerns of Australians. I think that is a tragedy.

I will just refer to some of the matters that were raised by the member for Brisbane on the deficiency of the bill. I have already referred to the failure of the bill to provide the capacity for the Inspector of Transport Security to be able to hold an inquiry of his own volition. I think it is also fair to say that the government has failed to accept a number of amendments that would be more consistent with the principles enunciated in the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act. The member for Brisbane has proposed that it would be more consistent if, before a recommendation is made to the Governor-General for the appointment of a person to the position of Inspector of Transport Security, the relevant minister consulted with the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives. That principle is similar to section 6 of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 and I think it is fair to say that including the Leader of the Opposition in these matters would be a more reasonable approach to take. We ask the government to consider accepting that provision.

We would also ask that the government consider another amendment: that the relevant minister shall give a copy of the report furnished under subsection (1) to the Leader of the Opposition in the house of Representatives, but it is the duty of the Leader of the Opposition to treat as secret any part of the report that is not tabled in a house of parliament. That principle is similar to section 35 of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986. It seems that those improvements would be more consistent with the way in which these matters are dealt with and would provide a more effective set of laws.

Proposed section 64 of the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006 states:

... the Minister may table a copy of a final  report, or part of a final report, in the Parliament, if the Minister thinks that it is, on balance, in the public interest to do so.

We would argue that that should be a mandatory provision, that there should not be a discretion to table a report and that, indeed, there should be a requirement to table some report for public consumption, having regard to the sensitivities that this particular area attracts.

I think that these constructive proposals made by the opposition should be seriously considered by the government. We do not seek to impede the progress of this bill. Indeed, we have been encouraging its enactment for some time. Similar to another bill that was before us in this place this morning, we have been encouraging and cajoling the government to consider enacting this legislation immediately. It cannot be argued that there has been any effort by the opposition to stymie or in any way obstruct the progress of these two bills that have been before us today in relation to national security matters. There has, instead, been a failure to act by the government and a failure to act by the minister responsible.

It does worry and concern me—and I am sure it worries others—when I hear of some of the breaches of national security. Last Tuesday I was in Devonport with a number of people. As the member for Melbourne Ports indicated, the former member for Braddon used to raise concerns about the security breaches that are potentially able to be committed as a result of very lax security systems both at Devonport and Burnie airports. The fact is that that has not been attended to. In leaving Devonport on Tuesday, I found myself not having to have my bag screened in any way. I think this is a failure. It does worry me that the luggage is screened once I get to Melbourne airport after I have left Devonport. It is nice to think that the people at Melbourne airport will not be threatened if it is screened going into the airport, but I think it is necessary that there is greater security in our ports and our airports. There has been a failure in this.

There are some deficiencies in this bill before us. There have been some constructive proposals that have been put forward by the member for Brisbane that have not been listened to by this government, which sits on its hands and allows the national security of this country to be undermined by a failure to act.

Roger Price (Chifley, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am pleased to follow my colleague the honourable member for Gorton on the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006. I notice that the only government speaker to date has been the honourable member for O’Connor. I listened intently to his contribution, and it was a good one, but I am not sure it was actually on this bill. This is a very serious bill involving national security. The member for O’Connor accused the opposition of refusing to cooperate with the Howard government on serious matters like national security. I recall that one bill the then Attorney-General wanted very quick passage of through the House went through the House and the Senate in less than 24 hours. The opposition is always willing to cooperate with the government on important national security matters, but as an opposition we need to question what the government is doing, how it is doing it and whether or not it is effective. The honourable member for Gorton pointed out that it has taken five years after September 11 for this legislation to come to fruition. That is not a government that is operating on overdrive. It is not exactly breaking the speed limits. Yet many hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens are travelling by aeroplane, by train and, in fewer numbers, by ship and they ought to be guaranteed that, as much as possible, their travel is safe.

Debate interrupted.