Brendan O'Connor (Gorton, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

On behalf of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, I present the committee's report entitledInquiry into the Department of Defence annual report 2022-23.

Report made a parliamentary paper in accordance with standing order 39(e).

by leave—On behalf of the joint standing committee, and as the chair of the Defence Subcommittee, I present the committee 's report entitled Inquiry into the Department of Defence annual report 2022-23. This inquiry examined Australia's assistance to Ukraine, the Defence health system, Defence's capability assurance mechanism, artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons and armaments manufacture, procurement and inventory. Australia is facing an increasingly complex and rapidly evolving strategic environment with rising tensions and reduced warning time for conflict. Responding to these challenges, Australian statecraft and diplomacy is investing in Indo-Pacific partnerships while deepening engagement across South-East Asia and the Pacific and with our allies around the world.

A cornerstone of our approach remains our unwavering support for Ukraine, a commitment endorsed by our Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in fact, this government and, importantly, the federal opposition. This bipartisan support is critical not only to Ukraine's immediate needs but also to the need for a stable rules based international order. As the conflict in Ukraine endures, it is clear that Australia's support must be carefully coordinated and sustained for the long term. Our Department of Defence and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade are already doing vital work managing and coordinating this assistance. However, there is currently no central point of contact for communication and clarity of responsibilities for Ukraine, our partners and particularly the Australian public. To address this shortcoming, the subcommittee has recommended in this report the creation of a whole-of-government mechanism—a dedicated one-stop shop, if you like—to streamline Australia's support efforts. This will ensure that we are more efficient and effective in our assistance in the future.

We must also be strategic about the equipment we provide to Ukraine. The subcommittee believes it is crucial that a Ukraine lens be applied to the decision-making process around the retirement of equipment from military service. Identifying items of equipment well in advance of their retirement will allow more effective planning while providing more appropriate time to ensure Australia's ongoing compliance with international agreements and treaties.

Furthermore, transparency is essential. Public discussions about the potential gifting of military hardware like the Hawkei vehicles and Taipan helicopters have lacked some clarity. The subcommittee recommends the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade publish a summary of their decision-making processes, enabling the public to understand the rationale behind these decisions and increasing trust in our actions.

In addition to military support, Australia's training contributions to Ukraine through Operation KUDU have proven highly successful. We are committed to expanding this operation, continuing our support for the training of both Ukrainian forces and civilians to enhance their resilience.

On the diplomatic front, the subcommittee believes there is a strong case for reopening Australia's embassy in Kyiv. Given the long-term nature of the conflict, a physical diplomatic presence would not only strengthen our bilateral ties with Ukraine but also align us with 70 other nations that have already reopened their embassies. Alongside this, the subcommittee has recommended the posting of an Australian military attache in Kyiv to provide crucial support for logistics, for equipment and for training efforts on the ground.

Turning to domestic matters, we must also address the significant workload facing Defence and its health services contractor in providing healthcare services to over 60,000 personnel across various Defence units. The subcommittee heard evidence that while efforts are being made to address challenges in the healthcare system, staffing shortages and delays in medical appointments remain ongoing concerns. We urge both Defence and its contractor to investigate these issues urgently and take the necessary steps to ensure timely service delivery that meets the needs of our personnel.

The subcommittee is also concerned about Defence's oversight of its health services contract, particularly the workforce fill rates and performance targets. Despite ongoing efforts, these issues persist. The subcommittee believes continued attention and remediation are essential. Additionally, the shortfall in recruitment health assessments is affecting Defence's ability to meet its recruitment targets. We therefore call on Defence to work closely with its contractors to address these shortfalls.

Looking at the broader picture, the subcommittee reviewed Defence's capability assurance systems and is confident that they are well documented and effective. However, the subcommittee recognises that the cyber and space worthiness systems are still in development, and the subcommittee has recommended that these areas receive urgent attention. The shortage of skilled testing and evaluation personnel was identified as a key vulnerability. This gap could hinder the development of critical defence capabilities, and we have urged Defence and the defence industry to prioritise investment in training and retaining these highly skilled personnel.

The 2023 Defence Strategic Review and the 2024 National Defence Strategy provide a clear roadmap for addressing these challenges. And again, the subcommittee is confident that with a focus on minimum viable capabilities, timely delivery and allocated funding, Defence will be able to meet its objectives and build the integrated force of 2031.

Australia finds itself in a rapidly changing strategic environment, facing an elevated risk of state-on-state conflict. To meet these challenges head on, the Australian government, in collaboration with our AUKUS partners, is prioritising the development and acquisition of asymmetric capabilities, including autonomous weapons systems. These technologies will empower the Australian Defence Force to project influence effectively across a full spectrum of responses, ensuring our capacity for impactful and proportionate action in any scenario.

As we look to integrate these advanced capabilities, it is essential that we assess the full range of artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons systems to ensure they meet the unique requirements of our defence strategy. However, we must also remain committed to the principle that all new capabilities be fully compliant with international humanitarian law.

The subcommittee acknowledges that rapid advancements in AI and computing will continue to shape the future of weapon systems. To guarantee the reliability and functionality of these systems, Defence must establish robust test and evaluation frameworks, ensuring systems are thoroughly validated before deployment.

Additionally, we must address challenges such as automation bias and ensure our personnel are trained to understand the limitations of these new technologies.

The subcommittee heard evidence on the application of international humanitarian law, particularly article 36 of the additional protocol to the Geneva conventions, in regulating the use of AI and autonomous systems in modern warfare. The subcommittee is confident that existing legal frameworks remain sufficient to govern these advancements and that state responsibility will continue to apply in situations where individual accountability is unclear.

Australia remains committed to contributing to international discussions on AI policy, and we must stay informed of evolving international law and policy developments. As such, the subcommittee strongly urges Defence to continue adhering to the requirements of article 36 of the Geneva conventions and other relevant international obligations as we develop, acquire and deploy new defence technologies. Australia's future defence capabilities will be shaped by innovation. But we must always ensure they align with our legal and ethical obligations. This balance will safeguard our national security while upholding our commitment to international law.

Finally, as we strengthen Australia's sovereign defence capabilities we must address our reliance on international supply chains, particularly around munitions. The subcommittee has recommended sourcing more components domestically to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities in times of conflict or other disruptions. Additionally, a transparent reporting framework for guided weapons explosive ordnance stockholdings has been recommended, which will allow progress to be tracked and Australia's self-reliance in munitions production to be enhanced.

While challenges remain, the subcommittee is confident that Defence's ongoing efforts to improve its systems and capabilities will position Australia's defence for long-term success. By strengthening domestic industries, improving transparency and staying agile in response to emerging threats, we can ensure that Australia's defence remains robust and resilient, securing our national security both now and into the future.

In conclusion, I thank, firstly, the deputy chair, Andrew Wallace MP, and other members of the subcommittee for their final contributions to this inquiry. I also extend my thanks to Julian Hill for his critical contributions to the inquiry as the former chair of the subcommittee. I also thank the secretariat, Wing Commander Julian Baesjou and committee secretary Kate Portus for their advice and their support to the subcommittee in the past year, and all the witnesses and contributors to this inquiry—including the significant support from Defence in briefing the subcommittee and supporting its site visits in Queensland and Victoria.

I commend the report to the House, and I move:

That the House take note of the report.

Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

by leave—The Australian parliament has long enjoyed a generally bipartisan approach when it comes to the operation of its intelligence and security as well as defence mechanisms. I thank the new chair for his services; being a former defence minister of some repute, coming back into this scene is probably like pulling on an old glove! I also thank the member for Bruce, who I have enjoyed a very good working relationship with over the last eight years. I wish him well in his new job, but not too well!

I've previously served as the chair of this subcommittee, and I now serve as the deputy chair. I'm also the deputy chair of the PJCIS. From both vantage points I'm able to see how important it is when the two parties of government are able to work together with collegiality and consideration.

After all, members and senators, no matter their political party or their professional background, should share the same primary objective, and that, of course, is to protect Australians and secure their future.

As the deputy chair, I regularly meet with defence contractors, suppliers, policy experts and veterans. Over the last two years, those meetings have exposed the worrying trend and a disturbing truth that Australia is in a more precarious position than ever. We know that Australia is facing the most geopolitically unstable period since the end of World War II. China, Russia, North Korea, Iran and an axis of resistance and terror are set on sowing discord and dismantling democracies, including our own.

But what makes Australia's position so precarious isn't the strong alliance mobilised beyond our borders. It's the weak leadership we are seeing within the corridors of the federal government. Whether you look at personnel, procurement, policy or partnerships, you'll find the Albanese government lacking in the courage and conviction necessary to lead Australia forward. This has been a consistent trend when it comes to space and defence, where we are light-years behind our competitors and counterparts, thanks to this government's mismanagement in that regard. As Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Hamilton of Space Operations Branch at Defence Space Command said:

Space is fundamental to our warfighting ability, and losing access to space would significantly degrade it. We often take our access to space for granted; unfortunately it's not guaranteed.

In defence circles, we often talk about holding the high ground as being imperative to military operations, and space is the ultimate high ground. The reality is that, under this government, Australia's space and defence capabilities have been denuded. Labor removed space manufacturing from the national manufacturing agenda. In an affront to our US allies, Labor slashed funding for the $1 billion National Space Mission for Earth Observation.

What about defence project JP9102? This would have delivered Australia's first sovereign-controlled satellite communication system, shoring up our space defence surveillance and observation capabilities for a generation. For those of you who might be listening to this around Australia, this was our opportunity to build and launch Australia's first sovereign owned and controlled satellite—our first. Madame Deputy Speaker Chesters, do you know how many satellites the United States has? It has 1,800. Do you know how many the People's Republic of China has? It has 1,200. Do you know how many Australia has? None. We had an opportunity to build and launch our first sovereign satellite, and just a few weeks ago this government announced the cutting of that project JP9102. This government broke its first funding commitment through the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator, putting innovators on notice that Labor can't be trusted.

Yesterday I had the opportunity to sit in on the AIDN symposium, and I listened with some attentiveness to the CEO, Brent Clark, talking about how this government is on a go-slow with the appointment of contracts for the defence industry. He gave the salient warning to this government that, unless and until it pulled its finger out and started awarding contracts to Australian defence industry contractors, next year, in 2025, when AIDN does its policy symposium, the theatrette of the Australian Parliament House would be full of Australian Defence Force officers, but there would be nobody from Australian defence manufacturing. That is utterly unacceptable.

Australian defence industry contractors are bleeding. They are dying a death by a thousand cuts.

What this government doesn't seem to understand is that, unless there is cash flow, small to medium-sized and even large contractors will not be here this time next year. Many of them won't be here at the beginning of next year. They are dying a death of a thousand cuts. I would plead with the Acting Prime Minister, the defence minister of this country, to ensure that money is pushed out the door. On the one hand, the defence minister talks about how we are in a perilous situation—the worst geopolitically strategic environment since the end of World War II—and yet we are not putting money out the door to feed Australian defence industry contractors. It just beggars belief.

The chair, very appropriately, talked about munitions productions. Let's talk about NIOA. Here's an Australian success story in the heart of regional Queensland. They've supplied our defence personnel and Australian industry with munitions for over 50 years. The coalition backed them as part of our ambition to establish a world-class defence industry. But, instead of getting behind Australian defence manufacturers and existing manufacturing infrastructure, this government chose to pop the champagne on a deal worth over a billion dollars in taxpayers' money to subsidise a foreign company—namely, Thales. Thales is a French company, partially owned by the French government, now competing with an Australian family owned business—no value for money, no transparency, no accountability.

Add to that the delay in the defence industry plan. What about the mismanagement of the Henderson precinct project? And, of course, this government dropped the ball and delayed material support for the people of Ukraine. They are presiding over a skilled workforce crisis, meaning that the skills we need to deliver AUKUS in cyber, construction and practical trades will be in short supply just as we need them most.

After pledging to boost our defence workforce, the government's consistent pattern of indecision and divisive politics has seen a decrease of 4,747 ADF personnel. To respond to the shortage of defence personnel, they're just lowering the target instead of upping their efforts. Shrinking the target doesn't excuse the Albanese government for their failures. The reality is that Australia's defence is at breaking point, putting lives and livelihoods on the line, and this Prime Minister just doesn't care. Small and medium enterprises dotted across regional Australia are fighting to stay afloat. Groundbreaking Australian researchers and world-class manufacturers are clinging on to the hope that our part-time defence minister doesn't wake up tomorrow and cancel their contracts.

Before I finish, I do want to thank all of those who provided submissions to the committee and I want to thank once again the new chair, the outgoing chair, the secretariat and our outgoing defence adviser, Julian Baesjou, who's done a sterling job over the last 12 months.